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Preface 
Members of the criminal law community regularly make assertions about «the 
community's sense of justice" on a particular issue and claim that, therefore, to be 
true to this sense of justice, a particular formulation or interpretation of a crimi­
nal code provision is required. Such claims typically express the speaker's own in­
tuitions, which the speaker believes are shared by other people of common sense. 
Such thoughtful speculation commonly is the basis upon which formulations of 
criminal law are proposed, adopted, and interpreted. 
A social scientist may cringe at hearing this. The community's intuitions on 
blame and punishment are not matters that one need speculate about. Modern 
behavioral science is well equipped to determine with some reliability the rules 
that laypersons use in assessing blame and deserved punishment. Basing criminal 
law formulation on speculation rather than fact suggests that the criminal law 
community is out of touch with modern science in an important and damaging 
way. 
In this book we report eighteen original studies on a wide range of issues that 
are central to criminal law formulation, including issues relating to the justified 
use of force, insanity, causation, complicity, risk-creation, omission liability, cul­
pability requirements, duress, entrapment, multiple offenses, and criminalization 
matters such as felony murder and sexual offenses. T he questions selected for in­
vestigation are those for which the community's intuition would be of impor­
tance to the legal decision-makers. In addition to reporting the community's 
views, we compare those views to the rules instantiated in current criminal codes. 
Many important differences between code and community are found, and we dis­
cuss the implications of those differences. 
Social scientists may look at these studies and wonder: What is it that makes 
these authors think the world breathlessly awaits yet another series of studies on 
"the law and social science"? There already exist a number of studies that trace re­
lationships between various legal concerns and the findings of social and psycho­
logical science. How do the studies reported in this book differ from other stud­
ies? What sorts of new contributions do they make? 
First, our studies differ from others in the specific questions we investigate. As 
noted, we test the views of ordinary people on the issues that govern the formula­
tion of criminal codes. An example may make this clearer. Criminal codes are 
quite strict about what actions can be committed in self-defense. Roughly, the de-
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fender can use only force sufficient to defend against the attack and can use 
deadly force only if serious harm is threatened and safe retreat from the attacker is 
not possible. One of our studies demonstrates that ordinary people hold consid­
erably looser standards for acceptable force in self-defense. We then say what we 
can about the possible meanings of this code-community difference and, some­
what gingerly, discuss possible implications for code modification. 
Our second claim to rareness, if not uniqueness, lies in this: the accuracy of our 
understandings of the legal codes. Frequently, when social scientists set out to do 
research relevant to legal concerns, they do so without a careful examination of 
the structure of the legal system that generates the issues to be examined. This has 
meant, much more than has been generally realized, that the studies do not make 
contact with the concerns of the legal system or make contact in a way that flaws 
the extrapolations that the social scientists wish to make. Thus, their intended au­
dience-legal professionals-is not reached or is not moved by their arguments. 
For example, an empirical study investigating lay intuitions on the blamewor­
thiness of "recklessness" and "negligence" may give interesting results. Yet, if the 
definitions of "recklessness" and «negligence" used in the study are different from 
those used in criminal codes-where the t�o terms typically are given detailed 
definitions-the results will be of little or no use to criminal law decision-makers. 
Those familiar with social science research on insanity will be able to supply 
many examples of a similar sort; studies in which the questions that were raised 
with the study respondents were not in the form required to give answers to ques­
tions of interest to the legal decision-makers and scholars. 
All too often, social scientists have aimed to collide with legal concerns-but 
missed their target. No doubt we make mistakes in this book, but this is not one 
of them. One of us has extensively studied criminal codes and has been involved 
in code-drafting efforts. Throughout the book, we discuss what weight should be 
given to a code-community discrepancy. That turns out to be a complex question. 
However, when our research demonstrates a discrepancy between code and com­
munity, we have confidence that it is a real one, rather than one that can be ex­
plained away by some misunderstanding of the code. 
Aside from our deep conviction that any human being with pretensions to live 
the "life of the mind" would benefit from a copy of this book-or perhaps two 
copies-we can specify sets of readers to whom we address the book. First, and 
most obvious, our audience includes those who are involved in the processes of 
code drafting and interpretation-those legislators, committee staffers, and 
think-tank and university scholars who participate in creating criminal codes as 
well as those judges who must interpret code provisions and explain them to ju­
rors. Second, our audience includes those research scholars and legal philoso­
phers who do empirical and theoretical work on criminal justice issues or, more 
broadly, who work on issues of society and morality. By extension then, we also 
think that social scientists who study various issues of contact between law and 
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social science might find at least some of our findings and perhaps our research 
methods to be of interest. Instructors of seminars or courses on law and social sci­
ence might want to explore at least some of the issues we raise and examine our 
research methods. 
Many people have helped us carry out the research we report in this book, and 
we gratefully acknowledge their assistance. The studies were conceived, designed, 
and executed during the fall of 1 990 and the spring of 199 1  in seminars at Rutgers 
University School of Law, where Paul Robinson then taught. Our greatest debt is 
to the students in those seminars who enthusiastically did more than any seminar 
student could be expected to do: Cynthia Adler, Blake Bolinger, Amy Bosacco, 
Alison Brown, Kara Bruge-Holland, Michelle Carter, Ron Fisher, Gary Gallant, 
Geoff Garner, Tim Hartigan, William Horan, Kimm Lacken, Alfred Low-Beer, 
James Passantino, Eric Riso, Linda Thomas, Liz Varki, Ann Waybourn, and John 
Young. They learned more about research methodology than they wanted to 
learn, out of a conviction that criminal law ought to be based on more than spec­
ulation. 
Anne Marie Carosella, while a graduate student at Princeton, was the teaching 
assistant for the Rutgers seminars and labored long and gallantly for experimental 
designs that would test the hypotheses set forth herein and provide analytically 
tractable data. Dan Bailis did much in analyzing the data after Ms. Carosella's 
graduation. The law-psychology research group at Princeton University, includ­
ing at various times Dan Bailis, Marisa Reddy, Kathryn Oleson, Beth Bennett, 
Robert Harlow, and Holly Sukel, helped interpret the data patterns. Emily Reber 
helped prepare the data tables and figures that are presented throughout the text. 
Deborah Prentice tactfully coped with a number of data-analytic questions, some 
of a regrettably elementary sort, and accurately identified various incoherences in 
manuscript drafts. Natasha Goldstein, a law student at Northwestern University, 
did valiant work of every sort on the final manuscript. The willingness of Profes­
sors Stephen Morse, Tom Tyler, and Nelson Polsby to provide wise advice on as­
pects of the project also is gratefully acknowledged. 
Rutgers University School of Law financed the data-collection and related ac­
tivities. Deans Roger Dennis at Rutgers and Robert Bennett at Northwestern pro­
vided Paul Robinson with financial and moral support for the many years of this 
work. The National Science Foundation, the Center for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of 
California at Berkeley, and Princeton University provided research support to 
John Darley during the period. 
We have benefited from the discussions we have held with those we acknowl­
edge and others, but the views that we express, of course, are our own. 
Paul H. Robinson 
John M. Darley 
1 
Community Standards and the 
Criminal Law 
A common form of argument and analysis when discussing legal liability is to 
claim that "justice" requires one result or another. The "justice" argument is used 
most often and with greatest conviction when analyzing criminal liability, because 
criminal law, more than any other, is thought to be premised on principles of 
blameworthiness and desert. Various conceptions of justice have been proposed 
by moral philosophers, but when laypersons claim that justice requires a particu­
lar criminal liability or punishment in a case, rarely are they referring to concep­
tualizations derived from moral philosophy. Instead, they see the proper result as 
one that is in accord with their intuitive notions. Persons can articulate reasons 
for their intuitive judgments, of course, and importantly they often believe that 
those reasons are not idiosyncratic to themselves but are held by a broad commu­
nity of moral persons. Thus, the argument that "justice would be served if ... " is 
a claim not only of the speaker's personal view but of an intuitive but grounded 
notion of justice that the speaker believes is shared by the community of moral 
individuals. 
It is these notions of just results held by ordinary people that we set out to in­
vestigate. Since we collected the moral intuitions of more than thirty people about 
each set of cases, we were also able to determine the degree to which these intu­
itions actually were shared among individuals, thus testing the belief of many in­
dividuals that their moral intuitions reflect a community consensus. Thus, one 
focus of our investigation has been on the following questions: What are the 
moral intuitions of individuals about the sorts of blameworthiness and just-de­
serts issues that arise in criminal cases? To what extent are these intuitions shared 
( that is, do shared standards of justice exist)? In this book, we report the results of 
several of our investigations into these and related questions. By empirical proce­
dures, we determine at least the beginnings of the outlines of "community stan­
dards"-those views that are held by ordinary members of our communities 
about criminal liability and punishment. 
Rather than addressing this "moral intuitions" question across the spectrum of 
possible issues-all criminal activities-we allowed the specific cases we exam­
ined to be dictated by our second focus. Professor Robinson is knowledgeable 
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about criminal law as it is represented in the legal codes that govern the criminal 
justice system's determinations of trial outcomes and assignments of criminal lia­
bility. Those individuals versed in criminal law often are struck by the thought 
that the results dictated by criminal codes are at variance with our notions of the 
moral intuitions of individuals in our culture. Are these "secondhand intuitions;' 
these intuitions of legal scholars about code-community discrepancies, correct? 
This became the second focus of our investigation. We strategically aimed our in­
vestigations of community standards at areas in which we suspected that such dis­
crepancies existed or in which a discrepancy might be of particular interest. Are 
there really times when community standards are importantly different from the 
liability and punishment provided by legal codes? 
Our studies follow a set form: We contrast the empirical judgments made by 
community members with those liability judgments determined by current ver­
sions of the legal code-particularly, those assigned by the Model Penal Code (the 
Code) but also those assigned by other codes or proposed codes that have some 
claim on the attention oflegal scholars and code drafters. Our purpose is to cause 
a particular sort of controversy. We seek to bring the legal community to consider 
the consequences of discovered discrepancies between the moral intuitions of or­
dinary people and legal codes. Additionally, we will discuss what rides on the an­
swers to the previous questions and what such discrepancies might imply for the 
criminal justice system. 
In our investigations we discover that often the legal codes and the community 
standards reflect similar rules in assigning liability to a case of wrongdoing; but 
also often they do not. For each instance of a discovered similarity or discrepancy, 
we discuss the possible implications of the similarity or the difference. To signal 
our conclusions, we will argue that a discrepancy between code and community is 
by no means always an argument for changing the legal code, but it is an argu­
ment for careful examination of the possible roots of the discrepancy. At certain 
times, one would choose to "go with the code;' to retain the code's formulation of 
an offense and the range of punishment for the offense that the code prescribes. 
At other times, the weight of the argument lies with the community standards; 
the code drafters should consider reformulating the legal codes to come into har­
mony with the moral judgments that our subjects provide. In still other cases, we 
see multiple possible directions that a code-community standard could take and 
are genuinely puzzled about what to recommend. 
In summary, this book investigates the existence, nature, and implications of 
community views on the rules and principles of criminal liability and punish­
ment by contrasting those views to the rules and principles embedded in legal 
codes. By doing so, we frankly hope to generate controversy-to generate debate 
on criminal codes. 
But haven't the social sciences charted the moral intuitions of ordinary individ­
uals? One might expect that a vast research literature on this subject already ex-
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ists. Certainly we expected this. We expected our contribution to be an examina­
tion of current legal code principles in the light of existing social science research. 
But for reasons that we do not fully understand, there has been little previous 
work in this area. Social scientists have not mapped the contours of the moral in­
tuitions of our culture; psychologists-who one would expect to be particularly 
keen on carrying out this mapping-have not done so. ( For a more detailed dis­
cussion of why this might be so, see Darley and Schultz, 1990.)  There are only a 
scattered set of studies that examine the issue of code-community discrepancies, 
which we will cite as they become relevant to the particular elements of the code 
that we are examining. 
This is not to say that there are not a good many studies about ordinary peo­
ple's perceptions of various "law-psychology" issues. Much empirical work has 
been done on criminal justice issues, especially those that relate to the causes of 
crime and its effective treatment or control (Fox, 1 985) .  Public attitudes toward 
crime and fear of it have been examined (Eitzen and Timmer, 1985, pp. 86-1 1 1 ) ,  
as well as attitudes toward particular aspects of the criminal justice system, such 
as the police and the death penalty. (See, e.g., Cowan, Thompson, and Ellsworth, 
1 984. ) One aspect of this work that may be useful to substantive criminal law re­
form is the investigation of people's assessment of the relative seriousness of dif­
ferent offenses (Wolfgang and Weiner, 1 982). Many procedural aspects of the sys­
tem also have been investigated. Empirical research has proved useful in learning 
about the effect of the physical appearance of litigants (Dane and Wrightsman, 
1 982; Baumeister and Darley, 1982; and Kulka and Kessler, 1978), the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony (Wells and Loftus, 1984), the group decision-making pro­
cesses of juries (Kassin and Wrightsman, 1988), strategies for biasing jurors dur­
ing voir dire (Blunk and Sales, 1 977),  the effect of jury instructions (Kassin and 
Wrightsman, 1 979) ,  and sentencing disparity among judges (Hogarth, 1971 ) .  
There also is a vast literature on the relationships between-or more accurately 
the contradictions between-legal and psychiatric definitions of mental illness. 
Little has been done, however, in assessing lay views on what some might argue is 
the one subject on which the community view is the final authority-the assess­
ment of deserved liability and punishment.1 
In light of the social science interest in a wide range of criminal justice issues, 
the absence of liability and punishment studies puzzles us. Especially in a system 
such as ours-which ultimately relies upon layperson juries for the final liability 
judgment2 and often empowers them to grade the seriousness of the violation­
one would expect that public conceptions of liability and punishment would be 
matters of keen interest. As a practical matter, given the evidence of the limited ef­
fect of jury instructions in the jury decision-making process ( Elwork, Sales, and 
Alfini, 1 982) ,  one might guess that litigants on both sides would want empirical 
evidence of the intuitive liability rules that juries are likely to follow. Yet, for what­
ever reason, examination of community views on the substantive rules for assign-
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ing criminal liability and punishment does not appear to be high on the social 
science agenda. A primary theme of this book is to argue that it should be. 
Social scientists have little reason to undertake this work, however, unless the 
criminal law community is persuaded that studies of community views are im­
portant to the development of criminal law and policy. If criminal law drafters see 
such information as important to their work, social psychologists will be moti ­
vated to undertake such studies, and their legal counterparts will b e  encouraged 
to participate. Toward this end, much of the argument in this work is directed at 
lawyers, judges, legal scholars, and legislators. We attempt to show that commu­
nity standards are of relevance to the legal community and also what that rele­
vance consists of in specific cases. 
AN OVERVIEW 
An overview of the book will be helpful to the reader. In our previous discussion 
we seemed to imply that the liability and punishment principles instantiated in 
legal codes ought to match, in large measure, those that would be employed to 
judge cases according to community standards. It may seem natural to some that 
the legal doctrine ought to track the community's views, especially in a democ­
racy and in a system that relies upon the lay jury. But, like any other proposed 
principle for the distribution of criminal liability, this principle requires explicit 
justification. Why, exactly, should the community's views of liability and punish­
ment be taken into account? The next section of this chapter examines that ques­
tion. It concludes that community views are an essential consideration and ought 
to be an influential factor in the policy-making and code-drafting process but 
that such views ought not to be taken as determinative. 
Even in those circumstances in which community views have a legitimate role 
to play, there may be hesitation in looking to them because of the existing difficul­
ties and uncertainties of such empirical research. A brief description of the re­
search methodology of the pilot projects presented in this book appears at the end 
of this chapter. Appendix A contains a more detailed description of  methodology, 
as well as a discussion of the significant limitations inherent in all research of this 
kind. The pilot projects described hereinafter do not always provide complete, 
comprehensive, or definitive conclusions, but we maintain that research using so­
cial science methods similar to the ones we have used for our pilot projects can 
provide reliable data for criminal law code-drafters and policy-makers. 
In Chapters 2 through 6, we present a number of studies that examine the com­
munity's views on a variety of criminal liability and punishment issues. We also 
examine whether, if such shared community views exist, they match the rules and 
principles embodied in the legal codes that currently dictate criminal liability and 
punishment. The results of our studies suggest that shared notions of appropriate 
liability and punishment do exist on some issues. The comparisons to current law 
show that the subjects' views frequently do support the codes' positions, some-
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times even for provisions that commentators have assumed have little public sup­
port. Often, however, the subjects' views are markedly different from those of the 
codes. In  each instance, we discuss the implications of the results for the legal 
codes and for future research. 
Our discussion of the studies is divided into three sets of chapters to address 
separately each of the three major functions of criminal law doctrine. First, the 
doctrine must define the conduct that is prohibited (or required) by the criminal 
law. Such "rules of conduct;' as they have been called, provide ex-ante direction 
to the members of the community as to the conduct that must be avoided (or that 
must be performed) upon pain of criminal sanction. This may be termed the rule 
articulation function of the legal doctrine. When a violation of the rules of con­
duct occurs, the criminal law must take on another role. It  must decide whether 
the violation is sufficiently blameworthy to merit criminal liability. This second 
function, the liability assignment function, sets the minimum conditions for liabil­
ity. It is the initial step of the adjudication process. Here the law assesses ex post 
whether a person who violates a rule of conduct is blameworthy for the violation 
and therefore ought to be held criminally liable for it. Finally, in those instances in 
which liability is to be imposed, the criminal law must assess the seriousness of 
the violation and blameworthiness of the offender in order to determine the gen­
eral amount of punishment that is appropriate. While the liability function re­
quires a simple yes or no decision as to whether the minimum conditions for lia­
bility are satisfied, this third function, the grading function, requires judgments of 
degree. For a general discussion of these three functions of criminal law doctrine, 
see Robinson ( 1 990) and Robinson ( 1994) .  
WHY COMMUNITY V IEWS SHOULD MATTER 
Next we take up the question we previously raised. What relevance should the 
community's views of liability have for formulations of criminal codes? The ques­
tion of relevance is central to the value of the studies that we propose, so we need 
to give a general defense of the proposition here. 
The claim that a community's shared notions of condemnation and punish­
ment should guide the formulation of criminal law may be criticized for several 
reasons. For example, desert theorists argue that criminal law doctrine should be 
formulated to punish blameworthy offenders; the distribution of just punish­
ments ought to be the ultimate goal of criminal law. A distribution of punishment 
according to community views would be immoral, they might argue, because the 
members of the community may well express views about proper punishment 
that they would find unfair if they themselves were to be judged by such views or 
that are in some other way unfair when examined from some rational moral per­
spective. 
Utilitarians generate punishment rules from a quite different perspective. Utili­
tarians argue that doctrine should be formulated in a way that efficiently mini-
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mizes future criminal v iolations; efficient crime prevention ought to be the goal. 
A distribution according to community v iews, they might argue, would be detri­
mental to society because it would not maximize the efficient crime-prevention 
potential of criminal liability and punishment. T hat is, avoidable offenses (under 
efficient minimization practices) would be committed if such a distribution were 
adopted. To summarize and conjoin the arguments of the desert and utilitarian 
groups, it would be both immoral (from a deserts-theory perspective) and detri­
mental to society (from a utilitarian perspective) to distribute liability and pun­
ishment according to such community notions. 
We would suggest that, if desert is the governing distributive principle, the 
community's v iew is relevant, because it is one source of determining what counts 
as the just desert. Admittedly, a moral philosopher might be reluctant to defer to 
the community for an assessment of what is morally deserved. Desert is not a 
matter of intuition, the philosopher might argue, but is to be logically derived 
from principles of fairness and good. At the very least though, the community's 
v iews may play a role in testing the derived rules. That is, if a rule derived by de­
sert theorists is judged overwhelmingly by the community to be unjust, such dis­
agreement may cast some doubt upon the accuracy of the rule in assessing a per­
son's moral blameworthiness, at least suggesting that closer scrutiny of the 
reasoning behind the rule is required. 
Under a utilitarian rationale for distributing liability, the community's views 
are of somewhat more direct importance. First, moral condemnation is an inex­
pensive yet powerful form of deterrent threat. It demands none of the costs that 
attend imprisonment or even supervised probation; yet, for many persons, it is a 
sanction to be very much avoided. T he more importance a person places upon 
social acceptance, the more terrible (ergo efficient) this threatened sanction be­
comes. This marvelously cost-efficient sanction is available, however, only if the 
system retains its moral credibility. Each time the system is seen to convict in 
cases in which no community condemnation is appropriate, the system weakens 
the underlying force of the moral sanction. 
Furthermore, recent empirical evidence suggests that criminal law's most effec­
tive mechanism of compliance is not the deterrent threat of sanction; it is its ca­
pacity to authoritatively describe the moral and proper rules of conduct. People 
will follow those rules not because they fear punishment for violating them but 
because they see themselves as good and law-abiding people who are inclined to 
obey the law because it is the right thing to do. Most important, the compliance 
power of criminal law is directly proportional to its moral credibility (see, e.g., Ty­
ler, 1 990). If the criminal law is seen as unjust in one instance, its moral credibility 
and its concomitant compliance power are, accordingly, incrementally reduced. 
In addition to these effects, the perceived "justice" of the system is crucial to 
gaining the cooperation and acquiescence of those persons involved in.the process 
( offenders, potential offenders, witnesses, j urors, and so on) .  Greatest coopera-
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tion will be elicited when the criminal law's liability rules correspond with the 
community's views of justice. Conflict between the two undercuts the moral cred­
ibility of the system and thereby engenders resistance and subversion ( see, e.g., 
Kassin and Wrightsman, 1988, pp. 158-159; Scheflin and Van Dyke, 1980; and 
Kadish and Kadish, 1973 ) .  
The legal system that the community perceives as unjustly criminalizing cer­
tain conduct is one that is likely to cause the society governed by those laws to lose 
faith in the system-not only in the specific laws that lead to the unjust result, but 
in the entire code and criminal justice system enforcing that code.3 The reverse is 
also true. A rule that is strongly and persistently supported by the community as 
accurately reflecting moral blameworthiness but that is not followed by the crimi­
nal justice system raises similar destructive possibilities. The community is likely 
to engage in extralegal vigilante actions, with all of the dangers that that suggests.4 
Empirical research suggests that a tension or contradiction between the legal 
code and a community standard does have some of the consequences we suggest. 
Studies show that the degree to which people report that they have obeyed a law 
in the past and plan to obey it in the future correlates with the degree to which 
they judge that law to be morally valid (Grasmick and Green, 1980; Jacob, 1980; 
Meier and Johnson, 1977; Silberman, 1976; and Tittle, 1980) . Tyler's more recent 
Chicago panel study ( 1990) draws similar conclusions. The degree to which his 
subjects saw the legal authorities as having legitimate power predicted their will­
ingness to obey various laws promulgated by those authorities. 
Note that it is not the moral accuracy of the criminal law-as moral philoso­
phers would define it-that is important for the utilitarian value of doing justice. 
Rather, it is the community's perception of the law's moral correctness that assists 
the law's effectiveness in gaining compliance. That is, the community's view of 
justice provides the standard by which the system's perceived moral credibility is 
judged. For these reasons then, an understanding of the community's notions of 
justke is needed for informed analysis of legal systems. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
We will now briefly overview the procedures we used for examining the commu­
nity's views on appropriate liability and punishments for various conduct. We 
contacted people to participate in our studies and had them give us their views on 
the appropriate liability to assign to perpetrators of various criminal episodes that 
we described to them. Each individual read about a particular crime case-a "sce­
nario'' in our vocabulary-and decided whether to assign criminal liability and, if 
so, the general range of appropriate punishment. Individuals, "subjects" or "re­
spondents" as we will call them, then read another crime scenario, which differed 
in certain critical ways from the first scenario, and made similar determinations 
as to liability and punishment. The text of the scenarios is reproduced in Appen­
dix B. 
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In recruiting our subjects, we sought to involve persons from many walks of 
life. We did not test those familiar samples of convenience, such as college sopho­
mores; and we also did not test persons involved in the criminal justice system, 
such as judges, law students, or police officers, figuring that those people would 
have opinions that were to some extent formed by their contact with the system. 
Instead we tried to recruit "ordinary citizens." In Appendix A, we report on the 
demographic distributions of our subjects; we found them sufficiently broad that 
we feel we have the beginnings of a set of demonstrations of the judgment pat­
terns of typical citizens of the United States on liability and punishment issues. 
In all the studies we conducted, we presented subjects with a scale on which to 
indicate their assignments of liability for the persons in the scenarios. As shown 
here, that scale consisted of a choice of N (no criminal liability); 0 ( criminal liabil­
ity but no punishment); or 1 through ll on a scale that corresponded to prison 
sentences of from one day (1) to the death penalty (11). 5 
Criminal liability and sentence for __ _ 
N 0 
no liab. liab. 
no 
punish. 
2 3 4 5 
I day 2 wks 2 mo 6 mo I yr 
6 7 
3 yr 7 yr 
8 9 10 
ISyr 30yr life 
imprison-
ment 
11 
death 
The table used to translate liability scores into terms of imprisonment appears in 
Appendix C. 
As the reader will notice, the length of the prison sentences increases differen­
tially as the scale advances. For instance, the difference between scale value 5 ( a  
sentence o f  one year) and scale value 6 (a  sentence o f  three years) i s  only two 
years. However, the difference between scale value 8 ( a  sentence of fifteen years) 
and scale value 9 ( thirty years) is much greater. We set up the scale in this way for 
two reasons. First, it corresponds, at least approximately, to the psychological per­
spectives on equal distances between punishments (Erikson and Gibbs, 1979; 
Gescheider, Catlin, and Fontana, 1982). Second, the scale's punishment differ­
ences also correspond to the grading categories that are used in the typical Ameri­
can criminal code. (Given the psychological perspectives on equal distances be­
tween punishments, it should come as no surprise that legislators use these 
distinctions in creating the punishment categories for criminal codes.) This 
means that the punishment choices we presented to our subjects are similar to 
those available to legislators when they decide how to grade an offense. 
The several scenarios given to each respondent usually were identical in a set of 
core elements and differed only on the dimensions that we thought would make a 
difference in the subjects' liability judgments (or are held by criminal codes to 
make such a difference) .  By examining the differing sentences assigned to closely 
related cases (scenarios), we sought to determine whether shared community no­
tions of justice exist, and, if so, on what issues they exist and how those notions 
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compared to current law. An example will help to make this clear. Criminal codes 
sometimes treat the crime of forcible sexual intercourse differently if it is commit­
ted between individuals who have had a previous sexual relationship. Is this in ac­
cord with the way people currently think about rape? To determine this, we first 
wrote a core story in which an incident of rape was described. We then built that 
core story into a number of different scenarios. So in scenario variations, the inci­
dent was described as occurring between two individuals who had had a previous 
sexual relationship or two who had not had such a relationship. As we will show 
you in Chapter 6, our subjects assigned liability judgments to those cases in ways 
that differ in some respects from judgments instantiated in criminal codes. 
Each subject read one version of a scenario, then another. Sometimes a subject 
judged as many as seven or more versions of a scenario. Obviously then, they were 
aware of the differences that were built into the different versions of the scenarios, 
and their attention was focused on those differences. The danger here is that the 
subjects would feel that we ( the researchers) thought that the differences were im­
portant and that they should change the liability they assigned, even if they them­
selves did not think it appropriate. To avoid this problem, we instructed subjects 
that they should not read the differences in this way (as requiring them to assign 
different liabilities) . As the reader will see as we progress through the study dis­
cussions, the subjects often judged different cases alike in the liabilities that they 
assigned to the perpetrator of the crimes. In other words, they were not unduly 
influenced by thoughts that the researchers wanted them to see differences be­
tween cases that they (the subjects) reasoned should be treated similarly. 
This experimental design, in which each subject responds to every version of 
the scenario (called a "within-subjects design" in the vocabulary of experimental 
research) is a very powerful one, in that it is highly likely to find statistically reli­
able differences in the subjects' responses, even when those differences are 
comparativley smalL Particularly for the initial investigations in the field, we 
thought that this property of the research design was an important one to employ. 
As we said, different scenarios were variant versions of each other. Sometimes 
the differences were obvious and direct, such as the variations between the sexual 
offense studies just described. (In one scenario the rapist had a prior relationship 
with the victim; in another, he was a stranger.) In some of the other scenarios, the 
differences were both less direct and more subtle. For instance, in another case we 
described one set of actions that we thought would suggest that a perpetrator's 
conduct was necessary but not sufficient in causing another's death, and in a re­
lated scenario, conduct that was sufficient but not necessary in causing the death. 
It is a genuine question whether subjects perceived the concrete descriptions as 
being necessary in one instance and sufficient in another. The standard solution 
to this (in scenario research) is to ask the subjects questions that not only measure 
the punishments they want to assign but also probe for their psychological per­
ceptions of the circumstances of the scenario. So we asked subjects in the cases 
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described whether they thought that the actions were, for instance, sufficient in 
themselves to have produced the death and necessary to produce the death. As we 
will see, we were sometimes successful in producing the perceptions of the situa­
tions that we wished to produce and sometimes less successful. When we were less 
successful-and we have noted these instances-more complicated and more 
tentative interpretations of our results are necessary. 
We have conducted upward of twenty different studies ( not all of which are re­
ported herein). The studies were designed and executed in seminars at Rutgers 
University School of Law at Camden in the fall of 1990 and spring of 1991, with 
the help of faculty and graduate students from the Princeton University Depart­
ment of Psychology. 
In  the following chapters, we discuss the results of our studies and attempt to 
draw out the implications of our findings for the criminal law. In those discus­
sions, we will be fairly bold; we will sometimes make suggestions for code alter­
ations or other modifications of criminal justice procedures. This seems to us to 
be the best way that we can contribute to what we hope will become a debate. But 
we need to be dear that we do not regard our empirical studies as the last word. 
This is true for two sets of reasons. 
First, our studies have various general and specific imperfections. We have not 
tested the large and randomly selected sets of subjects that would provide an en­
tirely convincing mapping of community standards at the state or national level. 
Because we did not do this, we also have not given the question of what exactly 
constitutes a community standard the full consideration that it warrants before 
one would want to consider code alteration based on a conflict with community 
standards. Simply to signal how this community-standard consideration would 
go, we now provide a brief sketch: Whenever one polls a community about an 
opinion on some issue, whether politics, preferences, or legal codes, one can de­
rive an "average opinion:' But to say that the average opinion is a "community 
standard" is to claim more. It has sometimes occurred in presidential elections 
that some states voted for A by a 51 percent to 49 percent majority, others for B by 
a similar margin. Obviously, it would be absurd to say that A was the "community 
standard" in the states that he carried, and B likewise in the states that he carried. 
What needs to be recognized is that there was nothing that we should be comfort­
able in calling a community standard in either state. Therefore, in our studies, we 
need to require that some substantial majority holds a view before it begins to ful­
fill the requirements for being a community standard. 
Actually, we need to require more. If we find some subgroup in sharp disagree­
ment with the majority, this challenges the idea of a community standard more 
than would be the case if their disagreement was a matter of degree rather than of 
kind. For example, a majority of people may think that the existence of a previous 
relationship between two people does not affect the gravity of the offense if one of 
the individuals rapes the other. However, a minority does think that the existence 
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of a previous relationship matters. If that minority thinks that it only slightly mit­
igates the offense, then it would be possible to make the case, on the one hand, 
that there is a community standard about the seriousness of such an offense. If, 
on the other hand, the minority thinks that a rape that takes place within a mar­
riage is no offense at all, the case for a community standard is at a minimum con­
siderably harder to make. These are the sorts of considerations that need to take 
place when the existence of a community standard is asserted. In our discussions 
of the studies that follow, we will recognize this task by signaling the reader when 
we see evidence of sharp disagreements on legal standards among our subjects. 
Interestingly, sharp disagreements occurred rarely. (In technical terms, we rarely 
saw signs of a bimodal distribution of responses. ) 
These are the general problems with our studies. Specific studies can also have 
specific flaws and problems. In some of our studies, in which we intended sub­
jects to read the cases we presented them in a particular way (as perhaps establish­
ing a particular state of mind on the part of the perpetrator) ,  our subjects read 
them in importantly different ways; because of this, some of our conclusions re­
quire complex qualifications. In other studies, the set of scenarios that we pre­
sented turned out to represent a spectrum of possibilities that was more restricted 
than was adequate to test the legal code provisions. In other studies, still other dif­
ficulties came up that will require correction in future studies.6 Again, the func­
tion of these studies-and this book-is to begin a discussion of the interplay be­
tween law and social science on issues of criminal liability; and to both illustrate 
the kinds of important information that social scientists should be asked to pro­
vide to the legal community generally, and code drafters specifically, and to stim­
ulate the kinds of empirical and philosophical considerations that will need to be 
addressed in future discussions on these matters. A contradiction between the le­
gal code and community standards by no means automatically argues for the al­
teration of the code in the direction of the standards. There may be good reasons 
why the legal codes should deviate from community standards. The discovery of a 
contradiction simply points to a tension that is worthy of analysis. 
Do such tensions exist? Are there, in fact, important differences and conflicts 
between the legal codes that prevail in our country and the community standards 
of those governed by the code? Are there shared moral intuitions about when 
punishment is deserved and about how much is deserved? We address these ques­
tions empirically in the research reported in the following chapters of the book. 
2 
Doctrines of Criminalization: What 
Conduct Should Be Criminal? 
What conduct should be criminal? Most people would agree that homicide, rape, 
and theft, for example, ought to be criminalized. Some current offenses, like 
price-fixing, are less intuitively improper conduct. The common law distin­
guished the former kind of offense, called "malum in se" offenses, from the latter 
kind, called "malum prohibitum" offenses. Malum prohibitum offenses may 
seem somewhat artificial in what they prohibit; however, there is likely to be some 
consensus, at least within a jurisdiction, on their ultimate objectives-in this in­
stance increasing the competitiveness of the market. Some people might disagree 
that the particular offense formulation is the best means of achieving the ends, 
but few would dispute that the offense helps toward the goal and that the goal is 
desirable. 1 
However, a significant potential for disagreement exists between code and 
community with regard to "victimless crimes;' such as prostitution, gambling, or 
distribution of certain drugs. The criminalization of such conduct is designed in 
part to enforce the community's conceptions of morality. However, as the 1 920s 
«Prohibition" and its failure illustrate, different groups may have different con­
ceptions of what constitutes immoral conduct. As the community consensus on a 
morality issue fades, so can consensus on the laws that enforce it. As one would 
expect, in current American culture, there is lack of consensus on the enforce­
ment of laws against victimless crimes such as prostitution (Levi and Jones, 1985; 
Chilton and DeAmicis, 1 975; Newman and Trilling, 1 975) .  
A related question is the degree of  seriousness that the community assigns to 
different crimes-victimless or otherwise-and whether there is consensus on the 
degree of seriousness. These are issues of offense grading, and we will take them 
up in Chapter 6. 
A second area of potential disagreement between code and community is what 
we examine in this chapter. It concerns what might be called the code's "second­
ary prohibitions." These rules extend each primary prohibition to include certain 
variations of it. For example, if the primary prohibition is killing another person, 
secondary prohibitions broaden that offense to include attempting to kill another, 
creating a risk of death to another, assisting in the killing of another, or causing 
death by omission. 
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Another group of doctrines-called "justifications" -creates general excep­
tions to the primary prohibitions. Doctrines of justification define the circum­
stances under which the law permits a person to cause the harm or evil of an of­
fense without liability. Self-defense, defense of property, and authorized use of 
force during arrest by law enforcement officials are examples of common justifi­
cations offered as defenses. 
There appears to be little or no empirical work on such secondary prohibitions 
and justifications, and it is in this area that we focus much of our research. In this 
chapter, we examine views on secondary prohibitions. In Chapter 3 , we will deal 
with justifications. 
STUDY 1 :  OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF ATTEMPT 
Consider the intriguing case that arises when an individual takes steps toward 
committing a crime but does not actually commit it. Thinking about committing 
a crime is not itself a crime. However, at some point in a person's course of con­
duct, after the initial thought but before actual commission of the offense, the 
person becomes criminally liable. The history of Anglo-American criminal law 
reveals that at one time or another the law has used several remarkably different 
definitions of the point at which a person's preparation becomes a criminal at­
tempt. State laws still disagree on this issue. The underlying practical consider­
ations are twofold. On the one hand, the law does not want to assign liability to a 
person who has not committed a crime and, in the final event, would not do so. 
On the other hand, the law wishes to be able to "head off" crimes before they are 
committed and to punish those who have manifested their intention to commit a 
crime. On a more theoretical level, there generally is thought to be insufficient 
moral blameworthiness in thoughts alone to support criminal conviction and 
condemnation, but at some point between the thought and the completed offense 
sufficient blameworthiness comes to exist. Thus, there is the need to define a cate­
gory of "criminal attempt." 
In such cases, because the harm or evil of the actual offense has not occurred, 
the liability assigned to the attempt is termed "inchoate liability:' In most current 
legal codes, inchoate liability leads to less punishment than would be given if the 
same offense had been completed, but there is some controversy on this point. In­
deed, the Model Penal Code, the provisions of which have served as a model for 
code reform, generally grades an attempt on equal footing with the completed of­
fense.2 Most-but not all-jurisdictions, however, have been reluctant to adopt 
the Code's inchoate grading provision. 
The older (common law) legal tests for determining when a person's conduct 
reaches the point of criminal attempt tend to be quite demanding, in the sense 
that such tests require the person to come close to committing the crime before 
attempt liability is imposed. Under the "dangerous proximity" test ( a  common 
formulation) ,  a person typically has to reach a point where the offense is likely to 
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be  successfully completed-arrest before this point does not result in liability. As 
an example of dangerous proximity, consider a locksmith who decides to rob a 
coin shop safe he recently worked on. He goes back to the shop and confirms that 
the safe is still there. He then tells a friend of his plan to rob the coin shop the next 
day. Unbeknownst to the locksmith, his friend notifies the police. The next day, 
the locksmith goes to the coin shop and begins to crack the safe. Suddenly, two 
police officers burst in and arrest him. Although the locksmith has not completed 
the robbery, he has come dangerously close to its completion; his conduct satisfies 
the requirements of the dangerous proximity test, thus making him liable for at­
tempt. The test reflects a view that the moral blameworthiness sufficient for crim­
inal condemnation does not arise until a point where commission of the offense 
is a danger. This test seeks to balance the two practical considerations governing 
dangerous proximity cases in a specific way-to allow some opportunity for suc­
cessful intervention by those who would prevent the crime but also to delay the 
point of liability until the time when completion is a real danger.3 The dangerous 
proximity test is somewhat pragmatic in that it does not ask complex questions 
about what can be inferred about the person and his intentions. It simply requires 
citizens to avoid bringing plans for criminal activities to a point at which they 
could be successfully completed. 
The most common test in modern American codes, however, is the "substantial 
step" test, as formulated in Model Penal Code § S.O l ( l ) (c) .  Rather than focusing 
on how close the person has come to completion of the offense, as does the dan­
gerous proximity test, the substantial step test focuses on how far the person has 
gone after forming the intention to commit the offense. Any "substantial step" in 
the direction of commission is adequate (assuming the person's intention to com­
mit the offense is clear and unequivocal) .  This substantial step test (1) typically· 
imposes liability at an earlier point in the steps toward commission than does the 
dangerous proximity test; (2) reflects a claim that the moral blameworthiness re­
quired for criminal condemnation comes into play earlier; and (3) alters the bal­
ance of interests between the individual and society toward the interests of soci­
ety, by reducing an individual's opportunity to desist on his own, in favor of 
allowing earlier intervention. 
Other tests for determining attempt focus on criteria other than whether the 
person has come dangerously close or whether he has externalized his intention in 
performing a substantial step toward commission. The "probable desistance" test 
focuses on whether the person, without intervention by others, would have been 
likely to continue in the actions necessary to complete the offense. The 
"unequivocality" test attaches liability at the point where an observer, knowing 
only of the person's actions toward committing the offense without knowing the 
person's state of mind, would believe that the person intended to commit the of­
fense. The warning to members of society in this case is clear: Do not carry out a 
series of actions that would lead a reasonable observer to believe that you intend 
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to commit a crime. Each of the four tests represents not only a different point at 
which attempt liability attaches and relies on different criteria, but each has a dis­
tinct rationale and uses attempt liability for a somewhat different purpose.4 
The effect of a person's voluntary desistance also has received different treat­
ment at different times and in different jurisdictions. The older common law 
treated an attempt no differently than a substantive offense in this regard; once 
the elements of the offense were satisfied, there was no "undoing" the offense. At­
tempt liability was imposed no matter what the person did after passing the point 
where his preparation became a criminal attempt. Model Penal Code § 5.01 ( 4) in­
troduced a renunciation defense for attempt and other forms of inchoate liability, 
which provides a complete defense if the actor's desistance is complete and volun­
tary. (The defense is not available if the actor renounces out of fear or delays the 
planned attempt until a later date.) The defense is provided in part because the 
Code's substantial step test advances the point of criminalization considerably in 
the chain of events. Combined with the Model Penal Code's grading of an attempt 
as equal to the completed offense, the substantial step test would mean that once 
anyone takes a substantial step toward commission, that person has no incentive 
to stop; the person's liability will be that of the completed offense-whether the 
offense was completed or not. The common law and modern codes that maintain 
a grading difference, in contrast, have a built-in incentive for the perpetrator to 
desist at any point before completion of the offense. Thus, such codes have no 
practical need for a renunciation defense. It has been retained in most jurisdic­
tions, however, including those that grade inchoate offenses less seriously than 
completed offenses, perhaps because voluntary renunciation is thought to reduce 
a person's blameworthiness. 
We designed a study that sought to examine the community's views on these 
conduct requirements for attempt liability. To study these views, we presented 
subjects with a core scenario. Subjects were told that a locksmith, who is called to 
repair a safe in a coin dealer's store, notices that valuable coins are always kept in 
the safe. The locksmith decides to break in and rob the coin dealer by opening the 
safe and taking its contents. We then added to the core story various elements that 
created combinations of circumstances to which some common law and modern 
tests would assign attempt liability and to which others would not. For instance, 
in another scenario, we added the fact that the locksmith returns to the coin shop 
to make sure that the safe is still there, whereupon the locksmith is arrested and 
charged with attempted robbery. This variation satisfies the Model Penal Code's 
requirement, relied on in many jurisdictions, that the attempter need only take 
some "substantial step" in the direction of committing the offense. Our intent, by 
introducing these variations, was to determine under which circumstances our 
respondents would assign liability and how this pattern of liability matched the 
various tests. 
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Therefore, i n  the design o f  the present study, each subject read eleven versions 
of the same core scenario to which various alterations had been made. Each sce­
nario is identical to every other one except for the facts describing how far the 
person progresses after forming the criminal intention. Each scenario corre­
sponds to one of the current legal tests. Table 2. 1 outlines the eleven versions of 
the scenario and the legal test to which each version corresponds. The initial core 
scenario, in which the person only forms the intent to commit the crime, is shown 
in the first row. The substantial step scenario, in which the person returns to the 
shop to see if the safe is still there, is shown in the second row. Brief characteriza­
tions of the other scenarios are given in the "description" column of the table. The 
«summary" column of Table 2. 1 gives a summary description of each scenario, 
and these are used to identify each scenario in subsequent tables. The "comment" 
column gives further explanation of the legal treatment of the case. 
After reading each scenario, subjects indicated what criminal liability, if any, 
they would assign to the locksmith. The liability results of the study are reported 
in Table 2.2. Columns d and e summarize the liability that would be assigned to 
the scenario by the common law and the Model Penal Code. 
We will first consider the different liabilities assigned to the various attempt 
scenarios and later turn to examine the effects of renunciation of the crime and 
the related act of desisting out of fear of being apprehended. 
Table 2.2 arrays the various scenarios from top to bottom in terms of the gen­
eral progression of how close the locksmith comes in each version to the actual 
commission of the crime. In the first scenario, the individual develops an inten­
tion to commit the crime and goes no farther. In the last scenario (row 6), the in­
dividual actually commits the crime. 
As we will use many similar tables throughout this book to report our research 
results, we will briefly comment on the composition of the tables to facilitate their 
interpretation. Adjacent to the scenario descriptions are three columns indicating 
related but different ways of analyzing the degree of liability that our respondents 
assigned to the perpetrator whose actions were described in the specific case un­
der discussion. Column a reports the average amount of liability assigned to the 
perpetrator on the eleven-point scale we discussed in Chapter 1 .  Subjects who as­
sign no liability or liability without punishment are included in this calculation as 
assigning a liability of zero. Column b reports the percentage of the respondents 
who chose "No Liability" for the locksmith, roughly equivalent to a jury verdict of 
"not guilty." Column c reports the percentage of respondents who chose either 
the "No Liability" or "Liability But No Punishment" options of the scale: This in­
dicates the percentage of subjects who would impose no punishment on the de­
fendant. This percentage will always be higher than the percentage shown in col­
umn b, because column c includes the subjects reported in column b and adds to 
that the percentage of subjects who report that they judge that the perpetrator de-
TABLE 2. 1 Attempt Scenarios 
Core Story: A locksmith, Ray, recalls working on a safe in  a coin shop. The safe 
was kept in the back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray thinks 
about how easy it would be to "crack" the safe. Ray decides he will rob the safe 
in the coin shop. 
Scenario Number, Description 
(and Abbreviation) Summary Comment 
1 .  The actor only thinks about robbing Only thinks No test would assign 
the safe and decides to do so. He about offense liability. 
takes no action toward committing the 
crime. (TH) 
2. After deciding to rob the shop, the Substantial Actor is l iable under 
actor goes to the coin shop to make step test this test, because 
sure the safe is still there. (SS) satisfied "reconnoitering" 
(casing) the shop is a 
substantial step. 
3. After deciding to rob the shop, the Unequivocality The actor is liable 
actor makes a special tool to crack test satisfied under this test be-
the safe with. (EQ) cause action mani-
fasts criminal intent. 
3a. The actor cases the shop and Renounces The Model Penal Code 
meets the owner while he does so. after reaching (MPC) allows a 
Out of pity for the owner, he gives up point of defense H an actor's 
his plan to rob the safe. (EQR) unequivoca/ity renunciation of criminal 
intent is "complete and 
voluntary." No liability 
if this defense is 
available. 
4. Having told a friend he intends to Probable Without outside inter-
rob the shop, the actor drives there. desistance test ruption the actor would 
Before he can get to the shop he is satisfied have completed the 
stopped by police, who were informed offense. Actor is 
of his intent by the actor's friend. (PO) liable under this test. 
5. The actor is in the process of Dangerous Actor is liable because 
cracking the safe in the coin shop proximity test the offense is nearly 
when he is stopped by two undercover satisfied completed. 
policemen. (PX) 
Sa. When he is in the shop and about Renounces MPC allows a defense 
to crack the safe, the actor feels pity after reaching when actor renounces 
for the shopowner and decides not point of his criminal intent 
to rob the safe. (PXR) dangerous "completely and volun-
proximity tarily." No liability if this 
defense is available. 
(continues) 
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TABLE 2.1 (Continued) 
Scenario Number, Description 
(and Abbreviation) 
5b. When he is in the shop and about 
to crack the safe, the actor stops 
because he sees a policeman in the 
front of the store and he fears getting 
caught. (FA) 
6. The actor completes the robbery 
and returns home with the coins. (CP) 
6a. The actor completes the robbery 
and returns home. On the way home, 
he feels pity for the shopowner and 
returns the coins to the safe. (CPR) 
6b. The actor completes the offense, 
feels pity for the shopowner, tries 
to return the coins to the safe, but 
is caught by police. (UNA) 
Summary 
Desists out of 
fear after 
dangerous 
proximity 
Offense com­
plete, no 
renunciation 
Renounces 
after offense is 
complete 
Renounces, 
but is unsuc­
cessful at 
"undoing" 
1 9  
Comment 
Actor is allowed no 
renunciation defense 
because renunciation 
was not voluntary. 
Actor is liable for full 
attempt. 
The actor is liable for 
the completed 
offense. 
Actor is liable for com­
pleted offense be­
cause renunciation 
defense not available. 
Actor is liable for com­
pleted offense because 
renunciation defense 
unavailable. 
serves criminal liability but does not deserve any punishment. As you will see as 
the reports of our studies cumulate, the "Liability But No Punishment" category 
proves an interesting judgment to track. 
Finally, and again, we usually attempt to remind the reader of the legal code 
treatments that are given to the various cases. In this table, columns d and e char­
acterize the treatment of the offense given by various legal formulations. When 
different legal codes differ in their treatments of the scenarios, as do the common 
law and the Model Penal Code in this case, we provide several columns-one for 
each of the different legal treatments. 
Many people find tables hard to scan and comprehend. (So, frankly, do we.) 
Therefore, we often provide graphs or figures that compare liability ratings 
among cases (as in our next presentation). Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present a visual 
representation of the liability means and percentage of respondents choosing "No 
Liability" or "Liability But No Punishment" that are presented in columns a, b, 
and c of Table 2.2. In these two figures, only a subset of the cases is included (ex­
eluding scenarios with renunciation or desistance) because we want to highlight 
specific important conclusions to be extracted from these results. The two-letter 
descriptions along the horizontal axis of each figure correspond to the abbrevia-
20 
TABLE 2.2 Liabil ity for Various Degrees of Conduct Toward a 
Completed Theft Offense 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
% No 
Liability 
% No or No 
Attempt Liability Punishment Common Model Penal 
Scenarios Liability (N) (N+O) Law Result Code Result 
1 .  Thought only 
(TH) 1 .46 65 77 No liability No liabil ity 
2. Substantial 
step (SS) 1 .54 50 73 No liability Attempt liability8-
3. Unequivocality 
(EO) 1 .8 1  42 65 b Attempt liability8-
3a. Renounces 0.38 85 92 No defense Complete 
defense 
4. Probable 
desistance (PO) 1 .88 27 62 b Attempt l iabil ity8-
5. Dangerous 
proximity (PX) 5.35 0 0 Attempt liabil ity Attempt l iability8-
5a. Renounces 0.69 46 85 No defense Complete 
defense 
5b. Desists 
out of fear 1 .58 35 65 No defense No defense 
6. Completed 
offense (CP) 6. 1 2  0 0 Full offense Full offense 
liability liability 
Sa. Renounces 
and "undoes" 3.23 1 2  27 No defense No defense 
6b. Renounces 
but unable 
to "undo" 5.35 0 4 No defense No defense 
Liability Scale: N = No criminal l iabil ity, O = Liability but no punishment, 1 = 
1 day, 2 = 2 weeks, 3 = 2 months, 4 = 6 months, 5 = 1 year, 6 = 3 years, 7 = 7 years, 
8 = 1 5  years, 9 = 30 years, 1 0 = 1ife, and 1 1  = death. 
8An attempted theft under the Model Penal Code is graded the same as a 
completed theft. 
bThis depends upon which of the common-law tests is applicable in the 
jurisdiction . 
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FIGURE 2.3 Liability for Various Degrees of Conduct Toward Theft 
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tions assigned to each scenario in Table 2.2. In Figure 2.3, the vertical axis repre­
sents the subjects' judgment as to the actor's amount of liability. The higher the 
number, the more severe the sentence. In Figure 2.4, the vertical axis represents 
the percentage of respondents who assign either no liability or liability but no 
punishment to the attempter; the higher the percentage, therefore, the fewer the 
respondents who would impose liability or punishment for the attempt. 
With that explanation, let us turn to the results of this study. Look at the result 
for the "thought-only scenario (TH) '' in Figure 2.3.  It appears that even thinking 
about committing an offense generates some assignment of liability from our av­
erage subject. Recall that this is the case in which the locksmith forms a settled in­
tention to rob the coin dealer's safe but takes no further steps to do so. Looking at 
the same scenario in Figure 2.4, we notice that 65 percent of the subjects assign no 
liability, and therefore 35 percent of the subjects impose liability in this thought­
only scenario. (However, about one-third of those imposing liability-1 3  percent 
of all subjects-assign no punishment.) 
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FIGURE 2.4 Percentage of Subjects Assigning No Liability or Liability But No 
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·son to commit an offense has been shown to be a power-
iui Je1 v in other contexts. It should be no surprise to see that 
the p( e, has some effect in generating judgments of liability 
by a m11. ubJ(,;'-ts. Here a usually unnoticed property of scenario re-
se .. , rch may create a . Jerence between our result and the result that would likely 
emerge from an actual court process. Our scenarios were written "from the eye of 
God;' as it were, and gave the readers access to the inner workings of the person's 
mind. Thus, in this case our subjects were able to believe unequivocally that a per­
son had formed a settled intent to commit a crime. In the real world, it would be 
extraordinarily difficult to establish intention with such certainty in the absence 
of any conduct and, as a result, more difficult to successfully prosecute the indi­
vidual. 
The scenarios in which the dangerous proximity test criteria are not met are 
scenarios 1 through 4. Notice that they get very low assignments of liability, and 
the line connecting them in Figure 2.3 is essentially flat, which suggests that re­
spondents are seeing these cases as alike in the degree of liability they generate. In 
scenario 5, in which the criteria for "dangerous proximity" are met, the liability 
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ratings of our subjects become correspondingly much higher. This suggests that 
dangerous proximity best reflects what our respondents perceive to be the critical 
point after which attempt liability should be assigned. Figure 2 .4 indicates that 
between 27 percent and 65 percent of our subjects indicate no liability in the first 
four scenarios, where the defendant does not reach the point of dangerous prox­
imity. However, this percentage drops universally to zero in the scenarios where 
the dangerous proximity test criteria are met (scenarios 5 and 6 ) ,  a difference that 
is statistically significant (p < .0 1 ). (To say that a result, in this case a difference in 
the percentages, is "statistically significant" is to say that it is highly unlikely to 
have occurred due to some chance fluctuation. Thus, it is appropriate to interpret 
it as a "real" difference in subjects' responses, caused by the differences between 
the scenarios. The term "p < .05" means that there are only five chances out of 
one hundred that the result could have occurred by chance; "p < .0 1 "  indicates 
one chance out of a hundred.) Even more strikingly, the percentage of subjects 
who would impose no liability or no punishment ranges between 62 percent and 
77 percent for scenarios 1 through 4 but drops to zero for the latter two scenarios 
5 and 6 (p < .0 1 ) . These results reveal a relatively dramatic difference in the sub­
jects' view of the scenarios where the dangerous proximity test is not met ( sce­
narios 1 through 4),  and those where it is, (scenarios 5 and 6). This suggests that, 
of the available tests, the common law's dangerous proximity test, as applied to 
this case, seems to best reflect the views of a majority of the subjects. 
Our respondents assign different liabilities for attempts than for completed 
crimes: the liability mean for the dangerous proximity scenario in Table 2.2 ( row 
5-5 .35, or 1 .8 years5 ) is significantly lower than the completed offense scenario's 
liability mean of 6. 1 2 ,  or 3.4 years (row 6).  This result is consistent with the tradi­
tional grading of attempt as less serious and is inconsistent with the Model Penal 
Code's grading of attempt as being on an equal footing with the completed of­
fense.6 The Code's grading of attempt seems all the more incongruous when the 
liability for a completed offense, 6. 1 2  (3.4 years) ,  is compared to that for the 
Code's test for attempt, the substantial step test, of 1 .54 (7.5 days) .  While the 
Code dictates that a person held for attempt is liable at a grade equal to that for 
the full offense, a majority of our research subjects ( 73 percent-see row 2 of col­
umn c) think that no liability or punishment is appropriate for a mere "substan­
tial step:' In Chapter 6, we further examine these matters of proper grading. 
We turn our attention next to the effects of an individual's voluntary desistance 
from committing the crime or the renunciation of it after its completion (Table 
2.2,  scenarios 3a, Sa, and 6a) .  Figure 2.5 presents the data for these scenarios. In 
that figure, bar graphs are presented, with each scenario involving renunciation 
shown paired with its nonrenunciation equivalent. (The data for the 
nonrenunciation equivalents are found in scenarios 3, 5, and 6. 
We call your attention first to the leftmost pair of scenarios, which are the cases 
in which the individual takes an unequivocal step in the direction of the crime. 
Clearly, renunciation reduces the assigned penalty; but notice again that our re-
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FIGURE 2.5 Effect of Renunciation in Reducing Liability 
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spondents assign very little penalty in the first place to that case ( 1 .8 1 ;  1 1 .4 days) , 
so we do not want to make much of this result. Looking next at the case where re­
nunciation comes after dangerous proximity (case Sa, the middle pair ofbars) , we 
note that the judgments of our subjects conflict with aspects of both the common 
law doctrine and the Model Penal Code. While the common law does not provide 
a defense when a person renounces after satisfying the dangerous proximity test, 
our results indicate a sharp (and statistically reliable, p < .05 ) decrease in punish­
ment assigned. Referring again to Table 2.2, 85 percent of the subjects think either 
no liability or no punishment is appropriate in this renunciation case while no 
subject thinks no punishment is appropriate for the individual who reaches the 
level of dangerous proximity and does not renounce the attempt; that is, it seems 
that the majority of subjects view renunciation even after taking the dangerous 
proximity step-the step that they think generally created an attempt offense-as 
a legitimate defense. Unlike the common law, the Model Penal Code does provide 
a defense in such a case-if the renunciation is complete and voluntary-and this 
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seems to fit our subjects' intuitions; if the locksmith decides not to commit the 
crime for his own reasons, very low liability is incurred. 
This result is somewhat ironic. As noted previously, the common law recog­
nized no renunciation defense. However, the Model Penal Code introduced the 
renunciation defense. Why? The drafters realized that they were essentially re­
quired to create it to avoid a problem created by their other planned changes. Spe­
cifically, the early intervention authorized by their substantial step test means that 
a person who is in the early stages of committing a crime is liable. This factor, 
combined with the Model Penal Code drafters' grading of attempts as equal to the 
substantive offense, means that a person who has taken a substantial step toward 
a crime is liable for the full penalties for the commission of that crime. Thus, 
there is no incentive for the «rational criminal" who has taken a substantial step 
to stop before commission of the crime; surely a socially undesirable reinforce­
ment contingency! Here, again, is the problem: If the person who begins a crime 
is liable at a level equal to the full substantive offense, he or she has little reason to 
stop once his or her conduct constitutes an offense. Because the substantial step 
test for commission is satisfied early in the process, this incentive to continue 
kicks in early. Thus, the renunciation defense is provided to give attempters a rea­
son to stop-right up until the moment before the offense is complete. If one re­
jects the Code's equal grading provision and substantial step provision, as our test 
subjects appear to do, the reasons that led to the creation of the renunciation de­
fense in the Model Penal Code disappear. Yet the data suggest that the subjects 
would keep such a defense. Thus the Code's defense is supported by the subjects 
but apparently for reasons other than those given by the Code. 
Note that the effect of renunciation on liability according to our subjects is sig­
nificantly less after completion of the offense (as illustrated by the rightmost pair 
of bars) than before completion ( as with the two other example pairings). The as­
signed liability drops from 6. 1 2  (3.4 years) for the unrenounced completed of­
fense (case 6 )  to 3.23 (2.8 months) for the completed but renounced and "un­
done" offense (case 6a) .  The Code also gives significance to the point of 
completion-even more so than our subjects-it denies a defense for renuncia­
tion after the offense is complete. That our subjects give a significant mitigation 
even after the offense is complete may reflect a view that such renunciation un­
dercuts the resoluteness of the offender's original intent and, therefore, retroac­
tively alters their assessment of the offender's original culpability. As discussed be­
low, an alternative explanation arises from the absence of the harm of the offense. 
In comparing the case in which the person desists (our of fear of being caught) 
after satisfaction of the dangerous proximity test to the case in which the person 
renounces due to a change of heart about the misdeed, we find that the liability 
assigned by our subjects decreases from 1 .58 (8.8 days) to 0.69 (less than 1 day) . 
(Please again refer to Table 2.2 for these comparisons-scenarios Sa and Sb, col-
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umn a.) A good majority of the subjects (65 percent) still think no punishment is 
appropriate (column c) , although 65 percent would assign liability (column b). 
The Model Penal Code joins the common law, however, in barring a defense 
based on these facts. The absence of the harm or evil of the completed offense ap­
pears to have a greater effect on our subjects than it has in the legal doctrine. 
Our subjects' focus on the occurrence of the harm or evil of the offense also is 
highlighted by their collective response to the case of the offender's renunciation 
after completion of the offense. That the offender "undoes" the harm (returns the 
stolen goods) does not exempt him from liability according to our subjects (see 
the rightmost pair of bars in Figure 2.5) but significantly reduces the offender's 
punishment from 6. 1 2  (3 .4 years; 100 percent imposing punishment) to 3.23 (2.8 
months; 73 percent imposing punishment) .  Notice also that when the offender, as 
above, renounces after completion but is unable to "undo" the offense, liability is 
much closer to the unrenounced completed offense than it is to the renounced 
completed offense. The renouncing thief who cannot "undo" the offense is given 
an average score of 5 .35  ( 1 .8 years; 96 percent imposing punishment) .  
Further results suggest that occurrence of the harm or evil is  not the only influ­
ential factor; remorse counts as well. The two may be equally influential. (Again, 
please refer to Table 2.2 for these comparisons.) Note that the liability means are 
the same in the dangerous proximity attempt scenario (scenario 5) and the com­
pleted offense scenario in which the offender would like to but is unable to 
"undo" the offense (scenario 6b--5.35; 1 .8 years) . In the former case, the person 
has the evil desire to commit the offense but has not caused the harm of the of­
fense. The latter scenario has the harm of the offense but a change of heart leading 
the offender to want to "undo" the offense. These liability means differ signifi­
cantly from other scenarios in crucial ways: They are each significantly lower (p < 
.OS) than the liability assigned to the successful, unrepentant offender (scenario 
6-6.1 2 ;  3.4 years) ,  in which the harm exists in the absence of any remorse; and 
both means are higher than in the scenarios in which ( 1 )  renunciation occurs be­
fore completion (scenarios 3a and Sa-0.38 and 0.69, respectively; both less than 
1 day) and (2) renunciation occurs after completion (scenario 6a-3.23; 2.4 
months) . This patterning of results suggests that both the occurrence of the harm 
and the perpetrator's remorse about that occurrence figure in our respondents' 
assessments of punishment. 
Finally, it is important to note that our respondents frequently selected the "li­
ability but no punishment" option in this study (as is effectively shown in Figure 
2.4}. This option w�s used not only in the case of renunciation and desistance im­
mediately after the point of dangerous proximity but also in those scenarios in 
which the person satisfies an attempt test short of dangerous proximity. (Com­
pare columns b and c for scenarios 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2.2.)  These results may sug­
gest that our subjects think it important to disapprove of the person's conduct 
(and thus a majority would impose liability in each case-50 percent, 58 percent, 
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and 73 percent, respectively; these percentages are obtained by subtracting the 
no-liability percentages from 100 percent) but are hesitant to impose punishment 
in the absence of sufficient proximity to the harm or evil of the offense. The sub­
jects may want to disapprove of the person's conduct and intention but, because 
they ultimately see insufficient blameworthiness, are hesitant to impose punish­
ment. The interesting implications of the use of the " liability but no punishment" 
option, and what our respondents are attempting to communicate by it, are dis­
cussed further in Chapter 7. We note here, though, that the use of this option il­
lustrates the distinctly dual nature of the law's function: rule articulation (an­
nouncing ex ante the rules of proper conduct) and liability assignment and 
grading (ex post adjudication of violations of the rules).7 
Study 1: Summary 
The liability results of the objective requirements of attempt study might be sum­
marized in psychological terms as follows. In the view of our subjects, punish­
ment ought not to be imposed until a person has reached a point of dangerous 
proximity to completion of the offense.8 Further, the level of punishment for at­
tempt ought tv be significantly less than that for the completed offense. Once the 
point of dangerous proximity is reached, punishment still may be avoided by 
complete and voluntary renunciation. Finally, when an offense is completed, a 
change of heart will only mitigate punishment, although undoing the offense will 
mitigate punishment still further. 
With respect to legal implications, this study sought to determine which of the 
tests for the objective requirement of attempt best reflects the community's view. 
In the scenarios in which the person has gone just far enough to satisfy the sub­
stantial step test, the unequivocality test, or the probable desistance test, a strong 
majority of subjects would impose either no liability or no punishment. But, in 
the scenarios in which the person satisfies the common law's dangerous proximity 
test, a dramatic shift in opinion occurs: All of the subjects would impose both lia­
bility and punishment. This would seem to suggest that, if the community's view 
were to be the guiding principle in the definition of the offense, criminal codes 
should revert to the common law's dangerous proximity test. If early intervention 
by law enforcement is desired to increase the effectiveness of crime prevention, 
legislation could create authority for enforcement officials to intervene without 
holding the person liable for an attempt to commit the substantive offense or to 
intervene by holding the person liable only at a low level. Liability might be im­
posed at a fixed misdemeanor level, for example, for an offense of "Preparing to 
Commit an Offense" or something of such nature. 
While preferring the common law's dangerous proximity test for determining 
when attempt liability should attach, our subjects also recognize a defense for vol­
untary and complete renunciation, as does the Model Penal Code. Indeed, many 
subjects indicate that they would permit a defense-and a majority would impose 
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no punishment-if the person desists out of fear of being caught rather than sim­
ply from a change of heart. This confirms what we will present in several other 
studies: Unlike the Model Penal Code, which downplays the significance of result­
ing harm, our subjects' liability and punishment judgments are highly influenced 
by whether harm or evil occurs. Indeed, a significant minority of subjects impose 
no punishment on the person who completes the offense but soon thereafter re­
nounces and undoes the primary effects of his offense. Chapter 6 discusses fur­
ther the community's and the law's treatment of resulting harm in grading of­
fenses. 
STUDY 2: CREATING A CRIMINAL RISK 
Just as someone may be liable for attempting to cause a prohibited harm, so too 
may one be liable for creating a risk of causing a prohibited harm, even if the 
harm does not come about. Not every risk created is a criminal risk. Current 
codes typically limit liability to substantial risks of harm. Legal codes set a mini­
mum standard of criminal risk to distinguish those risks to be regarded as crimi­
nal from those that are not. Where to set the minimum standard is a complex 
question for legal code drafters, but most are in agreement that the ultimate judg­
ment of criminality of the risk is a product of, among other things, the serious­
ness of the harm risked, the probability of the harm occurring, and the purpose of 
the conduct.9 For example, one may create a high risk of getting a passerby wet in 
the way one sets a lawn sprinkler, but the seriousness of the harm risked may be 
sufficiently low so as not to make this a criminal matter. Whenever one drives a 
car, one risks causing death to pedestrians; but the likelihood of killing one is low 
enough, and the purpose of the conduct is valuable enough, that the simple act of 
driving is not considered a criminal risk. 
Thus, an assessment of whether someone creates a criminal risk depends in 
large measure on the degree of harm and the probability of the harm occurring. 
In this criminal risk study, we sought to determine both the minimum level of po­
tential harm and the degree of risk that the community believes are necessary for 
assignment of criminal liability. In addition, we tried to determine what interac­
tion, if any, may exist between these two factors. 
In particular, we set out to determine whether these two elements of risk af­
fected liability independent of what the respondents believed to be the person's 
"culpable state of mind" as to causing the prohibited result. To do this, we needed 
to counter a common psychological tendency of individuals reading descriptions 
of cases. I f  a person is described as creating only a slight risk of harm, it might 
commonly be thought that he or she is at most simply aware of such risk. By com­
parison, observers may think that a person who creates a great risk of harm is 
more than just «aware" of that risk; the person may be seen as at least knowing 
and perhaps in some sense intending that such harm will come about (Karlovac 
and Darley, 1988; Fischoff, 1975) . Thus, if one compares a case in which a person 
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creates only a small risk to a case in which a person creates a high risk, greater lia­
bility assigned in the latter case may be a function of a belief that that person has a 
more culpable state of mind. 
In the following study, we attempted to hold constant the person's culpable 
state of mind in order to determine whether increased degree of risk and in­
creased potential harm would, according to our subjects, carry the same increases 
in liability and punishment that the code suggests, without the possibility that 
subjects would infer a higher culpable state of mind of the person when that per­
son took greater risks. To accomplish this, we created a scenario in which we spec­
ified the person's state of mind, and we set the person's state of mind at "purpose­
ful." This means that our conclusions will be limited to cases in which some 
degree of harm was intended. 
The design of this study-and almost all other studies in this book-is identi­
cal in overview to that described in Study 1 :  Respondents read several versions of 
the same core scenario and responded to questions including judgments of liabil­
ity and punishment. In this risk study, we presented the respondents with the fol­
lowing core case: A wife, wishing to kill her spouse, puts poison into his breakfast 
food. In different versions of the case, the poison (unbeknownst to the wife) ,  if in­
gested, would cause only minor stomach cramps (slight injury) , material and 
substantial damage to the digestive tract (moderate injurx) , or alternatively, and 
as planned, death (high injury) . We varied the risk of harm by altering the likeli­
hood that the husband would actually eat the poisoned food. Our results are pre­
sented in two tables later in this section. 
We hoped that our subjects would interpret the scenarios in the ways we in­
tended. For instance, in this study, we hoped that it would be clear to our subjects 
that the wife intended to kill her husband. However, in research of this sort, it is 
always wise to check to see how the subjects actually did perceive the stories. To 
do this, we asked our subjects to report their perceptions of the case, as well as the 
liability they would assign to the perpetrator. These check questions are called 
"checks on the manipulations." In this risk study, we asked such questions. Before 
discussing liability judgments, let us first look at whether the respondents per­
ceived the various facts of the case as we intended them to. This is determined by 
examining the respondents' answers to the various questions shown in columns a 
through c of Table 2.6. (The exact version of the questions and the numerical 
scales on which the subjects responded to those questions are included in the 
footnotes to the table. ) We note that we were reasonably successful in setting the 
readers' perceptions of the offender's state of mind (column c) . Their ratings were 
between 3,  which would be agreement with the statement that "she knew or was 
practically certain that the victim would die;' and 4, "it was her purpose to cause 
the victim to die;' with the average rating falling considerably closer to 4, or "pur­
poseful." 10 Second, the respondents perceived the variations of risk as we hoped 
they would, with the slight-risk scenarios providing an average risk rating of 3.59 
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TABLE 2.6 Subjects' Perceptions of the Creation of Risk 
(a) (b) (c) 
Degree of Severity of Actor's State 
Scenarios Risk Outcome of Mind 
Slight risk 
1 .  Slight injury 3.21 3.29 3.63 
2.  Moderate injury 3.62 5.39 3.76 
3. High injury 3.95 8. 1 5  3.76 
Medium risk 
4. Slight' injury 5.1 7  3.29 3.74 
5. Moderate injury 5.27 5.61 3.69 
6. High injury 5.67 8.46 3.71 
High risk 
7. Slight injury 9.90 ' 3.48 3.81 
8. Moderate injury 9.1 7  5.86 3.79 
9. High injury 9.30 8.76 3.88 
Accompl ished 
1 0. Slight injury 9.90 3.02 3.80 
1 1 . Moderate injury 1 0.02 5.55 3.81 
1 2. High injury 1 0.46 8.79 3.88 
Key to column heads: 
(a) The chances that the attempt will succeed and the victim will suffer from 
its effects on this occasion are approximately: O=doesn't occur, 1 = 1  0% chance, 
2=20% chance, . . .  1 O=near 1 00%, 1 1  =the event occurs. 
(b) If the attempt does succeed, the result will likely be: 1 =no effect, 
5=Significant or substantial injury, 9=death. 
(c) Pick one or more of the following to describe the actor's state of mind: 
1 .  The actor did not realize that there was a risk that the victim would die. 
2. The actor realized that there was a risk that the victim would die, but did 
not care. 
3. The actor knew or was practically certain that the victim would die. 
4. It was the actor's purpose to cause the victim to die. 
(column a of Table 2.6), the moderate-risk cases an average rating of 5.37, and the 
high-risk cases an average rating of 9.46. In the "accomplished" cases, in which 
the risked harm actually occurred and the husband either suffered stomach 
cramps, digestive-tract damage, or died, the risk ratings were higher ( 10. 13  on av­
erage) but only slightly higher than the ratings in the high-risk cases. Our respon­
dents also perceived the severity of the outcome (column b of Table 2.6) as we had 
intended, with the slight injury receiving an average severity rating of 3 .27, the 
moderate injury an average of 5 .60, and the high injury an average of 8.54 
[F(2,78) = 260.54, p = .00 1 ] .  (The F test is another way of testing the statistical 
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TABLE 2. 7 Liability for the Creation of Risk 
(a) 
Scenarios Liability 
Slight risk 
1 .  Slight injury 6.81 
2. Moderate injury 7.48 
3. High injury 8.24 
Medium risk 
4. Slight injury 6.93 
5. Moderate injury 7.71 \ 
6. High injury 8.51 
High risk 
7. Slight injury 7.39 
8. Moderate injury 8.00 
9. High injury 8.95 
Accomplished 
1 0. Slight injury 7.33 
1 1 . Moderate injury 8. 1 7  
1 2. High injury 9.81 
(b) 
% No Liability 
(N) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 1  
(c) 
% No Liability or 
No Punishment 
(N+O) 
1 0  
2 
0 
1 0  
0 
0 
7 
2 
0 
7 
0 
0 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =  
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years, 
8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
significance of the obtained differences between groups. The "p < .00 1 "  element 
of the statistic tells us that the result obtained would have occurred by chance only 
once in a thousand times. )  
Now that we have established that our subjects saw the case as  we had hoped, 
we can turn to an examination of the liability results. Table 2. 7 reports liability 
ratings assigned in each scenario, along with percentages of respondents who 
chose "No Liability" and percentages of those who chose either "No Liability" or 
"Liability But No Punishment." 
Note that in all variations of the scenario, our subjects assign some liability; no 
respondents recommend "No Liability" in any of the scenarios. This suggests 
that, while the extent of harm risked and the probability of its occurrence may be 
relevant to grading, no minimum level of potential harm or minimum probabil­
ity is required before liability can be assigned. Or, if there is such a minimum, it is 
below even the lowest levels of harm and probability tested here. Presumably, the 
person's intention here to commit the offense and the poisoning of the cereal, 
without more, are sufficient for criminal liability. This is consistent with the re­
sults of the attempt study discussed previously. 
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FIGURE 2.8 Liability as a Function of Risk and Injury 
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Because of this, most of the results of this study concern issues of grading, 
which is the subject of Chapter 6, but we will review those issues here in 
preparation for a more complete discussion in Chapter 6. Figure 2.8 suggests that 
as either the probability of injury or the severity of the risked injury increases, the 
liability assigned to the risk-taker increases. [ Risk: F(3, 1 1 7) = 1 1 .28, p = .00 1 ;  Se­
verity: F(2,78) = 24.96, p = .00 1 . ] 
Interestingly, the interaction between these two factors is statistically signifi­
cant [F(6,234) = 7.53, p = 0.00 1 ] .  This result suggests that the probability and 
harm variables, taken together, have effects on judgments of liability that are not 
equivalent to the sum of their independent effects. Specifically, Figure 2 .8 shows 
that the accomplished, high-injury scenario draws an assignment of liability that 
is considerably more severe than the others (and thus may be the liability score 
that makes the interaction significant) . There is a distinct tendency for respon­
dents to be particularly severe in assigning liability to the case in which the wife 
intends to kill her husband and actually does so. In this planned and successful 
murder, our subjects assign her a sentence that corresponds to nearly life impris­
onment. 
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With the exception of this particular case, however, one is struck by the general 
continuity of the respondents' judgments. As either the probability or the severity 
of the harm risked increases incrementally, so too does the liability judgment in 
an essentially corresponding fashion. 
Are our respondents' reactions consistent with the criminal codes? Only in a 
broad sense. Because all of our scenarios described an individual who was pur­
poseful as to committing the crime, the Code would treat all of our scenarios as 
ones of attempted murder, without making distinctions depending on the prob­
ability of the harm or the severity of the harm risked. Our respondents, in con­
trast, alter their sentences depending on these factors-and do so in a nontrivial 
way. First, they assign greater liabilities as a function of the degree of risk. (This is 
shown by the consistent differences in elevation of the high, moderate, and slight 
risk lines of Figure 2 .8 . )  In other words, our respondents judge that the actual risk 
created is relevant to their liability judgments. This is consistent with their ten­
dency to be more harm-oriented than the Code, with the present harm being in 
the creation of risk. Second, as the quite steep slopes of the four lines of Figure 2.8 
show, our respondents also base their liability judgments on the amount of injury 
that is actually intended or "risked." Again, we see their judgments based on the 
extent of the risk actually created; not just that intended. We will return to this is­
sue in Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion of its implications. 
What remains to be investigated are those cases in which an individual creates a 
risk of a serious harm with a high probability of success-but does so at a much 
lower level of culpability (for instance, recklessly or even negligently) .  How would 
research subjects assign liability to those cases? Another useful study would test 
scenarios in which the person intentionally creates only a risk of harm and in 
which the extent of harm risked varied. This would reveal whether the subjects 
punished intentional risk creation of different extents of harm differently. Much 
remains to be studied in this area. 
STUDY 3: OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLICITY 
One can be held accountable for another person's conduct if one is judged to be 
"an accomplice" of that other person. In this study, we examine the objective re­
quirements of "complicity"-that is, what a person actually must do in order to 
be liable as an accomplice. ( In study 9-in Chapter 4-we consider the culpabil­
ity requirements for complicity: that is, the culpable state-of-mind require­
ments.) 
What sorts of actions has the law treated as sufficient for complicity? To be an 
accomplice under common law a person has to encourage or assist the perpetra­
tor in some way. Two general ways of behaving complicitously were thereby rec­
ognized: First, by encouraging another to commit a crime, one may cause or rein­
force another's settled intention to commit the crime; second, by assisting 
another to commit a crime, one not only implies encouragement but more 
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strongly and causally contributes to the commission of the offense. Note that the 
common law did not require that the action of the accomplice be necessary for 
commission of the offense-one could be an accomplice by standing watch even 
though those who would commit the crime do not show up or by being ready to 
drive a backup getaway car even though it is not needed. Similarly under common 
law, encouraging a principal to commit a crime engenders liability whether or not 
that encouragement was necessary for the commission of the crime. 
It was not enough under common law (for liability) , however, that a person 
merely tries to assist or encourage the perpetrator if such attempts by the person 
are unsuccessful. If the person provides neither actual assistance nor actual en­
couragement (because his unsuccessful attempt to assist was unknown to the per­
petrator, for example),  he is not liable as an accomplice. 
The Model Penal Code drafters found this common-law exemption for an un­
successful attempt to encourage or assist inappropriate; they broaden the scope of 
complicity by assigning liability to an actor's unsuccessful attempt to encourage 
or assist-A person need simply "aid or agree or attempt to aid" the perpetrator to 
be held liable as an accomplice. 
Where complicity liability is established, the actor is held liable for the full of­
fense. Unlike inchoate offenses, such as attempt, in which the actor commonly is 
accountable for a lesser grade ofliability than the offense attempted, complicity is 
a means of establishing full-offense liability. Thus, from the law's view, an accom­
plice has the same liability as the perpetrator. 
In this study, we tested our subjects' views on the minimum amount that a per­
son could contribute in encouraging or assisting an offense to be held criminally 
liable for it. We also tested whether our subjects would alter the degree of liability 
that they would impose according to the person's degree of contribution to the of­
fense. Few codes take degree of contribution into account in setting the grade of 
an accomplice's liability, but such a scheme has been introduced, albeit with rela­
tively broad categories, by the United States Sentencing Commission.1 1  
I n  this study, we presented our subjects with a series o f  scenarios, each of which 
presented a different degree of contribution to a killing, including scenarios in 
which the person attempts to assist but fails. In order to test whether our subjects' 
assessment of liability depended on the actual occurrence of a resulting harm, 
such as causing a death (we have demonstrated in other studies-for instance, 
Study 1-that resulting harm is a powerful determinant of liability and punish­
ment), several of the scenarios presented our respondents with instances in which 
the principal actor-the "perpetrator"-was not successful in his attempt to kill. 
The core of these scenarios involves an unhappily married woman who "longs 
for her husband's death, which would make her a rich widow:' A friend of the wife 
is aware of her feelings and assists or tries to assist her in various ways to bring 
about her husband's death, and these various methods form the variation in the 
scenarios. The wife alternatively kills her husband or attempts to do so and fails. 
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In Table 2.9, the three "murder fails" cases are scenarios 2a, 4a, and 6a, and their 
scores are boldfaced. 
The variations in the actions of the friend of the wife constitute the different 
scenarios in Table 2.9. Column a shows the liability assigned to the wife for her 
actions-she is assigned a liability of 1 0  or above (the equivalent of a life sen­
tence) when the murder succeeds. When her actions fail to kill her husband, her 
liability drops to about 7.5 ( 1 1  years, p < .05) .  We see again the pattern of our 
subjects giving lesser sentences for an attempt than for a completed crime. In the 
specific description of the failed attempt, it is reported that the wife "shot at her 
husband but missed"-therefore, no wound is inflicted. The respondents could 
have interpreted the miss as signaling that the wife is irresolute in her purpose. 
These two facts (no injury/possible lack of res�lve) may help explain the consid­
erable reduction in sentence for the wife in the three no-death scenarios. 
Let us next examine the central question of this third study, which is the liabil­
ity assigned to the accomplice. In scenario 1 ,  the male friend is described as realiz­
ing that "if she did decide to do it, he would be willing to help her," but before he 
can communicate this to her, "she shoots her husband dead!' Look at columns b, 
c, and d for scenario 1 ,  in which the liability assignments for the complicit friend 
of the wife are given. In this scenario, no liability is assigned to the friend. As we 
have done before, we asked our subjects various questions about how they per­
ceived the case. The exact questions are given in the footnotes to the table, and 
our subjects' numerical responses make up columns e and f As column e of sce­
nario 1 indicates, our respondents agree that the accomplice approved of the 
wife's murderous actions, with average ratings of between 8 and 9 on a scale in 
which 7 indicates agreement and 9 indicates strong agreement. (Notice, too, that 
in all cases the respondents agree that the friend approves of the wife's actions; 
thus, that fact can be taken as established for our discussion of all of these sce­
narios.) As column f of scenario 1 indicates, the respondents agree that the friend 
"does not help (the wife) at all!' 
In various of our other scenarios described in this and other chapters, the re­
spondents assign some liability if they decide that the individual has formed a set­
tled intention to commit a crime and acts upon that intention. But here they as­
sign no liability to the accomplice who decides he would be willing to help. What 
might cause this difference? We submit two possible explanations: ( 1 )  Deciding 
that one is willing to help in the commission of a crime is one step more removed 
than deciding to commit the crime, and that step might have been sufficient to 
make a difference to our subjects; and (2)  Alternatively, "realizing that one would 
be willing to help" may be read as a less-settled and -formed intention than, for 
instance, the intention formed in the attempt case of Study 1 ,  in which the person 
plans to rob the safe. 
Look next at scenarios 2 and 2a, in which the friend attempts to help the wife 
kill her husband but fails to do so even though the murder is accomplished (2)  or 
TABLE 2.9 Liabil ity as Related to Objective Requirements of Complicity 
Scenarios 
1 .  Only thinks of helping 
2. Failed attempi-toil-elp 
2a. Failed attempt to help/ 
Murder fails 
3. Encourages/No help 
4. Minimal help 
4a. Minimal help/ 
Murder fails 
5. Substantial help 
6. Necessary help 
Wife 
--
(a) 
Liability 
1 0. 1 5a 
1 0. 1 5a 
7.79b 
9.59a 
1 0.03a 
7.47b 
1 0. 1 2a 
1 0.06a 
(b) 
Liability 
o.ooe 
1 .1 56 
0.826 
4.1 5d 
6.1 5c 
4.88c,d 
9.1 8a 
9.32a 
(c) 
% No Liability 
(N) 
1 00 
68 
65 
1 2  
6 
6 
0 
0 
Accomplice 
(d) 
% No Liability 
or No Punishment 
(N+O) 
1 00 
85 
88 
38 
21  
24 
0 
0 
(e) 
Accomplic'e 
Approves 
Killing 
8.24 
8.71 
8.61 
8.75 
8.74 
8.64 
8.94 
8.94 
(f) 
Accomplice's 
Role 
1 .00 
1 .44 
1 .56 
2.59 
4.71 
4.21 
5.44 
6.41 
Ga. Necessary help/ 
Murder fails 7.71 b  7.29b 0 o 8.94 6.00 
7. Unique and necessary help 1 0. 1 5a 5.44c,d 9 32 8.21 5.03 
8. Masterminds 9.97a 9. 1 8a 0 3 8.88 7.47 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal liabil ity, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 O=life, and 1 1  =death. 
Key to column heads: 
(e) The accomplice approves of the wife kil l ing her husband: 1 =strongly disagree, 3=disagree, 5=unsure, 7=agree, 9=strongly 
agree. 
(f) The accomplice's role in the crime can best be described by which of the following statements? 
1 .  The accomplice does not help the wife at all. 
2. The accomplice attempts to help the wife but is unsuccessful in the effort. 
3. The accomplice and the wife reach an agreement that she is going to kill her h usband. 
4. The accomplice provides minimal help to the wife. 
5. The accomplice provides substantial help to the wife. 
6. The accomplice's assistance is necessary if the wife is going to kill her h usband. 
7. The accomplice provides unique help that is necessary for the wife to kil l  h er h usband. 
8. The accomplice masterminds the crime. 
Note: Superscript l etters i ndicate significance at the p < .05 level by a Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate 
means that are not statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns only. 
(JJ 
0\ 
Doctrines of Criminalization 37 
not accomplished (2a) . (The attempt to help is unknown to the wife.) These are 
examples of cases in which the accomplice provides no real assistance or encour­
agement of any kind. That individual incurs very little liability-next lowest to 
the liability assigned to the individual who only thinks about helping. This result 
is dramatically different from the Code's imposition of full offense liability for 
such a failed attempt to assist. 
In the "encourages" scenario (row 3) ,  the person has agreed with the wife that 
she should go ahead with her plan to murder her husband. Note from column f 
that respondents tend to agree that the two of them have reached an agreement 
that she will kill her husband. This "giving of encouragement" is recognized by 
both the common law and the Model Penal Code as filling one of the tests for ac­
complice liability and is seen by our subjects as requiring the assignment of some 
liability, although not a large amountY (Such agreement also would satisfy the 
test for conspiracy liability, which the Model Penal Code sets at the same grade as 
the substantive offense but which most jurisdictions grade as less than the full of­
fense. ) 
The liability assigned to the friend, 4. 1 5, is equivalent to a sentence of about 7 
months. But notice that about 38 percent of the respondents think that, whether 
they find the person guilty or not, the person does not deserve any time in jail. 
Again, this seems significantly less severe than the punishment provided by the 
Code. (However, the extent of the code-community difference may not be as great 
in other "agreement'' cases. In this scenario, the wife is described as already hav­
ing decided to murder her husband-so the agreement of the friend is probably 
not seen as necessary to the wife's decision, although her decision is undeniably 
reinforced by the agreement. The contrast case to this, that might have caused 
subjects to assign more liability to the accomplice, would occur when he gave en­
couragement before the wife decided to kill her husband. ) 
With this general introduction to the results, let us look at the patterning of the 
liability judgments. The eight murder scenarios describe what we hoped would be 
seen as an increasing degree of help and encouragement to the wife in her plan to 
kill her husband. The checks-on-the-manipulations questions help us determine 
if the subjects perceived the scenarios in the way that we had hoped. In the "failed 
attempt to help" scenarios ( rows 2 and 2a),  the friend overhears the wife tell her 
plan to her sister, and he then attempts to meet the wife to supply the necessary 
gun. However, before he reaches her, she has already shot at her husband. Respon­
dents see this as midway between providing no help and an attempt to provide 
help that is unsuccessful ( ratings of 1 .44 and 1 .56, respectively, in column f) .  In 
the minimal help scenarios (rows 4 and 4a), the wife has formed the plan to shoot 
her husband, and the friend tells her where to buy the gun. Obviously, his agree­
ment with the plan is implicit in that action. Respondents see this as providing 
somewhere between minimal and substantial help (ratings of 4.7 1 and 4.2 1 ,  re­
spectively, in which 4 = minimal help and 5 substantial help) .  In scenario 5, the 
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friend gives the wife his gun with which to shoot the husband, thus providing 
substantial help, and she uses the gun to kill her husband. (We did not run the 
scenario in which the friend gives substantial help, and she shoots at her husband 
and misses.) The respondents agree that he in fact provides substantial help (col­
umn f, a rating of 5.44, where 5 = substantial help). In scenarios 6 and 6a, the 
friend provides necessary help. The wife has been unable to obtain a firearm and 
is given one by the friend. She then confesses that she does not know how to shoot 
it, and he teaches her how. The respondents saw this as we had hoped, giving rat­
ings of 6.4 1  and 6 respectively (where 6 = necessary help). 
In scenario 7, the friend provides what we considered to be unique and neces­
sary help; he alerts the wife to the fact that her husband, suspicious of her in ten­
tions, is fleeing town, and she goes home and kills him before he can leave. But 
column /indicates that our subjects did not see the case the way we had hoped­
instead, they see the accomplice as providing only substantial help. We will come 
back to a discussion of this shortly. 
In scenario 8, the friend is described as a business partner of the husband and 
as a person who will be relieved of debt if the husband dies. Knowing that the wife 
is unhappy with her husband, he provides her with a plan in which she can shoot 
her husband and make it look like an accident. She follows the plan and kills her 
husband. While we labeled this the "mastermind" scenario, about half of the re­
spondents agree (column f) that he "masterminds the crime;' while the other half 
respond that he "provides unique help that is necessary for the wife to kill her 
husband.'' 
So with the rather important exception of scenario 7, our subjects see the role 
of the accomplice approximately as we had hoped. What differences did this make 
in their liability assignments? Comparing the liability ratings of eleven cases is not 
an easy matter-but we believe that Figures 2. 10  and 2. 1 1  will help. 
Figure 2. 1 0  is designed to facilitate examination of the effects of increasing de­
grees of accomplice complicity on the liability he is assigned.In this figure, all of 
the cases in which the wife successfully kills her husband are charted (except sce­
nario 7, the one that our subjects see so differently), and all of the cases in which 
the wife fails to kill her husband are eliminated; we will consider them later. As 
the involvement of the friend moves from ((thought only" to failed attempt, and 
so on, up through masterminding of the crime, the liability ratings of the respon­
dents increase; that is, the liability assignments to the friend increase as his causal 
involvement in the incident increases [F (2,66) = 85.90, p < .00 1 ] .  Notice, inter­
estingly, that the liability assignments level off once the complicit individual has 
reached the level of substantial involvement in the killing: To the cases of substan­
tial involvement, necessary involvement, and masterminding the crime, our re­
spondents assign a sentence of about thirty years in prison. This suggests that 
substantial assistance is something of a threshold after which greater assistance is 
oflittle consequence to liability. 13  The flattening of the accomplice's liability graph 
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FIGURE 2. 1 0 Liability Assigned to the Accomplice as a Function of His Involvement 
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at a level lower than the liability assigned to the perpetrator (9. 1 8, 9.32, and 9. 1 8  
for the accomplice versus 10. 12 ,  1 0.06, and 9.97 for the perpetrator) also confirms 
that our subjects see reduced liability as appropriate for the accomplice (as com­
pared to the perpetrator) , apparently without regard to how active a role the ac­
complice played in the three most serious scenarios. 
The "mastermind" scenario hints at the possibility of a limit of the liability 
grade reduction for accomplices. The liability assigned to the masterminding 
friend is high, above thirty years in prison, but still below that assigned to the 
wife. Yet, as a glance at Table 2.9 will confirm, the liability assigned to the wife is 
lower than it is in cases in which she acts more independently. It is interesting to 
note that some of the responsibility for the crime might be beginning to be 
shifted away from the wife here; this is the only succesful scenario in which she re­
ceives less than a life sentence for her actions. As her accountability for the death 
is reduced, one might expect the mastermind's to increase, perhaps eventually 
eliminating the usual accomplice grade reduction. 
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FIGURE 2. 1 1  Effects of Success or Failure of Killing on liability for the Accomplice 
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We now say what we can about scenario 7, which we have labeled "unique and 
necessary help:' Recall that this case was not perceived by our subjects as provid­
ing unique and necessary help; such would have entailed an average rating of 7 in 
column f. Instead, in this case the accomplice is perceived as simply providing 
substantial help to the wife (5.03 rating, where 5 = substantial help) .  Future re­
search will need to create a case in which respondents perceive that unique and 
necessary help is given by a complicit individual in order to see if the liability 
scores associated with such a case approach the liability given a mastermind, as we 
would predict. However, it is interesting to contrast the liability assignment of 
case 7 with that of case 5, in which the respondents did perceive that (as we had 
hoped) substantial help was given. The accomplice in case 5 draws a significantly 
higher liability assignment (a sentence of more than thirty years) than does the 
accomplice in case 7 (a  sentence of only about two years) ,  even though both are 
roughly matched on what we know of the nature of our respondents' perceptions 
of the complicit individual's involvement in the case. This suggests that our re­
spondents may be considering some as yet undiscovered factors that are influenc-
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ing their decisions, and future research should attempt to discover what these fac­
tors are. 
Next, what difference does it make to the accomplice's liability whether the wife 
successfully kills her husband or shoots and misses? This is answered in Figure 
2. 1 1 , in which we examine the three pairs of cases in which the friend fails in his 
attempt to help, provides minimal help, or provides necessary help, and the 
woman succeeds in killing her husband or fails. (See Table 2 .9, scenarios 2 and 2a, 
4 and 4a, and 6 and 6a. ) As the figure shows, the respondents consistently give a 
somewhat reduced liability to the accomplice friend in the cases in which the per­
petrator wife fails to kill her husband (F( l ,33) = 39.68, p < .00 1 ] .  (That is, the 
"failed'' line is consistently lower on the liability axis than the "succeeded" line. ) 
We have commented previously on the general tendency of our respondents to 
follow this pattern-to give reduced sentences when the harm of the offense does 
not actually occur. This is-on first glance-consistent with the Model Penal 
Code's treatment of such cases. While the accomplice's failed attempt to assist is 
treated the same as successful assistance, the perpetrator's failure to commit the 
crime does affect at least the label that is given to the accomplice's liability: His li­
ability is only that of complicity in an attempt rather than complicity in the full 
offense. Recall, though, that what the Code gives with one hand, it takes away 
with the other. While most jurisdictions give a somewhat reduced grade for at­
tempt liability, the Code grades attempts the same as the substantive offense, so 
that no reduction in accomplice liability would be achieved. 
Study 3: Summary 
The results of this complicity study are generally what intuition would have led us 
to expect. The greater the degree of help provided by the accomplice-where help 
is conceived of on a rough continuum beginning with encouragement and ending 
with criminal master minding-the greater the liability assigned to the accom­
plice. The significance of these results for various code formulations is, first, sup­
port for the common-law rule and against the Model Penal Code in the debate 
between the two (respectively) on whether actual assistance is required for ac­
complice liability or whether an unsuccessful attempt is sufficient. Our subjects 
tend to agree with the common-law formulation that requires actual encourage­
ment or assistance. 
Second, the gradations in liability assigned by our respondents to the person, 
depending on his degree of assistance in the crime, represent a pattern that we 
will see repeatedly in our data and one that frequently contradicts the legal sys­
tem's tendency to treat various actors who play "supporting roles" in the commis­
sion of a crime as equally liable with the individual who commits the crime. 
Complicity, in the eyes of our respondents, is a matter of degree. Within legal 
codes, it is often treated as an ali-or-nothing issue. If one fails to qualify as an ac-
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complice, there is no liability; if one is an accomplice, full liability for the offense 
is imposed, equal to that assigned the principal in the crime. Our respondents 
persist in making finely graduated liability distinctions. This gradation of liability 
is what the sentencing guidelines (see note 1 1 )  are attempting to provide, at the 
level of actual sentences assigned to accomplices. Note the similarity of this grad­
uated pattern to the pattern assigned by respondents in our study of causation 
( Study 1 7) ,  again a continuum of liability in a situation treated within legal codes 
as a dichotomous cutoff. 
Finally, our subjects seem to disagree with the codes' view that an accomplice's 
liability ought to be the same grade as the perpetrator's. This is true even in those 
cases in which the degree of assistance is very high--even essential to the success­
ful commission of the offense. Our subjects would give a minimum of one grade 
reduction to accomplices, much as most jurisdictions now do for attempt liability. 
STUDY 4: OMISSION LIABILITY 
The definitions of substantive offenses, together with the secondary prohibitions 
of attempt, risk creation, and complicity, give a complete account of what a per­
son must not do. But the rules of conduct enforced by the criminal law occasion­
ally require that a person perform specific conduct. People must pay taxes, regis­
ter for the draft, obtain a license to engage in certain regulated activities, and so 
forth. While we do not fully address it here, a subsequent study might examine 
whether current codes accurately map the conduct that the law ought to require 
upon pain of criminal liability for failure to act. Are some failures (omissions) 
currently punished by legal codes perceived by the community as of insufficient 
seriousness for liability? Should the criminal law create duties to act in situations 
not now required? 
In one aspect of this study, we focus on the practice of current codes in impos­
ing the same degree of liability on a person who commits an offense through 
commission as through omission. The codes see as equivalent, for example, af­
firmative conduct causing a death and an omission to perform a legal duty that 
results in a death, all other things being equal. 
In another aspect of this study, we focus on the most controversial instance of 
the law's failure to create a legal duty to help-in the case in which another per­
son is in danger of serious injury or death. Anglo-American law has generally re­
sisted imposing liability for a person's failure to act to help a stranger in distress. 
Under current doctrine, liability may be imposed for an omission to help only if 
the p erson has a specific duty to act [ see Model Penal Code § 2.01 ( 1 ) ] ,  and such 
duties are relatively rare and narrowly defined. For example, consider the case of a 
person who comes upon a drowning person whose life could be saved by the wit­
ness merely throwing the victim a nearby life preserver. The law imposes a duty 
for the witness to assist the drowning person-and thus imposes liability if such 
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assistance is omitted-only if the witness has one of several defined relationships 
to the endangered person. The most common sources of a duty to rescue are the 
duty of a parent to protect his or her child and a duty created by virtue of contrac­
tual agreement between parties-for instance, when a swimming club hires a per­
son to serve as a lifeguard. A duty to rescue also may be created if one undertakes 
to help a person in distress, which may signal to others that the situation is under 
control, and then the volunteer fails to help, thereby leaving the person less likely 
to be assisted by another. Once one assumes the responsibility to rescue, even vol­
untarily, one has a legal duty to carry it to completion. 14  
However, if  none of these relationships exist, the law holds that the person is 
under no obligation to help. Thus, in the case of the drowning individual, the wit­
ness who knows of the danger and can avert it generally has no duty to do so. This 
is so even if the act of helping, such as throwing the life preserver, presents no 
danger or even inconvenience to the person-even if the witness knows that the 
imperiled person otherwise will drown without the life preserver. Because the 
person has no duty to act, there is no criminal liability for failing to act. 
The debate on this issue has an old and distinguished history. Several commen­
tators have criticized the restrictive view of omission liability. Livingston, for ex­
ample, argues that one should have a legal duty to act to save a stranger if such 
can be done without personal danger or pecuniary loss ( Livingston, 1833, chp. II, 
articles 1 2-13) .  Such proposals to create a general duty to rescue have been criti­
cized, in turn, as being too broad ( Macauley, 1 837, Note M, pp. 53-54) .  Macauley 
argues in the foregoing cite that "there may be extreme inconvenience without the 
smallest personal danger or the smallest risk of pecuniary loss." More generally, 
proposals to create a general duty to rescue are thought by many to go beyond the 
appropriate realm of criminal liability and into the sphere of moral accountabil­
ity: 
It is, indeed, most highly desirable that men should not merely abstain from doing 
harm to their neighbors, but should render active services to their neighbors. In gen­
eral however the penal law must content itself with keeping men from doing positive 
harm, and must leave to public opinion, and to the teachers of morality and religion, 
the office of furnishing men with motives for doing positive good. It is evident that to 
attempt to punish men by law for not rendering to others all the service which it is 
their [ moral] duty to render to others would be preposterous. We must grant impu­
nity to the vast majority of those omissions which a benevolent morality would pro­
nounce reprehensible, and must content ourselves with punishing such omissions 
only when they are distinguished from the rest by some circumstance which marks 
them out as peculiarly fit objects of penal legislation (Macauley, 1837, pp. 55-56). 
While an omission to act may not be morally correct, the argument goes, it is not 
the sort of thing that ought to generate criminal liability other than in exceptional 
circumstances. 
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This is the prevailing view that is instantiated in the laws of our society, al­
though there are occasional exceptions. Despite such general reluctance to create 
omission liability, a few states have enacted a limited general duty to rescue, typi­
cally limiting the duty to cases of serious danger to the victim in which the rescuer 
need not endanger him or herself. [ See, e.g., Rhode Island General Laws § 1 1 -56-
1 ;  Wisconsin Statutes Annotated § 940.34(2) ] .  The statutes also tend to provide 
only minor penalties in case of conviction. 
Our omission study sought to test the community's views on whether criminal 
liability and punishment are appropriate for a failure to rescue a stranger and, if 
so, to determine how the assignment of liability and punishment may vary with 
different levels of danger or inconvenience. This study also examined the commu­
nity's views of the comparative liability for a commission and an omission under 
each of the existing traditional sources of duty-parental or contractual relation­
ship or assumption of responsibility to rescue. Subjects were given a series of sce­
narios involving one actor pushing another into the water in circumstances in 
which it is apparent that the victim will likely drown if not rescued; another actor 
observes this, but fails to act to rescue the victim. For the first subset of scenarios 
( 1  through 4 in Table 2 . 12) ,  a flotation device is present; all that is necessary for 
the bystander to do is to throw it to the victim. For the second subset (scenarios 5 
through 8),  since we were interested in whether the respondents would require 
bystander action of a more major sort, it is necessary for the bystander to swim to 
the aid of the victim. (The bystander is described as a strong swimmer.) We asked 
our respondents to rate the liability that they would assign both to the perpetrator 
(who affirmatively pushes the victim into the water) and to the nonacting by­
stander. The scenarios differed in the relationship between the bystander and the 
victim and in the degree of danger or inconvenience that rescuing the victim 
would impose on the bystander. 
The first point of interest is a global one: When compared with the liability 
judgments for the person who created the danger, the liability judgments for the 
bystander's failure to act are greatly mitigated. Liability and punishment for the 
person who pushes the victim into the water and thereby causes the death 
through commission, column a, is constant in all scenarios, at approximately 8.6 
(24.4 years) .  For the bystander who does not help, liability and punishment for 
failing to rescue is consistently significantly less. This is most easily seen by scan­
ning column d, which lists the liability scores assigned to the person who fails to 
help; at no point does bystander liability even approach that assigned to the per­
son who commits the act. 
Mitigation from full liability is given even in those cases in which the bystander 
has a legal duty to act, as in scenarios 2 through 4. ( In scenario 2, the bystander is 
a parent of the victim; in scenario 3, he has a contractual obligation to rescue the 
victim because he is a security guard at the site; and in scenario 4, the actor tells 
another that he will rescue the victim, thus assuming the obligation.) Even in 
TABLE 2. 1 2  Liability for Commission and Omission 
Commission Omission 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
% No Liability % No Liability Model Penal 
% No or % No or Code Result 
Scenarios Liability Liability No Punishment Liability Liability No Punishment (for omission) 
1 .  Stranger 8.55 0 0 2.93a 21 52 No l iabil ity 
2. Parent 8.66 0 0 5 . 1 ob 7 31  Same liability as commission 
3. Contract 8.62 0 0 6.2 1 b 0 1 0  Same liability as commission 
4. Assumption 8.62 0 0 5.55b 3 24 Same liability as commission 
5. Stranger-high 
danger 8.66 0 0 0.97a 55 86 No l iability 
6. Stranger-low 
danger 8.61 0 0 2.4 1 a  2 1  62 No l iability 
7. Stranger-high 
inconvenience 8.66 0 0 3.64a 1 4  43 N o  l iability 
8. Stranger-low 
inconvenience 8.59 0 0 3.79a 1 4  4 1  No liability 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liabi l ity but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death . 
N ote: S uperscript letters indicate significance at the p < . 05 level by a Newman·Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate 
means that are not statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns only. 
� 
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these duty scenarios, omission liability-5. 1 0  ( 1 .2 years) to 6.21  (3.8 years)-is 
significantly lower than commission liability for the same death-8.6 (24.4 
years) .  
Table 2. 1 3  reports, among other things, the respondents' perceptions of various 
aspects of the state of mind of the person who fails to rescue the victim; these per­
ceptions suggest that part of the difference in liability that our subjects assign to 
the perpetrator and the bystander might be partially due to perceptions that the 
two actors have different culpable states of mind as to causing the death. Our re­
spondents judge that the individual who pushes the victim into the water wants 
him to drown, while the individual who fails to help him is not seen as wanting 
the victim to drown. (For the omission actor, these ratings range between 3.38 
and 4.76, with a rating of 3 meaning the respondents "disagreed" with the state­
ment that the individual wanted the victim to drown and a rating of 5 indicating 
"unsure:')Still, as column c shows, the respondents agreed that the potential res­
cuer is practically certain that the victim would drown. This suggests that the re­
spondents give a liability discount to the person who fails to help, as compared to 
the person whose act of commission created the situation in the first place, even 
though they do regard the omission as blameworthy. 
Returning to considerations affecting the level of liability assigned to the ob­
server who fails to act, as Table 2. 1 2  shows, our subjects clearly do distinguish be­
tween the stranger ( no-duty) scenarios ( I  and 5 through 8) and the duty 
scenarios (2 through 4).  In the latter set of cases, a large majority of our subjects 
impose liability and punishment (93 percent to 100 percent) . 15 These results con­
firm the importance of the legal doctrine's consideration of whether a legal duty 
exists and suggest that the community sees the same sorts of relationships as cre­
ating this duty to rescue as does the Code. Thus the study results suggest that vio­
lation of a duty is recognized by the community as grounds for assigning a person 
criminal liability. However, the liability scores assigned in the duty cases are by no 
means as severe as those that the Code would assign in the same cases. The Code's 
penalties for omission would be the same as those assigned for commission of the 
act, which in our scenarios would be punishment levels of approXimately 8 .6 
(24.4 years). Consistently, our subjects assign liability levels well below 8.6, rang­
ing from 5. 1 to 6.2 ( 1 .2 years to 3.8 years) .  
I t  is not the case that our subjects are lenient in all o f  their judgments. I n  con­
trast to the legal duty scenarios, subjects appear to be stricter than the Code in 
cases where no legal duty exists. In all scenarios where a bystander fails to rescue a 
stranger, except the one involving high danger to the rescuer, a majority of the 
subjects would impose criminal liability in such cases ( from 79 percent to 86 per­
cent) . 16 Even in the high-danger scenario, 45 percent would impose liability. Yet, 
the legal doctrine imposes no liability where no duty to rescue exists. In the eyes 
of our respondents, absence of a duty does not exempt a person from liability for 
failing to save a stranger's life. As the responses to scenarios 5 through 8 show, our 
TABLE 2. 1 3  Respondents' Perceptions of Commission and Omission Cases 
Commission 
(a) (b) (c) 
Scenarios Knowledge Purpose Knowledge 
1 .  Stranger 6.48 5.86 6.71 
2. Parent 6.41 6. 1 0  7.28 
3. Contract 6.45 6.03 6.90 
4. Assumption 6.55 5.97 6.66 
5. Stranger-high danger 6.48 6.03 6.72 
6. Stranger-low danger 6.45 6.00 6.79 
7. Stranger-high i nconvenience 6.48 5.83 6.79 
8. Stranger-low inconvenience 6.62 5.86 6.69 
Key to column heads: 
Omission 
(d) (e) (f) 
Purpose Inconvenience Danger 
3.45 1 .48 1 .45 
4. 1 7  1 .21 1 .28 
4.28 1 .48 1 .24 
4.76 1 .2 1  1 .31 
3.38 5.21 6.93 
4. 1 0  4.03 4.55 
4.28 4.59 2.45 
4.21 3.21 2.34 
Statements (a) through (d) were responded to on a scale where 1 =strongly disagree, 3=disagree, 5=unsure,  and 9=strongly 
agree. 
(a) The actor is practically certain that the victim will drown. 
(b) The actor wanted the victim to drown. 
(c) The potential rescuer is practically certain that the victim will drown . 
(d) The potential rescuer wanted the victim to drown . 
(e) To what extent would it have been inconvenient for the potential rescuer to help the victim? 1 =not at all inconvenient and 
9=extremely inconvenient. 
(f) To what extent would it have been dangerous for the potential rescuer to help the victim? 1 =not at all dangerous and 
9=extremely dangerous. 
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respondents think that a bystander who can swim should swim to the rescue of a 
drowning individual and should be criminally liable for failing to do so. 
In saying this, we do not overlook that our subjects make some carefully nu­
anced qualifications of the duty to rescue a stranger. The results of these four 
nonduty scenarios are illustrated in Figure 2. 14. In this figure, we have arrayed 
the four scenarios in terms of the degree of sacrifice required of the possible 
helper, with the inconvenience cases assumed to require less sacrifice. Notice that 
the respondents lower their liability judgments as the inconvenience and particu­
larly the danger to the potential rescuer increases; the less the inconvenience or 
danger to the bystander in attempting a rescue, the more the liability he incurs for 
not doing so. {An analysis of variance indicates that the degree of either danger or 
inconvenience makes a reliable difference in the respondents' assignment of lia­
bility [ F( 1 ,27) = 1 1 .23, p < .002] . As the figure also indicates, the degree of dan­
ger that exists for the potential helper mitigates the respondents' condemnation 
of him for not intervening-more so than does the degree of inconvenience 
[ F( l ,27) 1 8.22, p < .00 1 ] .  
But details of the patterning aside, our respondents see a very far-reaching duty 
to intervene, one that generally goes beyond the views instantiated in the codes. In 
the high-danger case, involving the necessity to jump into shark-infested waters 
to attempt the rescue { scenario 5 of Table 2 . 12) ,  45 percent of our subjects assign 
liability to the person who chooses not to help, although the punishments as­
signed in this case were low. 
The code-community difference in the no-duty cases is not as great, however, 
when one focuses on punishment rather than liability. Many subjects impose lia­
bility but no punishment ( compare columns e and [of Table 2. 12 ) .  In the two sce­
narios with elements of danger, only a minority of subjects impose punishment . 
(38 percent in the low-danger scenario, 1 4  percent in the high-danger scenario). 
There is a possible pattern here, in which the respondents are using an assign­
ment of criminal liability to censure conduct, without wishing to impose an ac­
tual punishment on the censured individual. (We will see similar patterns of re­
sponses in other studies and will return to this theme in Chapter 7 . )  In the no­
danger cases ( in which a majority of subjects do impose punishment), the degree 
of punishment is not high, ranging from 2.93 (7.4 weeks) to 3.79 (5.2 months) . 1 7  
Study 4 :  Summary 
The results of this study indicate that our subjects would support a system in 
which causing a death by omission receives some liability, but less liability and 
punishment than if the death is caused by commission, all other things being 
equal. Some of the omission study's results support the standard legal distinc­
tions: In those cases in which there are relationships that the law suggests create a 
duty to act, our respondents assign more liability and punishment for failing to 
act than in those cases where no such duty exists. Where no duty exists, the degree 
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FIGURE 2. 1 4  Liability as a Function of the Degree of Sacrifice Necessary to Rescue 
Low 
Inconvenience 
High 
Inconvenience 
Low Danger 
Sacrifice Required of Potential Rescuer 
High Danger 
of liability and punishment is reduced as the degree of danger or inconvenience to 
the rescuer increases. Still, only in the case of high danger is the potential rescuer 
judged free from liability by a majority of respondents, and only in the case of no­
ticeable danger is the potential rescuer assigned no punishment by a majority of 
respondents. Inconvenience never exempts the potential rescuer from liability, 
but in such cases the degree of punishment is low. These results appear to support 
the few American state statutes that create a limited duty to rescue strangers from 
serious threats. 
When a person fails in a legal duty to rescue, created by contractual agreement, 
parental relationship, or voluntary assumption of responsibility, the subjects im­
pose significantly lower liability than current doctrine would. Apparently, causing 
a death by omission is judged less blameworthy than causing the same death by 
commission {with the potential rescuer sharing the same state of mind concern­
ing whether the victim was likely to die as the perpetrator). Current doctrine im­
poses full liability for the substantive offense for such cases of omission, while our 
subjects discount liability for omission . Our findings suggest that code drafters 
should provide significant grade reductions in those cases in which liability is 
based on a failure to perform a legal duty. 
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Finally, our respondents make nuanced distinctions between similar but not 
identical cases. For instance, our subjects vary the amount ofliability assigned ac­
cording to the nature of the circumstances that create the duty to rescue. A con­
tinuum of accountability also exists, in the context of rescue of a stranger, where 
liability varies with the degree of danger or inconvenience.18 This is another ex­
ample of the law's discontinuous treatment of what our subjects see as a continu­
ous function, an issue we take up again in Chapter 7. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The four studies reviewed in this chapter suggest that secondary prohibitions are 
indeed a rich source of disagreement between community views and criminal 
codes. Codes frequently impose liability where our subjects would not-or where 
they would at least impose considerably less. For instance, our subjects find the 
dangerous proximity test embodied in the common law a better trigger for at­
tempt liability than the substantial step test of the Model Penal Code. Further, our 
respondents give more weight to the renunciation of a criminal attempt even 
when that attempt has progressed far enough to trigger criminal liability. Unsuc­
cessful attempts to encourage or assist in a crime seem to our subjects to call for 
little or no liability, more in keeping with the common-law treatment of these un­
successful attempts than the Code treatment, which would impose full offense lia­
bility. Also, a person who intends murder but creates only a slight risk of minor 
harm receives a sentence from our subjects that is greatly reduced from the codes' 
treatment of the act as attempted murder. Our respondents also assign an accom­
plice to a crime higher liability as his contribution to the crime increases, but that 
level of liability does not rise high enough to equal the liability assigned the prin­
cipal criminal-as the codes provide. A person who has a duty to rescue another 
and fails in that duty (and the person who might have been saved dies) is liable, 
but not for murder, which is the liability that the codes would assign. 
In other instances, our respondents either impose liabilities greater than those 
imposed by legal codes or assign liability in cases in which the codes assign none. 
For example, some degree of liability is assigned by our subjects to individuals 
who develop a settled intention to commit a crime-a case in which the codes as­
sign none. Our respondents also would impose some liability on persons who fail 
to assist a person in distress, even though the codes impose none. 
This last result is worth further comment. Except in limited cases, current legal 
codes impose no omission liability on one who fails to help another in distress, 
even when that help would be easy to give. Our respondents disagree with this; 
they impose some degree of liability in those situations. The liability they impose 
is small, and they frequently suggest a verdict of "liability but no punishment." 
This suggests to us that they would support the broadening of duty-to-assist laws. 
It also suggests that they are discriminating between two functions of liability as-
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signments-two functions that are sometimes not differentiated. First" and up­
permost in the minds of people thinking about legal systems, the crimi�al justice 
system assigns punishments. But it also communicates community consensus on 
what is desirable and undesirable conduct, and it may have been this second mes­
sage-sending function that our respondents were thinking of when they assigned 
this small omission liability. We will have more to say about the dual functions of 
liability in upcoming chapters. 
The previous discussion has focused on liability discrepancies between code 
and community standards in individual cases; it is also possible to focus on the 
difference in patterning of responses across cases and the associated differences 
between code and community. Examining those differences highlights what 
might be called the underlying conceptual differences between code and commu­
nity standards. One very apparent pattern of differences is worthy of note. Our 
respondents consistently assign reduced liabilities to individuals who play sec­
ondary roles in the commission of a crime, even though the codes assign those in­
dividuals with liabilities that are equivalent to those of the principal. Also, and 
closely connected with this, our respondents assign reduced liability for the viola­
tion of secondary prohibitions, such as attempt, even when the Model Penal Code 
assigns liabilities equivalent to those assigned for the commission of the primary 
prohibited act. We will see further instances of this respondent pattern in upcom­
ing chapters. 
Finally, one other overarching pattern in our respondents' system of judgment 
requires noting: The community is more "harm-oriented" than is the Model Pe­
nal Code. That is, our subjects' liability judgments are more affected by whether a 
harm actually comes about. For example, a person intends to poison another. If 
she succeeds, she receives a severe sentence; if she fails, she receives a reduced sen­
tence, graded by our respondents by the degree of actual harm done to the victim. 
A wife intends to kill her husband and shoots at him. If he is killed, our subjects 
assign a severe sentence; if not, they assign a much less severe sentence. In con­
trast, the Model Penal Code generally looks to the intent of the harm-doer and as­
signs sentences to that harm-doer that set the liability at the level that would be 
given for the successful accomplishment of the crime intended. Of course, our 
case that most clearly demonstrated this point is the case in which it was murder 
that was attempted. Interestingly, the Model Penal Code makes an exception to its 
general tendency and punishes an attempted murder at one grade lower than a 
successful murder. However, we will see in upcoming studies that the respon­
dents' tendency to assign liability according to the actual occurrence of the harm 
exists for offenses other than murder. 
3 
Doctrines of justification: 
When Should It Be Lawful for 
One to Engage in Conduct 
That  Normally Would 
Constitute a Violation? 
Taken together, the criminalization doctrines (some of which we have examined 
in Chapter 2) ,  give a complete account of what a person must or must not do in 
order to obey the criminal law. The doctrines are not, however, a complete state­
ment of the criminal law's rules of conduct. The law recognizes that in some in­
stances a greater harm can be avoided or a greater good can be achieved by allow­
ing a person to engage in conduct that normally would constitute a violation. 
Burning another person's property is a violation, but it is to be tolerated (and 
even encouraged) if the burning acts as a firebreak to save a town. Striking an­
other person without consent is a violation but is permitted if a police officer 
finds it necessary in order to overcome resistance to a lawful arrest. While shoot­
ing another person normally would be illegal, it may be justified if it is a necessary 
defense against unlawful force. The doctrines defining when conduct constituting 
a violation is nonetheless lawful are known as justification defenses. They are per­
missive only: They tell people when they will be permitted to act in violation of 
the doctrines of criminalization; they do not require one to act. 
The criminal law recognizes a number of justification defenses. Self-defense 
and defense of property, which we examine in this chapter, are examples of defen­
sive force justifications: They allow a person to defend him or herself or property 
against an aggressor's threat. Law enforcement authority, also discussed in this 
chapter, such as the right to use force to arrest a violator, allows the use of 
nondefensive force. An officer or a private citizen in some cases (also examined in 
this chapter) may use force to effect an arrest even though the violator is no 
longer presenting a threat. Other j ustification defenses allow nondefensive use of 
force by, for example, teachers, prison guards, military personnel, parents and 
custodians punishing children, persons responsible for maintaining order on 
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public vehicles, doctors treating patients, and persons acting under a judicial or­
der. As we shall see, the law's requirements for all justification defenses are analo­
gous in several respects. Basically, the law requires that the force used be the mini­
mum necessary to avoid the threatened harm or to further the defined interest. 
The law also requires that the amo'Unt of force used not be disproportionate to the 
value of the interest to be protected or furthered (see Model Penal Code (MPC), 
Article 3; Robinson, 1 982). 
In this chapter's studies, we examine not only the rules of justified conduct but 
also those governing the effects of a person's mistake as to whether his conduct is 
justified. While there is some legal controversy surrounding the term "justified" 
when used to describe these cases, for the purposes of our discussion, we shall dis­
tinguish conduct that is actually justified from conduct that the person only mis­
takenly believes is justified. The latter cases are in truth instances of excuse, not 
justification, which are the subject of Chapter 5. 
Unlike some of the other areas that we have reviewed, there are a few studies in 
the psychological literature bearing on ordinary people's perceptions of the legiti­
macy of justifications for acts that would otherwise generate liability. Darley and 
Zanna ( 1982),  for instance, have demonstrated that even young children are capa­
ble of recognizing and granting validity to some of the most common classes of 
justifications recognized by the legal system. In the studies in this chapter, we 
measure the precise fit of community judgments with the patterns of justifica­
tions given validity within legal codes. 
STUDY 5: 
USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE 
The law allows a person to use force to defend himself or herself, even deadly force 
on occasion. What otherwise would be murder ( intentional killing) is fully excul­
pated as long as the conditions of self-defense are met. It is universally required 
that the use of force in self-defense be necessary. This notion of "necessity" means 
that ifless force (than that used) would have been adequate to one's defense, then 
the force used is not necessary and therefore not justified. If a person can protect 
himself by using no force at all, then any use of force is unnecessary. Thus, codes 
typically oblige a person to retreat before using deadly force if he or she can do so 
in safety. The law limits one's duty to retreat, however, by not requiring retreat 
from one's home or workplace, on the theory that such retreat would expose the 
person to greater danger. A second, equally important condition of self-defense 
requires that the person's use of force take account of the seriousness of the threat. 
That is, even if it is necessary to protect oneself, a person is not justified in using 
deadly force to defend against a kick in the shin. This required proportionality 
between the nature of the threatened harm and the nature of the defensive force is 
manifested in the law's limitation of the use of deadly force to instances in which 
serious bodily injury is threatened. 
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A person may fail to meet some of the conditions for the use of deadly force in 
self-defense yet receive a defense or mitigation if he or she (mistakenly) believes 
that the conditions are satisfied. For example, a person who mistakenly but rea­
sonably believes that he or she cannot safely retreat nonetheless will receive a de­
fense for the use of deadly force in self-defense. Similarly, a person who mistak­
enly but reasonably believes that an attacker is threatening serious bodily injury 
will receive a defense. If the person's mistake is culpable ( reckless or negligent) ,  
some jurisdictions deny a defense while others impose reduced liability. In the lat­
ter, for example, if a person is reckless as to the existence of a serious threat, that 
person may be liable for manslaughter rather than murder if he or she kills in 
mistaken self-defense. If the person's mistake is negligent, liability for negligent 
homicide may follow. If the mistake is reasonable ( nonnegligent),  the person may 
have no liability [MPC § 3.09(2 ) ] . If a person accurately perceives the situation 
but is mistaken as to what the law permits, that person's mistake does not provide 
a defense or mitigation. Thus, there is no defense for a person who mistakenly be­
lieves that he or she is legally justified in killing an attacker who does not present a 
serious threat [ MPC § 3.09( 1 ) (b ) ] .  The law also denies a defense to a person who 
provokes an attack in order to kill the attacker in self-defense [ MPC § 
3.04(2) (b) (i) ] .  
As is obvious, the Code's self-defense rules are detailed and complex. In our 
self-defense study, we examine the community's views on the use of deadly force 
in self-defense and compare those views to the legal doctrine's rules and condi­
tions. The core of this study's scenario is as follows: A man who legally carries a 
gun for protection is walking on a deserted street in a city at night. He is accosted 
by another man (under various circumstances) and shoots him, killing him. The 
liability results are summarized in Table 3. 1 .  
To begin discussion of these results, look first at the lower and upper bound­
aries of liability established by our two "control" cases (rows 1 and 2 of the table) .  
The lower-boundary control scenario (row 2)  involves a case in which a person is 
attacked with a deadly weapon and responds by killing the attacker. These results 
confirm that our subjects give a defense to a person who kills under conditions 
that satisfy the legal requirements for self-defense. First, the assignment of liabil­
ity was vanishingly low, an average of0. 14, which scales to well below 1 day in jail. 
Of the respondents, 71 percent gave no liability; 97 percent gave no liability or lia­
bility but no punishment. 
For a killing that meets none of the doctrine's requirements for justification, 
the upper-boundary control scenario (row 1 )  establishes the baseline liability of 
7.97 (approximately 1 5  years). This result surprised us because this level of liabil­
ity is noticeably less than the liability typically given to murderers by other re­
spondents in the other study scenarios that we have presented or will present later 
in this book. After reexamining this scenario, we came up with a possible inter­
pretation. In this case, a person is approached by a beggar and then shoots the 
TABLE 3. 1 Self-Defense Liability 
Scenarios 
1 .  Killing, no self-defense 
2. Killing, self-defense 
Knows deadly force is not 
necessary because: 
3. Unarmed attacker 
4. Could retreat 
5. Could retreat from home 
Believes deadly force is 
necessary but: 
6. Mistaken as to threat 
7. Mistakenly believes 
retreat not possible 
B. Actor provokes attack 
Believes deadly force is not 
necessary but: 
9. Mistakenly believes 
deadly force legal 
(a) (b) 
% No 
Liability 
Liability (N) 
7.97 3 
0. 1 4  71 
6.66 6 
4.63 23 
0.77 43 
1 .40 3 1  
0.49 54 
6.40 6 
6.71 3 
(c) (d) (e) (f) 
% No Liability or Maximum 
No Punishment Model Penal "Force Was Force 
(N+O) Code Result Reasonable" Permissible 
9 Liable for murder 2.20 2.34 
97 Complete defense 7.97 7.83 
1 4  Liable for m urder 2.97 3.54 
40 Liable for murder 4.06 4.46 
86 Complete defense 6.20 7.00 
so Complete defense 5.89 5.3 1 
or mitigation 
94 Complete defense 6.86 6.77 
1 7  Liable for murder 5. 1 1  4.3 1  
1 7  Liable for murder 2.74 3.20 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8= 1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
Key to column heads: 
(e) The amount of force the actor used was reasonable under the circumstances: 1 =strongly disagree, 5=unsure, and 
9=strongly agree. 
(f) What is the maximum amount of force that someone should be able to use to protect themselves in this situation? O=no 
force, 2=risk of bodily i njury, 4=bodily injury, 6=serious bodily injury, 8=serious bodily injury with risk of death, and 1 O=death. 
{JJ 
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beggar. Apparently, what to us seemed a trivial annoyance (being pestered by a 
beggar who persists in requesting money after he is initially turned down) led the 
subjects to see the pestered person as less blameworthy than the typical 
murderer-that is, the pestered person is seen as less blameworthy than one who 
actively seeks out another with the intention to kill. There is, unfortunately, the 
possibility that the respondents "read into" the case some degree of threat in the 
beggar's behavior or believed that the person who shot the beggar felt such a 
threat. 
Let us consider this lower sentence further. As we mentioned, in the other sce­
nario cases described elsewhere in this book, higher degrees of liability are as­
signed to persons who commit murders ( averaging around 1 0, which scales to life 
imprisonment);  thus, we would not conclude that our respondents take a particu­
larly lenient view of murder in general. What the unforeseen lower sentence for 
killing the beggar suggests is that we examine, in future research, the minimum 
threat that people view as warranting a defensive response. It also may be that the 
contexts in which those threatening behaviors occur are important to the study re­
spondents. A behavior that signals possible menace on a big-city subway platform 
may not be as menacing on a sunny small- town street. Moreover, our context is 
perhaps one that is perceived as dangerous by our respondents-a deserted city 
street at night. Regardless, our finding that some people consider the approach of 
a beggar (even under said circumstances) a mitigation for shooting that beggar 
seems alarming to us. 
We turn next to the liability assignments given in scenarios 3 through 9. It ap­
pears that our respondents are generally telling us that a killing that has some 
claim to be carried out in self-defense, whether that claim is granted validity by 
the legal codes, should receive a mitigated punishment. The liability assignments 
in all of the noncontrol cases are lower than that given for the baseline case ( sce­
nario 1 ) . 
In these noncontrol scenarios, the general pattern suggests that assigned liabil­
ity is a function of the seriousness of the threat to the attacked individual. (Ap­
pendix B presents the text of the different scenarios. ) Where the person knows 
that the attacker is unarmed and, thus, that deadly force is unnecessary ( scenario 
3 ), subjects impose liability of 6.66 ( 5.8 years) .  This is less, although only margin­
ally significantly less, than the baseline case in which no threat (or a very ambigu­
ous one) exists, suggesting that a person is judged increasingly less blameworthy 
as the degree of threat increases. As Figure 3 .2 shows, our subjects appear to see a 
continuum of degree of liability based on the degree of threat; that is, importing 
data from other study scenarios in this book, we may conclude that a case of no 
threat (murder) 1  is generally assigned a liability of 1 0  ( life imprisonment) ;  and, 
referring again to Table 3. 1 ,  killing the source of a trivial threat ( row 1 ) ,  1 5  years; 
killing an unarmed attacker ( row 3 ), 5.8 years; and killing an armed attacker ( row 
2) ,  less than 1 day. While further studies should investigate the exact nature of this 
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FIGURE 3.2 Liability Assigned for Defensive and Nondefensive Killing Scenarios 
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relationship, we already note a contradiction with the legal code. The legal doc­
trine adopts a simple cutoff. If the approacher threatens serious bodily injury, the 
attacked person is granted a complete defense. If less than serious bodily injury is 
threatened, murder liability is imposed. The Code treatment and our respon­
dents' liability judgments are contrasted in Figure 3.2. 
Furthermore, as the degree of the perceived threat increases, the amount of 
force our subjects authorize also increases. The subjects' views on the maximum 
force that they think permissible in the situation are in column f of Table 3. 1 .  In 
control scenario 2, when the knife-wielding individual attacks, our subjects judge 
that it is appropriate to respond with force that risks "serious bodily injury with 
risk of death;' 7.83 on the force scale. In scenarios 5, 6, and 7, the person is at­
tacked by a man either wielding or thought to be wielding a knife; our respon­
dents agree that the maximum force allowable in self-defense in these cases is also 
high, with judgments of 7.00, 5 .3 1 ,  and 6.77, respectively (column f). In the other 
cases, our subjects judge that the maximum force that would be appropriate in 
self-defense should be less than or equal to that which would cause bodily injury 
(but not serious bodily injury) to the attacker. Scenario 8, in which the person 
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FIGURE 3.3 Liability as a Function of Maximum Force Allowed 
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kills an individual that he provoked into attacking him, is a complex case, which 
we will address later in this discussion. Note for now that the maximum force that 
the subjects deemed allowable is rated at 4.3 1 .  
Notice, from Table 3 . 1 ,  that these ratings o f  the maximum force allowable are 
consistent with the subjects' judgments of liability and (we would suggest) proba­
bly provide the basis for those judgments. To visualize this comparison, look at 
Figure 3.3. In it, we have ordered, along the horizontal axis, the scenarios in the 
order of the maximum force that our respondents would allow in self-defense 
(the maximum force is given along with the scenario identification) ,  and along 
the vertical axis, the degree of liability assigned to the person who kills his 
«attacker." Note the close relationship. If our respondents judge that rather low 
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amounts of force are appropriate in self-defense, then they assign the person who 
kills the "approacher" more severe sentences. If they judge that more force is al­
lowable, they reduce the sentence to the individual who kills the attacker-until, 
in the final four cases, they tolerate responses that involve serious bodily injury to 
the attacker and give the defender quite low liability assignments. This suggests 
that the respondents are arriving at some global judgment-based on the set of 
facts they read-about what would constitute a reasonable action in the case, 
comparing the person's action and judging liability from the degree of discrep­
ancy between the person's action and the "reasonable" action. Again, this view 
contrasts with the simple cutoff approach of current codes. Under the Model Pe­
nal Code, for example, only a threat of serious bodily injury or greater justifies the 
use of deadly force; a lesser threat justifies only the use of force short of deadly 
force. 
We find an interesting code-subject discrepancy in scenarios involving possible 
retreat. Americans, stereotypically, "stand their ground;' and our subjects seem to 
want them to even when the legal codes say they should not. That is, when one's 
use of deadly force is unnecessary because that person could safely retreat (Table 
3. l 's scenario 4) ,  our subjects mitigate liability while the Code does not. As Table 
3.4, column f, reveals, subjects agree that the person could retreat, but as Table 3. 1 
(scenario 4, column a) reveals, the liability mean of 4.63 (9.6 months) reflects a 
considerably less severe sentence than the liability for murder that the current le­
gal doctrine imposes. Apparently, some of our subjects are unsure about whether 
retreat should be required at all. In scenario 4, 23 percent of our respondents give 
no liability; 40 percent give either no liability or no punishment. While a numeri­
cal majority appear to support the retreat rule, they support it as a basis for liabil­
ity significantly short of what the Code assigns to that case, which is liability for 
murder. 
Consistent with the subjects' equivocal support for the retreat rule, a large por­
tion of our subjects agree with the Code's view that a person should not be re­
quired to retreat from his or her own home, even if he or she knows that he or she 
can do so safely (see Table 3 . l 's "retreat from home' case of row 5) .  Table 3.4 
shows the respondents' ratings on the various dimensions of perception that we 
asked them about in regard to the self-defense cases. From Table 3.4 (column /J, it 
is clear that they only rather grudgingly agree that retreat was possible. As in sce­
nario 5 ofTable 3. 1 ,  43 percent give no liability in such a case. Similarly, a person 
who mistakenly believes that it is impossible to retreat (scenario 7) receives al­
most no liability (0.49, or less than 1 day in jail) from the respondents. It would 
be interesting to contrast this view with the views held by persons from other cul­
tures. 
Our subjects also agree with the codes in giving a defense to a person who in­
correctly but honestly believes that use of deadly force is necessary (scenarios 6 
and 7 ) .  This occurs both in cases in which the person is mistaken as to 
TABLE 3.4 Subjects' Perceptions of Self-Defense Cases 
Scenarios 
1 .  Killing, no self-defense 
2. Killing, self-defense 
Knows deadly force is not 
necessary because: 
3. Unarmed attacker 
4. Could retreat 
5. Cou ld retreat from home 
Believes deadly force is 
necessary but: 
6. Mistaken as to threat 
' 
7. Mistakenly believes 
retreat not possible 
8. Actor provokes attack 
Believes deadly force is not 
necessary but: 
9. Mistakenly believes 
deadly force legal 
Key to column heads: 
(a) (b) 
"Risk of "More 
Bodily Force Than 
Injury" Necessary" 
7.51 
2.23 
7.51 
6.60 
5.37 
5.66 
4.09 
7.43 6.60 
7.69 
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
"Could Have "Intended "Believed "Could "Unaware 
Safely to Force Retreat Could 
Delayed" Shoor Necessary" in Safety" Ret rear 
7.57 6.63 
2.40 5.03 
7.34 6.43 
5.57 6.46 6.23 
4.77 6 .1 1 5.49 
5.5 1 5.83 6.71 
4. 1 7  5.46 7.51 
5.77 6.57 
7.26 7. 1 7  4.49 
Statements (a) through (e) were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree." 
(a) The force the person used . . .  created a risk of causing serious bodily injury. 
(b) The person could have effectively protected h imself by using less force. 
(c) The person could h ave effectively protected h imself if h e  delayed the use of force. 
(d) The person intended to shoot the person he shot. 
(e) The person believed that the amount of force was justified/necessary to protect himself. 
(f) The person could have avoided the threat by retreating out of his house in  complete safety. 
(g) The person was u naware that he could retreat. 
0'\ 
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whether the attacker threatens serious bodily injury (e.g., as to whether he is 
armed-scenario 6) and in which the person is mistaken about whether safe re­
treat is possible ( scenario 7) .  The former result suggests some respondent empa­
thy for the person who must decide under difficult circumstances whether to 
shoot. The latter result, commented on before, is predictable, given the subjects' 
weak support for the retreat rule. As noted previously, many jurisdictions permit 
a defense only if the person's mistake is reasonable; an unreasonable mistake is 
grounds for murder liability. Other jurisdictions allow a mitigation for an unrea­
sonable mistake. The scenario used in this study gave no facts to suggest that the 
mistake is culpable, and columns e and [of Table 3 . 1  suggest that the respondents 
see the use of a serious degree of force as acceptable in these situations. Thus the 
no-liability result seems consistent with the Code's complete defense for a reason­
able mistake. One might speculate that the low liability scores, given in those in­
stances in which the person's mistake might have been interpreted as culpable, 
suggest that the codes should give at least a mitigation for a culpable but honest 
mistake. A future study might test its subjects' reactions to various levels of culpa­
bility in making a mistake as to a legal j ustification. 
It may be that the respondents are attempting to assess what a reasonable per­
son would infer from the actions of the attacker and, therefore, the latitude of ac­
tion that they will allow the defender. On this account, if the attacker commits 
certain actions, those may trigger an inference of significant, imminent harm by 
the attacked individual that leads him or her to respond with deadly force. This 
inference may be incorrect, but the attacked individual is given a great deal of lee­
way by our respondents in making it. Unless the inference is conspicuously egre­
gious, the fact that it is made, and acted on, is largely the attacker's problem. Put­
ting this another way, it is the privilege of the attacked individual not only to 
judge what force is sufficient to deal with the present level of force that the 
attacker is using but also to judge what level of force the attacker might escalate to 
in the immediate future. Fists may be all the force in play at the moment, but will 
knives or guns be next? 
Our subjects also agree with the Code in rejecting a defense for a person who 
mistakenly believes that he is legally authorized to use deadly force against an un­
armed attacker (scenario 9, Table 3 . 1 ) .  The liability mean of 6.71 (5.9 years) is not 
statistically different from that assigned to a person, using similarly unnecessary 
force, who does not believe that his use of deadly force against an unarmed 
attacker is lawful (scenario 3, 6.66; 5.8 years) .  This is an interesting result, and one 
that we will see again. It suggests that respondents believe that it is widely ac­
cepted that one should not kill an unarmed attacker. A mistaken belief that the 
law allows such an attack does not excuse it. Having said all of this, we should 
point out that future research, in which, for example, it is more clear that the per­
son knew his conduct was unlawful, will be necessary to confirm these conclu­
sions. 
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In the scenario in which the person provokes the panhandler into an attack that 
requires defensive force (scenario 8) ,  the respondents assign a high degree of lia­
bility to the provoker but the Code's liability even exceeds that. The provoked-at­
tack liability scenario has a liability mean of 6.40 ( 4.6 years) ,  which suggests that 
the subjects see clear blameworthiness in the provoker-but not of the level of a 
murderer (as the Code provides) and perhaps not even of the level of the person 
who kills upon a trivial threat (7 .97; 1 5  years) .  (This last result, 7.97-when com­
pared to 6.40-is only marginally significant. ) Further research is necessary to il­
luminate the parameters of this complex issue. To guide that research, we can at 
least suggest what might be the components of the situation that people seek to 
assess when they assign liability to a person who in some sense provokes an attack 
and then uses deadly force in response. Intuitively, one would expect that if an in­
dividual attacks another in response to a mild provocation, killing the mildly pro­
voking attacker would be seen as less warranted than if the provocation is  more 
complete and violent. Here is the intuitive rule that we think is operating: If I say 
something to you that is only mildly provoking, and you then come at me with 
dagger drawn, I will be assigned relatively low liability for killing you before you 
kill me. My mild provocation does not warrant your overblown response; you are 
the primary cause of your attack on me. However, if my provocation to you was 
really quite intense, then I have some causal responsibility for your attack on me 
and bear some liability for killing you to head off your attack. Perceivers of these 
situations are likely to be attempting to unravel the familiar question of "who re­
ally started it" (Carpenter and Darley, 1 97 8) .  There is also a question of what, ex­
actly, the one who provokes the attack intends to do when counterattacked. If the 
respondents perceive, as in the formulaic cowboy movie, that the fast-drawing 
villain provokes the innocent, slow-drawing citizen into "drawing;' with the cer­
tainty of outdrawing him and intending to kill him, then they see it as murder 
and are glad when the hero "does-in" the villain in the last reel. Fascinating ques­
tions lie here for future research. 
Study 5: Summary 
On the one hand, it appears that the subjects' judgments are complex, and in 
many instances they agree with the pattern of distinctions made in the Code. The 
subjects generally decline to punish in the scenarios in which the Code gives the 
person a defense ( respectively, scenarios 2, 5, 6, and 7) :  Scenario 2, of course, is 
the paradigmatic case-deadly force used in response to an attack with a deadly 
weapon. The other scenarios in which the respondents generally decline to punish 
the person are those in which the person knows he could retreat in safety but is in 
his home; where he mistakenly but honestly believes serious bodily harm is 
threatened; and where he mistakenly but honestly believes that he cannot safely 
retreat. Similarly, the subjects impose significant liability in scenarios in which 
the Code would deny a defense (respectively, scenarios 3 ,  4, 8, and 9):  where the 
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person knows the attacker is unarmed; where he knows he can retreat in safety; 
where he provokes the attack to justify his subsequent use of force; or where the 
actor sees that deadly force is not necessary to repel the attack but, believing the 
law permits it, uses it anyway. 
On the other hand, a second element in the patterning of our subjects' re­
sponses is evident-a tendency to assign lesser punishments than the Code. Our 
subjects and the Code disagree on the extent of liability that should be imposed in 
those cases in which the person either acts in self-defense but knows that deadly 
force i s  unnecessary ( cases 3 and 4) or in which he provokes the attack ( case 8) .  
The subjects' disagreement with the Code is  particularly striking in the case in 
which it would be possible for the person to retreat from the threat. While the 
Code denies a defense in this instance, leaving the person liable for murder, our 
subjects impose liability akin to manslaughter (5 .8 years in jail) or, in the case of 
failure to retreat, something less (9.76 months). Apparently the subjects see a 
clear and significant distinction between an unjustified killing in self-defense and 
an intentional killing where no threat of attack exists. A self-defense provision 
that mirrors the subjects' views would mitigate liability for even unjustified kill­
ings in a self-defense setting. 
The significant agreement that does exist between our subjects and the Code 
may be the result of community views manifesting themselves in the centuries of 
common-law development, upon which most of these rules are based. It may not 
be that the detailed rules are intuitive but rather that both the subjects' views and 
the Code's rules result from application of a few basic principles, such as the re­
quirements that the defensive response be necessary and proportionaP It also is 
possible that the rules of the legal code, which once may have been alien to the 
moral codes of the governed, over time became accepted moral principles. Moral­
ity can shape the law, but the law also can shape morality (Green, 1 985 ) .  
STUDY 6: 
USE OF FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 
The criminal law typically allows a person to use force in the protection of prop­
erty. As with self-defense, the force used must be necessary to protect the prop­
erty, both in the amount of force used and in its timing; that is, no lesser force and 
no delay in the use of force would have provided adequate protection. The force 
used also must be generally proportionate to the threat. Thus, the use of deadly 
force generally is prohibited to protect property alone, even if such deadly force is 
the only means by which the property can be protected. As with self-defense, 
when a person makes a mistake as to the necessity for the use of force, he none­
theless may get a mitigation or defense, depending on the culpability level of his 
mistake. All jurisdictions give a defense for a reasonable mistake. Some give no 
defense for an unreasonable mistake; others give a mitigation in degree ofliability. 
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The illegality of using deadly force in protection of property is unequivocal: No 
mistake is grounds for a defense. 
In this defense of property study, we tested the current defense of property 
rules against our subjects' assignment ofliability in analogous defense of property 
situations. Subjects were given seven scenarios in which the person uses force to 
defend against an attempt to steal his motorcycle. One scenario presented a base­
line case in which necessary, nondeadly force is used, which would receive com­
plete exculpation under current doctrine. The other six scenarios presented varia­
tions in which the person deviates from the baseline case in one or more ways, 
typically in violation of one of the limitations on the use of force to defend prop­
erty. The liability results are shown in Table 3.5.  Notice that column e contains the 
various liabilities assigned to the person who attempts the theft. As one would ex­
pect, the thief is assigned some liability, and it is roughly constant across the cases. 
With respect to perceptions of the use of necessary nondeadly force (the base­
line case results in row 1 ), our subjects agree that complete exculpation is appro­
priate. Of the respondents, 89 percent judge that no liability should be assigned to 
the property defender; the remaining 11 percent assign liability but no punish­
ment. 
Next, we examine scenario 2, in which the force is labeled "questionably neces­
sary." In this scenario, the description reads as follows: "Joe punches the man, be­
lieving at the time that it is necessary. Joe's wife begins to yell at Joe that the man 
was small and not very muscular and Joe probably could have scared him off with 
a yell. Joe later realizes that his wife was right:' Here, too, the subjects imposed es­
sentially no liability by the subjects on the property defender. 
Table 3.6 contains respondents' perceptions of various aspects of the defense­
property scenarios. Examining the ratings on the questions concerning whether 
more force than necessary was used (column a) and whether the force could have 
safely been delayed (column c), the respondents seem to give the benefit of the 
doubt to the defender in scenario 2. That is, they are not convinced that the per­
son used more force than was necessary or that the use of the force could have 
been delayed. Given that in this particular scenario the defender realizes only later 
that the force he used was not necessary, this seems a reasonable set of perceptions 
and ( see Table 3.5) liability assignments. 
In scenario 3, the owner has rigged a protective device to the garage door so 
that if anyone tried to break into the garage and steal the motorcycle, the device is 
triggered, firing a beanbag at the intruder. In this case, the thief breaks the lock on 
the garage door and opens it, and the device is triggered, breaking the thief's nose. 
Here we were beginning a probe of the reactions of our respondents to "spring 
guns" and "man traps," the use of which is significantly limited by law [MPC § 
3.06( 5 ) ] .  Their use is a complex area of the law because it is hard to predict the 
degree of harmful consequences of these devices for the thief or the nature of the 
existing threat when the device is triggered. Also, they can cause injury when no 
TABLE 3.5 Liability for the Use of Force in Protection of Property 
Scenarios 
1 .  Necessary force 
2. Questionably necessary force 
3. Necessary force applied by device 
4. No imminent threat (perceived 
as not immediately necessary) 
5. More than necessary force by choice 
6. Deadly force, ,knowing not lawful 
7. Deadly force, mistakenly believing 
it lawful 
(a) 
Liabilitx_ . 
0.00 
0.00 
0. 1 9  
0.48 
0. 1 4  
2.56 
2.63 
(b) (c) 
% No Liability 
% No or 
Liability No Punishment 
(N) (N+O) 
89 1 00 
n 98 
n 93 
48 82 
55 93 
21 46 
1 8  48 
(d) (e) (f) 
Maximum 
Mode/ Penal Force That 
Code Result Liability s.·,ouldbe 
for Defender for Thief Permitted 
Complete defense 4.58 3.80 
Unclear8 4.70 3.91 
Complete defenseb 5. 1 1  3.91 
Unclear: 4.1 4  3.36 
No defense; liable for 4.05 3.41 
simple assault, a 
misdemeanor 
No defense; liable for 5.39 4.32 
aggravated assault, a 
second-degree felony 5.45 4.25 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 month$, 5=1 year, 
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 O=life, and 1 1  =death. 
Key to column heads: 
(f) What is the maximum amount of force that someone should be permitted to use to protect his property in this situation? 
O="no force," 2="risk of bodily injury," 4="bodily injury," 6="serious bodily injury," 8="serious bodily injury with risk of death," and 
1 O="death." 
8This scenario was intended to present the case of a mistaken actor. Such an actor might get a defense under current law, 
especially if his mistake was reasonable; he might only get a mitigation if his mistake was not reasonable. In fact, the scenario was 
perceived as a case of necessary force, for which the actor would have a defense under current doctrine. 
blf the scenario had been perceived as the device creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, as was intended, there 
would be no defense. But no such risk was perceived by the subjects. See column d of Table 3.6. In a case of no risk of serious 
bodily injury, a complete defense is available. 
cAn "imminent threat• was required by common law; modern codes such as the Model Penal Code require only that the "force 
used be immediately necessary ... 
0\ 
0\ 
TABLE 3.6 Subjects' Perceptions of the Use of Force in Protection of Property 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
"More Force "Actor Believes "Could Have "Force Used 
(e) 
"Amount 
Than Less Force Safely Created Risk Reasonable Under 
Scenarios 
1 .  Necessary force 
2. Questionably necessary 
force 
3. Necessary force applied 
by device 
4. No imminent threat 
(perceived as not 
immediately necessary) 
5. More than necessary force 
by choice 
6. Deadly force, knowing not 
lawful 
7. Deadly force, mistakenly 
believing it lawful 
Key to column heads: 
Necessary' 
3. 1 6  
3.70 
3.75 
5.75 
5.59 
5.48 
5.41 
lneffectiven Delayedn of Deathn Circumstancesn 
3. 1 6  2.86 
5.66 3.84 3.25 
3.50 3.52 
5.61 3.42 
4.57 5.45 3.74 
4.39 7.41 4.00 
4.34 7.70 4.70 
(f) 
"Believes Lawful 
to Create 
Risk of Deathn 
3.95 
6.41 
Statements (a) through (f) were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree." 
(a) The actor could have effectively protected his property by using less force than he did. 
(b) At the time when the actor hits the man, the actor believes that less force would be ineffective to protect his property. 
(c) The actor could have effectively protected his property if he delayed his use of force. 
(d) The force that the actor used created a risk of causing the man's death. 
(e) The amount of force the actor used was reasonable in light of the situation. 
(f) The actor believes that he is legally entitled to use force that risks causing the thief's death. 0\ '-I 
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threat to person exists, because no one is present. Subjects seem to read this case 
as within the bounds of acceptability: They disagree that it was more force than 
was necessary (Table 3.6, column a) and do not agree that it created a risk of death 
(column d) . Of the respondents, 93 percent assign no liability or punishment to 
the person who set the device. Future research ought to examine how respondents 
feel about setting more lethal traps for thieves. 
Examining next scenarios 4 and 5, we find a continuation of the general pattern 
of lenient treatment of the person protecting his property. In case 4, in which the 
force used in defense is described as not immediately necessary, 82 percent of the 
respondents still assign no punishment to the force user. (Briefly, the thief agrees 
to leave when Joe yells at him, but the thief makes it clear that he has an imprint of 
the keyhole and will return for the motorcycle. Joe resorts to force in order to re­
trieve the imprint.) In scenario 5, we sought to make it completely clear that the 
force used was knowingly more than was necessary: «Joe realizes that he can sim­
ply scare the man away by yelling at him. He nonetheless approaches the man and 
punches him in the face." Despite our efforts, even in this scenario 93 percent of 
the respondents impose no liability or no punishment on the property defender. 
For each scenario, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they 
agreed with the statement that "the [person]  could have effectively protected his 
property by using less force than he did" {column a of Table 3.6). An examination 
of the respondents' ratings here suggests the thinking that may lie behind their 
rather permissive stance on property-defender punishment: They are not con­
vinced that more force than n ecessary had been used. Thus, even when a scenario 
explicitly describes the forte as unnecessary, the subjects generally are uncon­
vinced. In scenario 5, subjects' ratings on the necessity of the force used average 
5.59, less than one point above the scale midpoint of 5 (column a) , indicating that 
they are unsure that the force was more than was necessary. It may be in this case 
that the subjects are taking the role of the person whose property is threatened 
and concluding that we cannot require that his cognitions be perfectly clear or his 
responses perfectly measured, when he is in the midst of the stressful circum­
stances of an attempted theft. Further, there may be an element of calculation that 
involves the value of the property at risk; a motorcycle is a relatively costly object, 
and a punch on the nose not too high a price for the potential thief to pay. 
Consistent with the subjects' tendency to see nondeadly force as necessary is 
their general failure to impose liability even in those cases in which they see the 
force as possibly unnecessary. Even in the last scenario quoted above-· where the 
subjects fall somewhere between uncertainty and agreement as to whether the 
amount of force used was unnecessary-55 percent of the subjects think that no 
liability was appropriate and 93 percent think that no liability or no punishment 
was appropriate. 
Summing up this initial look at the five scenarios involving nondeadly force, a 
considerable majority of our subjects would impose no liability in any of the see-
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narios. Of the respondents, 82 percent or more would impose either no liability 
or no punishment. Overall, this might suggest that our subjects are not concerned 
with the �any distinctions that the Code uses and that the subjects generally ap­
prove of the use of nondeadly force in the protection of property, whether neces­
sary or not. 
Examining the matter more closely, however, some evidence hints that subjects 
do take into account the necessity for the use of force in assessing the proper de­
gree of liability. The two cases ( in Table 3.6, column a) perceived as the weakest 
cases for necessity are scenarios 4 and 5, with average agreement ratings of 5.75 
and 5.59, respectively, indicating slight agreement with the "unnecessary 
amount" manipulation check, as compared to means of 3. 1 6, 3 .70, and 3.75 for 
the other nondeadly force scenarios, which indicate disagreement with the state­
ment that unnecessarily strong force was used. Scenarios 4 and 5 also have the 
lowest "no liability" percentages, 48 percent and 55 percent, respectively ( see Ta­
ble 3 .5) .  But this seems at best weak support for the necessity principle, which is 
seen as fundamental to the legal doctrine. Recall that current doctrine treats the 
use of unnecessary force as a basis for denying any mitigation or defense to the 
property defender. Our respondents rather obviously treat it differently, as a fac­
tor determining liability. And the average liability of less than one day in jail (0.48 
and 0. 1 4, respectively, Table 3.5) that they impose for using more than necessary 
force is considerably less than would be imposed by current legal codes, which 
would treat the case as one of simple assault with a maximum sentence of one 
year (MPC §§ 2 1 1 . 1  and 6.08) .  
Rather than focusing on the necessity of the force, the subjects seem to rely 
more heavily on the reasonableness of the amount of force in light of the serious­
ness of the threat-what the doctrine calls the proportionality of the force-as a 
basis for determining liability. Where the aggressor makes a single threat to take 
property, as in the first five scenarios, the subjects see the "maximum amount of 
force that someone should be able to use to protect his property in this situation" 
as approximately constant (see Table 3 .5 ,  column f, ranging from 3.36 to 
3 .9l ,where 4 = bodily inj ury) . The amount of force that our subjects think ought 
to be permitted increases slightly in the remaining two scenarios, however, where 
the thief persists after repeated efforts by the owner to discourage him are unsuc­
cessful ( rows 6 and 7, 4.32 and 4.25) .  As we have noted, it would be interesting to 
determine in future research whether the maximum amount of force perceived as 
appropriate in defense would increase in relation to the value of the property de­
fended. For example, if the individual was a store owner defending his goods, 
would subjects see a greater degree of force as reasonable than if he were only de­
fending some inexpensive piece of property? 
Our subjects' tendency to see ( or claim to see) the person's use of force as nec­
essary, despite statements in the scenarios to the contrary, does not appear to exist 
in the deadly force scenarios. The two deadly force scenarios ( 6 and 7) have the 
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following core description: A thief is detected attempting to steal a motorcycle, 
and the owner attempts to get him to stop. The thief persists, and the owner gets a 
gun and shoots him. The respondents are told that the thief is wounded but not 
killed. Given the persistence of the thief in the face of several attempts to stop him, 
we thought the shooting portrayed force that at least some respondents might see 
as necessary, but it brought manipulation-check responses of 5.48 and 5.41 (Table 
3.6) ,  suggesting that our subjects as a group are leaning slightly toward agreeing 
that the force is unnecessary or are at best unsure that it is necessary. Our respon­
dents (see column Jof Table 3 .5)  j udge that force that causes bodily injury b ut not 
serious bodily injury is the maximum force appropriate to use on the persistent 
thief and that they agree ( column d of Table 3.6) that the actual force used, the 
gunshot, creates a risk of death, and therefore is, by inference, more than the 
maximum allowable force. This is confirmed by column e of Table 3.6. 
In these deadly force cases, the number of subjects who impose no liability 
drops to 2 1  percent and 1 8  percent. (This is a significant decrease in contrast with 
the nondeadly force scenario percentages. )  The liability means correspondingly 
increase, from between 0.00 and 0.48 (less than 1 day) to 2.56 and 2.63 (about 5.6 
weeks) .3 Thus, the thief's greater aggression may justify the use of greater defen­
sive force, but the use of deadly force correspondingly results in a considerable in­
crease in liability. While the use of unnecessary force in defense of property is 
generally approved of by respondents, this principle has a limit: The majority of 
subjects think that the person's resort to use of a deadly weapon is unjustified. A 
majority of our respondents think it wrong to shoot the person attempting the 
theft of the motorcycle. Interestingly, they are not moved by being told that the 
person mistakenly thought that the shooting was lawful ( scenario 7). This sug­
gests that people see a clear moral issue here: One should know better than to 
shoot in defense of that sort of property. 
These findings tend to support the Code's prohibition against the use of deadly 
force in defense of property, but we also must point out that there are vast differ­
ences between the way our respondents view the use of deadly force in defense of 
property and the way that such use of force is treated by the Model Penal Code. 
Indeed, almost half of the subjects ( 46 and 48 percent) would impose no punish­
ment in the cases of deadly force in the protection of property; Also significant is 
the fact that the liability means of 2.56 and 2.63 imposed by the subjects repre­
sent-on average-a sentence of 5.6 weeks, not the 1 - to 3-year minimum, 1 0-
year maximum sentence guidelines provided by the Model Penal Code. 
Scenario 6 may be the most revealing of the seven cases in what it shows us 
about people's judgments: 
Joe arrives home to find a man attempting to steal his motorcycle. 
[Next are described a number of attempts by Joe to stop the thief, through which 
the thief persists in his attempts to steal.] While Joe believes that it may not be lawful 
to use a gun to prevent the theft of a motorcycle, he sees no other way to stop the 
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man. He goes to his house just a few steps away, retrieves his gun, returns, and shoots 
the man. The man survives and is later taken into custody by the police. 
7 1  
The subjects indicate that the maximum amount o f  force that should be per­
mitted to protect property in this situation is 4.32 (Table 3.5,  column !J, or ap­
proximately enough force to result in bodily injury ( 4 == bodily injury; 6 == serious 
bodily injury; 8 = serious bodily injury with risk of death) .  Additionally, the sub­
jects clearly perceive Joe's conduct as creating a risk of death. Yet, despite Joe's 
failure to limit his conduct as the subjects would think appropriate, 46 percent of 
the subjects assign either no liability or no punishment. What of the remaining 54 
percent who believe that some punishment is important? Do they impose the rel­
atively severe sentence suggested by the codes? It turns out that they do not. 
About 75 percent of these subjects assign a punishment of less than one year.4 
This strikingly differs from the Code's treatment of the offense; the Code treats it 
as aggravated assault, a second-degree felony with a maximum sentence of ten 
years. 
Study 6: Summary 
Even in those cases in which the force used in defense of property is unnecessary 
or disproportionate-according to legal codes-the vast majority of subjects im­
pose no punishment. The subjects also show a tendency to interpret a person's 
conduct as necessary to defend his property even in instances in which such a 
conclusion is difficult to support on the objective facts. As with self-defense, the 
defensive nature of the person's situation appears to have a significant effect on 
the subjects' judgment. Even when the person's defensive response is knowingly 
improper-that is, he knows that the law does not justify his conduct-the sub­
jects significantly reduce the person's liability. Again, the subjects appear to dis­
tinguish a person who improperly defends his property from a person who uses 
the same force in other than a defensive context. This argues in favor of providing 
reduced grades of liability for those who err in defending property against an at­
tack It remains a question for further research as to whether the value of the 
property being defended enters into the respondents' calculations. 
If the legal code were modeled after the subjects' responses, it would give a 
complete defense for nondeadly force, necessary or not, used in the defense of 
property. The use of deadly force would be disapproved of but would result in low 
liability and punishment if the force appeared to be necessary (and the thief is not 
actually killed) .5 In further research it would be important to address the ques­
tion of what "philosophies" lie behind the judgments of individuals. Are there 
some individuals who believe that even deadly force is allowable in the defense of 
property? Does this belief reflect the view that the criminal justice system has be­
come ineffective in defending property? The results may well be consistent with a 
public that is angry with what they see as the criminal justice system's failure to 
protect. "At the very least," the argument might go, "if the system will not protect 
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my property, I should be permitted to do what is necessary [ and perhaps more J to 
protect it myself." 
STUDY 7: 
CITIZENS' LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
Citizens sometimes seek to exercise the authority of a law enforcement officer, as 
when they attempt to apprehend a person who has committed a crime against 
them. If the use of force is defensive in any way-for example, an aggressor is at­
tacking them or attempting to take their property-a citizen can rely on a defen­
sive-force defense, such as self-defense or defense of property, which frequently 
permits the use of greater force than would a citizen's law enforcement authority. 
If the use of force is not defensive, as when an offense is complete-for example, 
after a rape or after property damage has been caused-a citizen nonetheless has a 
right to use some degree of force to apprehend and restrain the offender [ MPC § 
3.07( 1 ) ] .  
Exercise o f  a citizen's law enforcement authority is subject to several limita­
tions. A citizen is never justified in using deadly force to arrest an offender ( un­
less he or she does so in assisting a peace officer and meets other special condi­
tions) [MPC § 3.07( 2 ) (b) ] .  A person may use nondeadly force only to the extent 
that it is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest. If a citizen is mistaken in 
some respect-for instance, about whether the person he or she is attempting to 
arrest is the actual perpetrator of the crime-that citizen may nevertheless get a 
defense if his or her mistake is reasonable. If it is unreasonable, some jurisdictions 
deny any defense or mitigation while others permit a mitigation. In the latter ju­
risdictions, if the citizen recklessly or negligently injures an innocent person, for 
example, the citizen may be liable for an offense of recklessness or negligence, as 
the case may be [ MPC § 3 .09(3 ) ] .6 The Code does not alter the degree of 
non deadly force permissible according to the seriousness of the offense for which 
the arrest is made; in all cases, the force must be just that which is necessary to 
effect the arrest. 
In the citizens' law enforcement authority study, we sought to test the current 
doctrine's rules on such authority against the community's views. Subjects were 
presented with scenarios involving the use of deadly and nondeadly force by the 
victim to restrain an offender after a rape and after a property damage offense 
(setting the victim's car on fire) .  Notice that in both cases the offense is already 
complete at the time force is used; thus, we are not dealing with cases of self-de­
fense or defense of property. The deadly force scenarios depict the victim as 
shooting the fleeing offender with a handgun and killing him; in the nondeadly 
force scenarios, the victim uses a stun gun that temporarily immobilizes but does 
not inflict lasting injury on the offender. In some scenarios, the person stuns or 
kills the offender and in others the person stuns or kills an innocent person that 
she mistakes for the offender. The subjects were asked, as usual, to determine how 
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much liability the restraining person should receive, if any. They were also asked 
how much force a person in such a situation should have been able to use (col­
umn e of Table 3 .7 )  and whether the actual force used created a risk of death ( col­
umn j). The results are shown in Table 3.7.  
Notice first that the subjects saw the differences between the use of the stun gun 
and the handgun as we had wished. They agreed ( column f, 7.92 on the average) 
that the person's use of the handgun creates a risk of death (not surprising, since 
they were told that the person shoots and kills the fleeing offender), and the per­
son's use of the stun gun does not create a risk of death (2.83 on the average) .  
Please look next at the liability judgments. First, observe the patterning of the 
liability assignments in the four cases in which the citizen uses force to apprehend 
the individual who actually committed the crime ( scenarios 1 ,  3, 5, and 7) .  Wbile 
the difference in liability assigned to the individual who uses deadly force ( sce­
narios 1 and 5) is slightly higher ( 0.2 1 and 2 .60; respectively, less than 1 day and 
5.6 weeks) than the zero liability assigned to the person who uses nondeadly force 
( scenarios 3 and 7) ,  what is most striking, as we noted in the previous study, is the 
tendency of our subjects to assign very low degrees of liability no matter what de­
gree of force is used. The most dramatic difference between our subjects and the 
Code is in the deadly force scenarios. A strong majority ( 65 percent) would allow 
the use of deadly force by the citizen to apprehend the rapist-or at least would 
not punish such conduct. If we add to this group the respondents who find the 
defendant guilty but would impose no punishment, we include 90 percent of our 
respondents. The Code, in contrast, denies a defense (or a mitigation) and 
thereby holds the person liable for murder. Only in the case of the use of deadly 
force to apprehend an individual who has damaged property do we see any mean­
ingful assignment of liability by a majority of respondents ( 67 percent) ;  appar­
ently, the use of force that has the potential to kill the offender in this particular 
instance exceeds the respondents' perceptions of the allowable level of force. Still, 
the average liability imposed for the same case, 2.60, translates to a sentence of 5.6 
weeks for an act that the legal code would treat as murder-a vast difference. 
Does this pattern of results change in the scenarios in which the restraining 
person stuns or kills an innocent milkman instead of the actual person who com­
mitted the crime? No-the liability ratings do not change very much at all. Exam­
ine the four cases in which the person mistakenly uses force to apprehend an indi­
vidual who did not in fact commit the crime ( scenarios 2, 4,  6, and 8 ) .  Look ahead 
now to Table 3 . 1 0  and notice, in column d, that the respondents judge that the 
person is unaware of the possibility of making this mistake. The person is not, 
therefore, seen as lashing out at anybody in the vicinity; the force is directed at the 
individual whom the person thinks committed the crime. Figure 3.8 compares 
the liability results in the mistaken-identity cases to the matched cases in which 
the person apprehends the correct individuaL Examining this figure, we see that 
the respondents deal with the cases of mistaken identity by assigning liability 
TABLE 3. 7 Liability for Exercise of Citizens• Law Enforcement Authority 
Scenarios 
Rape-Deadly force: 
1 . Actual offender 
2. Mistaken identity 
Rape-Nondeadly force: 
3. Actual offender 
4. Mistaken identity 
Property destruction­
Deadly force: 
5. Actual offender 
6. Mistaken identity 
Property destruction­
Nondeadly force: 
7. Actual offender 
8. Mistaken identity 
(a) 
Liability 
0.2 1 
1 .27 
0.00 
0.35 
2.60 
3.27 
0.00 
0.62 
(b) 
% No 
Liability 
(N) 
65 
1 3  
83 
30 
33 
8 
70 
23 
(c) 
% No Liability or 
No Punishment 
(N+O) 
90 
68 
1 00 
83 
45 
43 
1 00 
80 
(d) 
Model Penal 
Code Result 
Liable for murder 
Liable for murder 
(e) 
Maximum Force 
That Should 
Be Permitted 
7.55 
6.87 
Complete defense 
Complete defensea 
6.85 
6.49 
Liable for murder 
Liable for murder 
Complete defense 
Complete defense8 
4.39 
3.92 
4.07 
4.00 
(f) 
"Force Used 
Created Risk 
of Death" 
7.87 
7.82 
2.92 
2.82 
8.08 
7.92 
2.67 
2.90 
Liabil ity Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
Key to column heads: 
(e) What is the maximum amount of force that a person should be permitted to use to detain an offender in this situation? 
O=no force, 2=risk of bodily injury, 4=bodily injury, 6=serious bodily injury, 8=serious bodily injury with risk of death, and 1 0=death. 
(f) The force used was likely to cause death or bodily injury: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree." 
8This assumes that the actor was not reckless as to injuring an innocent person. If the individual was reckless, the person 
could be liable for assault under M PC §§ 3.09(3) and 2 1 1 . 1 (1 ) .  
'-.) 
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FIGURE 3.8 Effect of Mistake on Liability for Exercise of Citizens' 
Law Enforcement Authority 
a Property destruction: Deadly force 
-a-- Rape: Deadly force 
4 o Property destruction: Nondeadly force 
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• Rape: Nondeadly force 
Actual Offender Mistaken Identity 
Person Apprehended 
75 
judgments that are slightly higher than the matched cases in which no such mis­
take occurs. 
The Code's treatment of mistaken-identity cases does not match that of our 
subjects in several important respects. On the one hand, the Code does give a de­
fense to the person who mistakenly injures an innocent person with nondeadly 
force,? and a majority of the subjects would impose no punishment in such a case 
(83 percent in the rape arrest, 80 percent in the property destruction arrest) .8 On 
the other hand, a vast difference exists between the Code and our subject-com­
munity in the mistaken deadly force scenarios (2 and 6) .  Here the Code permits 
no defense9 and imposes liability for murder. But the number of subjects who 
would impose no punishment (column c of Table 3. 7) is substantial-68 percent 
in the rape case and 43 percent in the property destruction case. The no-punish­
ment percentages are not dramatically different between the mistaken-identity 
and no-mistake deadly force scenarios (68 percent versus 90 percent in the rape 
arrest scenarios, 43 percent versus 45 percent in the property damage arrest sce­
narios) ,  but the percentage of subjects who would impose no liability (column 
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b) is significantly lower where the restraining person has mistakenly killed an in­
nocent bystander ( 13 percent versus 65 percent in the rape arrest scenarios, 8 per­
cent versus 33 percent in the property destruction arrest scenarios).  One interpre­
tation is that our subjects disapprove of the mistaken killing, and the person's 
conduct is judged to warrant the formal disapproval of the legal system ( in the 
form of a "guilty" verdict) but not to warrant a prison sentence. We further dis­
cuss this "liability but no punishment" response-by now familiar to the 
reader-in Chapter 7 of this book. 
Our respondents' low-liability ratings of the person in the mistaken use of 
deadly force scenarios are striking. Figure 3 .9 presents this graphically; in analyz­
ing it, one should bear in mind that the legal code would treat the deadly force 
cases as murder and assign a liability of approximately 10. Only in the case in 
which the person mistakenly kills an innocent person in an attempt to arrest the 
offender who set fire to her car does a majority of subjects (57 percent) impose 
punishment. Even in this case, however, the respondents' liability mean suggests 
that the punishment imposed is relatively minor-3.27 (3 .2 months)-consider­
ing that an innocent person is mistakenly killed. This is considerably less severe 
than the potential life ( or death) sentence that a person could receive for the same 
accidental murder under the Code. In our scenarios, the mistake is what arguably 
might be described as "reasonable"; the person is at least not egregiously wrong 
in assuming that the person whom she harmed was the actual perpetrator. In fu­
ture research, the plausibility of the case of mistaken identity should be varied, 
and we would expect that at some point this variation would make a difference. In 
the present case, however, it is only the combination of mistaken identity and the 
application of deadly force that receives any substantial penalty-and this is still 
nowhere near the penalty that would be given by the legal code. 
What can we learn-from the patterns of the subjects' perceptions of the 
cases-that might reveal the grounds for their relatively lenient judgments? Three 
sets of perceptions stand out. First, given that the perpetrator is fleeing, respon­
dents deem that immediate action is required to apprehend him-otherwise he 
will escape arrest (see Table 3. 10, column a). Second, and particularly in the cases 
with the fleeing rapist, no less harmful action on the victim's part would success­
fully apprehend the perpetrator ( column b) . What the respondents clearly see is 
the dilemma that we intended to create: A perpetrator of a crime is fleeing and 
will escape unless the victim uses the only resource at her disposal to stop him, 
which is the gun. Third, notice, as we mentioned before, that the subjects always 
judge that the victim is quite unaware of the risk that she has mistakenly 
misidentified the individual whom she shoots as the true perpetrator of the crime 
(column d) . These three perceptions, taken together, suggest that the victim of the 
crime is seen by the respondents as reacting reasonably to the event. 
Recall the Code's treatment of the force allowable as it relates to the seriousness 
of the offense committed. The Code gives the same liability for use of force in the 
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FIGURE 3.9 Effect of Use of Deadly and Nondeadly Force on Liability 
for Exercise of Citizens' Law Enforcement Authority 
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rape scenarios as it gives for use of the same force in the property destruction sce­
narios, suggesting that the Code does not find it appropriate to allow relatively 
greater latitude to a citizen apprehending an individual who has committed a rel­
atively more serious crime. As is shown by their ratings of the maximum force al­
lowable in the various cases (Table 3.7, column e) , our respondents deeply dis­
agree. The subjects approve the use of greater force for arrest after the more­
serious rape offense than after the less-serious property damage offense (p < 
.00 1 ) . 10  After cases of rape, the average maximum force our subjects would per­
mit is 6.94 (with 6 = serious bodily injury and 8 = serious bodily injury with risk 
of death) ;  after setting fire to a car (the property destruction case),  the average 
maximum force our subjects would permit is 4 . 10  (with 4 = bodily injury). These 
results suggest that our subjects would have the law vary the degree of force per­
mitted according to the seriousness of the underlying offense. The subjects would 
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TABLE 3.1 0 Subjects' Perceptions of the Exercise of Citizens' 
Law Enforcement Authority 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
"Immediate "No Less ��Intended to "Aware of 
Action Harmful Shoot the Risk of 
Required Means Person Mistaken 
Scenarios to Detainn to Detainn Shor Identity" 
Rape-Deadly force: 
1 .  Actual offender 7.62 6.62 7.74 3.08 
2. Mistaken identity 7.42 5.57 3.20 3.1 2 
Rape-Nondeadly force: 
3. Actual offender 7.40 7.32 7.82 3.20 
4. Mistaken identity 7.41 7. 1 5  2.97 3.03 
Property destruction-
Deadly force: 
5. Actual offender 6.41 4.58 6.82 3.62 
6. Mistaken identity 6.27 4.70 3.50 3. 1 7  
Property destruction-
Nondeadly force: 
7. Actual offender 6.69 6.26 7.46 3.1 6 
8. Mistaken identity 6.87 5.97 4.1 0  3.37 
Key to column heads: 
Statements (a) through {d) were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly 
disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree." 
(a) If the victim did not act immediately, she would not have been able to 
detain the offender. 
(b) There was no less harmful way, given the facts in this scenario, for the 
victim to successfully detain the offender. 
(c) The victim intended to shoot the person she shot. 
(d) Before she shot, the victim was aware of a significant risk that the 
person she was about to shoot may not be the offender. 
authorize something between serious bodily injury and risk of death to effect the 
arrest of a rape offender but only bodily harm for arrest of an offender who causes 
property damage. 
Study 7: Summary 
To summarize our general findings on force in citizen arrests: The subjects agree 
with the Code's defense for a citizen's use of nondeadly force to effect an arrest. 
They disagree, however, with the Code's position that a citizen may not, indepen­
dent of a law enforcement officer, use deadly force to effect an arrest. Most of our 
subjects would approve the use of deadly force to arrest a fleeing rapist. A large 
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minority would take the same view even if the offender is fleeing from a property 
damage offense. 
In general, the subjects are much more forgiving than the Code of a person's 
mistakes in using deadly force to effect a citizen's arrest. The Code imposes mur­
der liability if the apprehending person kills an innocent person. A strong major­
ity of the subjects, in contrast, impose no punishment even in the case in which 
the citizen kills an innocent person in trying to stop a fleeing rapist. Only in that 
case in which an innocent person is killed in an attempt to stop an offender flee­
ing from a property damage offense does a (bare) majority of our subjects judge 
punishment to be appropriate and, even then, liability is a few months rather 
than the murder liability that the Code provides. 1 1  As the foregoing study demon­
strates, the difference in views between the rape and property damage cases re­
veals that many subjects take into account the seriousness of the offense in j udg­
ing the amount of force permissible to make an arrest-while the Code does not. 
We are surprised by these results. Although intuitively we expected that our re­
spondents might judge the use of force by citizens to apprehend criminals more 
leniently than does the legal code, we did not expect the overwhelming magni­
tude of the differences we found. We had expected that the use of deadly force 
would be more widely condemned in cases where, as here, the damage is already 
done and the force is being used aggressively (rather than defensively) to arrest 
the offender. This seems especially true where only damage to property is in­
volved, but though our respondents do assign more liability to that case than to 
others, the liability assigned is very low. 
Given these results, future research should test the generality of the leniency 
that the subjects display. Intuitively, one would expect that there must be limits 
on what sorts of mistake will generate these lenient patterns of liability. Surely one 
cannot egregiously mistake innocents for criminals and kill them with little or no 
liability. Furthermore, in this study's scenarios, the respondents could have be­
lieved that the person's primary goal in shooting the offender was to apprehend 
him rather than to kill him as deserved punishment. What if it were established 
instead that the arrester's primary purpose was otherwise? Would such a scenario 
receive equally lenient treatment? F inally, our offenders were fleeing. Do people 
believe that the legal system would be successful in eventually apprehending the 
perpetrator? Do those people who believe that the police will not be able to appre­
hend the criminal believe that it is more acceptable for the victim to shoot the 
perpetrator as a kind of victim-administered vigilante justice? From the perspec­
tive of the legal code, whether the criminal justice system will catch the offender is 
an irrelevant factor, but it may not be irrelevant to the community. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We have now examined community views on three cases in which an individual 
has a justification for the use of force: when the force is used in self-defense, in de-
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fense of property, or to apprehend offenders fleeing from crimes they have com­
mitted. In all of these studies, the community judges that these justifications are 
more compelling than the legal codes are willing to grant. Respondents frequently 
assign no liability in cases to which the code attaches liability. Even when respon­
dents assign liability, they typically assign considerably less punishm�nt than 
would be suggested by the legal codes. This discrepancy is least evident in the jus­
tifications provided by claims of self-defense. In defense of oneself, the Code al­
lows force, even deadly force, to be used in a number of cases. The differences be­
tween community standards and criminal codes become increasingly apparent 
when we examine what people think is justifiable in defense of property-and 
even more apparent in the cases involving a citizen who uses force to apprehend a 
criminal fleeing a crime or to apprehend a person thought to be a criminal fleeing 
a crime. Community standards, as evidenced by our respondents, tolerate the use 
of more force than the Code permits and assign lesser sanctions to the use of 
force-even in the instances in which our subjects judge that some blame accrues. 
What can explain this sharp contrast between community standards and crimi­
nal codes? One possible accounting is that criminal codes are formulated with the 
often implicit presupposition that there is a reasonably effective criminal justice 
system in place. In the assumptive world of the code drafters, people who commit 
crimes have a high likelihood of being caught, convicted, and punished with due 
severity. But we know that many individuals do not believe this is true of the real 
world of the 1 990s. Our subjects may believe that the criminal justice system is 
not likely to apprehend criminals, convict them when it apprehends them, or 
justly punish them when it convicts them. Our subjects also may believe that the 
criminal justice system is failing in its role of protecting citizens. Our discrepant 
results may stem from a general belief that when the criminal justice system does 
a poor job in punishing offenders, it is appropriate for individual citizens to do 
more in defense of both self and property as well as in law enforcement. The more 
ineffective the system is seen to be, the more people may be willing to let victims 
take matters into their own hands. 
If this is the explanation for our results, it is a sad and troublesome one. The 
strength of the differences between community standards and legal codes that we 
found would indicate, at a minimum, that large segments of the population are 
deeply dissatisfied with the criminal justice system. These observed discrepancies 
may illustrate one of the "hidden costs" to policies that fail to provide adequately 
funded police forces or to court systems that fail to punish blameworthy offend­
ers. 
We are conducting further research to correlate individual attitudes about the 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system with judgments on what uses of force 
are appropriate in defense of both self or property or to apprehend those who 
commit crimes. However, one result is already clear: A code that seeks to mirror 
the community's views would have to broaden the Model Penal Code's justifica-
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tions and to ameliorate its treatment of unjustified conduct in a justification con­
text. One suspects that in the actual operation of the criminal justice process, spe­
cifically when juries choose to acquit or refuse to indict or when prosecutors 
choose to reduce charges through plea bargains, these community judgments are 
registered. Still, should the legal codes be modified to match these community 
standards or at least to move in their direction? We find that an extraordinarily 
complex question, one to which we propose an answer in Chapter 7. 
4 
Doctrines of Culpability: 
When Is One's Violation of 
a Legal Rule Blameworthy? 
Once we have determined what we want our legal code of conduct to be (the sub­
ject of Chapters 2 and 3 ) ,  we need to answer the question of when liability should 
or should not follow a code violation. Even if a person violates one of the criminal 
law's rules, it does not follow that liability is appropriate. The condemnatory na­
ture of criminal law requires that inadvertent and unavoidable violations not be 
punished. If a person's violation is blameless, that individual ought to be free 
from liability even though he or she may well have caused the harm or evil pro­
hibited by the doctrines of criminalization. Furthermore, liability is properly re­
served for violations of sufficient seriousness committed with sufficient culpabil­
ity to j ustify condemnation as criminal. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the criminal 
law's and the community's views on this issue of the minimum requirements for 
liability. 
The law tests for adequate blameworthiness in two ways. F irst, it requires proof 
that the person's violation did not occur by virtue of blameless accident or mis­
take. This is achieved by requiring the prosecution to prove a person's culpabil­
ity-purpose, knowledge, or recklessness (or occasionally negligence )-as to 
each element of an offense. As a second test, the law provides the person with the 
opportunity to raise various defenses-such as insanity, immaturity, duress, or 
involuntary intoxication-that suggest that, even if a person had the required cul­
pable state of mind, the individual nonetheless is not responsible for his or her vi­
olative actions. In this chapter, we discuss the studies we conducted that concern 
the first kind of minimum requirement, the culpable state of mind. In Chapter 5, 
we assemble and discuss the studies that concern the second blameworthiness is­
sue, excuse defenses. 
To assure the minimum level of blameworthiness, the law requires proof of a 
person's culpability as to each element of an offense. Thus, the "intruder" in your 
basement is criminally liable only if he knows it is another's house that he is en­
tering. If, because all of the row houses are identical and he just moved in next 
door, he enters your basement garage honestly believing it to be his own, his tres-
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pass may be a violation of the rules of conduct but may not be a sufficiently culpa­
ble violation to merit the condemnation of a criminal conviction. 
As we mentioned earlier, modern criminal codes classify a person's culpability 
with regard to the circumstances or results that make his conduct criminal into 
one of four broad categories: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. A 
person can bring about an outcome "on purpose;' meaning that he or she fully 
intends that the particular consequence will happen. For example, I may set a 
bomb, hoping and intending to injure the people in a particular area. Alternately, 
the injury can be brought about knowingly but not purposefully. When I blow up 
a safe to steal the contents, I may know that the blast will injure people on the ad­
jacent floors, but it is not my purpose to do so; all things being equal, I would pre­
fer that no one would be injured. Alternatively, I may only be reckless as to the 
blast injuring others. That is, I may be aware of a risk of causing injuries but dis­
regard the risk. Finally, I may be unaware of a risk that people may be injured but 
should have been aware-a reasonable person would have been aware-in which 
case the law judges me negligent as to causing the injuries [Model Penal Code 
(MPC) § 2.02(2) ;  Robinson and Grall, 1 983 ] .  
Generally, a minimum of  recklessness as to each objective element i s  required 
for criminal liability, given the rather severe penalties that the system imposes-as 
compared to the civil justice system. Thus, for example, a person must be aware of 
a substantial risk that his or her conduct may obstruct a highway or that the prop­
erty he or she is taking belongs to another or that the garage the person is entering 
is not his or her own-in order to incur criminal liability. This preference for 
recklessness as the normal minimum culpability required for criminal liability is 
expressed by provisions, such as the Model Penal Code's, that "read in" reckless­
ness whenever an offense definition is silent on the required culpability as to an 
offense element [ MPC § 2.02 (3 ) ] .  
Several of our previous studies have touched on  culpability issues. For instance, 
in Study 1 we discovered that a person who forms a settled intent to commit a 
crime is assigned some liability. Study 2 found that when a person's purpose is to 
kill another, even though the action taken runs only a slight risk of bringing about 
a minor harm, our respondents judge the person to be highly culpable. These 
findings give us some preliminary indications that culpability is not only a pre­
requisite for liability but also a powerful determinant of the degree of liability. We 
will have more to say about this later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 6 (in 
which we take up issues of offense grading) . 
STUDY 8: OFFENSE CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
AND MISTAKE/ACCIDENT DEFENSES 
The definition of an offense typically requires that a person's conduct cause a 
specified harmful result or that the conduct be performed under specified cir­
cumstances that make it harmful or evil. Offense definitions are constructed from 
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these three kinds of objective elements-conduct, results, and circumstances 
[MPC § 1.13(9)] . A result element might be something like the requirement in ar­
son that a building be damaged. A circumstance element might be the require­
ment that the building be a dwelling and that it belong to another person (specific 
required characteristics of the nature of the damage) or the requirement in rape 
that the intercourse occur without the consent of the victim or the requirement in 
"statutory rape" that the partner be underage (an existing circumstance at the 
time of the conduct) . A conduct element might be the requirement of intercourse 
in rape or of setting a fire in arson. In some instances, the definition of an offense 
does not require a specific kind of conduct. Homicide offenses prohibit conduct 
of any kind that causes a death. Property destruction offenses frequently require 
only that the person engage in some conduct-any conduct-that causes the pro­
hibited damage. 
Satisfaction of all of the objective elements of an offense definition is required 
for liability for the offense. Burning a dwelling that is your own property is not 
arson. Having intercourse with another who consents is not rape. Of course, such 
conduct may render a person liable for another offense, if the conduct satisfies the 
elements for that other offense. Intercourse with someone who consents is not 
rape but may be statutory rape if the person is underage. 
In addition to the objective elements of an offense definition, modern codes re­
quire proof that a person have a specified culpability level as to each objective ele­
ment of an offense [MPC § 2.02( 1 )  and (3)] . That is, it is not enough for criminal 
liability that a person's conduct caused destruction of another's dwelling or that a 
person had intercourse with another without consent. The person must be shown 
to have been culpable as to the fact that the property belonged to another (and 
even that the property was a "dwelling;' if that is an objective element of the of­
fense) or that the person was not consenting to intercourse. 
Just as all objective elements must be proven to establish liability, so too must 
each culpability requirement as to each objective element be proven. Where a re­
quired culpability element is not proven, the person is given a defense frequently 
called a mistake defense, especially where the missing culpability concerns a cir­
cumstance element [MPC § 2.04( 1)] . That the person made a reasonable "mis­
take" as to the partner's age, for example, means that the person did not have the 
culpability of negligence as to the partner being underage that some statutes re­
quire for statutory rape. In those cases in which a person lacks the required culpa­
bility as to a required result, in contrast, ordinary language might refer to the case 
as one of "accident." For example, when a person has no reason to be aware that 
his storage of a friend's improperly labeled goods creates a risk to his neighbor's 
house, he is faultless as to causing damage to the neighbor's house if the goods 
turn out to be dangerous chemicals that explode when improperly stored. The 
reasonableness of the person's conduct in causing the "accident" means that the 
offense's requirement of negligence as to causing damage is not satisfied. 
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As one can imagine, the process of drafting a criminal code requires thousands 
of decisions as to the level of culpability that should be required as to each objec­
tive element of each offense. Each decision determines the kind of mistake or ac­
cident that will provide a defense to the violation. The drafters must determine 
what minimum level of culpability should be required as to each element of each 
offense. By what process and under what guiding principles should these deci­
sions be made? Should a person's liability be increased if he or she has a greater 
culpability than the minimum required? 
Our culpability requirements study sought to determine the community's 
views of the appropriate level of culpability that should be required for various 
kinds of elements of various kinds of offenses. Subjects were given scenarios con­
taining instances of "unconsented-to" sexual intercourse, statutory rape, and 
property damage offenses involving damage to a dwelling or to unimproved 
property. The property damage offenses have a clear result element, while the 
rape offenses have "circumstance" elements-lack of consent and age-that are 
central to liability. Some of the property scenarios focus on the person's culpabil­
ity as to causing the harmful result; others focus on the person's culpability as to 
the fact that the property belongs to another. 
The six base scenarios-mistake as to causing damage to a house, mistake as to 
causing damage to unimproved property, mistake as to ownership of the house 
damaged, mistake as to ownership of the unimproved property damaged, mistake 
as to lack of consent to sexual intercourse, mistake as to age of the underage part­
ner-were each presented in four variations �n which the level of culpability of the 
person's mistake varied-among knowledge, recklessness, negligence, and fault­
lessness. 1 In this culpability study, . unlike in some of the others we have con­
ducted, we informed the respondents that the action was either knowing, reckless, 
negligent, or faultless rather than giving them circumstances and hoping that 
they inferred the violator's proper state of mind. For instance, in the case of prop­
erty damage in which we wanted our subjects to perceive the person to be faultless 
as to the property being that of another, we told the respondents that the person 
was told by his lawyer that the property is his. In the corresponding negligence 
case, respondents were told that, although the person does not realize that title to 
the property has not yet come to be his, a reasonable person would realize this. 
(Because we specified these matters directly, and because these respondents had 
so many cases to judge, we omitted asking them the questions about how they 
perceived the various elements of the case. Research carrying these topics further 
might give more subtle information about culpability and might include the ma­
nipulation-check questions. ) 
The liability results of our respondents for each of these twenty-four variations 
are contrasted with those of the Model Penal Code in Table 4. 1 .  The table gives the 
complete results of the study and is not easy to follow. Therefore, we also will pre­
sent several figures that clarify various aspects of the data. 
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Within each of the six scenarios, the differences in liability assignments due to 
the different levels of culpability suggest the general importance of the assessment 
of culpability in the assignment of criminal liability and punishment. This result 
emerges very clearly in Figure 4.2, which graphs liability assignment as a function 
of the person's level of culpability. 
Subjects perceive the four variations of each scenario as presenting distinguish­
able cases in which liability and punishment increase as the manipulated level of 
culpability increases. The consistent slopes of the lines graphing the six cases 
make this very clear. Furthermore, the patterns of liability in Figure 4.2 suggest a 
special significance in the distinction between recklessness and negligence ( that 
is, between conscious versus inattentive risk-taking). This can be seen by the fact 
that the slope of the line connecting the reckless and negligent cases is always 
more sharp than the slopes of the lines connecting the other cases. This effect on 
the subjects' liability assignment of the reckless-negligent distinction would seem 
to support the Model Penal Code's special treatment of recklessness as the normal 
minimum culpability requirement [MPC § 2.02 (3) ] .  
However, a further examination o f  Figure 4.2 suggests a result that is not always 
in accord with penal codes. The difference between the average liability assigned 
by our respondents for reckless and knowing culpability suggests that the higher 
culpability, knowing, might properly be reflected in an offense definition that 
grades the knowing violation one grade higher than the reckless violation. (Each 
unit on the liability scale represents a difference in punishment that commonly is 
equal to one offense grade. )2 The Model Penal Code treatment of offenses, shown 
in column d of Table 4. 1 ,  sometimes but not always makes grading distinctions 
according to the reckless-knowing distinction. In the case of damage to the neigh­
bor's house, knowingly causing the damage is a second-degree felony although 
recklessly causing the damage is only a third-degree felony, a grading similar to 
the ones that our respondents imposed. However, in both the damage to unim­
proved property and rape cases, in which the Code does not assign a different 
level of liability to the knowing and reckless commission cases, our respondents 
would do so. The responses of our subjects, if modeled in the code, would assign a 
higher degree of liability to the knowing versus the reckless commission of all of­
fenses. 
In fact, on examination, the Code's differing grading of the culpability levels 
for the various offenses generates more inconsistencies with our subjects' ten­
dency to have culpability alter such grading in all offenses. Look first at the Code's 
treatment of various levels of culpability as to causing damage (Table 4. 1 ,  sce­
narios 1 and 2 ,  column d). The Code's treatment of knowingly and faultlessly 
causing damage to a dwelling tracks that imposed by our subjects. A knowing vio­
lation is one grade higher than that for a reckless violation; a faultless violation is 
exempt from liability (Table 4. 1 ,  scenario 1 ). The Model Penal Code scheme devi­
ates from the subjects' view in that it fails to lower liability for cases of negligent 
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TABLE 4. 1 Liability for Mistake/ Accident 
(a) (b) {c) (d) 
Scenarios: % No Liability 
Element of Offense % No or No Model Penal 
and Actor's Culpability Liability Liability Punishment Code Result 
1 .  As to causing damage 
to house: 
a. Knowing 6.21 0 0 2nd-degree felony 
[§220.1  (1 )(a)] 
b.  Reckless 5.08 0 1 0  3rd-degree felony 
[§220.1 {2)(b)] 
c. Negligent 2.22 8 55 3rd-degree felonyb 
[§220.3(a)] 
d. Faultless 1 .25 30 75 No liability 
2. As to causing damage 
to unimproved property: 
a. Knowing 5.54 0 3 Misdemeanor- [§220.3(a)) 
b. Reckless 4.31 3 1 8  Misdemeanor- [§220.3(a)J 
c. Negligent 1 .75 1 5  65 Misdemeanor- [§220.3(a)J 
d. Faultless 0.95 38 83 No liability 
3. As to house belonging 
to another: 
a. Knowing 5.77 0 3 2nd-degree felony 
[§220.1 (1 ){a)] 
b .  Reckless 5.31 0 3 3rd-degree felony 
[§220.1  {2)(b)] 
c.  Negligent 3.62 0 28 No liability 
d. Faultless 3.26 8 38 No liability 
4. As to unimproVed 
property belonging to 
another: 
a. Knowing 4.92 3 1 0  Misdemeanor- [§220.3(a)] 
b .  Reckless 4.49 3 1 3  Misdemeanor- [§220.3(d)] 
c. Negligent 3. 1 0  3 38 No liability 
d. Faultless 2.44 1 0  50 No liability 
5. As to victim's lack of 
consent in rape: 
a.  Knowing 6.60 5 8 1 st-degree felony 
[§213. 1  (1 )(a)] 
b .  Reckless 5.55 3 1 5  1 st-degree felony 
[§21 3.1 (1 )(a)] 
c. Negligent 3.82 1 3  33 No liabil ity 
d. Faultless 0.26 78 90 No liability 
(continues) 
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TABLE 4. 1 (continued) 
Scenarios: 
Element of Offense 
and Actor's Culpability 
6. As to victim being 
underage in statutory 
rape: 
a. Knowing 
b. Reckless 
c. Negligent 
d. Faultless 
(a) (b) 
% No 
Liability Liability 
5.28 3 
3.97 8 
1 .38 33 
0.51 65 
(c) (d) 
% No Liability 
or No 
Punishment 
Model Penal 
Code Result 
8 3rd-degree felonyc 
[§21 3.3(1 )(a)] 
23 3rd-degree felony 
[§21 3.3(1 )(a)] 
73 3rd-degree felony 
[§21 3.6( 1 )] 
88 No liabil ity 
Liabi l ity Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 = 
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years, 
8=1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 O=life, and 1 1  =death. 
aAssumes property damage between $1 00 and $5,000. 
bAssumes property damage i n  excess of $5,000. 
89 
cAssumes that the defendant is at least 1 8  years old (4 years older than the 
1 4-year-old victim). 
damage as compared to cases of reckless damage. Indeed, it imposes the same de­
gree of liability ( third-degree felony) for negligent violations as for reckless viola­
tions, contradicting its own general tendency to draw the line between reckless 
and negligent culpability. 
The Code's treatment of analogous cases of damage to unimproved property 
(Table 4.1, scenario 2) is also divergent from our subjects' views. As above, a neg­
ligent violation is a basis for liability under the Code, while the subjects would 
considerably reduce the liability of the person in that case. Knowing and reckless 
violations are not distinguished in the Code; they are treated the same as a negli­
gent violation. They are distinguished by our respondents, as the line in Figure 
4.2 marked "causing damage-property" makes clear. 
The Code's scheme also is divergent from our subjects' views in its treatment of 
violatons that involve mistakes as to ownership (Table 4.1, scenarios 3 and 4). The 
Code gives no liability in cases of negligent and faultless mistake as to ownership; 
our subjects give liability-albeit low liability-as also is shown in Figure 4.2. 
Turning to an examination of the rape cases (Table 4.1, scenarios 5 and 6), 
what can be said about our respondents' perceptions of the two rape scenarios? 
Note first the lack-of-consent case in Figure 4.3. Our respondents' views (as rep­
resented in this figure) also diverge in several respects from the Code's treatment 
of mistake as to consent in rape. Our subjects treat the degree of culpability as a 
90 
FIGURE 4.2 Liabil ity as a Function of Culpability Level 
8 
-a-- Rape-Lack of consent 
• Causing damage-House 
• Other owner-House 
• Causing damage-Property 
• Rape-Underage 
6 
-a-- Other owner-Property 
Faultless Negligent Reckless 
Culpability Level 
D octrines of Culpability 
Knowing 
graded consideration, assigning a higher degree of liability as the offense 
progresses from negligence with respect to consent, through recklessness, to 
knowing. In contrast, the Code (Table 4.1, column d) imposes no liability for a 
negligent mistake, while the subjects' liability mean (column a) is 3.82 (5.2 
months). The Code does not distinguish reckless and knowing errors, grading 
both as first-degree felonies; the subjects impose greater liability for a knowing 
error, 6.60 ( 5.4 years) ,  than for a reckless error, 5.55 (2.2 years) .  
A more exaggerated form of this difference appears in the liability patterns for 
statutory rape, the case in which the victim is described as being under the statu­
tory age of consent. The Code treats knowing, reckless, and negligent errors as to 
the victim's age as the same grade. Our subjects make significant distinctions be­
tween them all. The majority of subjects (73 percent) would impose either no lia­
bility or no punishment where the person is negligent as to age (Table 4.1, sce­
nario 6c, column c) , but the Code treats this as a third-degree felony. 
The rape results reveal that the subjects tend toward setting different minimum 
levels of culpability for the two different cases. In statutory rape, a majority of the 
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FIGURE 4.3 Liability as a Function of Culpability as to Different Offense Elements: 
Rape and Statutory Rape 
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Faultless Negligent Reckless 
Culpability Level 
Knowing 
subjects impose no punishment on a person who is faultless or negligent as to the 
victim's age. In rape, in contrast, only faultlessness as to the victim's lack of con­
sent draws no punishment from a majority of subjects; negligence as to lack of 
consent is no defense in the view of most subjects. This suggests that the subjects 
perceive the minimum culpability requirements of these two offenses somewhat 
differently, and intuitively one sees why they make the particular distinctions that 
they do. 
If one were to draft a statutory rape provision using the intuitions contained in 
our respondents' judgments, one would grade the offense as a continuous func­
tion of the degree of culpability of the offender, rather than-as the Code cur� 
rently does-as a dichotomous function, with negligent and higher degrees of 
culpability all assigned a third -degree felony grade. 
Many of the foregoing results can be summarized as follows: Our results gener­
ally support the Code distinction that draws a sharp line between reckless and 
negligent commission of an offense. However (and frequently counter to the 
Code) ,  our respondents also distinguish between knowing and reckless commis­
sion and between negligent and faultless commission. They assign differing liabil-
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FIGURE 4.4 Uability as a Function of Culpability as to Different 
Offense Elements: Damage to House 
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ities, in other words, to all of the different levels of culpability. This strikes us as an 
important result, but a somewhat predictable one; it is the result that we would 
have intuited. But certain of our other results confront us with a data pattern that 
we did not expect (or, at least, did not expect to be so strong in effect as to be evi­
dent from our data) .  If confirmed in further research, it would reveal an impor­
tant code-community disagreement. 
Evidence of the disagreement is shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. In them, we have 
graphed liability for damaging a house and for damaging unimproved property. 
In each of those cases, we had two culpability elements pertaining to the same of­
fense. In Figure 4 .4, liability as a function of culpability is graphed for both the el­
ement of culpability as to causing damage and the element of culpability as to the 
property belonging to another-in this case a house that is owned by another. 
( Recall that the person has some reason to believe that he himself has bought the 
house.)  Figure 4.5 displays liability as a function of the analogous elements of cul­
pability as to damage to and ownership of unimproved property. Notice that, in 
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FIGURE 4.5 Liability as a Function of Culpability as to Different Offense Elements: 
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each graph, the line graphing liability as a function of culpability as to the prop­
erty belonging to another is flatter in slope than is the line graphing liability as a 
function of culpability as to causing damage. \Vhat this means is that in each in­
stance, where the culpability as to ownership is varied, the range of liabilities, 5.77 
(2.6 years) to 3.26 ( 3.2 months) for the house and 4.92 ( 1 1 .4 months) to 2.44 ( 4.4 
weeks) for property, is noticeably less than the range ofliabilities when the culpa­
bility as to damage is varied, 6.2 1 (3.8 years) to 1 .25 (4.9 days) for the house and 
5.54 (about 1 .5 years) to 0.95 ( 1  day) for property. This suggests that the person's 
culpability as to causing damage is a stronger determinant of his liability, in our 
respondents' minds, than is his culpability as to another's ownership.3 This seems 
to give objective evidence of the somewhat vague feeling shared by many criminal 
law practitioners and scholars that some objective elements within an offense are 
different in effect and importance than others. \Vhile both "causing damage" and 
"property of another"-and culpability as to each-are required elements of the 
damage offenses, culpability as to "causing damage" and culpability as to "prop-
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erty of another'' appear to play different roles in the determination of liability and 
punishment. "Causing damage" appears to be a primary determinant, a "core" el­
ement, while "property of another" appears to be a more "collateral" element, 
which establishes a minimum background condition. We will discuss the implica­
tions of this further in the summary of this study herein below. 
One last result is worthy of note. Elsewhere in this book ( in Chapter 6),  we 
comment on the task of the comparative grading of offenses. Here we would point 
out that the respondents saw the various offenses we described to them in this 
study as differentially serious in nature. The differences in elevation between the 
lines in Figure 4 .2 illustrate a pattern that makes good intuitive sense. Look sim­
ply at the treatment of the various crimes committed knowingly. As one might ex­
pect, the rape scenario in which another person is harmed shows the highest lia­
bility, 6.60 (5.4 years) for knowing culpability, followed by the scenario of damage 
( in which people might be endangered) to a dwelling, 6.2 1 (3 .8 years) . Damage to 
unimproved property, 5.54 (2 years) ,  and consensual intercourse with a minor, 
5.28 ( 1 .6 years),  are viewed as slightly less-serious offenses. 
Study 8: Sum mary 
The culpability requirements study sought to determine the community's views 
of the degree of liability that ought to be assigned to various levels of culpability 
required for different kinds of elements for three kinds of offenses. Culpability el­
ements of offenses serve two distinct functions: defining the minimum require­
ments for liability and distinguishing different grades of a single offense. The re­
search results give some insight into how the subjects would have each function 
performed. 
We take up our most interesting finding first. In setting the minimum require­
ments for liability and also in grading offenses, it appears that some culpability el­
ements are considerably more significant than others. For example, in an offense 
of causing damage to property, a person who is faultless or only negligent as to 
causing the damage (while knowing it is another's property) receives no punish­
ment from a majority of our subjects. In the cases in which the person is faultless 
or negligent as to the property being that of another (while knowing that he is de­
stroying the property) , in contrast, a majority would impose punishment. Our re­
spondents seem to be suggesting that, at least in the specific case of storing poten­
tially dangerous material, which was the way we manipulated elements in these 
scenarios, the person needs to recognize an obligation to assess the danger poten­
tial of what is being stored. It is of some concern ( though a lesser degree of con­
cern) that the person figure out who owns adjacent property. A sturdy compo­
nent of common sense commends itself to our attention here: A person first needs 
to figure out the damage-causing potential of his or her actions. To whom, ex­
actly, the potential damage might occur is an important but secondary question. 
Thus, in formal terms, we would suggest that the person's culpability as to the po-
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tential for causing damage is more influential on the subjects' decision to impose 
liability than the person's culpability as to the property being that of another. The 
same pattern is seen at the high-culpability levels; higher culpability as to causing 
damage increases punishment significantly more than higher culpability as to the 
property being that of another (Table 4. 1 ,  scenarios l through 4, columns a 
through c) . 
This pattern suggests the need to distinguish between elements when defining 
the minimum requirements for liability. If one were to follow our subjects' intu­
itions, the minimum culpability as to causing damage may properly be set higher 
than the minimum culpability as to knowing whether the property belonged to 
another. Moreover, differences in levels of culpability as to causing damage should 
make a larger difference in the liability grading of an offense than culpability as to 
ownership. This illustrates one of the dangers of a provision such as Model Penal 
Code § 2.02( 4 ) ,  which applies a stated culpability term in an offense to all objec­
tive elements. It tends to apply the same culpability requirement to both "core" 
elements-such as causing damage-and "collateral" or "background" ele­
ments-such as ownership by another. 
But what constitutes a core element as opposed to a collateral element? The re­
search results suggest that this is not an easy question. The results reveal different 
patterns of  weighing culpability elements, depending on the circumstances of the 
crime. These are complex considerations that merit further investigation. 
With respect to the second function of culpability requirements-distinguish­
ing grades within the same offense (as in homicide)-our subjects appear to 
make significant liability distinctions on this basis across the range of culpability 
levels. The difference in the respondents' assigned punishment for a person who 
is knowing and one who is  reckless frequently is greater than what constitutes the 
difference between offense grades in  American criminal codes. Also, our respon­
dents generally distinguish between the other levels of culpability as well; they 
generally assign increasing levels of liability as the level of culpability rises from 
negligent, to reckless, to knowing. As we have suggested, these patternings of lia­
bility assignments significantly differ from those provided by the Model Penal 
Code. First, few offenses in the Code, other than homicide, contain grades de­
pendent upon culpability level.4 Indeed, most offenses are not defined to have 
more than a single grade. This may have been an attempt by the Code to preserve 
the sentencing discretion of judges. The fewer the grades of an offense provided 
in the Code, the greater the flexibility of the judge to rely on distinctions of his or 
her own choosing in imposing sentence. The shift to more articulated sentencing 
rules in the thirty-plus years since the drafting of the Model Penal Code may sug­
gest that it is time to have the Code make more distinctions in grading offenses. 
Certainly degrees of an offense based on the person's level of culpability would 
provide a refinement that would better mirror the community's liability and pun­
ishment judgments. If code drafters want the criminal code to follow community 
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views, it would be useful to do studies of this sort-to determine where the com­
munity sets the minimum culpability levels for different elements of different of­
fenses and whether increased culpability over these minimums ought to give rise 
to a higher grade of liability.5 
STUDY 9: 
CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLICITY 
Liability for complicity requires that a person assist another in the commission of 
an offense. The precise nature of the conduct requirement of assisting is exam­
ined in the objective requirements of complicity study in Chapter 2. In addition 
to this objective requirement, current doctrine requires that a person have a de­
fined culpable state of mind as to providing such assistance in commission of the 
offense. 
Just as criminal liability is inappropriate for an inadvertent commission of an 
offense, so too is liability inappropriate for one who indvertently assists another 
in the commission of an offense. Thus the Model Penal Code requires that, at the 
time of assisting the perpetrator, the accomplice must be acting "with the purpose 
of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense" [MPC § 2.06(3)(a) ] .  
A proposal to require "knowledge" rather than "purpose" was rejected by the full 
membership of the American Law Institute ( the Institute) . The requirement of 
«purpose" was judged preferable and was said to continue the long-standing 
common-law rule. 
However, the phrase "purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of 
the offense" is ambiguous on an important point. Does the very demanding "pur­
pose" requirement apply only to the person's culpable state of mind as to assisting 
("promoting or facilitating") the perpetrator's conduct, or does it apply as well to all 
elements of the substantive offense, such as "purposeful" with respect to the prohib­
ited results of the person's conduct? If it applies to all elements of the substantive of­
fense, the effect is dramatic, for it makes complicity very difficult to establish, es­
sentially limiting it to cases in which the accomplice intended not only the offense 
conduct to occur but also intended any required results to occur or circumstances 
to exist. For example, statutory rape typically requires no more than negligence as 
to the partner being underage. When a person purposely assists conduct that in 
fact constitutes statutory rape, can that individual be defended by claiming that 
he or she only thought it probable ( reckless) that the partner was underage but 
did not know or did not necessarily intend that the partner was underage? If com­
plicity liability requires purpose as to all offense elements, anything less than pur­
pose as to the partner being underage will provide a defense in this case. For an­
other example relating to a result element, the offense of endangerment requires 
that the perpetrator be at least reckless as to creating a risk of death. When a per­
son purposely assists conduct that constitutes endangerment (dumping hazard­
ous chemicals near a playground, for example),  can that person be defended by 
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claiming that he or she knew that, by assisting such conduct, a risk of death would 
be created but that he or she did not necessarily intend such a risk to be created? If 
complicity liability requires purpose as to all offense elements, anything less than 
purpose as to creating the risk of death will provide a defense in this case. 
This was the ambiguity at issue in Etzweiler v. State!> for example, where the de­
fendant was charged as an accomplice to a killing caused by a drunk driver. The 
defendant clearly had "purposely" ass isted h is drunk friend to engage in the con­
duct consisting the offense, driving; he gave his drunken friend the keys to his car. It 
was not clear, however, that Etzweiler was "purposeful" or even "knowing" as to 
his conduct creating a risk of death. At most, one might conclude that, by giving 
car keys to his obviously intoxicated friend, Etzweiler was "reckless" as to the re­
sulting death; that is, at the time of giving the keys, he was aware of a substantial 
risk that a death could result. 
The justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Etzweiler disagree over 
the proper interpretation of the state code's "purpose" requirement for complic­
ity, which was modeled in large part on the Model Penal Code. A majority of the 
court holds that the purpose requirement has the effect of elevating a ll culp ability 
requirements of the homicide definition to purposeful for the accomplice. Thus, 
while manslaughter normally requires only recklessness as to causing a death, 
complicity in manslaughter requires that the accomplice be purposeful as to caus­
ing the death (even murder liability requires only knowing as to causing death) . 
Some common-law cases came to a similar view that the culpability requirements 
for complicity in an offense are "elevated" over those of the substantive offense it­
self. Other common-law cases essentially came to the view of the dissenting 
judges, which is as follows. 
The dissenting justices in Etzweiler conclude that complicity's purpose require­
ment only requires that the complicit individual be purposeful as to assisting the 
perpetrator's conduct-that is, purposely giving the friend the car keys with the in­
tention of allowing him to drive the car. The culpability requirements of the sub­
stantive offense-recklessness as to causing death, for manslaughter-are not ele­
vated to purpose for complicity liability. Under the latter view, a person can be an 
accomplice to manslaughter by purposely assisting another to engage in conduct 
that the accomplice is aware creates a substantial risk of causing death ( i.e., the ac­
complice is reckless as to causing death) .  The Model Penal Code drafters make it 
relatively clear that they support this "no-elevation" view, at least with respect to 
result elements as in Etzweiler [MPC § 2.06( 4) ] .  The complicity culpability re­
quirements study sought to test the subjects' views on the importance to liability 
of an accomplice's culpability as to assisting and culpability as to the elements of 
the substantive offense. 
Six scenarios presented variations on the Etzweiler situation. The study in­
volved the same core description of an individual who makes his car keys avail­
able to an intoxicated friend. The two individuals arrive at the plant where they 
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work. Because the friend is intoxicated, the other individual is driving. The intox­
icated friend announces his plan to borrow the car to race home to change clothes 
before work. The area through which he will drive is crowded with workers arri�­
ing for their shift at the plant. In some cases, we describe the nonintoxicated indi­
vidual as sure that his drunk friend will kill people if he drives; in other cases, the 
sober person is only aware of the possibility that his drunk friend might kill peo­
ple. Thus, we attempted to make clear that the state of mind of the complicit indi­
vidual was knowing or reckless as to causing the death that we described as ensu­
ing, an element that we intuited was likely to be an important one to our 
respondents. The drunk obtains access to the car keys, heads home, and kills two 
workers just arriving through the factory gate. 
We manipulated the description of the circumstances of the drunk's obtaining 
the car keys from his friend to create the perceptions that the accomplice is either 
purposeful, knowing, or reckless as to his drunk friend taking the car to drive 
while intoxicated. In the purposeful case, the sober friend willingly hands the 
drunk friend the keys. In the knowing case, he first urges the drunk friend not to 
drive, then reluctantly hands over the keys. In the reckless case, he refuses his 
drunk friend but then leaves the keys in a place where his friend can find them, 
even though it crosses his mind that the friend might take them. 
The results of the study are presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. In Table 4.6, we in­
clude the liability assigned to the accomplice. In Table 4. 7, we present the respon­
dents' perceptions of the accomplice's and the perpetrator's states of mind with 
respect to the various elements of the situation. 
We will examine some general aspects of the data patterns. Notice first the 
commonsense result (Table 4.6, column a) that the liability of the individual who 
drives while drunk and kills others is high; translated into years, the sentence is 
from eleven to fourteen years. This is as we would expect. The perpetrator, while 
drunk, is not so drunk that he cannot pressure the accomplice to give him the 
keys, make his way to the car, start it up, and drive off. As column i of Table 4. 7 
indicates, the respondents see the driver as somewhere between unaware and 
aware that his driving has a substantial chance of killing somebody. Second, no­
tice that the driver's liability is constant through all scenarios; it is not affected by 
variations in the state of mind of the accomplice, and again this is as we would ex­
pect. Third, note that in each instance, the liability of the accomplice (column b) 
is significantly less than that for the perpetrator. This is a second instance of a pat­
terning of results that we saw in Study 3-that accomplices are given a significant 
discount in liability as compared to the perpetrator. The doctrine, remember, 
holds an accomplice liable at the same grade as the principal. 
We examine next the questions that enable us to see how the respondents per­
ceive the accomplice's state of mind in the different scenarios (columns g and h). 
Respondents give their answers on a 4-point scale, with "4" indicating a rating of 
"purposeful;' "3"  a rating of «knowing," and "2" a rating of "reckless." (See the 
TABLE 4.6 Liability as Related to Culpability Requirements for Complicity 
Scenarios 
Purposeful as to assisting driving: 
1 .  Knowing as to causing death 
2. Reckless as to causing death 
Knowing as to assisting driving: 
3. Knowing as to causing death 
4. Reckless as to causing death 
Reckless as to as,sisting driving: 
5. Knowing as to causing death 
6. Reckless as to causing death 
(a) (b) 
Driver Accomplice 
Liability Liability 
7.76 4.50 
7.65 3.56 
7.82 3.56 
7.68 2.74 
7.50 1 .82 
7.74 1 .68 
(c) 
% No 
Liability 
(N) 
8.8 
8.8 
5.9 
1 4.7 
1 7.6 
23.5 
(d) (e) (f) 
% No Result Result Under 
Liability · under "/Elevation" 
or No MPC View 
Punishment ( & Etzweiler (Etzweiler 
(N+O) dissen� decision) 
29.4 Murder No liability 
44. 1 Manslaughter No liability 
38.3 No liability No liability 
50.0 No liability No liability 
67.6 No liability No liability 
70.6 No liability No l iability 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal l iability, O=Liabi lity but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
\0 
\0 
100 
TABLE 4. 7 Subjects' Perceptions as to Culpability Requirements for Complicity 
(g) (h) (i) 
Accomplice's Perpetrator's 
Accomplice's State of State of 
State of Mind as to Mind as to 
Mind as to Causing Causing 
Scenarios Driving Death Death 
Purposeful as to assisting driving: 
1 .  Knowing as to causing death 3.09 2.59 1 .29 
2. Reckless as to causing death 3.21 1 .97 1 .26 
Knowing as to assisting driving: 
3.  Knowing as to causing death 2.82 2.47 1 .29 
4. Reckless as to causing death 2.59 2.00 1 .32 
Reckless as to assisting driving: 
5. 
6. 
Knowing as to causing death 2.21 2.24 1 .29 
Reckless as to causing death 2.03 1 .91  1 .35 
State of Mind Scale: 1 = negligent, 2 =reckless, 3=knowing, and 4=purposeful. 
Key to column heads: 
(g) State of mind as to driving: 
1 .  The accomplice was unaware of a substantial chance that the 
driver would drive the car. 
2. The accomplice was aware of a substantial chance that the driver 
would drive the car. 
3. The accomplice was practically certain that the driver would drive 
the car. 
4. The accomplice hoped or wanted the driver to drive the car. 
(h) State of mind as to causing death: 
1 .  The accomplice was unaware of a substantial chance that the 
driver would kill someone. 
2.  The accomplice was aware of a substantial chance that the driver 
would kill someone. 
3. The accomplice was practically certain that the driver would kill 
someone. 
4. The accomplice hoped or wanted the driver to kill someone. 
(i) Perpetrator's state of mind as to causing death: 
1 .  The driver was unaware of a substantial chance that he would kill 
someone. 
2. The driver was aware of a substantial chance that he would kill 
someone. 
3. The driver was practically certain that he would kill someone. 
4. The driver hoped or wanted to kill someone. 
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key to Table 4.7 for the full description of  the questions. ) Look first at the num­
bers in column g for scenarios 1 and 2. Respondents see the accomplice as closer 
to knowing (3 .09 and 3.2 1 ,  with 3 = knowing) than to purposeful as to having the 
friend drive the car, where we hoped the accomplice would be perceived as pur­
posefuV and slightly below knowing in the knowing scenarios (3 and 4)-(2.82 
and 2.59) .  The reckless scenarios (5 and 6) are perceived about as we had wished 
(2 .2 1 and 2.03) .  
Examine next the question concerning the accomplice's state of mind with re­
spect to the killing that eventuated (column h); there one sees a similar effect. The 
reckless scenarios (2,  4, and 6) are perceived about as we had intended, 1 .97, 2.00, 
and 1 .9 1 ,  respectively, with 2 = reckless. The knowing scenarios are perceived as 
intermediate between knowing and reckless (2.59, 2 .47, and 2.24).8 This last re­
sult is mildly troublesome; it means that the dimension of variation that we 
thought was most important, which was the state of mind with respect to the kill­
ing, was not perceived by our subjects as varying across the full range that we had 
desired. Keep this in mind as we interpret the data; found differences in liability 
scores are likely to be of a lesser magnitude than they might otherwise have been 
if the full range of perceived culpability had been achieved. 
As can be seen from the graph of the results in Figure 4.8, the punishment as­
signed to the accomplice is affected by his state of mind, both with respect to the 
degree of deliberateness that he shows in giving his friend the car keys when he 
knows it is his friend's intention to drive and with regard to what he knows about 
the risk that his friend's driving creates. The line labeled "purposeful" is the line 
graphing the liability assigned to the accomplice who plans that the friend will 
take the car keys and drive. The line labeled "knowing" is the line graphing the re­
sults for the accomplice who knows that the drunk will take the keys and drive; 
the "reckless" line shows the liabilities assigned to the accomplice who recklessly 
disregards the known risk of the other driving. Note also the increase in liability 
assigned, particularly &t the "purposeful" and "knowing" levels of assisting the 
perpetrator to drive, to the accomplice who is "knowing" with respect to the 
driver's causing death, as opposed to only "reckless." 
Statistical analyses confirm what the figure reveals: First, the accomplice is 
judged more liable if his conduct in turning over the keys is purposeful with re­
spect to assisting his friend's driving (although recall that the respondents see it as 
intermediate between purposeful and knowing) , less liable if his action is know­
ing as to assisting, and least liable if his conduct is simply reckless in that respect 
[F (2,64) = 1 8.20, p < .0 1 ] .  Second, the accomplice is held more liable if he is 
knowing (although recall that the respondents see the accomplice as intermediate 
between knowing and reckless) rather than merely reckless with respect to the 
risk of killing others [F( l ,52) = 10.97, p < .02 ] .  The figure hints that the accom­
plice's state of mind with respect to the risk of killing another becomes less im­
portant when he is only reckless with respect to giving the perpetrator access to 
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FIGURE 4.8 Liability as a Function of Accomplice's Culpability as to 
Resulting Death 
Culpable state of mind as to 
assisting perpetrator to drive: 
5 o--o Purposeful 
o--o Knowing 
<>----¢ Reckless 
4 
3 
2 
___
___ -¢ o--
1 
Reckless Knowing 
Culpable State of Mind as to Causing Death 
the car keys, but the statistical analysis that tests the reliability of that difference 
does not reach significance. Further research might examine this possibility. 
At the higher levels of culpability with respect to assisting, the magnitude of the 
two effects looks about the same. Being knowing versus only reckless as to caus­
ing a death causes a difference of about one grade in both categories, and the state 
of mind with respect to assisting the perpetrator also causes a difference of about 
one grade. Recall that we had a prediction about the relative magnitude of these 
two effects; we thought that culpability with respect to causing death, ignored by 
the Code, would be the more major determinant of liability among our respon­
dents. But recall also that we have a possible reason why this might not show up in 
our results: Our manipulation of culpability with respect to causing a death was 
not entirely successful, leading to a range restriction on that dimension. Given 
our subjects' one-grade-level difference that derives from only a slight difference 
in perceptions of culpability as to resulting death, one might speculate that the ef-
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feet of culpability as to death indeed has the strong influence that we predicted. 
But this conclusion will have to be tested by further research. 
Study 9: Summary 
First, and as we have seen previously, the respondents are making graduated, con­
tinuous judgments where the codes make dichotomous ones. Next, our subjects 
can and do see the difference between the two culpability issues that this study 
presented to them, and these two dimensions of culpability make a difference in 
their collective liability assignment. This suggests that both of these issues should 
be addressed within the legal provisions dealing with complicity liability. 
Next, let us consider how our results bear on the various formulations of the 
doctrine. To do this, recall our discussion of the interpretation of the requirement 
of "purposefulness." In one (the "elevation" ) view, the accomplice needs to be 
purposeful as to bringing about the prohibited result; in this case our accomplice 
would need to be purposeful (a rating of 4) in bringing about the eventual out­
come of death. As column h of Table 4. 7 shows, not even our highest three 
"knowing" cases ( 1 ,  3, and 5) meet this criterion-and yet significant liability is 
assigned to the accomplice in each of those three cases. (These three cases are 
shown as the upper ends of each of the three lines in Figure 4.8.) Obviously, our 
respondents do not hold the interpretation (as do the majority justices in 
Etzweiler) that purposefulness with regard to causing death is essential for liabil­
ity. In fact, they do not even require knowledge for liability; they assign significant 
although reduced criminal liability to an accomplice who is merely reckless-not 
even knowing-with respect to the death that eventuated (the lower ends of each 
of the three lines in Figure 4.8, or cases 2 ,  4, and 6 of Table 4.7) . However, notice 
also that the accomplice's state of mind about the death, when it is reduced from 
knowing to reckless, does cause our respondents to assign noticeably less punish­
ment. (This is shown by the liability difference between the opposite ends of each 
of the three lines in Figure 4.8.)  
The subjects' stark disagreement with the "elevation" view is shown in Table 
4.6; that view (column !J would assign liability in none of the cases we presented 
to our subjects-yet the subjects assign liability in all cases. Subjects are assigning 
punishments to accomplices who are knowing or even only reckless with respect 
to the criminal outcome in instances in which the elevation view would assign no 
liability. From the point of view of our respondents, the culpability requirement 
as to result should not be elevated to purposeful as the Etzweiler majority and 
others would require; instead, the offense should be graded according to the de­
gree of culpability that the accomplice shows. 
Even the "nonelevation" view of the Model Penal Code (column e)-that the 
accomplice need merely be purposeful with respect to assisting the conduct that in 
fact causes the death-does not entirely accord with our subjects' judgments. Ac-
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complices who knowingly-rather than purposefully-commit the act of assis­
tance draw punishment (scenarios 3 and 4 of Table 4.6) that corresponds to more 
than 4 months and 6 weeks, respectively. Accomplices who merely recklessly assist 
(scenarios 5 and 6) draw reduced but still significant sentences from our respon­
dents-about eleven days and nine days, respectively.9 
Remember that our respondents do not see our "purposeful" cases as being 
completely purposeful. Although we were not altogether successful in producing 
cases that the subjects interpreted as creating accomplices who are completely 
purposeful with respect to causing death, that variable nevertheless makes a con­
siderable difference in the liabilities that our subjects assign. This result suggests 
that the variable might emerge as even more determinative of liability assign­
ments of respondents in future studies ( that leave no doubt as to purposefulness). 
If this proves to be the case, then it strengthens the argument for recognizing cul­
pability as to causing death as the primary determinant of complicity liability. 
From the point of view of our respondents, the Code is wrong to set "purpose" 
as the minimum requirement for culpability as to assisting the conduct. The re­
sults support a tentative draft proposal that was voted down by the full Institute 
that would have required only "knowledge" as the minimum requirement for as­
sisting the conduct (see earlier discussion at the beginning of Study 9).  Further, 
even if only knowledge was required as to assisting the conduct, the Code would 
differ from our respondents' judgments because it would exclude liability in cases 
of recklessness as to assisting the conduct. Finally, our respondents would also 
view the Code deficient, as a grading matter, because it fails to adjust grade ac­
cording to culpability level. 
So, our subjects assign liability (although reduced liability) in knowing and 
reckless cases of assistance, and the Code does not. What might explain this dif­
ference? One rather speculative explanation is that the legal code seems to begin 
by taking for granted that the central question is whether the accomplice should 
be regarded as committing the same offense as that with which the perpetrator is 
charged. In other words, is the crime committed by the "assister" the same as the 
crime committed by the perpetrator? Not surprisingly, the Code sets quite high 
standards for a "yes" answer to that question. Judging by the reduced liability rat­
ings that they give, our subjects do not ask themselves the same question. They do 
not ask themselves in this study: "Is the accomplice guilty of manslaughter?" They 
instead express the view that an individual who contributes to the commission of 
a crime by another deserves some punishment. The more purposeful that contri­
bution-both in terms of facilitating the actions of the perpetrator and being 
aware of the perpetrator's criminal purposes-the higher the liability incurred. 
But, even when the accomplice is merely reckless in his or her contributions to the 
offense, some liability is incurred, although eventually it may result in nothing 
more than a condemnation rather than incarceration. 
There are some hints that legal code drafters have recognized this point. Some 
states have created an offense called "criminal facilitation" that punishes the ac-
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complice at a lower level than is assigned to the perpetrator of the offense, but this 
"facilitation" also requires less in the way of culpability. Such a "facilitation" pro­
vision would approximate the liability pattern assigned by our respondents. 
STUDY 10: VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
When a person voluntarily becomes intoxicated and, in that state and as a result 
of it, commits an offense, the assignment of liability is complicated by two com­
peting factors. On the one hand, because of his intoxicated state, the person may 
not be aware of the nature or consequences of his conduct. For example, the indi­
vidual's conduct may create a risk of causing another's death but because the per­
son is intoxicated, he is unaware of the danger. This absence of awareness of risk 
normally would bar liability for reckless homicide (manslaughter) because reck­
lessness requires such awareness. In the first study in this chapter, we confirmed 
the importance of such culpable state of mind requirements to a finding of 
blameworthiness. On the other hand, that the person voluntarily became intoxi­
cated makes it less clear that he should gain a mitigation for the resulting lack of a 
culpable state of mind; many would say that the person should not benefit from a 
self-imposed dysfunction of this sort. Obviously, the issue is a complicated one. 
Current criminal-law doctrine typically responds to this dilemma with the fol­
lowing rule: If a person is culpable as to becoming intoxicated, that person will be 
treated, for the purposes of assessing liability, as if he were aware of a risk ( i.e., 
"reckless" as to an offense element)-even though, because of the state of intoxi­
cation, the person is in fact unaware of the risk. A fixed minimum requirement of 
culpability as to becoming intoxicated [ "negligence" in Model Penal Code § 
2.08( 5 )  (b) ] thus establishes whether a person falls under the rule that imputes 
awareness of risk ( recklessness) to the person. This means, for example, that a 
person who negligently becomes intoxicated and thereafter kills another (with no 
culpability as to the killing at the time because of the person's intoxication) will be 
held liable for reckless homicide (manslaughter) under the Model Penal Code. 
Given this approach by current law, the primary focus of inquiry in investiga­
tions and trials is on whether the person has the minimum required culpability as 
to becoming intoxicated. A higher culpability as to becoming intoxicated-reck­
lessly, knowingly, or purposely-does not increase the person's liability. Nor do 
different levels of a person's pre-intoxication culpability as to committing the of­
fense have a bearing on his liability. In concrete terms, this means that a person 
may be only negligent as to becoming intoxicated but that the law will impute 
recklessness to him or her-even recklessness as to causing death. The liability 
here may seem more than is deserved. 
At the same time, an individual who (for one reason or another) intentionally 
desires to harm another, gets intoxicated, and does so, is given the same liability 
treatment as an individual who has no desire to harm another but gets intoxi­
cated and does so accidentally. This seems counterintuitive to us; an individual 
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who has some reason to know that he might be violent when intoxicated would 
seem to have more reason to avoid getting intoxicated-and perhaps such a per­
son warrants more condemnation if he does get intoxicated and commits the 
crime. 
The voluntary intoxication study sought to test the subject-community's sup­
port for the rule that, as long as the minimum of negligence as to becoming intox­
icated is met, a fixed level of culpability-that of recklessness-will be imputed to 
a person who lacks a culpable state of mind because of voluntary intoxication. 
The study also sought to test whether some instances exist in which the respon­
dents judge that the level of culpability imputed under the rule should be higher 
or lower than the "recklessness" provision of the present law. Specifically, we ex­
amined the case suggested by the previous example, in  which-before becoming 
intoxicated-individuals have various levels of culpability as to causing another's 
death while intoxicated. 
We speculated that a person's pre-intoxication level of culpability as to the of­
fense elements (causing another's death) would be seen as properly influencing 
the intoxicated offender's liability. That is, as a person's pre-intoxication culpabil­
ity as to the offense increases, so too would the degree of liability assigned to him. 
A person who has no reason to think that he might cause a death while intoxi­
cated (this is where the conditions are labeled "faultless as to causing a death") 
would, we speculated, be given less liability than a person who becomes intoxi­
cated while aware of a risk that he might cause a death while intoxicated ( reck­
less), and that person in turn would be given less liability than a person who be­
comes intoxicated intending and hoping to cause another's death (purposeful). In 
commonsense terms, a person who is aware that he becomes violent when drunk 
ought to avoid becoming drunk in the first place. 
Current doctrine, as we said before, does not take account of a person's pre-in­
toxication culpability as to causing harm; the law focuses only on the pre-intoxi­
cation culpability as to becoming intoxicated and on the culpability as to the of­
fense elements at the time of the conduct constituting the offense. 10 This strikes 
us as odd; we speculated that a person's pre-intoxication culpability as to the of­
fense would have the greatest effect on our subjects' assignment of liability and 
that culpability as to becoming intoxicated would have less effect and further that 
the latter probably would not operate simply as the minimum-level requirement 
that current doctrine gives it. 
In this study, we presented subjects with two control scenarios containing cases 
of a purposeful and a reckless unintoxicated killing, which would be murder and 
manslaughter, respectively, under current law. We then presented nine test cases 
that varied the person's pre-intoxication culpability as to becoming intoxicated 
and the person's pre-intoxication culpability as to causing a death while intoxi­
cated. In each scenario, the person is described as sufficiently drunk so that he 
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lacks awareness of the consequences of his conduct at the time of the killing. He 
is-at the time of the killing, therefore-only negligent with respect to the killing, 
but the legal codes will impute to him recklessness as to causing the death. Thus 
the code treatment of all of these cases is alike: manslaughter. 
A few comments on the scenarios will be useful. The core of the scenario de­
scribed an individual who is angry with his roommate for attracting the affections 
of the individual's girlfriend. In the control murder scenario, included to deter­
mine what liability the respondents would assign to an act of murder involving 
no intoxication, the roommate returns home and the perpetrator beats the room­
mate, who later dies from the beating. The liability assigned here is 9.54, between 
a 30-year sentence and life imprisonment ( see Table 4.9) .  In the control reckless­
killing scenario, he plans only to severely beat his roommate but not to kill him. 
He beats him, this time with a lead pipe about the head, and the roommate later 
dies from the beating. Again, no intoxication is involved. The liability assigned 
here is, on the average, thirty years in prison-high compared to some of the 
other study cases we report. It is almost certainly higher because beating another 
individual with a lead pipe about the head is an action that is highly likely to 
cause death. In the comparisons below, it is well to remember that the sentence 
assigned to this manslaughter also is relatively high. In future research it would be 
worthwhile to create a reckless killing case that involves an act that is less certain 
to bring about death. 1 1  
A closer description of the various noncontrol scenarios is in order here. When 
the scenarios involved pre-intoxication purpose to kill, the person plans to kill his 
roommate and gets drunk while waiting to do so. In the pre-intoxication reckless­
killing scenarios, the person plans only to severely beat his roommate. In the 
faultless killing scenarios, the person is angry with his roommate but plans no as­
sault on him and does not kill the roommate; instead, he kills a friend with whom 
he is drinking. As for his culpability as to becoming intoxicated, in the scenarios 
presenting purposeful intoxication, the perpetrator drinks in order to get intoxi­
cated. In both the reckless and negligent culpability conditions, he is taking medi­
cation for a back condition. In the reckless scenario, he thinks that alcohol might 
interact with his medication to make him severely intoxicated, but he drinks any­
way. In the negligent condition, he never reads the warning label on his medica­
tion and is unaware of any possibility that the medication will react with alcohol 
to produce severe intoxication, although the warning label clearly states this. In 
both of these latter conditions, when the person drinks, the medication interacts 
with the alcohol and he gets very drunk, whereas the alcohol alone would not 
have produced such an effect. 
Before examining the liability results, let us examine how our respondents ac­
tually perceived the various kinds of culpability that we intended to create. Notice 
first the three rightmost columns d, e, and f of Table 4.9. These tell us how the 
TABLE 4.9 Liability for Voluntary Intoxication 
Scenarios 
Controls: 
1 .  Purposeful killing 
2. Reckless killing 
Pre-intoxication purposeful killing: 
3. Purposeful intoxication 
4. Reckless intoxication 
5. Negligent intoxication 
Pre-intoxication reckless killing: 
6. Purposeful 
'
intoxication 
7. Reckless intoxication 
8. Negligent intoxication 
Pre-intoxication faultless killing: 
9. Purposeful intoxication 
1 0. Reckless intoxication 
1 1 .  Negligent intoxication 
(a) 
Liability 
9.54 
9.02 
9.89 
9.78 
9.46 
8.82 
8.56 
8.37 
8.38 
8.02 
7.89 
(b) (c) 
% No Liability 
% No or No 
Liability Punishment 
(N) (N+O) 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 2 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 2 
0 4 
0 7 
(d) (e) (f) 
Culpability Culpability Culpability 
as to as to as to Killing 
Intoxication- Killing- at Time 
Pre-intoxication Pre-intoxication of Killing 
1 .71 
3. 1 4  
1 .59 1 .07 1 .83 
2.37 1 .37 1 .96 
3.26 1 .28 2. 1 7  
1 .80 3.37 3.52 
2.44 3.76 3.67 
3.61 3.85 4.07 
1 .65 4.29 3.80 
2.50 4.39 3.80 
3.57 4.52 3.91 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1  day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 
6=3 years , 7=7 years, 8=1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
Key to column heads: 
(d) Culpability as to intoxication, pre-intoxication. Before becoming intoxicated, the actor: 
1 = wanted to become i ntoxicated. 
2 = was practically certain that he would become intoxicated. 
3 = was aware of a substantial risk of becoming intoxicated and most people would have been aware of the risk. 
4 = was not aware of a substantial risk of becoming intoxicated but most people would have been aware of the risk. 
5 = was not .aware of a substantial risk of becoming intoxicated and most people would not have been aware of the risk. 
...... 
0 
00 
{e) Culpability as to kill ing, pre-intoxication: Before becoming intoxicated, the actor-
1 = wanted to cause the death. 
2 = was practically certain that he would cause the death. 
3 = was aware of a substantial risk of causing the death and most people would have been aware of the risk. 
4 = was not aware of a substantial risk of causing the death but most people would have been aware of the risk. 
5 = was not aware of a substantial risk of causing the death and most people would not have been aware of the risk. 
(f) Culpability as to kil l ing at the time of the kil l ing: At the time of h is conduct constituting the offense, the actor-
1 = wanted to cause the death. 
2 = was practically certain that his conduct would cause the death. 
3 = was aware of a substantial risk that his conduct would cause the death and most people would have been aware of 
the risk. 
4 = was not aware of a substantial risk that his conduct would cause the death but most people would have been aware 
of the risk. 
5 = was not aware of a substantial risk that his conduct would cause the death and most people would not have been 
aware of the risk. 
...... 
0 
\0 
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subjects perceive the various kinds of culpability that we thought relevant to their 
judgments. Column d contains mean responses to the statements concerning how 
culpable the individual is as to getting intoxicated-that is, how deliberately he 
goes about getting drunk. The element of the story that we included about getting 
intoxicated had the desired effect to some extent. When we described the individ­
ual as purposefully setting about getting drunk, the subjects accurately see this as 
more purposeful than the individual who only recklessly sets about getting 
drunk. The individual who negligently sets about getting drunk is seen as even 
less purposeful than the individual who recklessly sets about getting drunk. How­
ever, the differences are not as extreme as we would have liked. In the cases in 
which we described the individual as purposeful, for instance, the subjects see the 
person as between purposefully and knowingly getting drunk (the average is 1 .68, 
where 1 = purposeful and 2 = "practically certain that he would become intoxi­
cated") .  We will say more about the implications of this later. 
In column e, we present the subjects' ratings of the degree to which they see the 
perpetrator as purposeful as to killing the eventual victim before getting intoxi­
cated. As we had wished, in the story in which the perpetrator is described as hav­
ing formed a plan to kill the other, the perpetrator is always seen as highly pre­
meditative as to the killing, less so (substantially aware) when he only plans to 
beat the other ( reckless), and not at all planful when the stories describe him as 
having no intention of killing another. In column f, we indicate the degree to 
which the subjects see the perpetrator as purposeful in killing the other at the 
time that the killing takes place. The results indicate that subjects see differences 
in intentionality here, when we would have preferred this to have been a constant, 
approaching 4.0 (where 4 = unaware of a risk of causing death). This creates a 
complexity that we will discuss later. 
As we next examine the data on liability assignments from the various experi­
mental conditions (column a of Table 4.9), note first that all of the assignments of 
liability are consistently high; the lowest liability score (7.89) translates to a sen­
tence of 14.2 years. In retrospect, we would suggest that a person who beats an­
other about the head with a lead pipe is an individual whom people are going to 
be enthusiastic about incarcerating-and the generally high scores reflect that. 
Next, we examine the differences in liability judgments caused by the varia­
tions in the different kinds of culpability-a task facilitated by Figures 4. 10  and 
4. 1 1 . The differences between the liability assigned to the various cases that dif­
fered with respect to the purposefulness of causing the death before becoming in­
toxicated are statistically significant (p = .01 ), suggesting that the subjects see a 
person's pre-intoxication culpability as to causing a death as a significant and im­
portant determinant ofliability. The importance of the differences that pre-intox­
ication culpability makes is shown in Figure 4. 1 1 . 
Also confirming this is the fact that liabilities assigned in the reckless and fault­
less cases of pre-intoxication culpability are statistically significantly lower than 
the results in the control murder scenario, while the results in the purposeful case 
Doctrines of Culpability 1 1 1  
FIGURE 4. 1 0  Liability as a Function of Pre-Intoxication Culpability as to Killing 
1 0  
9 
8 
-a-- Purposeful intoxication 
• Reckless intoxication 
a Negligent intoxication 
7�------�--------�------�------�--------r-------�
Faultless Reckless Purposeful 
Pre-Intoxication Culpabil ity as to Killing 
(scenarios 3, 4, and 5 of Table 4.9) are not. (These numbers are pooled across the 
three levels of purposefulness with respect to intoxication. ) This suggests that the 
subjects see the case of pre-intoxication purpose as similar to murder but view 
the cases of pre-intoxication recklessness and faultlessness as less serious than 
murder. Suggesting a similar conclusion, the liability ratings assigned to the per­
son who plans to kill the roommate and then purposefully gets drunk while wait­
ing to do so are statistically significantly higher than the results for the man­
slaughter control; two of the three liability assignments in the reckless cases are 
not statistically different from the manslaughter control; and all of the liability as­
signments in the faultlessness cases are statistically significantly lower than the 
manslaughter control. 
All this suggests that the subjects see a pre-intoxication purpose to kill another, 
followed by a deliberate attempt to get drunk, followed by killing the other, as 
more serious than manslaughter; they see pre-intoxication recklessness as similar 
to manslaughter; and they see pre-intoxication faultlessness as less serious than 
manslaughter. In sum, a person's pre-intoxication culpability as to causing death 
1 12 
1 0  
9 
8 
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FIGURE 4. 1 1  Liability as a Function of Pre-Intoxication Culpability as to 
Becoming Intoxicated 
-m-- Purposeful (pre-intoxication) killing 
• Reckless (pre-intoxication) killing 
a Faultless (pre-intoxication) killing 
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Culpability as to Becoming Intoxicated 
is not only a highly influential determinant of liability but, indeed, is viewed by 
our subjects as being similar in effect to a person's culpability as to causing death 
at  the time of the offense in the nonintoxication (control) cases. 
The liabilities assigned in the "faultless, killing scenarios (represented by the 
"faultless killing" line of Figure 4. 1 1 ) might strike the reader as high. But consider 
the facts. In those variants of the scenario the person, upset with his roommate, 
goes out with friends and drinks. One of his friends assists him home and the per­
son "loses control and starts striking [the friend J with a lead pipe. [The friend J 
later dies from the beating." The preexisting condition of anger is likely to affect 
the subjects' judgments here; one should not drink when in a hostile state. Also, 
and again, those who beat people about the head with a lead pipe are persons 
whom we want to incarcerate. Still, the person who is nonnegligent (i.e., faultless) 
as to causing a death before his intoxication is given less liability than our man­
slaughter case; the average sentence is about twenty years. It is, however, still a 
substantial amount. 
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Recall that the legal codes place considerable emphasis on the person's culpa­
bility for getting intoxicated. What are our subjects' judgments about that dimen­
sion of variation? They were told that the perpetrator, awaiting the return of his 
roommate, becomes intoxicated either deliberately or recklessly, or he drinks and 
is unaware that it will interact with the medication he is taking, and so becomes 
drunk negligently. As Figure 4. 1 1  shows, this makes a difference in the liability 
judgments of the respondents in the way that one would expect (p = .05 1 ) ,  but the 
difference is of a lesser magnitude than the difference caused by the pre-intoxica­
tion culpability as to the killing, a fact that is revealed by the flatter slopes of the 
lines in Figure 4. 1 1 . Look again at Figure 4. 10, which displays the person's liability 
as a function of the degree of culpability represented in his pre-intoxication plans 
to kill another. Obviously, as the steepness of the slopes of the lines suggests, pre­
intoxication culpability is a more major determinant of the respondents' assign­
ment of liability than is culpability as to getting intoxicated. 
Still, the statistically reliable effect for culpability as to getting intoxicated sug­
gests that the subjects see a person's level of culpability as to becoming intoxicated 
as a small but relevant factor in determining the person's liability for a death 
caused while drunk. The subjects do perceive that the person's intoxication comes 
about either purposefully, recklessly, or negligently (as their responses in column 
d of Table 4.9 indicate) .  Our respondents moderate their sentences slightly, de­
pending on the level of this culpability, but are not much moved by these distinc­
tions. 
This minimal adjustment of sentences is still worth noting, given that our sub­
jects do not see the person's culpability as to being intoxicated in the various con­
ditions as differently as we would have hoped. Examine the ratings of the cases in 
which we expected the subjects to perceive the person as negligent with respect to 
getting drunk-the cases in which the medication he took for back problems in­
teracted with the alcohol to cause the drunkenness. Instead of negligence, the 
subjects saw the person as reckless, perhaps reasoning that anyone who is taking 
medications must be aware of at least a risk of serious intoxication through inter­
action of medication and alcohol. In these cases (5, 8, and 1 1  of Table 4.9) ,  the av­
erage culpability as to intoxication rating is 3 .48 (column d) ,  meaning that the 
person is seen as between being aware of the risk and not aware, but most persons 
would be aware of the risk. 
Even though range-restricted, the alteration of liability judgments caused by 
the person's level of culpability for getting intoxicated is inconsistent with the 
doctrine's treatment of a person's culpability as to becoming intoxicated as a sim­
ple "trigger"-a minimum requirement-rather than as a liability factor. It is 
true that the legal code would impose similar liability for manslaughter in all of 
the scenarios, given that all  of our actors are at least negligent with respect to be­
coming intoxicated, while our subjects grade the punishment as a close function 
of the specifics of the circumstances. In a broader sense, however, the results gen-
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erally fit with the code's rule. All of the persons are at least negligent with respect 
to getting intoxicated, and all are assigned sentences within one grade of that as­
signed to the individual in the control scenario who commits manslaughter. The 
generally high level of liability assigned to all appears to support the doctrine's se­
lection of negligence (rather than recklessness, for example) as the trigger point 
for the attribution of liability equivalent to manslaughter. 1 2  
Concerns that negligence as to becoming intoxicated might be too low a level 
on which to impose liability cannot be perfectly tested in this study since the re­
spondents see the person we tried to portray as negligent as about midway be­
tween negligent and reckless (Table 4.9, column d of scenarios 5, 8, and 1 1 ). Still, 
they impose significant liability on a person whom they see as near negligent­
who lacks awareness of the consequences of his conduct at the time of the killing. 
This suggests to us that negligence is not seen by our respondents as too low a 
level to set as a requirement for liability. 
We previously indicated that we would need to say something about our sub­
jects' perceptions of the culpability of the person as to causing death at the time of 
the killing, and we turn to that topic now. Returning to the results in Table 4.9, 
notice the data on the culpability of the person as to causing death at the time of 
the killing (column f). In scenarios 3,  4, and 5, an interesting set of attributions 
emerges for the perpetrator who had previously planned to kill his roommate and 
then became intoxicated for whatever reason. Note that the average score for cul­
pability at the time of the killing for these cases hovers around 2, meaning that the 
respondents see the person in each of these cases as being knowing with respect to 
killing the roommate at the time of the killing, even though the perpetrator was 
described as so drunk that "at this point [he J could barely stand. His thought pro­
cesses and vision are severely impaired." Although we expected that the subjects 
would see this individual as less aware of the consequences of his actions, and 
thus less culpable as to causing death at the time of the killing, what the respon­
dents may be suggesting with their high ratings of purposefulness makes psycho­
logical sense: If I plan to kill somebody, and then get drunk, my intent is pre­
served almost no matter how much the drink impairs my motor, thought, and 
perceptual systems. Furthermore, the subjects see people as being able to cling to 
their central intentions under these conditions and assign punishments that are 
as high as when the people commit the act without drinking. Future research will 
need to determine whether it is possible to separate these two kinds of culpability 
in the minds of perceivers. 
Study 1 0: Summary 
In the subjects' view, the factor that is highly determinative of liability is the per­
son's pre-intoxication culpability as to committing the offense. A person who be-
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comes intoxicated-purposefully, recklessly, or negligently-and at the time of 
becoming intoxicated is purposeful as to causing death is treated by the subjects 
as a murderer and, as we already mentioned, is seen as having a highly culpable 
state of mind as to the killing at the time the person causes the death. A person 
who is reckless as to whether he will cause a death (as shown by his plans to se­
verely beat another individual) ,  becomes intoxicated either purposefully, reck­
lessly, or negligently, and while intoxicated beats and kills the other, is assigned li­
ability similar to one committing reckless homicide (manslaughter) .  In the 
faultless cases, the person, upset because his roommate stole his girlfriend, drinks 
with friends and beats and kills the friend who helps him home. He too receives 
quite high sentences, although ones that are diminished from the reckless and 
purposeful cases. 
These results suggest that the differences between our respondent's moral intu­
itions and most codes are occasionally different, but not as different as in some 
other studies that we have considered. Certainly, the codes' position is consistent 
with the subjects' view in the cases in which a person culpably intoxicates himself 
and, before his intoxication, has no purpose as to causing another's death. Such 
an offender is treated as liable for manslaughter by most codes and treated nearly 
so by our subjects. 
The major code-community difference arises in the consideration of the per­
son's pre-intoxication degree of culpability as to causing death. It makes a great 
deal of difference to our respondents and none whatsoever in the codes. For in­
stance, when a person is purposeful as to causing death before he becomes intoxi­
cated, the subjects would impose liability for murder although each of the codes' 
voluntary intoxication provisions imposes liability only for manslaughter. That is, 
the codes, counterintuitively, do not discriminate the case of the individual who is 
purposeful about killing another beforehand and then gets drunk and kills from 
the case of the individual who has no such pre-intoxication purpose. But, as one 
of us has suggested in another work, the codes do not prevent a prosecutor from 
using-as the basis for homicide liability-the person's conduct in becoming in­
toxicated and his culpable state of mind as to causing death at that time (Robin­
son, 1985). Such a theory of prosecution would produce the murder liability that 
the subjects impose. 13  
Higher culpability than negligence as to becoming intoxicated generally has 
some but not a major effect in increasing the liability assigned by our subjects; 
however, such higher culpability is given no such effect in the legal codes. Appar­
ently, culpability as to getting intoxicated is only slightly a determinant of degree 
ofliability but serves mainly to provide a fixed minimum requirement for liability 
in the legal codes. Codes could be altered to give a slightly higher degree of liabil­
ity for greater culpability in becoming intoxicated, or such a consideration could 
be taken into account as a factor in sentencing. 
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STUDY 1 1 : INDIVIDUALIZATION OF 
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF NEGLIGENCE 
The Model Penal Code's culpability distinctions-distinguishing among being 
purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent as to causing a result or as to the 
existence of a circumstance-have been confirmed by several of our studies as re­
flecting decreasing levels of blameworthiness as p erceived by our respondents. All 
other things being equal, as the level of a p erson's culpability decreases, so too 
does the level of assigned liability. The higher culpability levels-purposeful, 
knowing, and to a lesser extent reckless-focus primarily on the person's con­
scious state of mind as to causing the harm-desiring, knowing, and risking it, 
respectively. The lowest level of culpability, negligence ( and recklessness to a 
lesser extent), relies not on a person's conscious wrongdoing but rather on a per­
son's need to pay adequate attention to whether his conduct creates an unaccept­
able risk of harm. This means that judgments about a person's negligence must 
involve a different sort of consideration than judgments of purposeful or know­
ing harm-doing; such judgments must consider what a person "should" have 
known or reasoned out. A person parking a car on a hill should think of the possi­
bility of the car overcoming its brakes and rolling downhill; a person shooting at a 
deer in a backyard should realize that the bullet could hit something other than 
the deer. 
In these negligence cases in which the person may have no consciousness of the 
circumstances or consequences that make his or her conduct criminal, the law 
assesses the person's blameworthiness by comparing his or her attention ( or inat­
tention) to that of a "reasonable" or "prudent" individual in the same circum­
stances. The reasonable, prudent individual knows that cars sometimes roll and 
bullets carry. It is for this reason that, within legal circles, negligence is said to be 
based on an objective standard, rather than on the subjective inquiries into this 
particular p erson's exact state of mind that would be characteristic of inquiry into 
higher culpability levels. 
Thus, a person's unawareness of the risks of harm that his action creates is cul­
pable if a "reasonable p erson" would have been aware of those risks. Obviously, 
the phrase "reasonable person" does not give a precise standard. Rather, it pro­
vides a jury or judge with a mechanism for thinking about whether the person is 
blameworthy. The reasonable person is not the average person, statistically. 
Rather, the term necessarily represents a composite of those traits that the com­
munity sees as making up a person who is perceived as reasonable. That is, it 
embodies the community's judgment of how the prototypical person can prop­
erly be expected to behave, not necessarily a prediction of how the average person 
actually would behave ( an inquiry that would leave the standard of care hostage 
to the percentage of sociopaths in the community) . Nor is the reasonable-person 
standard the same for every person and for all situations. Modern criminal codes 
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ask a jury to imagine a reasonable person in the actor's situation. \Vould the rea­
sonable person have been unaware of the risklo as the person was? Momentarily, we 
will further detail what kinds of circumstances and characteristics are taken into 
account in imagining the reasonable person �<in the actor's situation:' 
The judgments of improper risk-taking can be relatively refined. For example, 
in the case of driving, some driving may be negligent while other driving is not. A 
person may well drive in a manner that creates a greater risk than is acceptable. 
Even if the driver is not conscious of the unjustified risk he or she is creating-for 
example, the driver did not look at the speedometer to ascertain speed and did not 
notice the .. school zone" signs and the chikiren just getting out of school-the 
driver nonetheless may be blamed for inatteruiveness to the risk he or she creates. 
A reasonably carefuLdriver would have been aware of the risk; therefore, the inat­
tentive driver should have been aware. His or her failure to be attentive to the cir­
cumstances is judged to be blameworthy and an adequate basis for criminal liabil­
ity. 
The criminal and civil aspects of the legal system divide the responsibility for 
the punishment of negligence in an interestil)g way. Not every deviation from the 
reasonable-person standard is sufficiently condemnable to merit criminal liabil­
ity. Unlike civil liability, where the issue is "Vho among the parties should suffer 
the pecuniary loss that has occurred, criminal liability is not appropriate simply 
because a harm has occurred and the defendant caused it by conduct that was not 
entirely reasonable. Criminal negligence requires a sufficient degree of unreason­
ableness to merit condemnation. Thus, the Model Penal Code requires proof that 
the person's risk-taking is a «gross deviation" from the standard of care of a rea­
sonable person. Therefore the criminal justice system, which is set into action by 
representatives of society rather than of the injured party and which has at its dis­
posal society's most severe penalt
'
ies, deals With those cases of negligence in whid 
the negligent action is grossly out of line with societal standards. Less-flagrant 
cases can be pursued within the civil justic<: system, in which the penalties nor­
mally involve financial recompense for the <iamages done. 
These aspects of criminal negligence are relatively well accepted and clearly ex­
pressed in the statutes and cases. One final aspect is more problematic: Early legal 
tests defined the negligence standard in Purely objective terms-or so it was 
thought. The particular characteristics of the person-whether he or she was un­
usually stupid or distracted-were irrelevant. But there has also been a tradition 
of uneasiness with the absolute application of this standard; it seems to many 
commentators to be unrealistic and unfair to some violators. The mentally re­
tarded or physically handicapped person, for example, presents a relatively obvi­
ous case of one who cannot meet a fixed objective standard that the vast majority 
of persons can meet. To impose criminal liability on such persons when it is be­
yond their ability to meet the objective standard is to violate the primary princi-
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ple that criminal liability ought to be imposed only in those instances in which 
the person is blameworthy for the violation. One cannot be condemned for fail­
ing to do something that one is incapable of doing. 
In response to this very fundamental problem, some modern codes seek to par­
tially individualize the objective reasonable-person standard. The person is held 
to the standard of a reasonable person possessing attributes modified to reflect 
some attributes of the defendant that may make it difficult for him to meet the 
objective standard. Thus, the mentally handicapped person, judged under the 
standard of the reasonable person similarly handicapped, would not be held lia­
ble for failing to perceive a risk that a person with such a mental handicap could 
not reasonably have been expected to perceive in the same circumstances. Yet the 
handicapped individual might be held liable, despite his or her handicap, for a 
failure to perceive very obvious and serious risks that someone like him or her 
could be expected to perceive and avoid. 
The weakness in this policy lies in the difficulty of determining which charac­
teristics ought to be recognized as potentially altering the reasonable-person stan­
dard. Mental retardation might be an easy and obvious reason to reduce our ex­
pectations of a person, but what of the parent upset over recent news of a child's 
death? Should our expectations be adjusted for a person's age, gender, cultural 
background, religious beliefs ,  or genetic makeup? At some point, individualiza­
tion of the objective standard runs the danger of rendering it a subjective stan­
dard that every person will meet because we have so individuated the reasonable 
person as to make him or her identical to the specific individual. Even a callous 
egomaniac will be judged nonnegligent if his failure to perceive risks to others is 
judged by the standard of an equally callous and egomaniacal reasonable person. 
Even more complicated considerations also arise. For example, if we are to recog­
nize factors that lower our legal expectations, should we similarly recognize fac­
tors that raise our expectations? Should smarter, stronger, more coordinated peo­
ple be held to a higher standard because, with the same effort, they can do better 
than the average person? 
A similar challenge arises in j udging a person's recklessness. A person may be 
aware of a risk he or she creates yet disregard that risk as reasonable under the cir­
cumstances. The standard of culpable recklessness must determine whether a per­
son acts reasonably when he disregards a given risk. Again, the system must ask 
what circumstances and characteristics of the person it is fair to superimpose 
upon the reasonable person in creating a standard by which to judge the blame­
worthiness of the person's disregard of the known risk. Are these circumstances and 
characteristics of a person different from those that are properly taken into ac­
count when j udging the reasonableness of a person's failure to perceive a risk in the 
category of negligence? 
Neither the Model Penal Code nor the existing literature gives a coherent the­
ory for determining which characteristics or attributes of a person ought to be 
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used to individualize the reasonable-person standard and under what circum­
stances. Indeed, the Model Penal Code drafters essentially admit that the matter is 
beyond their current ability to sort out. The Code allows judges and juries to 
make an ad hoc determination of which attributes to consider. The Code does so 
by providing that a person is to be judged by the standard of care of a reasonable 
person "in the actor's situation": 
There is an inevitable ambiguity in "situation:' If the person were blind or if he had 
just suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack, these would certainly be facts to be 
considered in a judgment involving criminal liability, as they would be under tradi­
tional law. But the heredity, intelligence or temperament of the person would not be 
held material in judging negligence, and could not be without depriving the criterion 
of all its objectivity. The Code is not intended to displace discriminations of this 
kind, but rather to leave the issue to the courts [MPC § 2.02, comment 4, 242 
( 1 985) ] .  
In the present study, we sought to begin the inquiry into which attributes 
ought to be taken into account in judging either a person's failure to be aware of 
or his conscious disregard of a risk. Because no existing literature or case law pro­
poses a general theory or principle that can be tested, this study attempts the very 
preliminary step of identifying attributes that might be seen by people in the 
community as either mitigating or aggravating criminal negligence liability. From 
this initial sampling, it was hoped that the responses might show a pattern that 
could be used to develop hypotheses and that those hypotheses might then be 
tested in subsequent studies. 
The methods we used in this study were somewhat different from the ones to 
which the reader has become accustomed. Subjects were first asked to assign lia­
bility and punishment to each of three base scenarios, each of which presented a 
situation of risk: a commission resulting in death, an omission resulting in death, 
and an omission resulting in property damage. The commission resulting in 
death (scenario 1 )  involves a hunter who, in a remote wilderness area, shoots into 
the bush at a noise he hears and kills another hunter, earning a liability rating of 
3 .98, or about 6 months in jail. In the omission resulting in death (scenario 2) ,  a 
caretaker of a child pays insufficient attention to symptoms of the child's illness 
and fails to seek medical attention for the child, who dies. This was assigned a lia­
bility of 4.82, or between 10 and 1 1  months in jail. The omission resulting in 
property damage is depicted by an apartment house owner who does not main­
tain the property well, and thus it catches fire. This scenario (case 3 of Table 4. 1 2 )  
drew an average liability rating of 2 .6 l ,  or  5 to 6 weeks in  jail. Notice the subjects' 
responses ( in column d) to the question about whether the incident occurred be­
cause of something the person did ( row 1 )  or failed to do ( row 2) .  Obviously, the 
two acts of omission were seen as omissions. The act that we labeled "commis­
sion" was rated nearer an act of omission (Table 4. 1 2, case 1 ,  column d) ; this rat­
ing puzzled us until we talked to some who read the case who said that they 
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TABLE 4. 1 2  Liability and Culpability in Core Cases 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
% No 
Liability 
% No or No Commission 
Liability Punishment or Culpability 
Scenarios Liability (N) (N+D) Omission? Level 
1 .  Commission: 
Death 3.98 2 32 1 .73 4.00 
2.  Omission: 
Death 4.82 5 29 2.00 3.87 
3. Omission: 
Property damage 2.61 7 44 2.02 4.07 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal liabil ity, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 = 
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years, 
8= 1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 O=life, and 1 1  =death. 
Key to column heads: 
(d) Please indicate whether you think the incident occurred because of: 
1 = something the actor did. 
2 = something the actor failed to do. 
3 = some cause unrelated to the actor's conduct. 
(e) At the time of the incident, the actor: 
1 = wanted the other to die. 
2 = was practically certain that his action (or inaction) would cause 
serious injury or death. 
3 = was aware of a substantial risk of serious injury or death. 
4 = was not aware of a substantial risk but should have been. 
5 = was not aware of a substantial risk and a reasonable person would 
not have been aware of such a risk. 
thought the hunter "had failed to take proper precautions;' which was what they 
were rating rather than the act of shooting. Given this, we will continue to use the 
"commission" label for the case. Now notice the culpability-level ratings (column 
e) . They hover around «4;' which was a rating of "was not aware of a substantial 
risk but should have been." This suggests that our respondents saw the cases as in­
stances of negligence-as we had hoped. 
Each subject then was asked to consider whether each of fourteen "actor char­
acteristics" would make a difference in the liability they had assigned to the base 
scenarios. 14 The fourteen actor characteristics were selected from those that were 
thought to be most likely to give some kind of reaction-either mitigating or ag­
gravating. Frequently, the characteristics included the two extremes of a single 
continuum-for example, lower and higher than average intelligence, subnormal 
and advanced training, and youthfulness and old age. Subjects were asked to indi-
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TABLE 4. 1 3  Factors in I ndividualization of Negligence Standard 
Scenarios 
(a) (b) (c) 
Commission: Omission: Omission: 
Actor Characteristics Death Death Property Damage 
1 .  Old age -0.3 -0.4 0.0 
2. Advanced experience 0.6 1 .6* 1 .8* 
3. Genetic i rregularity -0.5 -0.9* -0.7* 
4. Upbringing (knowledge) 1 .5* -0.2 -0.3 
5.  Below-normal intel ligence -0.2 -1 . 4* -0.7* 
6 .  Religion (knowledge) 0.2 -0.2 0.0 
7.  Above-normal intell igence 0.6 0.8* 0.6 
8.  Upbringing (environment) 0.7* -0.3 -0. 1 
9. Lack of knowledge (culture) -0.3 -1 .7* -1 .0* 
1 0. Substandard education -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 
1 1 . Cultural norms -0.8* -0. 1 -0. 5  
1 2. Recent upset -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 
1 3. Religion (norms) 0.2 0.0 -0. 1  
*These items are statistical ly significantly different (p < .05) from the l iabil ity 
assigned to the person who did not have the named condition. 
Note: The characteristic of "immatu rity" is not included in th is table's analysis. 
cate for each variation whether, if the person possessed this characteristic, they 
would alter the punishment assessment they gave in the base scenario. A nine­
point scale allowed subjects to indicate less liability ( 1 ) , no change ( 5) ,  or more 
liability (9) . Table 4 . 1 3  needs to be analyzed differently than the other tables that 
we have presented. A rating that hovers around 0 means that the respondents, on 
average, did not believe that that characteristic either lowered or raised the liabil­
ity assigned to the person in the original case. Ratings that differ from 0 by about 
0. 7 are reliably different from 0, meaning that a rating of -0.7 or lower indicates a 
tendency on the part of the respondents to want to lower the liability assigned to 
the negligent individual in that case, and a rating of + 0. 7 or higher indicates that 
the average respondent believes that possession of that characteristic warrants an 
assignment of more liability. 
Before we look at the ratings, we need to briefly explain how we created the spe­
cific stories that the subjects based their judgments on. The specifics of the story 
that we created, for example, in the lack of cultural knowledge characteristic sce­
narios, for example, needed to vary depending on whether the story was about a 
failure to perceive a child's illness or the precautions to keep a building from 
burning. Similarly, different upbringings would cause the actor to know little 
about hunting or child care. Our case writers simply tried to create individuating 
information that fit the general category and that seemed to them to be both 
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plausible and a reasonable stimulus for individuation. For these reasons, the la­
bels that we have assigned the various conditions creating the different cases are 
rather approximate ones, and we will therefore interpret our results with consid­
erable tentativeness. 
Looking at Table 4. 13, we first note that subjects do not often give ratings that 
deviate far from zero; that is, they rarely find that a particular characteristic is a 
reason to sharply increase or reduce the liability they assigned to the perpetrator 
in the original scenario. That is, in several instances of individuation, our respon­
dents changed their ratings both far enough and systematically enough to pro­
duce a statistically reliable difference from their original ratings. (We have placed 
an asterisk by those scores to call them to your attention.) Given that we created 
the stories in ways that we thought might have some influence on our respon­
dents' individuations, this is an interesting fact. Our respondents, like code draft­
ers, seem cautious about individuating the objective standard of negligence. 
However, in several instances the subjects do individuate. The results suggest 
that some actor characteristics, according to our subjects, do affect a person's lia­
bility for inattention to risks. In each scenario, two or more characteristics 
showed statistically significant differences in each direction from the "no change" 
point on the scale, or "zero" (0). In the hunter scenario (Table 4. 1 3, column a) on 
the one hand, an individual whose upbringing ( characteristic 4) was such as to 
make him knowledgeable about hunting was judged more liable for shooting at a 
noise in the bushes. On the other . hand, an individual whose cultural norms 
( characteristic 1 1 ) do not include care with guns is judged as less negligent. For 
the apartment house owner (Table 4. 1 3, column c), the characteristic of coming 
from a cultural background in which persons have little or no knowledge of the 
risks of particular materials catching fire caused respondents to reduce liability; 
however, having advanced experience at building care increased it. 
Our respondents saw a number of factors as increasing or mitigating liability in 
the case of the child caregiver who failed to take the child in for medical attention 
(Table 4. 13, column b) . This makes sense if we note that that case is a more com­
plex one than the other two, involving recognizing "warning signs" of the infant's 
distress. Immaturity, below-normal intelligence, genetic irregularity, and a lack of 
knowledge of children all are characteristics that decrease liability. Having above­
average intelligence or past experience with children-and still failing to get med­
ical treatment for the infant-increases liability. 
But which individuating characteristics do our respondents give weight to 
across the three base scenarios? This is a difficult generalization to infer from the 
data. 1 5 We would tentatively suggest the following: In each of the cases, having 
relevant experience with the situation is seen as increasing liability for behaving 
negligently within it; and having a genetic defect, below-normal intelligence, or a 
culturally established lack of knowledge about the hazards often reduces liability. 
But the results suggest that the characteristics appropriate for individuating the 
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reasonable-person standard vary with the factual situation, confirming the code 
drafters' assessment that this is a complex problem and suggesting that perhaps 
they were right to leave this to the ad hoc determination of courts. Further study 
may reveal a pattern to the kind of characteristics j udged influential on liability in 
different kinds of situations. Or perhaps the jurisprudential literature will de­
velop a hypothesis that can be tested. 
Study 1 1: Summ ary 
In several ways, the study's results do give us some meaningful insights. The re­
sults confirm that some individuation of the objective standard is consistent with 
the community view. Also, they suggest an answer to the question of whether in­
dividuation ought to increase as well as decrease our expectations of persons. Our 
subjects clearly believe that it is appropriate to elevate the standard of care re­
quired of an experienced person and, occasionally, of a person who is above aver­
age in intelligence as well. 
Furthermore, although the Code drafters in the official commentary concern­
ing standard of care of a reasonable person in the "actor's situation" specifically 
exclude the characteristics of"heredity" and "intelligence" as reasons to lower the 
standard, our respondents occasionally use information about these characteris­
tics-genetic irregularity and below-normal intelligence-to reduce the liability 
they assign. One might think that, within the legal system, given that it generally 
is left to the juries to decide on the particular ways that they will individuate the 
reasonable-person standard, these cases of reduced liability can be accommo­
dated. Unfortunately, this is not entirely true. It is the judge who decides whether 
evidence of a particular characteristic will be allowed to be introduced into evi­
dence, so j ury intuition on this point is not a safeguard, because the j ury may 
never hear about such seemingly relevant factors. The fact that the Code's official 
commentary specifically excludes low intelligence as an individuating factor is 
particularly troublesome for this reason. A j udge may well feel bound to follow 
the commentary and exclude such evidence, while our respondents report that it 
is a factor on which they would individuate the standard. Were the court system 
willing to individualize the objective standard of negligence to the degree re­
flected in these results, it would be possible to call the jury's attention to the gen­
eral possibilities of individuation, perhaps even using these specific examples. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In our study of the culpability requirements for various offenses, we discovered, 
first, general community confirmation of the law's tendency to make a major dif­
ferentiation between reckless and negligent commission of an offense. Our sub­
jects make major differences in their liability assignments depending on whether 
the individual is reckless with respect to the various elements specified as relevant 
by the code or merely negligent. However, unlike the standard treatment of the 
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codes, which with the exception of homicide generally assign no higher liability 
for an offense committed knowingly or purposefully than for one committed 
recklessly, our subjects do assign higher liability for higher culpability than reck­
lessness. Our subjects also distinguish recklessly committed offenses from negli­
gently committed ones but, unlike the general code treatment, sometimes assign 
significant liabilities to negligently committed offenses. In general, to model our 
respondents' judgments, code drafters should consider more frequently having 
their codes make a distinction in the grade of the offense depending on the degree 
of culpability of the offender, rather than dichotomizing judgments between only 
two particular levels. 
Of course, it is possible that judges accomplish one of these results in their sen­
tencing decisions, by giving longer sentences to individuals who they see as filling 
the requirements for purposeful commission over and above knowing commis­
sion. However, given the current tendency to move toward more articulated sen­
tencing rules that remove discretion from judges, it strikes us that it might be bet­
ter to have this result included in code formulations-or at least embodied in 
sentencing guidelines-rather than being left to the discretion of the individual 
judge. Also, since cases of negligent commission in current code treatment typi­
cally do not trigger liability, these cases do not reach trial, and our respondents 
judge that they should. 
A similar result emerged when we examined the culpability requirements for 
complicity. The codes set purposefulness as to assisting as the minimum require­
ment for complicity, but our respondents are willing to assign liability to a person 
who knowingly-or even recklessly-assists. Our respondents assign different 
and lower levels ofliability as the culpability level decreases, which again suggests 
that the community would support a difference in grading of the offense depend­
ing on the degree of culpability. 
For the cases of voluntary intoxication that we presented to our respondents, 
we found a pattern of judgments that was broadly consistent with the legal treat­
ment of the cases in one respect. Codes commonly use negligence as the trigger 
point for the attribution of liability, and so do our subjects, thus supporting the 
codes' adoption of that standard rather than one triggered by a higher degree of 
culpability. However, our respondents are considerably influenced by the degree 
of pre-intoxication culpability that the person had with respect to commission of 
the offense, while codes, counterintuitively, do not consider that factor. 
A person is negligent if he or she disregards possible risks that a reasonable or 
prudent individual would consider. Traditionally, codes have treated this as an 
objective standard not to be varied as a function of, for instance, the lower intelli­
gence of the person whose conduct is being judged. However, some modern codes 
have moved in the direction of individualizing the standard, based on some of the 
characteristics of the charged individual, but have not provided a coherent theory 
of how to determine which individuations should be taken into account. Instead, 
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judges (and, to a lesser extent, juries) are allowed to determine what attributes of 
the person should be considered. Without a theory to test, we conducted a study 
that was to some extent a "fishing expedition," seeking to discover what attributes 
our subjects considered to be appropriate grounds for individualization of the 
reasonable-person standard. As the reader will recall, the results were complex­
and instances of both lowered and raised standards were found. This suggests that 
the modern trend toward individualizing the objective reasonable-person stan­
dard has support among the community. The absence of an obvious pattern tends 
to confirm the practical need to leave the individualizing determination to ad hoc 
judgment with little principled guidance. At the same time, the dangers inherent 
in this lack of a guiding principle are illustrated by the Model Penal Code com­
mentary's exclusion of a specific characteristic-below-normal intelligence-that 
our subjects believe is relevant in assessing the appropriate degree of liability. Be­
cause judges control the evidence that a jury will hear, jurors may never know of 
characteristics or circumstances that might alter their assessments of liability. 
5 
Doctrines of Excuse: 
When Is One's 
Rule Violation Blameless? 
That a person satisfies the culpability requirements of an offense (discussed in 
Chapter 4) typically will be enough to establish the blameworthiness for one's 
rule violation that makes criminal liability appropriate. Nonetheless, this pre­
sumption of blame may be rebutted by showing that, at the time of the offense, 
the perpetrator had a "disability" that excuses the person from responsibility for 
the offense. A person may be excused through any of the general disability excuse 
defenses-insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, or duress. 1 An insane 
arsonist, for example, may have intended to burn the building (a culpability re­
quirement of arson) ,  yet the offender's insanity may render him or her blameless 
for the offense. While assumptions of sanity, maturity, sobriety, and absence of 
coercion normally are correct and applicable in most cases, in the unusual case a 
person may have a disability-insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, or 
coercion-and its effects may be such that he or she cannot reasonably be ex­
pected to have avoided the criminal violation. 
The class of excuses that we address in this chapter are called "disability ex­
cuses" because society's reduced expectations for the conduct of the person come 
from some sort of disability or abnormality of the person. We have seen hints of 
these reduced expectations in previous studies, notably the study on the individu­
ation of standards for negligence (Chapter 4, Study 1 1 )  in which our respondents 
were willing to require lowered standards of care from individuals whose charac­
teristics gave them various disadvantages. Another class of excuses, "mistake ex­
cuses;' look not to a person's abnormality but, on the contrary, to the normalcy 
(or reasonableness) of that persons' mistake as to an aspect of the circumstances 
that, if the mistake holds true, would render the conduct noncriminal. ( In Chap­
ter 3, we discussed several examples of this kind of excuse relative to justification 
defenses. For example, we saw that a person who uses deadly force on an attacker 
whom he or she mistakenly believes threatens him or her with deadly injury is 
granted a defense by our respondents. )  Future research might examine other mis­
take excuses, such as those given to the following: ( 1 )  a person who violates a law 
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when that law has not been made reasonably available to the public; (2) a person 
who violates a law because he or she reasonably relies on what proved to be an of­
ficial misstatement of the law; and (3)  a person who makes a mistake as to the 
criminality of his or her conduct after making a diligent effort to ascertain the 
law.2 
We begin our examination of disability excuses with one of the most frequent 
points of contact between psychology and the law: the insanity defense. 
STUDY 1 2: INSANITY 
Previous psychological research has probed many questions about the insanity 
defense, but two seem particularly germane to our interests. The first question is 
dealt with in surveys focusing on people's estimates of the fairness and effective­
ness of the insanity defense as an instrument of public policy. These surveys have 
proven quite useful in comparing attitudes toward the insanity defense across dif­
ferent segments of the general population. For instance, Pasewark and colleagues 
have used this approach to compare laypersons' and legislators' estimates of how 
frequently defendants enter an insanity plea ( Pasewark and Pantle, 1 979; 
Pasewark and Seidenzahl, 1 980) .  They found that while legislators' estimates of 
the frequency of cases of the insanity plea were substantially more conservative 
( i .e., fewer) than those of lay community members, both groups vastly overesti­
mated the frequency and the success rate of insanity pleas. This overestimating 
tendency has been confirmed in more recent studies; people generally assign a 
much greater role to the insanity defense than it truly plays in the workings of the 
criminal justice system (Hans, 1 986; Steadman and Braff, 1 983) .  This finding is 
interesting in the present study, in that it suggests that most respondents, con­
cerned not to overapply the defense themselves, will be relatively reluctant to 
grant validity to mental illness as a reason for excusing offenders from criminal 
liability. 
Surveys and experiments that attempt to discover lay definitions of insanity 
constitute the second approach that previous researchers have applied to the 
study of the insanity defense. These studies have focused on the implications of 
lay definitions of insanity for the decision-making processes of juries. One con­
clusion has been that instructing jurors in simulated trials to apply different legal­
code tests of insanity makes remarkably little difference in the verdicts that jurors 
ultimately reach ( Finkel, 1988; Finkel, Shaw, Bercaw, and Koch, 1 985) .  This sug­
gests that various individuals hold their own views of what constitutes insanity 
and that they do not modify these views in the direction of code formulations, 
even when instructed to do so during their participation in simulated trials. In 
other words, lay definitions of insanity appear strong enough to override the 
specifications of the legal code in determining the Not Guilty by Reason of Insan­
ity (NGRI) verdict. 
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One study has tested lay understandings of legal definitions of insanity directly 
(Hans and Slater, 1984) . This survey was conducted in the week following the an­
nouncement of an NGRI verdict in the case of John Hinckley, Jr., the man who at­
tempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1982. During this week, 
Americans were exposed to unprecedented amounts of information and debate 
about the insanity defense. Consistent with previous research, Hans and Slater 
found that the majority of their respondents were still unable to accurately report 
the legal test for insanity that was being applied to Hinckley.3 A substantial pro­
portion of respondents (23%) volunteered the definition: "Didn't know what he 
or she was doing" (Hans and Slater, p. 1 07) .  
From our point of view, the interesting question is :  Do ordinary persons spon­
taneously use standards for judging mental illness that are in rough accord with 
those that the legal system suggests are relevant? This question is not answered by 
the research cited above. What distinctions, then, are made by standard legal 
codes? Within the legal system, mental disease or defect can affect a person's crim­
inal liability either ( 1 )  by negating ( i .e. , making it impossible for the prosecution 
to prove) a culpable state of mind that is required by the definition of the offense 
charged or (2) by satisfying the conditions of a general insanity defense. The lat­
ter, the general insanity defense, operates without regard to the elements of the of­
fense charged. If the conditions of the general insanity defense are met, the person 
escapes criminal liability, whatever the offense. Rather than focusing on the per­
son's actual state of mind as to the offense elements, the general insanity defense 
focuses on the person's general capacity for normal mental and emotional func­
tioning.4 In this study, we test the similarities and differences between community 
standards and the provisions of the general insanity defense. 
The common law recognized an insanity defense under what is called the 
McNaughten test, which provides a defense if one was laboring under such a de­
fect of reason due to mental disease that one did not know the nature or quality of 
the act one was doing or, if one did in fact know about the act, one did not know 
that what one was doing was wrong.5 The test focuses exclusively on the person's 
cognitive ( as opposed to control) dysfunction and requires a very high, if  not ab­
solute, degree of loss of function. The person must "not know" either the nature 
of his conduct or that it is wrong. In contrast, the cognitive dysfunction prong of 
the Model Penal Code's more modern formulation (called the "ALI test" because 
the American Law Institute authored the Model Penal Code) sets a somewhat 
lower standard of dysfunction: It requires only that the person lack "substantial 
capacity" to "appreciate" the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct [MPC § 
4 .0 1 ( l ) ] .  The Code's language permits the defense upon less dysfunction; cogni­
tive function only need be impaired, not absolutely lost. 
Many jurisdictions adopting the McNaughten test have added an alternative 
ground of exculpation: Even if one knows the nature of what one is doing and that 
it is wrong, one nonetheless is excused if he or she has lost the power to avoid do-
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ing the act in question to such a degree that one's free agency is at the time de­
stroyed.6 This introduces the possibility of a defense based on a pure control dys­
function, with a person's cognitive functioning intact. Like McNaughten, 
however, this "irresistible impulse" test, as it is called, is stated as absolute in its 
demands. One must have no power to control one's conduct, and one's free 
agency must be "destroyed." Under the control prong of the Model Penal Code's 
ALI test, in contrast, one need only lack "substantial capacity" to conform one's 
conduct to the requirements of law [MPC § 4.01 ( 1 ) ] .  Absence of control is not re­
quired for the Code's defense; substantial impairment of control is sufficient. 
These distinctions-cognitive versus control, and complete loss versus sub­
stantial impairment of function-represent the major distinctions among the 
most common American formulations of the insanity defense. Some jurisdictions 
still use just the McNaughten test-requiring high cognitive dysfunction. Some 
adopt McNaughten and add the irresistible-impulse test as an alternative ground 
of defense-thus requiring either high cognitive or high control dysfunction. The 
Model Penal Code's ALI test has been adopted in many jurisdictions. It requires 
only substantial impairment of either cognitive or control functioning. Some ju­
risdictions, such as the federal system, have recently dropped the control-function 
prong of ALI and kept the cognitive-function prong. Rather than reverting to 
McNaughten entirely, they have retained the ALI test's substantial impairment 
approach.7 Public disillusionment and dissatisfaction have led a few jurisdictions 
to drop the insanity defense altogether.8 
The following insanity study sought to determine whether our subjects would 
give a general defense because of a person's insanity, whether they recognize the 
validity of the cognitive versus control distinction that the doctrine uses, and 
which of the tests, if any, best reflects their views. In the core of the story we pre­
sented to the subjects, an individual (who is characterized with various details 
that suggest insanity) picks up an object that is nearby, such as a baseball bat, a 
mallet, or a rock, and hits another person with it, killing that other person. Be­
cause the writers of these cases wanted to make the mental dysfunction of the per­
son vivid, they created scenarios that differed from one another in several ways. 
What we will need to look at carefully, therefore, are the respondents' perceptions 
of the kind and degree of mental dysfunction experienced in each case. 
When we examine the subjects' perceptions of the degree and kind of insanity 
that was conveyed by the scenarios, we discover that their perceptions are some­
what different than we had expected them to be.9 The cases and the way our re­
spondents perceived them are shown in Table 5. 1 .  
The cases are numbered as they will appear i n  the next table, which i s  why the 
numbers run from 4 through 7 rather than beginning with 1 .  Columns a and b 
show the subjects' ratings of the degree to which the perpetrator suffers from a 
substantial or complete control dysfunction. Columns, c, d, and e report their 
perceptions of the degree of cognitive dysfunction. The questions on cognitive 
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TABLE 5. 1 Respondents' Perceptions of Cognitive and Control Dysfunctions 
Control Dysfunction Cognitive Dysfunction 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Unaware of 
Suggested Nature of Unaware of 
Scenario Label Substantial Complete Substantial Conduct Wrongfulness 
4. High control, 
low cognitive 7.58 7.39 3.05 2.76 2.71 
5. High control, 
low cognitive 7.29 6.61 2.95 2.50 2.74 
6. Medium control, 
h igh cognitive 4.47 4.74 7.68 7.97 7.58 
7. Low control, 
high cognitive 3.79 3.89 6.82 3.29 6.68 
The questions asked whether the respondent 1 ="strongly disagreed," 5=was 
"unsu re/' or 9="strongly agreed" that the actor had a substantial or complete 
control or cognitive dysfunction. The exact questions are shown in Table 5.4 and 
correspond to each of the five lettered columns of this table. The questions 
tabulated here are the common-language formulations. 
dysfunction are more numerous because, as we noted about cognitive dysfunc­
tion, the legal doctrine distinguishes between cognitive dysfunction of two sorts: 
First, one may be unaware of the nature of one's conduct (unaware that the thing 
one is hitting is a person) and second, even if one is aware of the nature of the 
conduct, one may be unaware of the wrongfulness of the conduct (unaware that 
hitting another is wrongful). Therefore, we included questions about both of 
these sorts of cognitive dysfunction. 
The results indicate that respondents are well able to distinguish cognitive from 
control dysfunction, a fact that lends some support for the use of this distinction 
by the doctrine. As can be seen from the scenarios in rows 4 and 6, we were gener­
ally successful in creating perceptions of high dysfunction, whether cognitive or 
control. Subjects perceived the case in row 5 as being a case of high control dys­
function; and perceived the case in row 6 as having a fairly high degree of cogni­
tive dysfunction. Looking at these degree-of-dysfunction ratings, one is struck by 
the fact that we have two conditions in which the control dysfunction is judged to 
be high and the cognitive dysfunction moderately low (scenarios 4 and 5) and 
two conditions in which the cognitive dysfunction is judged high and the control 
dysfunction low or moderate (scenarios 6 and 7 ) .  Therefore, in our analyses of li­
ability judgments, we will treat each member of each pair as to some extent a rep­
lication of the other member of the pair, although trying to remain sensitive to 
the differences between the pair. (These are the scenario descriptions of this study 
and are represented in the "suggested label" columns of Tables 5. 1 and 5.2. ) 
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TABLE 5.2 Liability as Related to Insanity 
Suggested Label 
Control Conditions: 
1 .  Murder 
2.  Self-defense 
3. Mistaken identity 
Experimental Conditions: 
4. High control, low cognitive 
5. High control, low cognitive 
6. Medium control, high cognitive 
7. Low control, h igh cognitive 
(a) 
Liability a 
1 0.42 
0.1 1 
7.79 
1 .89 ( 1 9%-8.29) 
3.00 (34o/o-9.25) 
0.64 (8o/o-5.67) 
1 .65 ( 1 6%-9.00) 
Doctrines of Excuse 
(b) 
% No 
Liability 
(N) 
0 
79 
0 
81 
66 
92 
84 
(c) 
% Civil 
Commitment 
81  
66 
92 
84 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 = 
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years, 
8=1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
8Civil commitment cases are included as 0 in calculating these means. The 
numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of respondents who assigned 
criminal liability and, of those, the average l iability they assigned. 
Before we leave Table 5.1, one more result is worth interpreting. The two differ­
ent aspects of cognitive dysfunction have a complex relation with each other. As 
we previously noted, one can be aware of the nature of one's conduct but unaware 
of the wrongfulness of the conduct. It looks like this is the way that our subjects 
treat this situation, as the doctrine suggests. Scenario 7 is perceived by them as be­
ing a case in which the person is aware of the nature of his conduct ( column d) 
but unaware of the conduct's wrongfulness ( column e) . As column c shows, our 
respondents agree that this individual has a substantial degree of cognitive im­
pairment. Note that if one is unaware of the nature of one's conduct that one will 
of course be unaware of its wrongfulness, but not the reverse. The two categories 
of awareness-of the nature of the conduct and of its wrongfulness-are serial in 
relation rather than alternative. 
Next, we will examine Table 5.2. The liability results again are shown in col­
umns a and b, and there is one additional feature in column a that we will explain 
in a moment. Before we examine the liability ratings for the mental illness cases, a 
note on the comparison cases is in order. The comparison (control) cases are sce­
narios 1, 2, and 3. The murder case ( row 1) involves a person who, because he is 
angry at another, goes to that person's house and bludgeons him to death, a 
straightforward murder, and we notice ( in column a) that it commands a sen­
tence of somewhere between life imprisonment and the death penalty. The self­
defense control case (row 2) shows the liability assigned to a convenience store 
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owner who defends himself from a knife-wielding robber by pulling a nightstick 
from under the counter and striking the robber, who is lunging at him with a 
knife. The robber is killed. This seems a straightforward case of self-defense to us 
and, judging by their slight liability assignment, to our respondents as well. The 
third control case ( row 3) involves again a convenience store owner who chases a 
robber, loses him, and misidentifies another individual as that robber. The look­
alike individual and the owner get into a fight, the owner uses the nightstick that 
he is carrying, injures the look-alike, and the individual eventually dies from the 
injuries. The liability assigned to this case is high. This indicates the respondents' 
views about the wrongfulness of a mistake as to what the store owner thinks is 
justified force. The subjects' response is notable because the mistake is in some 
sense similar to the sorts of mistakes that the mentally dysfunctional persons 
make in the experimental cases. 
Notice that a new column, c, appears in this table, containing the percentage of 
subjects who assign civil commitment to the perpetrator. In the real world, the 
choice facing judges and juries in insanity cases is not simply criminal liability or 
no criminal liability. A special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is avail­
able where an insanity plea is made, and this disposition generally leads to civil 
commitment, not to immediate release into society. Because of this fact, we gave 
subjects the option to recommend this course of handling the mental illness cases 
and even to suggest a term of the civil commitment. 10 We gave them this option as 
a way of assuring that those who are concerned about community safety more 
than anything else would feel that the civil commitment system would provide 
this assurance and that they need not impose criminal liability on someone who 
they thought might not deserve it in order to assure the community's safety. No­
tice that many of our subjects (66 percent or more) choose this civil commitment 
option (Table 5.2, column c) . The ability to specify not just civil commitment but 
also a term of years thus makes the civil option equally effective at protecting the 
community as the criminal option. Thus, those who give the criminal option 
would be those who are doing so because they believe that the person really de­
serves the condemnation and punishment of criminal conviction. 
The first result to notice from these various liability-judgment comparisons is 
the global one. Perpetrators who are judged to be suffering from a high degree of 
dysfunction, whether that dysfunction is of the cognitive or conduct-control sort, 
are normally not assigned criminal liability. In other words, our subjects do grant 
validity to a defense of insanity and sharply reduce the liability assigned to a per­
son who commits a crime while mentally ill; in making this judgment, our sub­
jects are in general accord with the way that the criminal codes treat such cases. 
Typically, more than 70 percent of our respondents assign no criminal liability to 
such cases. 
This result has special implications for the current controversy over whether 
the insanity defense should excuse only those cases of cognitive dysfunction or if 
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control-dysfunction cases also should be provided a defense. Recall that the fed­
eral system, as well as several states following its lead, recently has reverted to a 
cognitive-only test, denying any defense for a control dysfunction. Our respon­
dents would disagree with this change. In scenario 4, which is perceived as show­
ing high control and low cognitive dysfunction, 81 percent of the respondents im­
pose no criminal liability, and in scenario 5, similarly perceived, 66 percent 
impose no liability. Scenario 7, perceived as the reverse ( low control and high cog­
nitive), has about the same number of respondents giving no criminal liability 
(84 percent). This suggests that both cognitive and control dysfunctions can sup­
port an insanity defense. This conclusion is supported as well by the results in 
scenario 6. Where medium control and high cognitive perpetrator characteristics 
are perceived, 92 percent of subjects give the defense, noticeably more than the 84 
percent who give the defense in scenario 7 for low control and high cognitive 
traits. Control dysfunction can support a defense; the greater the perceived con­
trol dysfunction, the greater the likelihood of a defense. Of course, these respon­
dents do j udge that civil commitment is appropriate for the insane individual; 
they do not wish to release the perpetrator into the community. Indeed, were we 
to graphically illustrate the length of the period of confinement recommended by 
the respondents-without respect to whether it was civil or criminal confine­
ment-we would see that the time period of incarceration recommended was rea­
sonably constant across cases. Our respondents seem to be making a complex 
j udgment here. As is reasonably well understood in legal circles, there are a num­
ber of reasons why one incarcerates a person: because the person is blameworthy 
and deserves the sentence is one; to incapacitate the person so that no further 
crimes will be committed is another. (The latter is how one might treat a man­
eating tiger, were one to stray into the legal system. One would recognize that it is 
in the nature of tigers to eat men; so, one would not morally condemn the tiger 
for doing so. But exactly because it is in the nature of tigers to do so, one would 
lock the tiger up so that it would not have the opportunity to eat more men.) 
What our respondents wish to happen, given the alternatives presented to them, 
is to punish the noninsane perpetrator with a prison sentence and to incapacitate 
the insane perpetrator for a long period of  timell in a place that, within our sys­
tem, may look remarkably like a prison. 
Return now to the criminal liabilities (Table 5.2, column a) assigned to the 
cases in which we depicted possibly insane persons bringing about death. The 
number not in parentheses is the normal liability assignment; that is, the average 
liability assigned by all respondents, treating those who assigned no liability, no 
liability or punishment, or civil commitment as assigning a criminal liability of 
zero. 
The corresponding numbers in parentheses show the average criminal liability 
assigned by those who assigned criminal liability. (To make the reader's task easier, 
we have included two numbers. The first is the percentage of respondents who as-
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signed criminal liability. The second is the average liability assigned by those per­
sons. So, for instance, in case 4, we see that 1 9  percent of the respondents assigned 
criminal liability in that scenario, and their average liability score was 8.29.) This 
new "average liability" number is a different statistic than we have previously in­
cluded in our tables, and it is informative in this context because it reveals that 
those subjects (a  minority of respondents in each case) who do not exculpate the 
offender for reasons of insanity judge that quite high sentences are appropriate. 
Additionally, notice that this is true for all of the insanity cases ( 4 through 7) .  
Even within this minority group, however, liability ratings varied: Slightly more 
respondents assign criminal liability to the two high-control-dysfunction cases 
than to the two high-cognitive-dysfunction cases, and the average liability that 
they assign is higher. Further research will need to be done to determine both the 
persistence and importance of these differences and the degree to which they will 
transcend the specifics of the scenarios that we created for each case. 
Having examined the liability scores related to the insanity cases, we address 
one more issue in this study-the respondents' understandings of the legal code's 
wordings of the various formulations of the insanity defense. ( See Tables 5.3 and 
5.4, which together explain our subjects perceptions in this regard. )  For each sce­
nario, we asked our respondents to estimate the degree to which the individual in 
the scenario fits the various formulations of the insanity defense, and we did this 
in two ways: First, we presented our subjects with our best commonsense transla­
tion of the legal code concept (Table 5.4, column a); and second, we also gave 
them the exact wording of the legal code formulation (Table 5.4, column b). For 
example ( in insanity case 2 ) ,  we asked the degree to which the respondents agreed 
with the statements that the perpetrator "did not realize that striking the [victim] 
with the baseball bat was wrong" and that the perpetrator "was laboring under 
such a defect of reason [due to mental disease] that he did not know that what he 
was doing was wrong." 
Table 5.3 shows the average responses of our subjects to these questions and, 
more important, shows the correlations between the pairs of equivalent questions 
(that is, between the common and legal language formulations) .  The correlations 
(column c) are generally high, averaging 0.86 in scenario 4, 0.85 in scenario 5 ,  
dropping to 0.58 in  scenario 6, and returning to 0.84 in scenario 7. We interpret 
these high correlations to mean that, in this context, the subjects saw the paired 
statements as having about the same meanings. This conclusion of the essential 
interchangeability of the two forms of the statements is supported by the general 
close agreement between the average scores on each of the two equivalent ques­
tions. (The comparison across rows between columns a and b shows this. 1 2 ) This 
suggests that, on the one hand, it would not be wrong in the criminal justice sys­
tem to use the ordinary language formulations of the questions that the jurors are 
instructed to decide in determining whether a specific individual meets the legal 
criteria for insanity. On the other hand, it also suggests that the people to whom 
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TABLE 5.3 Respondents' Perceptions of Cognitive and Control 
Dysfunction: Agreement with Common and Legal Language Formulations 
(a) (b) (c) 
Common Legal 
Dimension of Language Language 
Scenario Perceived Dysfunction Agreement Agreement Correlation• 
4. High 1 .  U naware of nature of 
control, low conduct 2.76 3.42 0.79 
cognitive 2.  Unaware of wrongfulness 2.71 2.97 0.87 
3. S ubstantial impairment of 
appreciation of 
wrongfulness 3.05 3.29 0.86 
4. Complete loss of control 7.39 7.1 3  0.94 
5. S ubstantial impairment 
of control 7.58 7.47 0.86 
5. High 1 .  U naware of nature of 
control, low conduct 2.50 3.24 0.84 
cognitive 2. U naware of wrongfulness 2.74 3.08 0.90 
3. Substantial impairment of 
appreciation of 
wrongfulness 2.95 3.21 0.86 
4. Complete loss of control 6.61 6.42 0.83 
5. Substantial impairment 
of control 7.29 6.84 0.83 
6. Medium 1 .  U naware of nature of 
control, conduct 7.97 7.71 0.48 
high 2. U naware of wrongfulness 7.58 7.63 0.34 
cognitive 3. Substantial impairment of 
appreciation of 
wrongfulness 7.68 7.50 0.57 
4. Complete loss of control 4.74 4.42 0.68 
5. Substantial impairment 
of control 4.47 4.61 0.85 
7. Low 1 .  Unaware of nature of 
control, conduct 3.29 4. 1 6  0.77 
high 2. Unaware of wrongfulness 6.68 6.68 0.74 
cognitive 3. Substantial impairment of 
appreciation of 
wrongfulness 6.82 7.1 6  0.89 
4. Complete loss of control 3.89 3.63 0.85 
5. Substantial impairment 
of control 3.79 4.26 0.95 
Note: The exact wordings of these questions are shown in Table 5.4. 
Question 1 is tabulated in column d of Table 5.1 ,  question 2 in column e, 
question 3 in column c, question 4 in column b, and question 5 in column a. 
Respondents were asked whether they 1 ="strongly disagreed," 5=were "unsure," 
or 9="strongly agreed" with the common and legal language formulations that 
correspond with each of the five dimensions of perceived dysfunction for each of 
the four scenarios presented here. 
*All of the correlations shown in column c are statistically significant 
{p < .05). 
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TABLE 5.4 Key to Table 5.3-Questions for Common and Legal 
Language Formulations 
Dimension of (a) (b) 
Perceived Common Language Legal Language 
Dysfunction Formulation Formulation 
1 .  Unaware of Because of mental illness, The actor was laboring under 
nature of conduct the actor did not realize such a defect of reason due 
that he was striking the to mental disease that he did 
tenant with a baseball bat. not know the nature or the 
quality of the act he was doing. 
2. Unaware of Because of mental illness, The actor was laboring under 
wrongfulness the actor did not realize such a defect of reason that 
that striking the tenant with he did not know that what he 
a baseball bat was wrong. was doing was wrong. 
3. Substantial Because of mental illness, As a result of mental disease 
impairment of the actor's ability to under- or defect at the time of his 
appreciation of stand the wrongfulness of conduct, the actor lacked 
wrongfulness his conduct was substan- substantial capacity to appre-
tially impaired. ciate the c riminality or the 
wrongfulness of his conduct. 
4. Complete loss Because of mental illness, Because of the duress of 
of control the actor lacked any mental disease, the actor had 
ability to stop himself from so far lost the power to avoid 
striking the tenant with the doing the act in question, as 
baseball bat. that his free agency was at 
the time destroyed. 
5. Substantial Because of mental illness, As a result of mental disease 
impairment of the actor's ability to stop at the time of his conduct, the 
control himself from striking the actor lacked substantial 
tenant with the baseball capacity to conform his con-
bat was substantially duct to the requirement of 
impaired. the law. 
we gave these scenarios, and by extension, jurors, are able to understand and ap­
ply the somewhat ponderous legal wordings of the various formulations of ins an­
ity as well. This does not contradict the findings of other research (discussed at 
the beginning of this study) that showed that people were unable to reproduce the 
legal system definitions of insanity. 
Study 1 2: Summary 
Recall our discussion of the treatment that would be given to each case by various 
formulations of the current law. Let us for the moment assume that the typical 
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judgments in every insanity scenario are of "not guilty:' as in fact they are. If this 
is assumed, interestingly, both the formulation of insanity contained in the Model 
Penal Code and the formulation under the McNaughten-irresistible-impulse test 
accurately fit the pattern of our respondents' judgments, and the formulations of 
the McNaughten rule and the recently passed federal statute do not match the re­
spondents' judgments. Specifically, the last two formulations do not grant a de­
fense when the person is laboring under a control dysfunction, even though our 
respondents do see control dysfunction as establishing a defense of insanity. 
Thus, the two formulations that grant validity to the insanity defense based on ei­
ther a cognitive or a control dysfunction are the ones that best match the judg­
ments of our respondents. Further, the subjects were able to distinguish cognitive 
from control dysfunctions, lending some support for the use of this distinction by 
the doctrine. As the history of the doctrine might predict, cognitive dysfunctions 
appear to provide persuasive excuses to more of the subjects than do control dys­
functions. 
Further examination of the data suggests, rather tentatively, one more conclu­
sion. Examine again the degree of our subjects' agreement with the substantial 
impairment dysfunction statement for scenarios 6 and 7 (column c of Table 5. 1 ) . 
Although the subjects are in strong agreement with those dysfunction statements, 
they are by no means in total agreement with them. We would suggest that this 
supports the Model Penal Code's formulation of the cognitive dysfunction rule, 
which requires only that the person lack "substantial capacity" to appreciate the 
criminal wrongfulness of his conduct. This accesses the defense when cognitive 
functioning is impaired-rather than totally lost-a judgment with which our re­
spondents seem to be in accord. In further research, we will test whether a cogni­
tive dysfunction that respondents judge as establishing a lack of substantial ca­
pacity to appreciate the criminal wrongfulness of one's conduct is sufficient to 
cause those respondents to grant the insanity defense. 
Further research also will be necessary to provide more support to the conclu­
sions we have drawn from this study. Since our respondents perceive all of the 
cases as containing a high level of either control or cognitive dysfunction, further 
testing is necessary to determine what degree of each dysfunction is required be­
fore support for the insanity defense appears. It would also be useful to determine 
whether respondents use the defense in an essentially dichotomous way, granting 
it standing as a complete defense after it rises above a certain level, or if they 
would continuously scale their liability judgments to the degree of dysfunction 
that they detect. The former is the process that most closely matches those con­
tained in all of the legal formulations. 
There is a great deal of controversy about the insanity defense in our society. As 
we noted, many individuals feel, probably inaccurately, that the defense is used 
too often and has the effect of "letting off" many blameworthy persons. Given 
this is so, it is worth noting that a strong majority of our subjects still excused a 
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person who bludgeoned his victim to death if they judged that perpetrator as be­
ing genuinely dysfunctional because of mental illness. It may be that much of the 
controversy about the insanity defense is generated in circumstances in which the 
average reader of the publicity about a case sees the perpetrator as having only a 
modest degree of dysfunction-not enough to trigger the defense-whereas the 
jurors see the same degree of dysfunction as sufficient to trigger the defense. Still, 
we should also note that those minorities of the respondents who did find crimi­
nal liability appropriate assigned quite lengthy sentences. 
STUDY 1 3 :  
IMMATURITY AND INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
As our discussion of the previous study on insanity has suggested, when one com­
mits an offense under the influence of some significant dysfunction of one's ca­
pacity to control one's conduct or to understand the nature of one's conduct, the 
criminal law frequently recognizes an excuse that provides a defense. In addition 
to mental illness, the law excuses for dysfunctions that arise from either involun­
tary intoxication or immaturity (or, as we shall see in the next study, from du­
ress) .  
Current legal codes typically use a person's chronological age (although there is 
considerable debate over the exact age that divides maturity from immaturity) as 
conclusive evidence that the person is too immature to understand or control the 
harmful and criminal nature of his or her conduct [MPC § 4. 1 0; Robinson, 1 984, 
§ 1 75] . Our study sought to test the subjects' willingness to excuse persons be­
cause of their immaturity, as evidenced by their chronological age. A "control" 
harm was described, and then the same harm was described as having been com­
mitted by an individual of various ages. No other information accessing an excuse 
was given, so if respondents gave lesser sentences to the younger offender, they did 
so solely because of the differential inferences they drew from the offender's age. 
The defense of involuntary intoxication in legal theory works through mecha­
nisms similar to those used for the defenses of insanity and immaturity, as de­
scribed in the previous study concerning insanity. In Chapter 4, we discussed the 
legal theory relating to voluntary intoxication. If a person voluntarily becomes in­
toxicated, that person's intoxication has a limited effect in mitigating his or her li­
ability. In those cases in which a person's intoxication is involuntary, however, lia­
bility may be eliminated or mitigated in two ways, parallel to those seen for 
mental illness. First, the resulting dysfunction from involuntary intoxication may 
provide a defense if it negates a culpable state of mind required by the offense def­
inition. Second, the condition may excuse the violator if it satisfies the conditions 
of the general involuntary intoxication defense, notwithstanding that the ele­
ments of the offense are satisfied. Those conditions typically are analogous to the 
conditions required by a jurisdiction's particular formulation of the insanity de­
fense [MPC § 2.08( 4) ;  Robinson, 1 984, § 1 76] . As with insanity, the most com-
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mon defense formulations use the McNaughten test, the McNaughten-irresist­
ible-impulse test, or the ALI test. The differences among these tests arise from the 
distinctions between cognitive and control dysfunction and between loss versus 
impairment of function, as described in the previous study. 
In this study, we attempt to see the degree to which our respondents agreed 
with the immaturity and involuntary intoxication defenses recognized by the le­
gal doctrine, as well as the degree to which these two defenses are based on similar 
underlying mechanisms of exculpation. To examine community views on the 
general involuntary intoxication defense and its effect on a person's liability, sub­
jects were given five homicide scenarios intended to present a person who suffers 
from the following dysfunctions, respectively: high control only, high cognitive 
only, low control only, low cognitive only, and low cognitive plus low control. To 
examine community views on the doctrine's immaturity defenses, three scenarios 
presented cases in which the person engages in similar conduct under similar cir­
cumstances (but without being under the influence of any intoxication) .  In these 
cases, it is the person's age that is varied, from 1 0  to 14 to 1 8  years of age. 13 Finally, 
there was a control comparison case to establish the penalty these respondents 
would give to the perpetrator of a similar homicide who suffered from no dys­
function. 
In the control case and the three age-related cases, the core scenario is this: Two 
brothers have a history of antagonism. After an argument, one waits until the 
other is asleep and then kills him by dousing him with kerosene and setting him 
on fire. In the involuntary intoxication scenarios, the respondents were told that 
the cause of the involuntary intoxication is an unexpected interaction between 
two medications that the person is taking: one to control long-term pain and the 
other described as an over-the-counter drug for treatment of a cold. ( By describ­
ing it as an over-the-counter medication, we attempted to create the perception 
that people would regard it as generally safe and unlikely to enter into side-effect 
interactions with other medications.) The prescribing physician had not men­
tioned the possibility of drug interaction side effects, and the person had not 
thought to ask about them. The core of these stories had the involuntarily intoxi­
cated person killing his brother by suddenly dousing him with kerosene and set­
ting him on fire. We manipulated the kind and degree of the resulting dysfunc­
tion both by a description of the person's resulting mental experiences and the 
later testimony of a physician about what dysfunction the particular drug interac­
tion would cause. Thus, we attempted to create perceptions that the involuntary 
intoxication experienced by the person brought about high or low cognitive or 
control dysfunctions. Our respondents' liability judgments regarding these sce­
narios are in Table 5.5. 
Look first at the five scenarios (2 through 6) that involve involuntary intoxica­
tion. We consider these cases first because they are more closely analogous to the 
insanity cases of the previous study. For these cases, the civil commitment of the 
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TABLE 5.5 Liabil ity as Related to I mmaturity and Involuntary I ntoxication 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
% No Liability 
% No or No 
1 4 1  
Liability Punishment % Civil 
Scenarios Liability a (N) (N+O) Commitment 
Control :  
1 .  Murder 1 0.42 0 0 
Involuntary intoxication : 
2. High control 5.00 7 44 
3. High cogn itive 3.84 23 52 
4. Low control  6. 1 9  0 26 
5. Low cognitive 6.83 0 20 
6. Low control and 
cognitive 6.93 7 20 
Immaturity: 
7.  1 0-year-old 4.84 (53%-8.94) 47 47 47 
8. 1 4-year-old 6.66 (77%-8.77) 23 23 23 
9 .  1 8-year-old 8. 70 (90%-9.26) 7 1 0  7 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal l iabil ity, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 = 
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years, 
8= 1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
8Civil commitment cases a re included as 0 in calculating these means. The 
n umbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of respondents who assigned 
criminal l iability and, of those, the average liability they assigned. 
perpetrator was not an option that made sense within the judicial system and, 
therefore, was not given to our respondents as an option. First, and obviously, the 
sentences are greatly reduced from the control case of murder (as is revealed in 
column a) .  Second, both cognitive and control dysfunction appear to support a 
defense. This is similar to the conclusion of the insanity study. Third, statistical 
analysis reveals that the high and low dysfunction cases differ reliably: The high 
dysfunction scenarios (2  and 3 )  receive lower criminal liabilities (p < .05) than 
the low dysfunction scenarios ( 4, 5, and 6) .  The type of dysfunction-cognitive 
versus control-is not found to produce reliable differences. The interpretation 
that arises from this, then, is that people do assess cases of involuntary intoxica­
tion in terms of the degree of dysfunction that such cases bring about, and those 
perceptions of the dysfunctions cause respondents to reduce the liability they as­
sign to the perpetrator. 
Before taking this conclusion at face value, we need to look at the respondents' 
actual ratings of the degree of dysfunction brought about by the different sce­
narios (shown in Table 5.6). As column b indicates, the respondents certainly see 
the person in all of these scenarios as being intoxicated by the drug. They see him 
TABLE 5.6 Subjects' Perceptions of Immaturity and Involuntary Intoxication Cases 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
"Intoxication "Unaware "Unaware of "Understanding "Not Able "Ability to Stop 
Scenarios Age "Intoxicated" Involuntary" of Actions" Wrongfulness" Impaired" to Stop" 
Involuntary intoxication: 
2. High control 7. 1 9  6. 1 3  3.77 3.87 4.90 6.03 
3. H igh cognitive 7.90 6.52 7.00 7. 1 0  7. 1 3  6.74 
4. Low control 6.90 6.03 3.71 3.55 5. 1 3  4.74 
5. Low cognitive 8.26 8.45 6.39 7. 1 0  8.00 6.84 
6. Low control and 
cognitive 6.42 5.97 4.06 4.32 5.48 4.58 
Immaturity: 
7. 1 0-year-old 1 0.1 9 - - 2.58 2.90 3.61 2.58 
8. 1 4-year-old 1 4. 1 3  - - 1 .74 1 .90 2.42 2.00 
9. 1 8-year-old 1 7.87 - - 1 .39 1 .32 1 .39 1 .42 
Key to column heads: 
All statements were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree." 
(b) The actor was drug intoxicated at the time he performed the offense. 
(c) The actor, if drug intoxicated, was not responsible for being drug intoxicated. 
(d) Because of drug intoxication, the actor did not realize that he was committing the offense. 
(e) Because of drug intoxication, the actor did not realize that committing the offense was wrong. 
Impaired" 
6.42 
7. 1 0  
5.58 
7.39 
8. 1 9  
3.35 
2. 1 9  
1 .48 
(f) Because of drug intoxication, the actor's ability to u nderstand the wrongfulness of his conduct was substantially impaired. 
(g) Because of drug intoxication, the actor lacked any ability to stop himself from committing the offense. 
(h) Because of drug intoxication, the actor's ability to stop himself from committing the offense was substantially impaired. 
..... 
*"' 
N 
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as comparatively less intoxicated in scenario 6, and since that involves low degrees 
of dysfunction, that is appropriate. Moreover, as column c indicates, our subjects 
agree-somewhat grudgingly-that the offender is not responsible for being 
drug intoxicated in all of these scenarios. 
Next, let us look at the individual scenarios and see what conclusions we can 
draw from them. The information in columns d through h tells us how these cases 
are perceived in terms of cognitive and control dysfunctions, with columns d 
through f relating to cognitive dysfunction and g and h relating to control dys­
function. 
In the high control dysfunction case (row 2), respondents agree that the indi­
vidual is tending toward being unable to stop (column g) and is also impaired in 
his ability to stop (column h) . They also see the individual as being moderately 
cognitively aware; that is, they tend to disagree that he is unaware of his actions 
(column d), that he is unaware of the wrongfulness of those actions (column e), 
and that his ability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions is substantially 
impaired (column f). In this condition, it is reasonable to say that the respon­
dents perceive that the individual has a modest degree of cognitive impairment 
and a higher degree of control dysfunction; in other words, that scenario is not 
inaccurately described as a «high control, low cognitive dysfunction" case. Per­
sons perceived to have that level and kind of dysfunction by our subjects get a 
considerable reduction in sentence; certainly as compared to the control case of 
murder but also as compared to the low dysfunction cases. However, the liability 
rating of 5 ( 1 year in jail) is some distance from the sentence of no liability that 
many of the legal codes would give to an individual who has that dysfunction. 
Still, our respondents grant some considerable degree of validity to a defense 
based on a control dysfunction, which suggests that the legal codes that include a 
control prong in their formulations accurately represent community standards. 
Look next at scenario 3, in which we attempted to create perceptions of a high 
cognitive dysfunction (an unawareness of the meaning or the wrongfulness of the 
harmful actions) and a low degree of control dysfunction. The respondents' rat­
ings of the two statements on unawareness and the third on whether the individ­
ual is impaired in his ability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions all are 
high; clearly the case is perceived by our respondents, as intended, as one of high 
cognitive dysfunction. But the high ratings on the questions about whether the 
individual is able to stop the wrongful act indicate that the respondents see this 
case as one of high control dysfunction as well as one of high cognitive dysfunc­
tion. This means that, in this study, we were even less successful in creating a dear 
case of high cognitive dysfunction coupled with low control dysfunction than we 
were in the insanity study discussed previously. (Recall that it was demonstrated 
in that study that subjects do considerably reduce sentences for individuals who 
have high cognitive and moderate control dysfunctions.) Notice here that this in­
dividual receives a low liability rating of 3.84 ( about 5.5 months in prison), which 
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is the lowest sentence given in this study's various cases of involuntary intoxica­
tion. This makes sense, since the respondents see this individual as impaired on 
both of the prongs of the defense. 
The fact that the present case of high cognitive dysfunction was also read by 
our respondents as having a high control dysfunction may tell us something in­
teresting about their "theories of mental dysfunction." Intuitively, a person who is 
thinking so oddly as to be unaware of the wrongfulness of killing somebody may 
be seen by the respondents as not able to stop the action because he or she sees no 
moral need to stop it. To put it another way, one who is unaware of one's own ac­
tions and their wrongfulness has a cognitive dysfunction that may be seen by the 
respondents as also creating a control dysfunction. A similar pattern showed up 
in our insanity cases, in which the individual who is seen as highly cognitively 
dysfunctional is also seen as having a substantial although not complete control 
dysfunction (Table 5. 1 ,  case 6).  Again, future research will need to examine the 
generality of this inferential pattern of individuals; it may not always occur. For 
instance, it might be an inference based on the particular disability or the sub­
stance that brought about the voluntary intoxication in this case. Still, the fact 
that it also occurred, although to a more moderate degree, in the insanity case 
suggests that this inference pattern might be general. 
In the three involuntary intoxication cases in which we intended to communi­
cate various kinds oflow dysfunction levels (Table 5.6, rows 4 to 6),  we notice that 
the respondents in fact perceive those cases as involving moderate levels of dys­
function of a rather generalized sort. Specifically, the descriptions of scenarios 4 
and 6 caused the respondents to perceive a moderate degree of both control and 
cognitive dysfunction (columns d through h). Intuitively in keeping with this, 
they do reduce the sentences given to those individuals as compared to the con­
trol case of murder (Table 5.5, case 1-sentence of 1 0.42, above life imprison­
ment) or the case in which an 1 8-year-old, nonintoxicated individual committed 
the same act ( case 9, liability of 8 .70, or more than 25 years in prison) . But the 
sentences are by no means minor ones, ranging around five years in prison, and 
relatively few respondents (20 to 26 percent) assign no liability or no punishment 
in these cases. 
We should mark one anomaly that we cannot currently explain. In the "low 
cognitive" impairment scenario (5 ) ,  the respondents perceive that individual as 
having a considerable degree of both control and cognitive impairment-yet gave 
that individual a relatively high sentence. Further research will be needed to clar­
ify this finding. It is possible that the subjects saw something in the specifics of 
our description that led to this odd result. 
Still, with some tentativeness, we can derive one conclusion relevant to code 
drafters. Our respondents seem to analyze involuntary intoxication cases as anal­
ogous to those of mental illness; the subjects use the same concepts of control and 
cognitive dysfunction that they employ for analyzing mental illness. This sup-
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ports the common practice of providing analogous conditions of exculpation in 
the general involuntary intoxication and insanity defenses. 
It strikes us that some general comments may be in order on the exact circum­
stances that we created for the core scenario of the involuntary intoxication cases. 
Recall that the individual is taking a long-term drug for the control of pain, has 
not been warned by the physician as to the possibility of side effects, and takes an 
over-the-counter cold remedy that, in interaction with the pain medication, trig­
gers the mental dysfunction. This case seems fairly far toward the involuntary end 
of a voluntary continuum that we will now suggest. Briefly, that continuum repre­
sents what a sensible person should know about what might happen to his or her 
mental state as a consequence of certain actions. Our actor, it seems to us, is rela­
tively justified in not realizing in advance that the particular drug combination 
would produce mental dysfunction. He is, in other words, in a state of high dys­
function for involuntary reasons. Our previous study on voluntary intoxication 
showed what happens when the intoxication is more voluntary. 
What can we conclude from our respondents' j udgments of liabilities and asso­
ciated perceptions of the immaturity cases? ( Refer again to Table 5.6, scenarios 7, 
8, and 9, which vary the control, or murder, case only as to the the age of the per­
son.)  Notice, first, the "age" column (a) of the table; clearly the readers notice and 
can accurately report the age of the different persons in the scenarios. Also, col­
umns d through h list respondents' perceptions as to the degree of awareness that 
the person has about the consequences and the wrongfulness of his actions. In  
general, these results tend to suggest that the youngest person is seen as  compara­
tively less aware of the wrongfulness and likely consequences of his actions. He is 
less aware-but by no means unaware-all of the ratings stay well on the "aware" 
side of the scale midpoints. 
Next, notice the civil commitment factor (column d of Table 5.5) . For the cases 
involving underage perpetrators, we asked whether the respondents would rec­
ommend some alternative, nonprison form of dealing with the offender, as is 
sometimes available in the juvenile criminal justice system. Notice that some of 
our respondents do indeed recommend this form of treatment for the underage 
offender; the younger the offender, the higher the percentage of those recom­
mending civil rather than criminal commitment. For the 10-year-old person, al­
most half of the respondents recommend this form of treatment. 
Next notice the liability ratings assigned to the differently aged persons (Table 
5.5, column a) . Again, as in the previous study, the first number is the average lia­
bility assigned by all respondents, factoring in zero (0) for those who selected the 
civil rather than the criminal commitment option; the parenthesized numbers re­
port the percentage of respondents imposing criminal liability and, of those, the 
average sentence they would impose. Relatively severe sentences are given, and age 
makes little difference in this. This surprises us, and we would like to see if this 
result holds up in future research. However, tentatively, we will interpret it: The 
1 46 Doctrines of Excuse 
younger the perpetrator, the higher the percentage of respondents that would rec­
ommend that person to receive treatment that is alternate to criminal incarcera­
tion; however, for the majority of respondents who see criminal sentences as ap­
propriate, youth does not decrease the duration of the sentence. Two possible 
interpretations strike us: The majority sees criminal incarceration as an appropri­
ate vehicle for reform of the young individual, and they think that a long time in 
prison will accomplish this; or they see him as being just as incorrigible as an 
older offender would be, and they want to lock him away for a good long time. We 
suspect the latter. 
As we mentioned in the introduction to this study, the treatment of juvenile of­
fenders within the legal system is a topic of current discussion and controversy. 
Although our subjects are willing to assign some degree of cognitive and control 
impairment to 10- and 1 4-year-old youngsters, it may be that stronger inferences 
about impairment, or the lack of it, would be made from a consideration of the 
facts and circumstances of other particular acts of wrongdoing than those we have 
devised for this study. There may be instances in which a 10-year-old is judged 
both perfectly capable of being aware of the wrongfulness of a specific action and 
quite able to maintain the self-control necessary to avoid committing it. There 
also may be some instances in which an 1 8-year-old is seen to act without this 
awareness. If so, then some examination of these issues within the context of a 
trial might be the preferred procedure for judging the validity of the application 
of this defense. 
Study 1 3: Summary 
Our involuntary intoxication scenarios involved an interaction between a pre­
scribed and an over-the-counter drug; one would want to have cases about other 
forms of involuntary intoxication before coming to any firm conclusions. That 
said, involuntary intoxication does seem to be judged by our respondents accord­
ing to principles similar to those used for the general defense of insanity. How­
ever, our respondents are noticeably less willing to treat involuntary intoxication 
as a complete defense; it mitigates liabilities, but the liabilities assigned are still 
reasonably high. Further research is needed to determine whether this is the case 
in all instances of involuntary intoxication or if this was specific only to the cases 
we created. 
The younger the offender, the higher the percentage of our respondents who 
recommend that the offender be treated in some alternative to the normal crimi­
nal justice system. However, for any of a number of reasons that we have dis­
cussed, those who would require that the offender be retained in the criminal jus­
tice system are willing to give that person, despite the age factor, sentences of 
more than twenty years. Much depends, we suspect, on the degree of rationality 
that the respondents attribute to the offenders, and that may not correlate well 
with the age of the offender. Much remains to be explored in further research on 
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this topic, and we notice that the criminal justice system is in a somewhat unset­
tled state with regard to the treatment of youthful offenders as well. 
STUDY 1 4: 
DURESS AND ENTRAPMENT DEFENSES 
In legal codes, another defense, duress, exculpates a person whose conduct other­
wise would create liability. In duress, unlike in the insanity, immaturity, and in­
voluntary intoxication defenses, the focus is not directly on the dysfunction 
caused but on the external pressures on the individual that might create reasons 
why he or she engaged in the otherwise punishable conduct. These pressures nor­
mally arise from the improper actions of other people and create such a force that 
even a reasonably resolute person, subject to those pressures, might succumb to 
them and violate a law. The bank manager who lets the burglars into the bank 
vault after hours because the burglars have kidnapped his family (and he believes 
that they will harm his family if he does not let them in) is an example of an indi­
vidual who acts under coercion. The external pressure may cause coercion that, in 
turn, one might guess, causes an impairment of control analogous to the impair­
ments excused under insanity or immaturity defenses. Statutes typically require 
that the force exceed a given level and reach a level of sufficient coerciveness to 
render the person blameless, before a defense is available. Frequently the defini­
tion of that level involves the familiar legal fiction of the "reasonable person:' Un­
der the Model Penal Code, for example, the force must be such "that a person of 
reasonable firmness in [the actor's] situation would have been unable to resist" 
(MPC § 2.09) .  
The case of the "entrapped individual" is  sometimes thought to  share a similar 
philosophical grounding; an individual who would not otherwise have commit­
ted the criminal act is led by abnormal circumstances into doing so. The possibil­
ity of entrapment arises when an agent of the government somehow lures or en­
tices an individual into committing a crime. At the highest level of generalization, 
the entrapment doctrine gives a person a defense if a government agent induces or 
persuades that person to commit the offense. But as intuition would lead one to 
expect, entrapment statutes typically have additional limitations and restrictions 
that are taken into account. The defense is limited to instances of improper en­
trapment by a police officer, typically undercover; the same inducement by a pri­
vate individual is not grounds for a defense. The inducement or persuasion of en­
trapment is not as compelling as the coercion typical of duress and does not seem 
to so clearly exculpate the acting individual. 
The entrapment defense is almost unique to the United States, and there is a 
great deal of variety among different U.S. jurisdictions in defining it. The debated 
differences center around defining it in an appropriately limited way. Two general 
approaches are common. What may be called the "subjective formulation" of en­
trapment requires both that the person be induced to commit the offense by the 
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police agent and that the person is not otherwise predisposed to commit the of­
fense. Thus, under the subjective formulation, a career drug dealer cannot get an 
entrapment defense-even if the transaction was induced or encouraged by a 
government agent-because the dealer's previous transactions demonstrate pre­
disposition. 
Note that, somewhat counterintuitively, the subjective formulation of the en­
trapment defense does not have a specific requirement for the amount of pressure 
or enticement that was brought to bear on the person. As long as the person is not 
predisposed to commit the offense, any amount of pressure or inducement that 
successfully causes the person to commit the offense will provide a defense. The 
subjective approach focuses on both the police and the accused and requires two 
conditions for the defense to be successful-improper police conduct ( conduct 
that would have caused a person not otherwise predisposed to do so to commit 
the offense) and no predisposition on the part of the defendant. 
One �senses that some competing policy considerations may be trading off 
within this formulation. On the one hand, one does not want the police to go 
around inducing criminal acts among citizens not otherwise predisposed to com­
mit these acts. On the other hand, one recognizes that having undercover police 
officers purchase drugs or otherwise induce illegal transactions is sometimes nec­
essary for catching career criminals. Letting off career criminals is too high a price 
to pay for deterring police entrapment practices, hence the exclusion (from the 
subjective formulation of the entrapment defense) of persons "predisposed to 
commit the offense." 
A second common approach of entrapment defenses is what may be called the 
"objective formulation." Under this approach, the focus excludes whether the de­
fendant was predisposed to commit the offense and focuses exclusively on the 
propriety of the government agent's conduct. Of course, the subjective approach 
also focuses on one aspect of the police officer's conduct-Is the conduct such 
that it would cause a person not predisposed to commit the offense to do so? The 
difference, however, is that the objective approach does not ask, in addition, 
whether the defendant was in fact predisposed. 
A career drug dealer may get an entrapment defense under the objective for­
mulation if the government agent's conduct is " improper:' What conduct is "im­
proper"? Under the Model Penal Code (which uses such an objective formula­
tion) ,  for example, a government agent acts improperly and may generate an 
entrapment defense for an offender if the agent induces an offender to commit an 
offense by: " (a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the 
belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or (b) employing methods of persua­
sion or inducement that create a substantial risk that such an offense will be com­
mitted by persons other than those who are ready to commit it" [ MPC § 
2 . 13 ( 1 ) (a) and (b) ] .  
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Note that the objective formulation seems somewhat more inconsistent with 
people's intuition. The first clause of the statute requires only that the false repre­
sentation be designed to induce a belief that the conduct was not prohibited. The 
second clause requires only that the methods create a risk of inducing a person not 
ready to commit the offense to commit the offense. Thus, the statute does not re­
quire that the actual offender be brought to the belief that the action is legal or 
that the offender actually be persuaded or induced to commit the offense. That is, 
the defendant need not actually be induced by the agent; the person need only 
have committed the offense in response to certain actions on the part of the agent. 
For instance, a government agent may tell a habitual drug dealer that it is not ille­
gal to sell a certain sort of drug. The dealer may know full well that it is illegal and 
yet escape liability for the act of selling the drug under the objective formulation 
of the defense because of the agent's knowingly false representation. 
It may be apparent by now that the entrapment defense is not, strictly speak­
ing, an excuse that exculp ates the accused. It permits the person to escape from li­
ability but does so for a variety of reasons relating to fairness and deterring gov­
ernmental overreaching rather than the defendant's lack of blameworthiness. 
This is true of the subjective formulation as well as the objective formulation. No 
minimum coerciveness of the inducement is required. Nor is the defense available 
if the person succumbs to inducement from a private citizen-even under cir­
cumstances where the same inducement from a government agent would evoke a 
defense. 
This study tested cases involving both duress and entrapment. First, we sought 
to determine whether the subjects would recognize a duress defense for coerced 
conduct and, if so, how much coercion would be required to evoke the defense. 
Second, and considerably more tentatively, we explored the related questions of 
entrapment. We sought to determine whether our subjects would recognize a de­
fense under the various conditions of entrapment suggested by different formula­
tions of the defense. That is, we sought to determine whether the subjects would 
see entrapping conditions as exculpating the person or, alternatively, whether 
they might reduce the person's liability because they saw mitigating if not excul­
pating conditions. We sought to examine as well whether the respondents' views 
correspond better with one or the other of the two formulations of the entrap­
ment defense. 
In this study, we gave subjects both duress scenarios with varying levels of coer­
cion and entrapment scenarios with and without predisposition of the offender, 
with and without improper inducement by a government agent, as well as varia­
tions substituting a private citizen for the agent. The core story involved an indi­
vidual who agrees to transport eight ounces of cocaine for another individual. We 
asked the respondents to tell us the degree to which they saw the person as being 
personally disposed to commit the crime that he commits, to rate the amount of 
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coercion they saw exercised on the person, to judge whether a person of reason­
able firmness would be coerced or induced to commit the same offense, and to in­
dicate the degree of impropriety of the inducements that are held out to the per­
son in committing the crime, as well as to assess the punishment that the person 
·deserves, if any. Table 5.7 contains the respondents' judgments. 
As to the duress defense, notice first that in the control scenario (row 1 ) , in 
which the person commits the crime of transporting cocaine with no degree of 
duress or inducement, the liability our subjects imposed is 5.52, corresponding to 
a sentence of approximately 2 years. For contrast, take the most extreme duress 
case, that of high coercion (row 2) next. In this case an individual with no prior 
record transports the cocaine for an individual who threatens to kill his family if 
he does not do so. This high-coercion duress scenario gave liability results that are 
much lower than the control case, suggesting that the respondents see a consider­
able mitigation in this case; the average liability they assigned (column a, 2.29) is 
a sentence of 3.8 weeks. Notice also that 50 percent of the subjects assign no pun­
ishment to the offender. 
As the degree of coercion decreases (the low-coercion case of row 3) ,  the sub­
jects assign a liability that is between that of the high-coercion and the control 
cases ( 3.65, corresponding to 4.4 months in jail ) .  An examination of the distribu­
tion of the results provides no evidence of bimodality, which would have sup­
ported a "threshold" notion of coercion. It appears that here, as in other cases we 
have examined, the respondents are making continuous judgments of liability for 
cases in which the legal system imposes a threshold concept by requiring a fixed 
minimum coercion for a complete defense. Our respondents see degrees of coer­
don; the legal system sees either coercion or no coercion. 
Examine next the ratings on the perceptions of the coercion cases (columns d 
through h). In the case of high coercion, respondents are in agreement that the 
coercion is  indeed high (column d, 8.2 1 on a scale in which 9 = extreme coer­
cion) , and they are in agreement with the statement that it is sufficient coercion to 
cause any reasonable individual to succumb to it and commit the offense (col­
umn e) . ( But notice that the extent of the agreement is not strong, 6.3 1-where 5 
= unsure and 7 = agree. Respondents mention such options as reporting the 
threat-making individual to the police.) Our case of low coercion, which involves 
a person smuggling cocaine because he would lose his job as a truck driver other­
wise, is assessed by our subjects as a moderate to high coercion case (column d, 
6.29-where 9 = extreme coercion) ,  and they are generally unsure whether it is 
enough coercion to get a reasonable person to commit the offense (column e, 
4.88, or quite near the "unsure" response) .  This suggests, in future research, cases 
of very low coercion be included to test the lower limits of the respondents' per­
ceptions. There may be cases in which subjects recognize that some degree of 
pressure has been exerted yet do not grant the defense of coercion. However, note 
that in one sense the pattern of results takes us in the opposite direction-to con-
·-···-· 
TABLE 5.7 Liability and Subjects' Perceptions as Related to Duress and Entrapment 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
% No Liability 
% No or No "Reasonable "Reasonable 
Liability Punishment Amount Person "Improper Person 
Scenarios Liability (N) (N+O) of Coercion Coerced" "Predisposition" lnducemenr' Induced" 
1 .  Control-
no duress or 
inducement 5.52a 0 3 - - 5.58 
Duress scenarios: 
2. High coercion 2.29c 9 50 8.21 6.31 2.32 8.09 6.32 
3. Low coercion 3.65b 3 24 6.29 4.88 3.68 7.53 4.82 
Entrapment scenarios: 
4. No prior 
record-agent 2.44C 21  50 7.62 6.06 2.79 8.1 8 5.91 
5. Prior record-
agent 6.24a 6 9 3.65 4.38 6.91 6.03 4.50 
6. No prior 
record-buddy 3.5ob 3 26 7. 1 2  5.41 2.65 7.62 5.1 8  
Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
Key to column heads: 
Statements (e) through (h) were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree." 
(d) How much coercion (i.e., pressure or force) did the actor feel, from the accomplice, to commit the offense? 
(1 =no coercion; 9=extreme coercion). 
(e) The amount of coercion (i.e., pressure or force) from the accomplice on the actor would have been enough to cause a 
reasonable person in the actor's situation to commit the offense. 
(f) The actor Is generally inclined to commit an offense like this even if no one encouraged him to do so. 
(g) The accomplice used methods of persuasion or inducement on the actor, to get him to commit the offense, that were 
improper. 
(h) The accomplice used methods of persuasion or inducement on the actor, to get him to commit the offense, that would 
have caused a reasonable person to commit the offense. 
Note: Superscript letters indicate significance at the p < .05 level by a Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate 
means that are not statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns only. 
-
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sider what degree of coercion is necessary to completely exculpate the defendant. 
Even our actor who experiences high coercion receives no punishment from only 
50 percent of the subjects. This puzzles us, because the facts described in this sce­
nario appear to be highly coercive-the respondents see them as highly coer­
cive-and yet the offender does not receive complete exculpation. 
Still, the degree of coercion that our subjects perceive as operating on the per­
son makes a difference in the liabilities that our respondents assign. There is a sec­
ond line of evidence that coercion makes a difference to our respondents. Look 
within the low-coercion condition (scenario 3 ) ;  specifically, at the perceptions of 
whether a reasonable person would have been coerced into committing the crime 
( column e) . The extent to which the average subject judges that the degree of co­
ercion would cause a reasonably firm individual to succumb to the pressure and 
the degree of liability assigned to the offender correlate strongly. (Beta = -0.48, 
F( l ,3 2 )  = 9.62, p = .004, with the negative sign indicating that the lesser the de­
gree of  coercion that the respondent sees exerted on the person to commit the 
criminal act, the longer the sentence he or she imposes on the offender for com­
mitting the act.) 
We next look at the psychologically more complicated situation of entrapment 
to see if we can discern a pattern in the respondents' judgments. In scenario 4, the 
driver, who has no prior record of an offense, is approached by an undercover 
government agent who was previously acquainted with him in the Navy. The 
driver is put under pressure by the agent to transport drugs. Scenario 5 is the 
same, except the respondents were told that the person has had prior convictions 
for transporting drugs. 14 The liabilities assigned to the two cases are significantly 
different; the liability assigned to the person with the prior record is as high as 
(indeed, higher than) the liability assigned to the individual who commits the act 
with no inducement (control-case 1 ) .  Compare this result with that suggested by 
the objective formulation, which relies solely on the propriety of the conduct of 
the government agent. Quite dearly, the objective formulation does not accord 
well with our subjects' intuitions. For the objective formulation, the past convic­
tions are irrelevant; what is critical is that the government agent approached the 
person and, in some sense, "lured" him into the behavior. Yet for our respon­
dents, prior convictions are critical; the individual with a prior record is assigned 
a mean sentence of about four years, exceeding that assigned to the perpetrator in 
the control case; in contrast, the individual with no prior record is assigned a sen­
tence that is sharply lower (between four and five weeks in prison) .  
The reason for this difference i s  probably found i n  the respondents' percep­
tions of the degree to which the criminal act resulted from the predispositions of 
the person. (Refer to column f in which subjects were asked whether they agree 
that "the [ individual] is generally inclined to commit an offense like this even if 
no one encouraged him to do so.") When the person has a prior history of similar 
offenses, the respondents interpret the person's current criminal action as spring­
ing from his predispositions (they agree with the statement that the action is due 
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to the person's general inclinations) ,  and they tend to think that the coercion 
would not have worked with a reasonable person (column e) ; they judge the 
criminality of the person accordingly. In contrast, when the person is a first-time 
offender (case 4) ,  the coercive force of the inducements provided by the agent is 
seen as much more potent, and the assigned liability is accordingly reduced. 
These results are psychologically interesting: The discovery of prior convictions 
has caused our respondents to see that entrapment scenario quite differently from 
the others. 
This is not to say that there is no concern that government agents are involved 
in the inducement process or are acting improperly. In cases identical in every 
other respect, a slightly greater mitigation of liability is given in the case of in­
ducement by a government agent15 (case 4) than by a friend of the person (case 
6) ,  and the percentage of respondents who assign no punishment in the former 
case ( column c) is much higher. However, an examination of the various other 
ratings of the two cases suggests that this may not be due to the fact that the in­
ducer is a government agent; instead it may be because, knowing that the induce­
ments came from a government agent who can be expected to be more skilled at 
the "inducement game:' the amount of the coercion contained in the inducement 
is judged by the subjects as being slightly higher, the degree to which a reasonably 
firm person would succumb to the inducement is rated slightly higher, and so on. 
Whatever the source of this slight difference in the liabilities assigned in these 
two nearly identical cases, the finding tends to undermine the validity of the en­
trapment defense generally-both the objective and the subjective formulations. 
The defense is available only for inducement by a police agent, yet the subjects see 
the definition of police versus nonpolice source of the inducement as not a major 
determinant of liability. 
Much about the objective formulation is untested in this study and awaits fur­
ther research. For example, such research might create cases in which the govern­
ment agent entrapped but was not perceived as having coerced the person or in 
which the government agent violated one of the objective formulation's specific 
prohibitions, such as telling the person that the action was not illegal. 
The subjective formulation of entrapment is this: A person, who is not predis­
posed to commit the offense, is induced (not coerced, as in the duress defense) to 
commit the offense by a police officer with methods that would have induced a 
reasonable person to also commit the offense. On initial examination of our data, 
the subjective formulation of the entrapment defense corresponds better to the 
subjects' view than the objective formulation. Of our three entrapment cases, sce­
nario 4 draws on average the lowest liability assignment from our subjects-2.44 
( 4.9 weeks)-and the person is perceived as not predisposed to commit the crime 
(column f) .  Further, subjects tend to agree that a reasonable person in the same 
situation would have been induced to commit the crime (column h). Scenario 5, 
in which the person, who has a prior record, is seen as predisposed and the in­
ducement tends to be seen as not sufficient to cause a reasonable person to com-
1 54 Doctrines of Excuse 
mit the crime, draws a sentence higher than our no-inducement control case (sce­
nario 1 ) !  Further analysis confirms that the degree of perceived inducement 
matters. Within entrapment scenario 4, we examined the correlation between the 
agent providing an inducement and the degree ofliability our subjects assigned to 
the induced individual [Beta = -0.49, F( 1 ,32) = 9.62, p = .004 ] .  
Note that even the subjective formulation o f  entrapment does not find support 
among the subjects as a defense. The individual with no prior record who is lured 
by the government agent into committing the crime gets a liability rating of 2.44 
(about 5 weeks in jail) .  This assignment of some liability on the part of our re­
spondents suggests that they do not believe that a complete defense should be 
available in entrapment cases (as provided for in current doctrine) but believe 
that only a mitigation is appropriate. Moreover, recall also that the subjective for­
mulation, like the objective formulation, stresses the importance of the inducer 
being a police agent; however, our subjects give only minor weight to that distinc­
tion. 
We are tempted to ask whether, in terms of community standards, there should 
be an entrapment defense at all. One of the questions that awaits further research 
is whether one might explain the entrapment mitigations found in this study as 
reflecting the subjects' assessment of the degree of duress-like coercion that ex­
isted in the entrapment cases. Some of our results suggest that the subjects may 
recognize entrapment as a defense only to the extent that it would give a defense 
or mitigation under a duress defense (albeit a duress defense altered to take ac­
count of degree of coercion and to give mitigations for coercion that does not ex­
culpate) .  If this were so, then, if one were to reform the criminal-law doctrine to 
conform to the subjects' views, one would expand the duress defense to provide a 
mitigation (but not a complete defense) in cases of high to moderate coercion. 
Having done that, one might then abolish the entrapment defense as unnecessary. 
Study 1 4: Summary 
This study confirms the fact that people do mitigate and exculpate for coercion. If 
duress is perceived, liability is lowered. An individual who is under quite high du­
ress to commit a crime receives a significant reduction in liability but does not, as 
we might have expected, receive complete exoneration. The frequent use of the 
"liability but no punishment" option suggests that our respondents want to make 
it clear that they are not condoning the conduct, but such disapproval of the con­
duct does not diminish their willingness to exculpate the person. Recall that un­
like insanity, which has a special verdict that signals the reason for the acquittal, a 
duress acquittal under the current system leaves the message about the conduct 
ambiguous. Thus, one would expect more resort to this particular verdict of, es­
sentially, "rule violation but no punishment," under cases of duress than in insan­
ity cases. The use of this option by our respondents shows no ambivalence about 
exculpating the person, we suggest, but rather ambivalence about apparently ap­
proving the conduct. 
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With respect to entrapment, we found that both of the standard formulations, 
which emphasize the importance of the inducement coming from a police agent 
as well as the particular conduct of the police agent, do not have much effect on 
the liability judgments of our subjects. Instead, our subjects give a mitigation in 
those cases in which they believe the person is strongly coerced and in which they 
believe a reasonably firm person would also be induced to commit the crime. 
Thus, if the community's view was to be followed, the entrapment defense would 
disappear as a separate defense and be subsumed under the duress defense. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The issues that we have addressed in this chapter are perhaps broader in scope 
than in other chapters, and much about these doctrines of excuse remains to be 
explored. Still, some conclusions seem reasonably well established. The disability 
caused by mental incapacity is recognized by our respondents as a valid reason to 
exculpate a person. Formulations of mental incapacity that recognize both a con­
trol and cognitive deficit are the preferred ones; the respondents seem to judge 
that dysfunction of either type is a valid trigger for exculpation. The greater the 
dysfunction, the greater the likelihood of a defense. In addition, respondents 
seem satisfied with a substantial rather than a complete dysfunction as establish­
ing exculpation. 
Involuntary intoxication is analyzed in legal codes on principles similar to the 
ones used for the analysis of mental illness, and this seems appropriate to our 
subjects. Their responses show a similar pattern ofliability for involuntary intoxi­
cation as for insanity: They recognize both cognitive and control dysfunctions as 
an excuse and the greater the dysfunction, the greater the likelihood of exculpa­
tion. 
Duress scenarios, our data reveal, are recognized as providing at least a mitiga­
tion of liability for offenses, and the degree of mitigation is a function of the de­
gree of coercion that the respondents see in the particular situation. Whether du­
ress can provide a complete excuse-in the community's view-awaits further 
research. Code formulations of the entrapment defense require that it be given 
only when a police agent supplies the inducement that leads the person to commit 
the crime, and our respondents did not see the importance of this requirement. 
Instead, ·they seemed to judge these cases using considerations similar to the ones 
they used in the duress cases, leading us to consider the possibility that the en­
trapment defense might properly disappear as a separate defense and be sub­
sumed under the duress defense. 
We suggest that our respondents often deal with their complex judgments 
about many of these excuse cases by giving a response that signals that they do 
wish to disapprove of the conduct, but they do not wish to do more than symboli­
cally punish the person. 
6 
Doctrines of Grading: 
What Degree of Punishment 
Is Deserved for One's 
Blameworthy Violation?  
A legal code's grading of the seriousness of a blameworthy violation appears in 
two forms: within offenses and between offenses. \Vi thin a general offense such as 
rape or theft, it is often the case that the code makes some distinctions about the 
differential seriousness of different kinds of rapes or thefts. Different levels of 
punishment are attached to these different intra-offense gradings. Also, different 
types of offenses are given different grades, reflecting the relative seriousness of 
rape as compared to theft, for example. 
We have touched on the issue of grading within offenses already. The factors 
that establish the minimum requirements for criminalization and for liability, 
discussed in the previous chapters, provide the starting point for grading within 
an offense. They establish the requirements for the lowest grade of any given of­
fense. The determination of higher grades of the offense then requires consider­
ation of various other factors. Nearly all jurisdictions recognize several grades of 
homicide: negligent homicide, manslaughter (paradigmatically reckless homi­
cide) ,  and murder (intentional homicide) .  It is also common to distinguish even 
within these categories. Some jurisdictions may recognize two grades of murder 
and of manslaughter-first and second degree. Thus, first degree murder might 
be reserved for the most brutal forms of murder. Other offenses also have higher 
grades contained within their definitions, such as aggravated assault. Rape may 
have three or four grades-the term "rape" sometimes being used only in relation 
to the most serious of these grades. 
A second sort of question involves what might be called "comparative grading» 
across different offenses. This requires judgments about the seriousness of a par­
ticular offense in comparison to other offenses. Murder intuitively seems a more 
serious offense than rape, which seems a more serious offense than theft, and so 
on, and the criminal codes recognize this by classifying murder as a higher grade 
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of offense than rape and rape a higher grade than theft, with a corresponding 
classification of each of the grades within each general offense. 
Questions of offense seriousness and grading have become more important of 
late because of the move to standardize sentences by creating sentencing guide­
lines that judges must follow when they sentence convicted criminals. Factors that 
were once left to be considered by the sentencing judge in a highly discretionary 
judgment of how much punishment ought to be imposed are now articulated and 
given defined weight under modern sentencing guidelines. So, offense-grading 
principles, historically important in constructing criminal codes, have become 
important in the sentencing context. 
The criminalization doctrines identify many of the most important factors in 
assessing the degree of punishment a person deserves-and thus what we might 
call the comparative grading of the offense-because they define the harm or evil 
of the offense. Interestingly, they frequently have done so by appeal to human in­
tuition, although others have suggested that comparative grading is derivable 
from some more logical, less intuitive, analysis. Regardless of presumed source, it 
usually comes out that human safety is more important than the safety of prop­
erty; intercourse with a 9-year-old is a more egregious wrong than intercourse 
with a 16-year-old. Assessing the relative seriousness of an offense requires an as­
sessment of the relative value of the full range of interests protected by the crimi­
nal law. Criminal-law theorists have only recently attempted to formulate princi­
ples for determining the relative seriousness of violations, having relied 
previously on appeals to shared intuitions within the culture ( see, e.g., Feinberg, 
1 984; von Hirsch and Jareborg, 1 99 1 ) .  
The grading task for the code drafters, then, is twofold: to distinguish among 
distinct grades of an offense, specifying minimal requirements for the crime, and 
specifying the circumstances that will produce a more aggravated version of that 
crime; and also to put these individual crimes into some comparative relationship 
of seriousness. Many of the studies reported earlier in this book give a hint at the 
kinds of factors that are relevant to these tasks. 
First, the greater the seriousness of the harm caused, the higher the grade as­
signed to the offense. "Seriousness" can be an intuitive notion, and people can 
differ on how "serious'' a particular offense ( like theft) is, but it is dearly a notion 
that occupies a central place in a person's grading of offenses. Crimes in which life 
is risked or lost consistently receive more severe sentences than what we cannot 
help referring to as "lesser crimes." As we saw in our study on offense culpability 
requirements (Study 8 ) ,  people regard a sexual offense, in which an individual 
who did not consent to intercourse is raped, as more serious than setting fire to a 
dwelling ( in which people could conceivably be harmed) ,  and setting fire to a 
dwelling, in which a person could conceivably be harmed, as more serious than 
setting fire to a similar site that is uninhabited. Second, similar notions of serious­
ness define the grades within a category of offense. The risk-of-harm study (Study 
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2) ,  for example, showed that subjects increase liability as the extent of the harm 
risked increases. 
The operating principle used to grade between and within offenses appears to 
be the same: The greater the harm caused or risked, the greater the liability, all 
other things being equal. In Study 1 5, a study concerning sexual offenses, we show 
just how refined the community's judgments can be in distinguishing among ac­
tions judged to be of different seriousness. We also show that the general principle 
of "greater harm means greater liability" applies as well to offenses, such as many 
sexual offenses, that are defined in terms of the depravity of the conduct rather 
than the harmfulness of the results of those actions. 
A second powerful influence in grading is the person's culpability level. Several 
studies in the previous chapters (and particularly Chapter 4) have demonstrated 
that greater culpability in producing a fixed level of harm generally means greater 
liability. For instance, recall that greater liability is assigned to the accomplice 
who has greater culpability as to the perpetrator's offense or as to assisting a per­
petrator (Study 9) .  Also recall the greater liability assigned to the individual who 
purposefully sets out to become intoxicated before he kills another, as compared 
to the individual who only knowingly or recklessly does so (Study 10 ) .  In Study 
1 6, we refine that discussion with an investigation of felony murder, a doctrine 
frequently criticized as deviating from the normal principles of culpability. The 
study's results suggest that the subjects make relatively refined judgments about 
culpability. 
A third influence on grading is the actual presence of the harm or evil of the of­
fense and the strength of the person's causal connection to it. This is a related but 
distinct factor from the nature of the harm or evil noted previously. We said that, 
for instance, intentional killing is perceived as more serious than theft and is 
therefore graded more seriously. The point is that, within the realm of intentional 
killings, an actual killing is assigned more liability than an unsuccessful attempt 
to kill. The attempt study (Study 1 )  demonstrates this point. We refine this notion 
in this chapter by showing that resulting harm provides increased liability-but 
only if the harm is sufficiently causally connected with the person's conduct. In 
Study 1 7, we present subjects' reactions toward different causal connections to a 
resulting death, which indicate that the stronger the causal connection with a re­
sulting harm, the greater the increase in liability because of that resulting harm. 
This result was signaled in the objective requirements of complicity study (Study 
3 ) .  Complicity is a form of causing an offense perpetrated by another person. The 
complicity study suggested that the greater the degree of the accomplice's causal 
contribution to the offense, the greater the accomplice's liability. 
A fourth contributor in setting a person's ultimate punishment is the number 
of offenses for which he or she is to be punished. Consider the example of a head­
line which reads, "Burglar Who Committed 20 Burglaries Finally Caught." Obvi­
ously whether the burglar actually did commit the twenty offenses requires judi-
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cial determination, but suppose the system determines that the burglar did. 
Somehow this must be reflected in the sentence that the burglar receives. This 
goes somewhat beyond the issue of offense grading, but it is an essential part of 
setting the general range of punishment-the goal of the grading determination. 
In Study 1 8, we investigate a few of the basic principles involved in determining 
the range of punishment for multiple offenses. 
STUDY 1 5: 
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE-SEXUAL OFFENSES 
One of the major tasks of a criminal code is to identify the most significant fac­
tors that affect the seriousness of a criminal action and to define offenses in a way 
that incorporates these factors. Our first study in this chapter examines the grad­
ing of offenses within the category of sexual offenses. We selected these offenses 
because, intuitively, some of the judgments encased within some legal codes on 
these issues seemed "out of kilter" with the ways that ordinary people seem to 
think about these offenses in the 1 990s. 
Sexual offenses, as they are defined by the Model Penal Code (MPC, or "the 
Code") ,  are defined and graded around several central distinctions. For example, 
forms of forcible intercourse generally are treated as more serious than forms of 
consensual but unlawful intercourse, such as consensual intercourse with an un­
derage partner. Within each of these groups (forcible and consensual inter­
course) ,  the Code adds several grading refinements and it is here that we think 
that the Code may contradict community standards. Forcible intercourse is 
deemed less serious if the victim is a voluntary social companion on the occasion 
of the crime or previously permitted the person sexual liberties [MPC § 
2 1 3 . 1  ( 1 ) ] .  Forcible intercourse is judged to be still less serious (indeed, is not a 
sexual offense but only simple assault) if the aggressor and the victim are mar­
ried ' or living together as married [MPC § 2 1 3. 1 ( 1 )  and (2) ] .  However, if the 
same forcible intercourse occurs between a homosexual couple living together as 
married, it is not judged to be as serious as rape, because the relationship between 
the parties is not given legal standing in the Code.2 
Cases of consensual intercourse similarly are distinguished in seriousness ac­
cording to several factors. Intercourse with a partner under the age of 1 6  ("statu­
tory rape")  or with a mentally retarded female who is "incapable of appraising the 
nature of her conduct" is judged less serious than forcible rape but more serious 
than consensual intercourse by a female with a retarded male or consensual inter­
course with a person who is in the person's legal custody (such as a prisoner is to a 
jailer) .  It is a complete defense to several offenses, including statutory rape, that 
the victim previously engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with others 
[MPC §§ 2 1 3 . 1 ( l ) ( a ) ]  and (2 ) (b),  2 1 3.3( 1 ) (a) , 2 1 3.4(2) and (8) ,  and 2 13 .6(4) ] .  
Our sexual offenses study sought to test the offense distinctions used in the 
Model Penal Code against the community's views by presenting a series of see-
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narios, each o f  which embodies one o f  the Code's distinctions. In this study, those 
who wrote the different scenarios allowed the circumstances of the scenarios to 
vary more widely than has been the case in many of the other studies, because 
they wanted the cases to have some overall plausibility. Thus, occasionally a code­
community difference that we will report may be due to differences in scenarios 
other than the ones that are central to the legal issues that we are pursuing. When 
that is possibly the case, we will comment on it. The results of the study are de­
scribed in Table 6 . 1 .  
The control case of "straight" rape involves a woman who is followed as she 
leaves her health club, forcibly detained in a deserted parking lot, and forced to 
have sexual intercourse by a man who threatens to kill her if she screams or resists 
him. Our respondents gave this act (Table 6. 1 ,  case 1 ,  column a) a liability rating 
of 7.84, which corresponds to 13 .4 years in prison. Examine next the case of the 
rape perpetrated by an individual who was out on a date with the woman, returns 
with her to her apartment, and rapes her there, the "date" case (row 2) .  The forc­
ible intercourse mitigation that the Code recognizes for a voluntary social com­
panion appears only as a slightly lower liability mean for that scenario than the 
control scenario, 7.26 versus 7.84 (9.4 years versus 1 3.4 years, p < . 1 1 ) .  
This interpretation of the difference is complicated by the fact that the readers 
perceive a higher, although not significantly different, degree of consent on the 
part of the woman to the intercourse in the date scenario and also attribute a 
higher degree of causation to her as well. (Examine Table 6.2, scenarios l and 2, 
columns b and c for these results.) In future research, a date rape versus a stranger 
rape comparison should attempt to create similar perceptions of consent and 
causation in both instances, and see if any reduction of sentence for the offender 
remains.3 Still, one can say of these results that, even if the subjects see greater 
consent in the date context, they see it as having only a slight effect on liability, not 
such that would seem to support the grading difference assigned to the two cases 
by the Code. It may well be that our perceptions of the meaning of accepting an 
invitation to a date may have changed from those held at the time the Code's 
drafters developed these rules. Perhaps the point to extract is that community 
standards can change over time, and legal codes might properly change with 
them. The hint of a discovered difference between the two cases, if it can be repli­
cated in future studies, provides some support for the grading difference that the 
legal code assigns to the two cases, but even so the extent of the Code's difference 
in its treatment between the two ( maximum of life for first-degree versus maxi­
mum of ten years for second-degree offense) is much more of a difference than is 
justified in the subjects' view. 
In the next two cases, the rape occurs between people who have been cohabit­
ing. The woman tells the man with whom she has been living ( case 3) or to whom 
she has been married ( case 4) that she is leaving him and does not want to see him 
anymore. The conversation takes place in their residence and she asks him to 
TABLE 6. 1 Liability for Sexual Offens�s 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
% No Liability 
% No or No 
Liability Punishment Model Penal 
Scenarios Liability (N) (N+O) Code Result 
Forcible intercourse: 
1 .  Stranger 7.848 0 0 1 st-degree felony 
[§21 3. 1 (1 )(a), rape] 
2. Date 7.268•b 26 29 2nd-degree felony 
[§213.1  (1 )(a)&(ii}, 
rape] 
3. Live together 6.27b,c 26 31  Misdemeanor 
[§2. 1 1 (1 )(a), 
simple assault] 
4. Married 5.68C 53 66 Misdemeanor 
[§2. 1 1 ('1 )(a}, 
simple assault] 
5. Homosexual 5.58C 53 66 2nd-degree felony 
[§2. 1 3.2( 1 )(a), 
deviate sex by force] 
Consensual intercourse: 
6. Statutory 2.29d 1 8  55 3rd-degree felony 
[§21 3.3(1 )(a), 
statutory rape] 
7. Statutory-
prior promiscuity 2.39d 21  53 Complete defense 
[§21 3.6(3)] 
8. Mentally 
handicapped 1 .97d 34 63 3rd-degree felony 
female [§21 3.1 (2)(b), gross 
sexual imposition] 
9. Mentally 
handicapped· 1 .37d 37 74 Misdemeanor 
male [§21 3.4(2), sexual 
assault] 
1 o. Female in jail 1 .82d 37 63 Misdemeanor 
[§21 3.3( 1 )(c) , 
seduction] 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal l iability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 = 
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, /5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years, 
8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
Note: Superscript letters indicate. significance at the p < .05 level by a 
Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate means that are not statisti-
cally significantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns 
only. 
TABLE 6.2 Subjects' Perceptions of Sexual Offenses 
Scenarios 
Forcible intercourse: 
1 .  Stranger 
2. Date 
3. Live together 
4. Married 
5. Homosexual 
Consensual intercourse: 
6. Statutory 
7. Statutory�rior promiscuity 
8. Mentally handicapped female 
9. Mentally handicapped male 
1 0. Female in jail 
Key to column heads: 
(a) (b) 
"Actor 'Victim 
Forced" Consented" 
8.1 88 1 .37C 
8. 1 38 1 .87b,c 
7.798•b 2.32b 
7.828•b 2. 1 8b 
7.oob 2.26b 
2. 1 6C 7.708 
2.26C 7.638 
3.05C 6.958 
2.82C 7.088 
2.57C 7.228 
(c) (d) (e) 
'Victim Should 'Victim Acted 
'Victim Have Struggled Morally 
Caused" More" Inappropriately" 
1 .82 2.55 1 .47 
2.47 2.97 1 .89 
3.95 2.97 2.87 
3.95 2.95 3.1 1 
3.50 3.97 3.76 
5. 1 6  5.32 
5.71 5.47 
4.05 3.37 
3.89 3.45 
3.86 3.89 
All statements were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree." 
(a) The actor forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. 
(b) The victim consented to have sexual intercourse with the actor. 
(c) The victim's behavior caused the actor's actions. 
(d) The victim s hould have struggled harder to prevent what happened. 
(e) The victim acted in a way that is morally inappropriate. 
(f) The victim was capable of meaningfully consenting to sexual intercourse. 
(f) 
'Victim 
Capable of 
Consent" 
5.37 
5.55 
Note: Superscript letters indicate significance at the p < .05 level by a Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate 
means that are not statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns only. 
-
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sleep in a different room or at a relative's home. Angered, the man comes into the 
bedroom, and they begin fighting. Then the story returns to the core, in which 
the man forces the woman to have sex and threatens to kill her if she screams or 
resists. Notice that the rejection of the man creates the possibility that the respon­
dents would perceive the rapist as in the grip of an emotion, and perhaps they re­
duce the liability assigned for that reason. With that in mind, let us examine the 
results. 
Notice first that the respondents agreed that in this forceable intercourse case, 
the man forced intercourse on the woman-but agreed less enthusiastically than 
in the stranger and date rape cases (Table 6.2, column a) . They also perceive ( col­
umn b) a low degree of consent on the part of the victim-but significantly more 
consent than in the stranger rape case. This may provide at least a partial account 
of why the subjects' liability means for stranger rape ( column a ofTable 6. 1 ,  7.84, 
or 1 3.4 years) and date rape ( 7.26, or 9.4 years) are noticeably higher than those 
for a couple living together (6.27, or 4.2 years) or for a married couple (5.68, or 
2.4 years) .  But even with this possibility, the differences we found are not nearly 
so different as the Code provides when the aggressor and victim are married or 
living together: from first- or second-degree felony for rape of a stranger or date 
rape to a misdemeanor for forcible intercourse with a legal or common-law 
spouse (treated as simple assault, for which the maximum sentence is one year) . 
This seems to us to suggest that a reexamination of the Code is in order. 
If the Code regards forcible sexual intercourse between a couple who are mar­
ried or living together as significantly less serious, this seems a judgment that is 
no longer in tune with the way people think. If the Code lowers the degree of the 
offense because the drafters were attributing an automatically higher degree of 
consent to the woman, this too seems inappropriate. Sadly, we have learned in the 
past few decades that spouses do batter, abuse, and rape their mates without re­
gard for the lack of the victim's consent. The issue of consent is a judgment best 
left to the jurors who are privy to the details in each specific case. . 
The greatest difference between the Code's and the subjects' views of the forc­
ible intercourse scenarios arises where the aggressor and victim are a homosexual 
couple living together. In this story (Table 6. 1 ,  case 5) ,  the circumstances are the 
same as in the married couple story. One individual announces he wishes to end 
the relationship; angered, the other forcibly rapes him, threatening to kill him if 
he resists or screams. The subjects see the case as meriting essentially the same de­
gree of punishment as that given in the case of forcible intercourse between a 
married couple ( 5.58 versus 5.68, p ::::: ns) .  The Code, in sharp contrast, treats the 
married heterosexual case as a misdemeanor (simple assault) ,  not a sexual offense 
at all, and the homosexual case as a serious sexual offense (deviate sexual inter­
course by force) ,  a second-degree felony. Clearly, a good deal of the reason for this 
lack of difference is that our respondents see the case of rape within marriage as 
much more serious than does the Code. A further reason is that our respondents 
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are not assigning an increment in liability for the fact that the homosexual inter­
course is "deviant" although the Code appears to.4 
Disparities between the Code and the subjects also exist in the consensual in­
tercourse scenarios. The two cases at issue here are the "statutory" and the "statu­
tory with prior promiscuity" cases (Table 6. 1 ,  scenarios 6 and 7) .  In both, a 
1 4-year-old girl initiates sexual intercourse with a 1 9-year-old boy. In the latter, 
she has a reputation for prior promiscuity. The Code gives a complete defense to 
the third-degree felony of statutory rape for the offender in the case of a victim's 
prior promiscuity, while the subjects see no significance in an underage victim's 
prior promiscuity ( 2.29 versus 2 .39, column a) .  The mean sentence in both cases 
is a bit less than four weeks, and more than half of the subjects would assign no 
punishment. The respondents' reasoning here seems clear. Given the specifics of 
the case (that the girl is 1 4, near the age of consent, and initiates the intercourse, 
that the boy is 1 9, and that there is no suggestion of violence) ,  the respondents do 
not regard the case as particularly serious whether or not there is prior promiscu­
ity on the part of the girl. Notice that in these two scenarios-and these two 
only-the respondents tend to agree with the statement that the victim brought 
about the intercourse ( column c of Table 6.2 ) .  They also agree strongly that she 
had consented to it (column b) ; a sensible judgment, since they were told that the 
girl had initiated it. However, note the sharp difference in the relatively lenient 
sentence that our subjects assign (2 .29, or 3.8 weeks in jail) and the third-degree 
felony liability (a five-year maximum) that the Code assigns in the case of the in­
dividual who has intercourse with a nonpromiscuous 1 4-year-old girl. As we said 
earlier, the respondents do not see this particular case of statutory rape as serious. 
The Code classifies consensual intercourse with an underage female and with a 
mentally retarded female as the same grade, and the subjects also consider the lat­
ter (case 8) as approximately equal in seriousness to consensual statutory rape. 
(The liability difference between the two cases is not statistically significant. ) Here 
it is important that we say more about the specifics of the mentally handicapped 
case. The degree of mental retardation or mental handicap is probably perceived 
by our subjects as mild, since the mentally retarded woman is described as able to 
attend physical therapy sessions at a local health dub, and the case description 
makes it clear that the handicapped individual initiates the sex act with the man. 
Our respondents clearly perceived ( column b and c of Table 6.2)  that these cir­
cumstances, taken jointly, warrant the inference that the handicapped individual 
tends to play a causal role in bringing about the intercourse and certainly "con­
sents" to the intercourse. 
In these circumstances, the respondents do not view the male's participation in 
this case of intercourse as particularly blameworthy. This does not mean that peo­
ple will never see intercourse with a mentally handicapped person as serious; an­
other set of circumstances would probably lead to an inference of more serious 
wrongdoing. For instance, one would expect that a person who is extremely men-
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tally retarded would not be perceived as able to give meaningful consent to inter­
course. However, the results do suggest that people are capable of making quite 
nuanced judgments in this area and resist seeing statutory rape or intercourse 
with a mentally handicapped person as always being as serious as a third-degree 
felony. 
One obvious limitation on our results ought to be mentioned here; in our case 
of consensual intercourse with an underage person, the underage person is a 
1 4-year-old teenager and is likely to be seen by the respondents as fairly adult in 
her decision-making capacities. Were the victim to be younger, one would expect 
that the subjects would see the offense in a more serious light. (So would the 
Model Penal Code; if the victim is less than 10 years of age, the Code moves the 
grade up to the same grade as for forcible rape of a stranger-first or second-de­
gree felony [MPC § 2 1 3. 1 ( l ) (d) ] .  Similarly, the mentally retarded person also 
seems to be perceived as competent enough to give consent. However, the contra­
diction between our respondents' judgments on these two cases and the Code re­
mains. The consensual statutory rape cases we presented-of the teenage girl or 
the mentally retarded individual-are cases that represent classes of cases that re­
ceive different treatment by our respondents than they are assigned by the Code. 
We will return to a discussion of what this suggests. 
Turning to a comparison of cases 8, 9, and 10, in the mentally handicapped 
male case (scenario 9) ,  a female has sexual intercourse with a mentally handi­
capped male under the same circumstances as the previously described case in 
which the male has intercourse with a mentally handicapped female ( scenario 8);  
and in the «female in jail" case (scenario 10),  a female prisoner has sexual inter­
course with one of the guards. The guard has supervisory responsibility over the 
woman, but there is no suggestion in the scenario that he has used his power to 
coerce the woman into intercourse (she consents to it) .  The Code finds differ­
ences between these three cases. Under the Code, consensual intercourse with a 
mentally retarded female is classed as a third-degree felony, while the same con­
duct with a mentally retarded male or with a person for whom the offender has 
custodial supervision is a misdemeanor. The subjects, in contrast, do not distin­
guish significantly between these three forms of consensual intercourse {mentally 
retarded male, mentally retarded female, and person in custody). Nor do they as­
sign significant sentences to any of them; all persons receive a mean sentence of 
less than two weeks in jail, and approximately between two-thirds and three­
quarters of the respondents assign no jail term at all. 
In these three cases, the respondents see the victim (or perhaps we should say 
the «victim") as giving consent to the intercourse. As an examination of the rat­
ings in the «consent" column for these cases reveals, in all of these cases the re­
spondents agree (Table 6.2, column b) that the "victim" has consented to the in­
tercourse. An underlying issue here (that code drafters might raise) is the degree 
to which the consent is freely and competently given-that is, perhaps a reason-
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able person's interpretation of the perceptions of the perpetrator on this issue of 
consent. The legal code may treat other cases involving prisoners or mentally 
handicapped individuals differently because it regards those cases as involving a 
lower degree, or otherwise flawed case, of consent. If this is so, then code drafters 
might consider making the degree and quality of consent the explicit focus of the 
j udicial inquiry rather than imputing different degrees of consent to the different 
categories of sexual offenses. Alternatively, this may be one of those cases in which 
there is a reasoned set of valid considerations for having the legal code contradict 
the intuitive judgments of respondents, in which case it would be useful to articu­
late those considerations. 
Another important aspect of the results is that some major differences appear 
in punishment assignments between groups of our subjects. More specifically, the 
results reflect a dramatic disagreement in the amount of punishment imposed in 
the consensual intercourse scenarios. A majority of subjects would impose no 
punishment in any of scenarios 6 through 10 (see column c of Table 6. 1 ) . Our ex­
amination of the distribution of punishment given by the subjects suggests two 
distinct camps of opinion among the subjects. While a majority of subjects im­
pose no punishment, the subjects that do impose punishment impose liability in 
the 4 to 6 range ( 4 == 6 months; 6 == 3 years) ;  no one in the study assigned punish­
ment in the in-between range of 1 to 3. One would have expected more sentences 
in this range if the distribution was of the typical normal curve pattern. 5 
Obviously, this finding arises mainly from the cases in which the lower liability 
assignments were made. This is one of the few times in our studies that we have 
found a relationship that suggests that subsets of subjects see the situation differ­
ently. The grounds for this result will need to be addressed in future research. One 
obvious hypothesis, that males and females are seeing the situation differently, 
seems not to be the case.6 A related possibility is that a small subset of our sample 
regards sexual congress with an underage or mildly retarded person as a serious 
offense while most others do not. Further research is needed to understand this 
difference and the possible attitudinal sources of it. 
Study 1 5: Summary 
The results of the sexual offenses study suggest that the subjects agree with some 
of the distinctions contained in the Code but not others. Of the scenarios tested, 
all forms of forcible intercourse are viewed by the subjects as more serious than 
any form of unlawful consensual intercourse. The subjects do not, however, rec­
ognize the Code's significant reduction in liability for forcible intercourse with a 
social companion, nor do they provide as much reduction as the Code does for 
forcible intercourse with a spouse. The Code defines a marital-like relationship of 
a heterosexual couple as receiving a greater mitigation than our subjects would 
grant in the seriousness of forcible intercourse. Yet, at the same time, the Code 
disregards a marital-like relationship of a homosexual couple, treating the offense 
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as if it is one between strangers, though our subjects would treat the case as analo­
gous to that of a married couple. These differences between the Code and our 
subjects may reflect a change in public attitudes since the late 1 950s, when the 
Code was drafted. 
The subjects see as less serious than the Code does all forms of consensual in­
tercourse, and most of the Code's distinctions in this area are not particularly sig­
nificant to the subjects. In our respondents' view, consensual intercourse with 
someone under 16  years of age is seen as only slightly more serious than other 
forms of consensual intercourse. Contrary to the Code's rule, our subjects j udge 
prior promiscuity of the underage partner as having no such mitigating effect, al­
though there is the possibility that this is true because the sentence assigned the 
non-prior-promiscuity is so low as not to be much reducible. In the context of 
consensual intercourse as well, the distinctions that the Code uses-prior promis­
cuity of a statutory rape victim, female versus male mentally handicapped vic­
tim-and its more serious treatment of all forms of unlawful consensual inter­
course may reflect public opinion as it was before 1 962. More than three decades 
have passed since then, and public opinion has shifted. Even in the several years 
since this data was collected, state code reforms have nearly eliminated use of the 
Model Penal Code's spousal exception to rape as well as other traditional formu­
lations of sexual offenses. Thus, state legislatures appear to have been sensitive to 
the changing public views revealed by these results and have reformulated their 
codes accordingly. 
Another more complex explanation of the differences between the Code and 
the subjects' responses is that the Code standards were based on a mix of two con­
siderations-first, assumptions about what the degree of consent was likely to 
have been, as inferred from the nature of the existing relationships between the 
two individuals; and second, notions concerning "a husband's rights" and the 
"unnaturalness" of any homosexual relationship. It would be useful, in future re­
search, to see if individuals who differ on these attitudes also differ in their liabil­
ity assignments to specific rape scenarios. But we would continue to suggest that 
it would probably be useful, to the degree to which codes were based on what 
seem to us to be outmoded notions, to revise the Code to reflect changes in com­
munity views. If codes are instantiating notions about what degree of consent is 
assumed to exist in different relationships, it might be better to deal directly with 
consent issues in the context of the specific trial rather than infer them from rela­
tionships. 
Should the Code be drafted in terms of the ultimate issue of effective consent, 
rather than using substitutes for consent such as age, mental handicap, or posi­
tion of power disadvantage? In an age in which sexual harassment is a 
commonplace issue, this is a remarkably timely question. Some might suggest 
that these objective substitutes are needed because a person uses them to know 
whether the partner is capable of, and in a position to, give effective consent. In 
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this way, we avoid punishing persons who are honestly mistaken about effective 
consent. But an alternative approach to protect these same persons from liability 
is available: to rely on culpability requirements to exculpate for a mistake. To be 
logically consistent, however, this might mean that the culpability requirement 
would need to be restored for statutory rape, for example, from which it fre­
quently has been removed. 
We have offered the suggestion that community standards about sexual of­
fenses may have changed over the past few decades. Not all offenses are likely to 
be the subject of significant changes in public opinion, but a mechanism ought to 
exist that will detect such changes and signal a need for code drafters to reexamine 
the offense definitions. This is one important function of increased social science 
research on community views of criminal liability and punishment. 
STUDY 1 6: 
THE CULPABILITY OF THE PERSON-FELONY MURDER 
One person causes the death of another. As common intuition suggests, the legal 
codes concern themselves with exactly how this came about and assign different 
degrees of liability depending on the answer. Specifically, the standard grading 
differences among homicides tie the degree of liability to the level of a person's 
culpability as to causing the death. As is familiar to the reader by now, a person 
who purposely or knowingly causes a death is liable for murder; one who reck­
lessly causes a death is liable for manslaughter; one who negligently causes a death 
is liable for negligent homicide; and the grade of the offense in each instance is di­
minished.7 
When an accomplice is involved in the homicide, similar considerations of cul­
pability are used. Specifically, the culpability level of a person who assists the prin­
cipal (an accomplice) as to causing another's death is determinative of the degree 
of liability. Like the principal, an accomplice who is purposeful or knowing as to 
the homicide is liable for murder; one who is reckless is liable for manslaughter; 
and one who is negligent is liable for negligent homicide.8 
But for a certain kind of homicide-when the homicide occurs during the 
commission of a felony-the consideration of either the principal's or the accom­
plice's degree of culpability abruptly stops; any homicide of this kind is consid­
ered to call for the penalties assigned for murder. Most jurisdictions have a special 
doctrine, called the felony-murder rule, that holds a person liable for murder, 
without regard to his level of culpability as to causing the death, if that person 
causes the death in the course of a felony.9 Thus, an offender's negligent killing 
that would otherwise be punished as negligent homicide is treated as murder if it 
occurs during a robbery. 10 A second aspect of the felony-murder rule applies this 
aggravation of culpability to accomplices as well. Thus, an accomplice in a rob­
bery is liable for murder, although he assists a principal who is only negligent as 
to the killing and is himself (the accomplice) only negligent as to such a death. 1 1  
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Initially, one intuitively sees the point of this. Assume I am robbing a bank and 
fire a warning shot into the floor, but I have used such a powerful pistol that the 
shot ricochets and kills some innocent customer to my surprise. The force of the 
claim that I have committed a more serious offense than negligent homicide is 
clear. I have created a situation fraught with danger and should pay the price 
when the potential harm is realized. Still, one also understands why the case is still 
distinguishable from intentional killing ( murder) in a way that suggests lower lia­
bility. 
The felony-murder rule is still broader in some jurisdictions, and it seems to 
move even farther away from our intuitions. Some jurisdictions hold felons liable 
for a death caused by an innocent person who resists the intended felony. 12 Thus, 
in the case in which a person who is being robbed draws a gun and accidentally 
kills an innocent bystander, the robbers are held liable for murder for the killing 
of the bystander by the robbery victim. A specific case will make the operation of 
the rule clear and also will help explicate why it causes us uneasiness. Two thieves 
have tunneled into a bank vault and are surreptitiously hauling away cash. Alerted 
by a silent alarm, two independent private security groups rush to the scene, each 
unaware of the other. In the confusion, a member of security force A shoots and 
kills a member of security force B. The thieves, neither of whom are armed, are 
charged with murder. Now clearly, the thieves created the occasion for the acci­
dent and are in some very basic and central way responsible for the outcome, but 
it does not seem intuitively obvious that the right decision is to assign them the 
same penalty we would assign a thief who shoots the security guard. 
In some jurisdictions, the rule goes yet farther. It has been applied to both kill­
ings of an innocent and killings of one of the felons. 1 3  In this latter case, it is fel­
ony murder for the surviving robber if a robbery victim pulls out a hidden gun 
and kills one of the robbers in self-defense; that is, some jurisdictions hold surviv­
ing robbers liable for murder for the death of their fellow robber. Consider the 
case: I and my accomplice are stealing valuable property from a warehouse at 
night. A security guard approaches to apprehend us, and my accomplice unwisely 
attacks the guard while I cower in the corner. The guard shoots the accomplice, 
kills him, and I am charged with murder. Intuitively, this seems a bit severe. 
It seemed severe to the Model Penal Code drafters as well. The Code drafters 
disapproved of the felony-murder rule, even in its most narrow form. They sub­
stituted an evidentiary presumption, rebuttable by the defendant, that if a killing 
occurs in the course of a felony, the felons are presumed to have caused the death 
"recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value 
of human life;' which it defines as adequate culpability for murder [ MPC § 
2 1 0.2( l ) (b) ] .  Commentators similarly criticize the felony-murder rule and have 
applauded the Model Penal Code's rejection of it. 14 Finkel ( 1 990) has provided a 
forceful analysis of the complexities and apparent contradictions in the various 
courts' holdings in the felony-murder matter, and the degree to which the felony-
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murder rule seems to contradict community sentiment. Both code drafters and 
commentators argue, in part, that the rule fails to accurately assess the felon's de­
gree of blameworthiness. That is, they concur with what we would expect ordi­
nary people's intuitions would be about the blameworthiness of the individual­
who admittedly caused the state of affairs that led to the death but did so in ways 
that cause us to wish to distinguish that case from a prototypical case of murder. 
Interestingly, this is one of the instances in which the code drafters and the 
commentators have had little effect on state criminal codes. The enduring popu­
larity of the felony-murder rule is reflected in the fact that although more than 
over two-thirds of the states have recodified their codes to adopt the Model Penal 
Code's general structure, a majority have insisted on reinserting felony murder. 
Could this be because we misunderstand community standards about this issue? 
Does the community wish to impute the penalties for murder in the cases we have 
discussed? Or, might those legislators be wrong in believing that their constitu­
ents would insist on such a rule? Another perspective suggests itself. A broad fel­
ony-murder rule, while in some general sense unjust, is a useful additional deter­
rent that might make felons more careful during the commission of a felony, or 
better yet, might make them not commit the felony in the first place. Relatedly, it 
does give the prosecution a heavy weapon to bring into play during pretrial ma­
neuvering on crimes in which a death has occurred; various individuals who have 
played some subsidiary role in a crime that has led to a death can be threatened 
with murder liability if they do not cooperate with the prosecution. 
We will first examine the community view on the various possible instances in 
which the felony-murder rule could come into effect and then say more about the 
sources of the rejection of the Model Penal Code position. 
Subjects in this study were presented with a variety of felony-murder scenarios 
and three control cases (Table 6.3 ) .  The control cases give us the baseline liability 
that our respondents assign for standard murder (scenario 1 ) ,  for manslaughter 
(scenario 2 ) ,  and for negligent homicide (scenario 3 ) .  The liability-punishment 
results in the felony-murder scenarios (cases 5 through 1 1 ) can then be compared 
to the three controls to determine which of those controls the subjects see each 
felony-murder scenario as more akin to, murder, manslaughter, or negligent ho­
micide. 
Look first at the control scenarios. In scenario 1 ,  an individual deliberately pur­
chases a gun and kills his best friend, at whom he is angry. The respondents, not 
unnaturally, see this as a case of deliberate murder (the culpability rating in col­
umn d is 1 .64, with 1 = purposeful and 2 = knowing) and assign an average pun­
ishment (column a)  to the killer of between life imprisonment and death. When 
an individual recklessly fires a gun at a noisy and drunken party in a nearby house 
(case 2 ) ,  the offender is seen by our subjects as reckless (3 .29, with 3 = reckless 
and 4 = negligent) and deserving of a penalty of 9.08, or approximately 30 years in 
prison. This, then, is the punishment we would expect if a person commits man-
TABLE 6.3 Liability for Felony Murder 
(a) 
Principal 
Scenarios Uability 
1 .  Purposeful killing 1 0.39a 
2. Reckless killing 9.08b,c,d 
3. Negligent killing 4.58f 
4. Purposeful shooter, 
purposeful co-felon , 
owner victim 1 0. 1 1 a,b 
5. Negligent shooter, 
negligent co-felon, 
owner victim 8.78c,d 
6. Purposeful shooter, 
Negligent co-felon, 
owner victim 1 0.o8a,b,c 
7. Negligent shooter, 
purposeful co-felon, 
owner victim 8.53d 
8. Purposeful but innocent 
shooter, purposeful 
co-felon, felon victim (killed) 
9. Purposeful but innocent 
shooter, negligent 
co-felon, felon victim (killed) 
(b) 
Accomplice 
Uability 
1 0.39a 
9.08a 
4.58d 
9.56a 
7.31 a 
6.92b 
9. 1 1 a 
5.25c,d 
4.97d 
....... 
"-.] 
N 
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
Legal Treatment 
Defender Culpability Culpability Culpability Under Felony 
Uability of Principal of Accomplice of Defender Murder Rule 
1 .64 Murder 
3.29 Manslaughter 
4.00 Negligent homicide 
1 .43 1 .54 Murder 
3.86 3.9 1 Murder 
1 .76 3.83 Murder 
4.00 2. 1 9  Murder 
0.69 2. 1 1 1 .97 Murder* 
0.67 3.71 2. 1 1 Murder* 
1 0. Negligent but innocent 
shooter, purposeful 
co-felon, felon victim (killed) 5.39c,d 0.51 1 .89 3.69 Murder* 
1 1 . Negligent but innocent 
shooter, purposeful 
co-felon, owner victim 6.83e 6.64b,c 0.33 1 .83 1 .72 4.08 Murder* 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal l iabil ity, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
Note: Superscript letters indicate significance at the p < .05 level by a Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate 
means that are not statistically sign ificantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns only. In addition,  no 
subjects gave either No Liabil ity (N) or Liability but No Punishment (0) . The columns indicating (N) and (N+O) have therefore been 
left out of this table, as all percentages were 0. Culpabil ity of principal (column d), accomplice (column e), and defender (column � 
were scored on the fol lowing scale: 
1 = The actor wanted to kill the victim (purposeful). 
2 = The actor was practically certain that his conduct would cause the victim's death (knowing). 
3 = The actor was aware of a substantial risk that the victim would be killed (reckless). 
4 = The actor was not aware of a substantial risk that the victim would be killed but should have been aware (negligent) . 
5 = The actor was not aware of any substantial risk that the victim would be killed and a reasonable person in his situation 
would not have been aware of such a risk (faultless) . 
*Only under the broader forms of the felony-murder rule, where the rule is applied to killings by nonfelons. 
....... 
"'-1 
\.J,.l 
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slaughter-the reckless killing of another person. 15 When the person fails to 
check on whether the gun is loaded and accidentally kills a friend (case 3) ,  the re­
spondents judge that he should have been aware of that risk and therefore was 
culpably negligent (their culpability rating was 4, and 4 = negligent) and assign 
punishment of 4.58 (9.6 months). These controls provide reference points against 
which we can evaluate the sentences assigned in the various felony-murder cases. 
We next examine the felony-murder cases. Looking back, we see that we created 
a number of cases in which the differences between them, which are critical to our 
analysis, are quite difficult for the reader to understand. (And in retrospect, con­
ceivably, quite difficult for the writers to understand as well.) For that reason, we 
will walk through them in some detaiL Begin with cases 4 through 7, all of which 
share a common core. Two men set out to rob a liquor store, carrying guns. One 
or both of them plan to shoot the owner if he does not turn over the cash fast, or 
one or both do not plan to shoot the owner but simply plan to menace him with 
what they think is an unloaded gun. The owner is slow about turning over the 
cash, and one of the robbers, whom we have labeled the principal or "shooter;' 
shoots him. This is true even if the principal did not plan originally to shoot the 
owner. To go on in a slightly tedious fashion, this creates four cases in which the 
principal does shoot the owner: The principal did or did not plan to shoot the 
owner and the accomplice did or did not plan to shoot the owner. In the cases in 
which the person, whether principal or accomplice, did not plan to shoot the 
owner, we thought that he would be perceived as negligent with respect to causing 
death and perhaps draw a reduced sentence. For all of these cases, the felony­
murder rule grades the offense as murder. 
Look at the liability results for cases 4 through 7 (column a) . There are a num­
ber of questions that we can ask of these data. Let us start with a relatively simple 
one. In each case, the perpetrator, purposefully or negligently, is the one that 
shoots the owner; the accomplice does not. Does this perpetrator-accomplice dis­
tinction make a difference in liability assignments given by our respondents? 
As Figure 6.4 reveals, it does. The figure is made by simply averaging the four 
sentences given to the perpetrator and the four given to the accomplice in  the four 
symmetric cases of scenarios 4 through 7. As can be clearly seen, the perpetrator 
receives a higher average sentence. The principal, even though he sometimes does 
not plan to do so, does pull the trigger and shoot the owner; the accomplice, even 
though he sometimes plans to do so, does not. The legal doctrine, in contrast, 
fails to recognize such a mitigation for an accomplice. Standard complicity rules, 
such as those in the Model Penal Code, hold the accomplice liable as if he were the 
principal; our respondents do not. This result is consistent with the "complicity 
discount" that we have seen in other studies, for instance, Study 3, Objective Re­
quirements of Complicity (Chapter 2 )  and Study 9, Culpability Requirements for 
Complicity (Chapter 4) .  However, in a more global sense, our respondents and 
Doctrines of Grading 
FIGURE 6.4 Liabil ity as a Function of the Role of the Actor 
Perpetrator Accomplice 
Role of Actor 
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the various versions of the code are in accord: All give a very high sentence to both 
the principal and the accomplice. 
A useful next question to ask is whether the state of mind as to causing death 
with which the two robbers enter the situation makes a difference to our respon­
dents. Variations in the story made the accomplice or the principal either negli­
gent as to the death because he had no plan to shoot or purposeful as to causing 
the death because he had plans to shoot. In Figure 6.5, we have simply averaged 
the liabilities assigned to those who plan to kill, whether perpetrator or accom­
plice, and those who do not. 
Obviously, state of mind matters. Those who plan to kill receive higher average 
sentences than those who do not plan to kill. 
Averages can be built up from more than one pattern of differences, and both 
Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 present averages. Thus, we need to look at the various 
cases that make up the averages, to see if anything is hidden by the averaging pro­
cess. Figure 6.6 shows the results of the four cases that are averaged in Figures 6.4 
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FIGURE 6.5 Liability as a Function of the State of Mind of the Actor as to Killing 
Negligent Purposeful 
State of Mind of Actor as to Killing 
and 6.5. Our look can be mercifully brief, because the figure indicates that the in­
dividual cases are rated about as we would expect, based on the two rules we ar­
ticulated: The shooter gets a higher liability than the one who does not shoot, and 
a person who plans to shoot gets higher liability than one who does not plan to 
shoot. In the figure legend, we first indicate whether the principal is purposeful or 
negligent with respect to the shooting and indicate second whether the accom­
plice is purposeful or negligent with respect to the shooting. Thus, for instance, 
the line labeled "Purp-Neg" is the one that charts the results of the case in which 
the principal plans to shoot and the accomplice does not (or scenario 6 of Table 
6.3 ) .  
Three of  the lines give a lower sentence for the accomplice, as we would expect 
from the joint operation of the two rules. The only case in which the accomplice 
draws a higher liability than the principal is the one (corresponding to scenario 7) 
in which the principal does not plan to shoot and the accomplice does plan to, 
which is the case in which we would expect this reversal to happen. This being the 
case, it is fair to summarize the results as follows: Respondents assign more liabil-
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FIGURE 6.6 Liability as a Function of Role and State of Mind as to Killing 
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ity to the principal than to the accomplice, probably reflecting a tendency to pun­
ish more heavily the individual who does the actual shooting. They also give less 
liability to a person-principal or accomplice-who they know does not intend 
to shoot if the store owner resists. These two effects, combined, give the accom­
plice who does not plan to shoot a considerable reduction in liability from the 
other cases. Finkel and his associates (Finkel and Duff, 199 1 ;  Finkel and Smith, 
1993) have found similar effects. They demonstrated that, in a number of felony­
murder scenarios, college student respondents assigned lesser sentences to ac­
complices than to felony-murder principals. 
Recall a point that we have made before. It is worth noting that our scenarios 
were such as to give the respondents confidence in the belief that one of the rob­
bers really does not intend to shoot. Subjects were straightforwardly told this in 
the scenario. Notice the culpability ratings in Table 6.3 ( column d for the princi­
pal, and column e for the accomplice) ,  which indicate that the subjects believed 
what they were told. Further, the culpability ratings do make a difference; they do 
predict the liability ratings assigned to the two individuals. An actual robber, try-
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ing to convince an actual jury of that lack of intention, might have considerable 
difficulty in doing so and therefore often may be treated as a purposeful 
murderer. Still, the pattern of responses of our respondents argues that the ac­
cused should at least have the chance to try to convince the j ury concerning his 
intentions. More generally, this pattern of differences between the felony-murder 
rule and the subjects' responses echoes the commentators' criticisms of the rule 
and the Model Penal Code's rejection of it in its current form. 
Here is how we would formulate the rule that might underlie our respondents' 
judgment. Notice that the penalties assigned the negligent persons were re­
duced-but not reduced to the level of the grade given the negligent individual 
who kills another while cleaning his gun. The baseline for negligent homicide is  
4.58 (9.6 months) ,  although the subjects' sentences for negligent felony-murder 
principals are 8.53 (22.5 years) and 8.78 (27.0 years) and for negligent accom­
plices are 6.92 (6.6 years) and 7.3 1 (9.4 years) .  These sentences are sufficiently 
greater than the baseline for a negligent killing to suggest that there is some sup­
port for the notion at the heart of the felony-murder rule-that a killing in the 
course of a felony ought to be punished more severely than it would be without 
the felonious context. This suggests that our subjects, like the state legislators, are 
assuming that committing an armed robbery for example, creates a risk of caus­
ing death of which the person must be aware. The data pattern suggests that, from 
our respondents' view, the felony-murder rule is on the right track but simply 
goes too far. The subjects would support a felony-murder rule that significantly 
aggravates negligent killings during a robbery but only to the level of manslaugh­
ter for principals and to something less than that for accomplices, not to the level 
of murder as the current doctrine does. In other words, they would support a "fel­
ony-manslaughter rule" with a standard "accomplice discount." 
We now proceed to a discussion of cases 8 through 1 0. In these cases, a by­
stander to the robbery (the wife of the store owner) ,  who is hidden from view, 
shoots and kills the principal felon. Since the principal felon is dead, the question 
we asked in these cases is what sentence should be given to the accomplice. As 
noted previously, some j urisdictions extend the felony-murder rule to impute to 
the surviving felon, as murder, killings committed by innocent persons defending 
against the felony. In case 8, the wife purposefully shoots the principal, and the 
accomplice had planned to shoot the store owner if he did not respond quickly. In  
scenario 9 ,  the wife purposefully shoots the principal, and the accomplice had not 
planned to shoot the store owner. In scenario 10, the wife accidentally shoots the 
principal, and the accomplice had not planned to shoot. Given these facts, it is 
possible to intuitively order the cases. One might expect that the accomplice who 
had planned to shoot would get a higher sentence than the accomplice in either of 
the cases in which he had not planned to shoot, and that the purposeful choice of 
the wife to shoot might further lower the liability assigned to the accomplice. 
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In fact, no such "intuitive" differences appeared. The subjects' liability assign­
ments hovered around 5.20, a sentence of about 1 year for all cases, with no statis­
tically significant difference among them. One way of saying what this means is 
that the subjects do not spontaneously impose the level of liability that the most 
extended form of the felony-murder rule provides in these cases. Intuitively, the 
respondents might condition their liability ratings on the fact that a bystander 
shoots the felon, and the respondents do not attempt to reason through the some­
what complex possible interpretations of the various intentions of the accom­
plice. 
The lower level of respondent liability assigned to the accomplice in these cases 
of killings of the principal by an innocent does not differ significantly from the 
baseline for a negligent killing, 4.58 (9 .6 months) . It is possible ( some would say, 
likely) that standard homicide grading would impose liability for negligent homi­
cide in such cases. That is, it is likely that a jury would conclude that a robber who 
enters a store with his gun drawn is at least negligent as to causing a death (when 
one occurs) regardless of who shoots whom ( i.e., the robber should have been 
aware of a substantial risk that such conduct could cause a death) . If this is true, 
then the liability levels given by the subjects in cases of killings of co-felons by in­
nocent bystanders may be obtained in settings in which the code is applied with­
out the felony-murder rule. The rule is needed, in the subjects' view, only in cases 
of negligent killings of innocents by felons. Further, even in these cases the sub­
jects would prefer that the rule only aggravate liability to manslaughter ( reckless 
homicide) at most, and in most cases to something considerably less. 16 
Finally, let us examine the somewhat baroque case of scenario 1 1 , in which a 
bystander attempts to stop the robbery and clumsily shoots the owner of the store 
instead. In this case, although the felon is actually purposeful or knowing as to 
planning to cause a death, the subjects put his liability for the killing by an inno­
cent of another innocent at 6.83 (6.2 years) ,  significantly less than the liability for 
murder (p = .01  ) .  Indeed, such liability is significantly less than the liability im­
posed on the purposeful accomplice in the analogous situation ( scenario 7 in 
which a negligent principal kills the innocent owner, 9. 1 1  ( 9 = 30 years; 1 0  l ife) .  
The fact that the killing is actually done by an innocent person, not the principal 
or an accomplice, appears to matter a great deal to the subjects. 17 
Study 1 6: Sum m ary 
This study confirms that subjects, like current legal doctrine, aggravate the liabil­
ity of a person who kills during a felony over what that liability would be if the of­
fense did not occur during a felony. They punish a person's negligent killing dur­
ing a robbery at a liability level similar to a reckless killing in a nonfelonious con­
text. If one brandishes a gun during the course of a robbery, and it goes off acci­
dently and kills an innocent, the subjects are not particularly sympathetic to the 
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view that this is equivalent to accidentally discharging a gun and killing another. 
But according to our subjects, current doctrine goes too far, for it punishes such 
a negligent killing as if it were murder, although the subjects would prefer to pun­
ish it as manslaughter. So, the subjects would support a "felony-manslaughter 
r ule." 
The complicity aspect of the felony-murder rule reflects similar differences. 
Like the doctrine, the subjects punish the accomplice for more than negligent ho­
micide when the perpetrator kills during a felony. But while the doctrine treats 
the accomplice exactly like a murderer, the subjects impose liability somewhat less 
than they would for manslaughter. The lesser liability of the accomplice is signifi­
cant. It reflects the view of the subjects, manifested in several studies, that the ac­
complice generally deserves less liability than the perpetrator, all other things be­
ing equal. If the code were to adopt a standard "accomplice discount:' felony­
murder accomplices could remain within the rule; the accomplice would be held 
at some level of liability less than that of the "felony-manslaughter" perpetrator. 
The vicar ious aspect of the felony-murder rule-holding a felon liable for 
murder for a killing by the intended victim of the felon or by some other by­
stander-has even less support among the subjects than the aggravation and 
complicity aspects of the rule. Where the victim kills the principal felon, the lia­
bility imposed by the subjects on the surviving accomplice is not significantly 
more than that imposed for a negligent homicide and is far from the murder lia­
bility imposed on the accomplice by the felony-murder rule in some jurisdictions. 
(Also, under the felony-murder rule, the state of mind of the accomplice as to 
planning to kill does not seem to matter.) Where an innocent person is killed by 
the robbery victim, the accomplice's liability is slightly more than that for negli­
gent homicide but is still nowhere near manslaughter liability. This result is likely 
under normal homicide grading; thus, the subjects would see no need for exten­
sion of the special rule to these cases. 
To conclude, it is possible that a jury might reach the same conclusions as our 
subjects even without a felony-murder rule, by seeing culpability in the felon's 
creation of a situation in which the likelihood of a killing is brought about. It may 
be, as we suggested earlier, that it is this perception of blame for creating the dan­
gerous situation that generates the subjects' responses. Such increased liability is 
possible if not likely under the normal graded-homicide offenses, and its likeli­
hood is increased if the Model Penal Code's evidentiary presumption approach is 
used. The Code, recall, uses the fact of the felony as grounds to create a presump­
tion of "recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life:' 
which is defined as sufficient culpability for murder; the defendant can rebut this 
presumption. One might suggest, on the one hand, then, that these results argue 
against the continuing need for a felony-murder rule. On the other hand, the re­
sults suggest that a form of a felony-murder rule might be unobjectionable-and, 
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thus, if politically demanded, might be continued-if revised to better reflect the 
subjects' views, which call for lower liability levels. 
A rule that mirrors the subjects' views would aggravate a negligent killing by a 
felon in the course of a felony to reckless homicide (manslaughter) ,  not murder. 
No special complicity rule would be required; accomplices would receive the nor­
mal complicity discount, which varies with the level of the accomplice's culpabil­
ity and degree of contribution. A felon might be liable for killings by an intended 
victim of the felony, at the level of negligent homicide, but not under a special 
rule for killings during a felony. 
STUDY 1 7: THE STRENGTH OF THE PERSON'S 
CONNECTION WITH THE PROHIBITED 
RESULT-CAUSATION REQUIREMENTS 
A person acts, intending a result that is prohibited, such as another's death. 
Through some chain of circumstances, the result intended occurs, but not exactly 
in the way intended by the person. Should we hold the person liable for that re­
sult? This situation is a familiar one to fans of courtroom drama. For example, I 
intend to kill Jones but only put him in the hospital with a minor wound. The 
hospital, due to some medical ineptness, causes Jones's death. Have I committed 
murder? In another example, I shoot at Jones and miss, but he dies of fright in­
duced by the noise of the shot. Have I murdered him? Alternatively, and as a third 
example, intending to kill my rival, Smith, I administer a slow-acting poison to 
him. Before it acts, a third rival, Clark, bludgeons Smith to death. What is my lia­
bility? Philosophers have posed these and similar cases for generations, to explore 
the limits of  moral sanctions; we posed some similar cases to a set of our respon­
dents. 
We begin by examining the current legal code. Current criminal-law doctrine 
typically imposes two requirements for a person to be held causally accountable 
for a prohibited result. First, the person's conduct must have been necessary for 
the result to occur: " It is an antecedent but for which the result in question would 
not have occurred" [MPC § 2 .03 ( l ) (a) ] .  Second, even if the person's conduct is a 
necessary cause ("but for" cause) of the result, the nature of the connection be­
tween the conduct and the result must be sufficiently close and direct; the result 
must not be "too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing 
on the person's liability or on the gravity of his offense" [MPC § 2.03 (2 ) (b) ] .  
Where these two requirements-termed "factual cause" and "legal cause:' respec­
tively-are not met, a person cannot be held accountable for the result and, typi­
cally, is liable only for an attempt to commit the substantive offense (or, in some 
instances, has no liability 1 8 ) .  
A "necessary cause" requirement is one formulation of factual cause. Another 
is a "sufficient cause" requirement. A cause is necessary if the result would not 
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have occurred but for the cause. A cause is sufficient if, without additional assis­
tance, intervention, or changed circumstances, it will cause the result. The tradi­
tional doctrinal position is to require the former (a necessary cause) .  During the 
Model Penal Code debate, it was argued that an alternative, less-demanding 
ground for causal accountability be permitted, requiring only that the cause be "a 
substantial factor in producing the result," 19 a formulation even less demanding 
in many ways than a sufficient-cause requirement.20 The members of the Ameri­
can Law Institute rejected the sufficient- or substantial-cause formulations, in­
stead adhering to the traditional requirement of a necessary cause.21 This means 
that, in the case example in which I poisoned Smith but Clark bludgeoned him to 
death before the poison acted, I would not be liable for murder (but would be lia­
ble for attempted murder). Although the poison eventually would have killed 
Smith without additional assistance or intervention, and thus fits the definition of 
a sufficient cause, it was not a necessary cause: Smith would have died when he 
did from the beating by the subsequent person, even if he had never been poi­
soned. One goal of the causation study was to examine which of these two tests­
necessary cause or sufficient cause-best represents the community's view of a 
prerequisite for causal accountability. 
A second concern of the causation study was the effect of the strength of the re­
lationship between a person's necessary cause and the prohibited result-the so­
called legal-cause requirement. This is the question that arises, to refer to the first 
example described previously, when I set out to murder Jones but only wound 
him, and some other events (such as carelessness in the hospital) bring about 
Jones's death. The test of the legal-cause requirement in current doctrine is rela­
tively vague: The result must not be "too remote or accidental in its occurrence to 
have a just bearing on the actor's liability." Yet much depends on the application 
of this standard, specifically, the difference between liability for the full substan­
tive offense and liability for an attempt (or, in some cases, exoneration from all li­
ability).  The study sought to test various factors that might affect the communi­
ty's liability judgment in such cases of potentially ((remote" or "accidental" 
results. An identification of relevant factors, it was felt, might lead to formulation 
of a more specific standard or might guide decision-makers in applying the pres­
ent vague standard. 
In summary, the causation study sought to determine which of the two factual 
cause requirement tests-necessary cause or sufficient cause-best reflects the 
community's view of a prerequisite for causal accountability. A second goal was to 
examine the effect of the strength of the relationship between a person's necessary 
cause and the prohibited result-the legal-cause requirement. 
We first presented respondents with two control scenarios that established lia­
bility baselines for a clear, direct, and immediate killing ( scenario 1 of Table 6. 7) 
and a failed attempted killing ( scenario 2) .  The various other scenarios can then 
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TABLE 6.7 Liability as Related to Causation 
Principal 
(a) (b) 
Scenarios Liability Legal Code Result 
1 .  Murder, control 9.89a Murder 
2. Attempt, control 7.258 Attempted murder 
3. Subsequent 
killer 9.473 Attempted murder 
4. Allergy 8.75b Murder 
5. Careless nurse 8.33b,c Murder or attempt 
Oury) 
6. Accident on 
way to hospital 8.03C,d Probably attempted 
murder 
7. Construction 
accident 7.36d•8 Attempted murder 
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Second Actor or Accomplice 
(c) (d) 
Liability Legal Code Result 
8.89b Murder 
6.678 Attempted murder 
9.893 
7.97C 
7.5ac,d 
Murder 
Murder 
Murder or attempt 
Oury) 
7 .36d,e Probably attempted 
murder 
6.758 Attempted murder 
Liability Scale: N=No criminal l iability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 = 
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years, 
8=1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
Note: Superscript letters indicate significance at the p < .05 level by a 
Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate means that are not 
statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within 
columns only. 
be compared to the control cases to see if the assignment of liability in each in­
stance is more akin to the case of causal accountability for murder or more akin to 
the case of no causal accountability, where only attempt liability is imposed. As 
this process suggests, we first examine the liability ratings for the two control sce­
narios, which establish boundaries within which the other cases can be inter­
preted. Examining Table 6.7, one sees that the liability assigned to the murder in 
scenario 1 is high (9.89, or just slightly less than life imprisonment) .  Second, no­
tice that the attempted murder scenario drew an average sentence of 7.25 (9.4 
years) .  This finding in itself is significant for the topic of this chapter, because it 
shows just how important the actual occurrence of the resulting harm is as related 
to the respondents' grading of liability. 
Let us first look at the "factual cause" issue-the necessary- versus sufficient­
cause debate. In scenario 3, labeled "subsequent killer;' the first person inflicts a 
wound sufficient to kill but, before the victim can die from this wound, the sec­
ond person, unaware of the prior attack, shoots and immediately kills the victim. 
(This scenario is equivalent to the earlier example in which I poisoned Smith but 
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Clark bludgeons him to death before the poison takes effect.) Recall that the nec­
essary-cause requirement of the legal code is not satisfied in this scenario. The 
first person's conduct is sufficient to cause the death but is not necessary; the vic­
tim would have died exactly when he did from the conduct of the second person. 
The subjects found the first person warranted a high degree of liability. The 
subjects impose liability upon the first person that is very dose to that imposed in 
the direct-killing control case (9.47 versus 9.89). However, the liability that they 
impose is very different from that imposed in the attempt control (9.47, or 30 
years to life, versus 7.25, or 9.4 years, for the attempt control, with p < .02) .  Thus, 
where a person's conduct is sufficient to cause death but is not necessary for the 
death, the subjects impose liability only slightly less than that imposed for con­
duct that is both necessary and sufficient to cause death. 
Obviously, the respondents are much closer to a formulation that treats either 
necessary or sufficient actions equally as examples of murder than they are to the 
code formulation in which one is treated as murder and the other as only attempt. 
But we also point out that column e of scenario 3 (see Table 6.8) indicates that 
subjects were unclear that the act of the first person was not necessary for bring­
ing about the death; instead, their mean rating (5.74) hovered around the neither­
agree-nor-disagree point on the scale. Further research will need to see if the pun­
ishment equivalent to murder is given by the community for actions dearly seen 
as not necessary but sufficient to bring about death. 
Consider next the "legal cause" requirement, which holds that the connection 
between the person's conduct and the result must be close and direct for liability 
to be incurred. Four scenarios (4 through 7 in Table 6.7) involving an attempted 
homicide were used to present various situations that we thought might raise le­
gal causation issues. In all of these scenarios, two persons go to the victim's house 
to kill him. The first person shoots at the victim, either missing or only wounding 
him, while the second person serves as a lookout. The scenarios differ in the way 
in which the death of the victim ultimately results. In two scenarios, the death oc­
curs when the man is being treated in the hospital. The victim dies from an un­
usual allergic reaction to a drug given during initial treatment of the wound (case 
4). Alternatively, death results from the careless actions of a nurse during initial 
treatment (case 5) .  In a third case, death of the wounded individual results from a 
traffic accident that occurs while the victim is on the way to the hospital for 
followup treatment, and this occurs two months after the shooting (case 6). In the 
fourth case, the shooters miss their intended victim, and he flees from them. His 
death results from a construction-crane accident that occurs during his flight 
(case 7) .  The liabilities assigned to the persons in these cases are contained in Ta­
ble 6. 7, and the respondents' perceptions of the cases are listed in Table 6.8. 
Let us deal with what is by now a familiar issue, which is the liabilities assigned 
to the perpetrator and to the individual who plays a lesser role in the incident. To 
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TABLE 6.8 Subjects' Perceptions of  Causation 
(e) (f) (g) (h) 
''Actor's "Actor's "Actor ''Accomplice 
Act Act Intended Intended 
Scenarios Necessary" Sufficient" Death" Death" 
1 .  Murder, control 7.86a 8.22a 8.56a 7.75b 
2 .  Attempt, control 8. 1 7b 7.92b 
3. Subsequent killer 5.74c 7.7aa 8.31 a,b 8.36a 
4. Allergy 7.2oa.b 5.22b a.oab 7.83b 
5.  Careless nurse 6.91 a,b 4.8 1 b  a.oab 7.72b 
6. Accident on way to hospital 4.37d 4.83b 8.Q3b 7.69b 
7. Construction accident 6.34b,c 4.81 b 8.1 1 b  7.81 b 
Key to column heads: 
All statements were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 
5 ="unsure," and 9="strongly agree." 
(e) The victim's death would not have occurred but for the actor's conduct. 
(f) The actor's conduct was by itself sufficient to cause the victim's death. 
(g) The actor intended to kill the victim. 
(h) The accomplice intended that the actor kill the victim. 
Note: Superscript letters indicate significance at the p < .05 level by a 
Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate means that are not 
statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within 
columns only. 
test all of the complex causal connections we wanted to investigate, it was neces­
sary to have two individuals involved in the commission of the act. The liability 
assigned to the second person, who functioned as lookout in the cases we will ex­
amine, in contrast to that assigned to the first person, gives us another chance to 
examine the effect of the criminal role on liability. To examine that, we have plot­
ted the liabilities assigned to the perpetrator and to the lookout in Figure 6.9. 
As this figure shows, the liability scores assigned to the perpetrator and the 
lookout are consistently quite different; the liability assigned to the individual 
who fulfills only the lookout function is consistently lower than that assigned to 
the major perpetrator. 
This is consistent with the "accomplice discount" that we have seen in other 
studies. In these cases, in which the second individual serves only as a 
watchkeeping accomplice, the codes regard both as equally liable. Given the re­
sults that emerge so clearly from Figure 6.9 and the results of our two earlier com­
plicity studies, the community standard is in significant disagreement with the 
codes, in that a lesser degree of liability ( reflected in a lesser prison term) is given 
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FIGURE 6.9 Liability for Perpetrator and Lookout in Causation Scenarios 
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to the accomplice. Recall that some modern sentencing guidelines are moving in 
this direction; they assign reduced sentences to those who play lesser roles in 
crimes.22 
Notice that we have omitted scenario 3 from the figure and this discussion. In 
that scenario, the second person, unaware of the first person's actions, steps in 
and kills the wounded victim. The killer, therefore, is not an "accomplice" but 
rather an independent perpetrator, who is appropriately assigned murder liability 
by our subjects. 
Let us now look at the question of "legal causation:' The point at issue here is 
whether and when an outcome of a chain of events is so remote, in any of the var­
ious senses of"remote:' that the respondents do not see the perpetrator as having 
the normal accountability for the outcome, even if that was the outcome the per­
petrator intended. 
The drop in liability assigned to the complex causal scenarios ( 4 through 7 in 
Table 6.8) suggests that these scenarios include factors that discount a person's 
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FIGURE 6. 1 0  Liability as Related to Causation 
1 0  
9 
8 
m--------���--------;m�--------;m�------�m 
--m-- Murder control 
• Attempt control 
• Liability in test cases 
187  
7�--��--------r---------r---------r---------r----
Subsequent Killer Allergy Nurse Accident Construction 
Scenarios 
causal accountability for the resulting death. In Figure 6. 10, we have attempted to 
examine this by contrasting the liabilities assigned to the principal in each of the 
four test scenarios. The top line in the figure shows the liability assigned by re­
spondents to the case of murder, and the bottom line shows the liability assigned 
to attempted murder. What one would expect (according to the doctrine of legal 
causation) is that some of the scenarios should be assigned murder liabilities and 
others should coincide with the liability assigned to the attempt case. Obviously, 
our respondents' assignments do not mirror this expectation. 
Factors that seem to make a difference include whether the risk that comes to 
fruition is one that commonly results from the conduct (compare allergic reac­
tion-8.75, or 27 years-to construction accident cause-7.36, or 1 0.2 years) ;  the 
presence of a subsequent volitional person contributing to the result (compare al­
lergic reaction-8.75, or 27 years-to careless nurse-8.33, or 1 9.5 years) ;  and 
the remoteness of the result in time and place from the person's conduct (see 
death by accident two months later when returning to the hospital for treat-
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ment-8.03, or 1 5  years).23 Further studies could establish the factors that con­
tribute to a perception of remoteness and the relative effect of the different factors 
on liability. It may be that the subjects are reaching their judgments ofliability via 
the mediating inference of remoteness-or some alternate reasoning model may 
be needed to explain their judgments. Further still, one may need a reasoning 
model that includes both remoteness of result and necessary-versus-sufficient 
causal contribution to the death. 
Notice the pattern of the results in the figure. The liability of the perpetrator in 
each of the test scenarios, other than the construction-crane accident, is statisti­
cally significantly different than his liability in the murder and attempt control 
scenarios-lower than the murder liability but higher than the liability for at­
tempted murder. This suggests that the subjects see the circumstances as reducing 
but not eliminating the person's accountability and liability for the death. In 
other words, the subjects see causal conditions as presenting a continuous rather 
than a dichotomous relationship with liability. The legal rules, in contrast, set 
causation as a minimum requirement, which when met establishes liability for 
the full offense (in this case, murder) and when not met defaults liability to that 
for a case of attempt. 
Therefore, and as common sense suggests, the degree of perceived liability gen­
erally decreases in a graduated way as the causal connection between the person's 
conduct and the result becomes weaker. Furthermore, many of the factors that one 
might guess would add to a result's "remote or accidental" nature do serve to re­
duce the liability that the subjects impose. An unusual event, such as an allergic 
reaction to a drug during treatment, reduces liability. A subsequent person's care­
lessness reduces liability even further, as does a significant time delay between the 
conduct and the result. Notice also, however, that no simple rule summarizes our 
results; the construction accident takes place within minutes of the attempted 
murder, but receives lower liability assignments than do other scenarios in which 
the death-causing incident is much more delayed in time from the murder at­
tempt. Therefore, unless the relevant factors (e.g., remoteness, accidentalness) 
and their interrelation can be more clearly explicated, it may be best for code 
drafters to leave this particular determination to juries, rather than attempt to 
codify it. 
Study 1 7: Summary 
As to the factual cause issue, our findings are inconclusive. Our subjects gave lia­
bility almost equal to murder in the sufficient-cause scenario, which would sug­
gest that the codes' necessary-cause test was too limiting. But our analysis also 
suggests that the subjects were unclear as to whether the cause in that scenario 
was a necessary cause. 
Our results did dearly suggest, however, that the extent of a person's liability is 
reduced as the result becomes more "remote or accidental" in relation to the per-
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son's conduct. This result is at significant variance with the current treatment in 
the modern codes. Subjects do not seem to conceive of the causation issue in the 
dichotomous way that the doctrine treats it. They do not see causal accountability 
as a yes-no issue but as one with a continuum of accountability. As a person's de­
gree of accountability increases, so does his liability, from attempt liability up to 
liability for the full substantive offense. This is one of several examples of the cur­
rent doctrine's tendency to treat continuous functions as dichotomous ones, an 
issue discussed further in the concluding chapter. 
STUDY 18 :  
PUNISHMENT FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES 
Current law has some considerable difficulty in determining the appropriate 
range of punishment for multiple related offenses. If a single instance of theft de­
serves a punishment of x amount, how much punishment is deserved if the of­
fender is convicted of two identical but separate instances of such theft? Tradi­
tionally, judges sentence such an offender separately for each of the two offenses, 
then determine whether those sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively. 
Concurrent sentences are served at the same time; consecutive sentences are 
served one after the other. This leads to the odd result that a person who, for ex­
ample, carries out two burglaries and gets a two-year sentence for each-to be 
served concurrently-serves only two years. Concurrent sentences are rightly crit­
icized because they trivialize the second (and all subsequent) offenses. If consecu­
tive sentences are imposed, our burglar would have his two sentences served one 
after the other, for a total jail term of four years. Consecutive sentences are criti­
cized on the basis that two identical offenses by the same offender do not neces­
sarily deserve twice the punishment as a single offense. 
The theory behind this latter claim is somewhat unclear. It may stem in part 
from the fact that the punishment deserved for an offense is based only in part on 
the harm caused, such as the deprivation of the owner of his property. The per­
son's willingness to violate the announced rules of society may be part of the 
foundation for punishment, and this factor is already taken into account in the 
sentence for the first offense. In any event, there seems to be some general sense 
that additional punishment is deserved for each additional offense but that the 
additional amount deserved is less than that for the first offense. There seems to 
be some feeling, in specific, that a third, fourth, fifth, or further offense ought to 
each give rise to additional punishment but that, in each instance, the amount of 
the punishment ought to be less than the additional punishment assigned for the 
previous offense. This multiple-offense discount notion is instantiated in the 
United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) guidelines. Each additional of­
fense is punished, although with increasingly reduced penalties. (The Sentencing 
Commission guidelines use a formula that takes account as well of different seri­
ousness levels of the different offenses, establishing the baseline with the most se-
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rious offense and adding on penalties for additional offenses by considering of­
fenses in their decreasing order of seriousness ( USSC Guidelines Manual §§ 
3D l . l-3Dl.5. 1 ).24 
The «multiple-offense discounf' may well describe what sentencing judges 
would like to do, but their options may be limited by the consecutive-versus-con­
current options we discussed earlier. (One somewhat manipulative way around 
this, reported by some judges, is to give the defendant more than the offense de­
serves on one or both of the counts, then have the sentences run concurrently. ) 
Given these competing models of multiple-offense sentencing, it seemed useful 
to have some empirical data on what ordinary people think on the issue; so, we set 
out to collect such data through this study. The multiple-offenses study sought to 
determine whether the subjects concur with the general notion of a multiple-of­
fense discount in the sentencing of such cases. 
The study also sought to investigate the significance of the time interval be­
tween multiple offenses (all of which occur before conviction for any one) .  We 
speculated that the closer in time t\l.e offenses occurred, the more the subjects 
would treat them as a single offense and, therefore, impose proportionally less in­
crease in liability for each subsequent offense. The longer the period of time be­
tween the multiple offenses, the more the subjects would be likely to treat them as 
entirely independent offenses deserving entirely independent, nonoverlapping 
penalties. It might even be the case that they would begin to see the offender as a 
habitual offender and assign harsher sentences for the second offense than for the 
first. 25 
The study also sought to determine whether the operative principles are differ­
ent for offenses against a person, such as assault, than for offenses against prop­
erty, such as theft. One might speculate that offenses against property, where the 
harm can more easily be reduced to a monetary form, may well be thought of in 
those terms only. Sentences for multiple offenses against property might follow a 
principle of a simple accumulation of the monetary value of all the property 
taken. In other words, while two assaults may be viewed as entirely separate of­
fenses for which a substantial add-on is appropriate for multiple violations, mul­
tiple theft offenses might be viewed as no different in seriousness than a single 
theft offense where the value of the property taken equals the sum of the values 
for the multiple offenses. This is the approach taken by the United States Sentenc­
ing Commission guidelines: If the nature of the harm of multiple offenses is such 
that it simply can be aggregated, as in theft or fraud, then the amounts are aggre­
gated and treated as a single offense of this amount [USSC Guidelines Manual § 
3Dl .3(b) ] .  Thus, the guidelines take different approaches to aggregatable and 
nonaggregatable offenses. They suggest a very different patterning of additional 
penalties for multiple theft offenses than for multiple assault offenses. Even the 
treatment of theft, the aggregatable offense, does not really give full value to each 
additional dollar of theft, since the grading of theft itself provides a discount for 
each additional dollar stolen, but they do ignore whether the total loss is caused 
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by one theft or  by many. That seems inconsistent with the general principle that 
every new offense should count for something additional-not just in recogni­
tion of greater harm but also in recognition of an additional violation of the legal 
rules. Nonaggregatable offenses such as assault, however, would be expected to 
generate more substantial add-on sentences. 
Other possible hypotheses might suggest other patterns of multiple-offense 
sentencing. We thought it best first to do the study, and let its results guide further 
theorizing.We set up two sets of scenarios. In the core assault scenario, an indi­
vidual who had been angered by a co-worker (or co-workers) at an office where 
he used to work returns to the office, armed with a baseball bat, and breaks sev­
eral bones of the co-worker (or co-workers) .  In the core theft scenario, the thief, 
waiting until no one is around (and thus by inference avoiding needing to use vi­
olence on anybody who observes him) steals a 55-gallon-drum from a gas station 
to resell it (or steals several drums from several gas stations) .  26 
To study the effects of the time interval between the multiple offenses, we cre­
ated several cases in which two persons are assaulted or two drums are stolen, and 
the interval between the events is either nearly zero (the previously described sce­
narios ) ,  two weeks, or two years in length. 
We asked our subjects, in other words, to read and retain the subtle differences 
in a good many cases. Luckily for us, they did. Table 6. 1 1  indicates that subjects 
are reasonably accurate as to the number of individuals injured in the various c;:ts­
saults and the number of drums stolen in the various thefts (column a). The re­
spondents also recognize the differences in the time intervals between the crimes, 
in the cases in which multiple crimes are committed (column b) . 
The liability results for this study are in Table 6 . 12 . As with other tables that we 
have presented in which multiple comparisons are possible, it is difficult to ex­
tract them from the table. Perhaps the main points to extract from the table are 
that no respondent thinks that no liability is appropriate, and only very few assign 
liability with no punishment-and when this assignment is made, it is almost al­
ways in the theft cases. 
As we said, the various comparisons we want to make are difficult to make 
from an inspection of the liability table alone. It seemed useful to present them in 
figures. Let us look first at the major question of this study, which involves the 
patterns of changes in liability when the number of offenses increases. In Figure 
6 . 1 3 ,  we assemble for comparison all of the cases of theft or assault in which the 
multiple thefts or assaults occurred immediately one after the other. 
First, notice that the liability assigned for any assault is always greater than that 
assigned for any theft (F( l ,40) = 1 27.88, p < .000 1 ] .  This is exactly as we would 
expect from both intuition and the criminal code; harming another person is 
more serious than stealing an oil drum. 
Notice, second, that both curves have the general property that both matches 
our intuition and is built into the federal sentencing guidelines for 
nonaggregatable offenses. The greater the number of offenses, the greater the sen-
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TABLE 6. 1 1  S ubjects' Perceptions of Multiple Offenses 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Number 'Threat "Intended "Likely "Likely 
of Time of to Future Past 
Scenarios Offenses Interval Harm" Commit" Offense" Offenses" 
Single day-Assault: 
1 .  1 victim 1 .00 
2. 2 victims 1 .98 
3. 4 victims 3.93 
4. 7 victims 6.85 
Single day-Theft: 
5. 1 item 1 .05 
6. 2 items 2.00 
7. 4 items 3.88 
8. 4 items/1 victim 1 .46 
9. 7 items 7.02 
Two-week interval: 
1 0. Assault, 
2 victims 2.00 
1 1 . Theft; 2 items 2.05 
Two-year interval: 
1 2. Assault, 2 victims 2.00 
1 3. Theft, 2 items 2.05 
Key to column heads: 
1 .00 
1 .00 
1 .00 
1 .00 
1 .00 
1 .02 
1 .98 
1 .97 
2.98 
2.93 
8.63 
8.83 
8.93 
9.00 
2.05 
2.51 
2.41 
2. 1 0  
2.66 
8.83 
2.52 
8.85 
2.73 
8.61 
8.68 
8.76 
8.83 
8.68 
8.71 
8.6 1 
8.51 
8.66 
8.78 
8.57 
8.83 
8.46 
5.41 5. 1 0  
5.83 5.49 
5.95 5.59 
6.44 5.93 
5.22 5.24 
5.51 5.49 
5.90 5.76 
5.46 5.56 
6.05 5.95 
6.37 5.90 
5.92 5.90 
6.71 6.27 
6.51 6.47 
Statements (c) through (f) were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly 
disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree." 
(a) Number of crimes the actor committed: 1 to 1 0. 
(b) Time i nterval between offenses: 1 =1ess than a day, 2=2 weeks, and 3=2 
years. 
(c) In the scenario above, there was physical harm or a threat of physical 
harm to persons. 
(d) The actor intended to commit the offense. 
(e) After h is conviction, the actor is likely to commit other offenses in the 
future. 
(f) The actor is likely to have committed other offenses in the past for which 
he has not been caught. 
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TABLE 6. 1 2  Liabil ity for Multiple Offenses 
(a) (b) (c) 
% No Liability 
Scenarios 
Single day-Assault: 
1 .  1 victim 
2. 2 victims 
3. 4 victims 
4. 7 victims 
Single day-Theft: 
5.  1 item 
6. 2 items 
7. 4 items 
8. 4 items/1 victim 
9. 7 items 
Two-week interval: 
1 0.  Assault, 2 victims 
1 1 . Theft, 2 items 
Two-year interval: 
1 2. Assault, 2 victims 
1 3. Theft, 2 items 
% No Liability or No Punishment 
Liability (N) (N+O) 
5.85 0 0 
6. 1 7  0 1 5  
6.76 0 0 
7.1 0 0 0 
3. 1 7  0 0 
3.95 0 5 
4.37 0 2 
3.54 0 1 0  
4.68 0 2 
6.41 0 0 
4.1 0  0 5 
6.59 0 0 
4.1 5  0 7 
Liabil ity Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 = 
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years, 
8= 1 5  years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death. 
tence grows [F( l , l 20)  = 70.0 1 ,  p < .00 1 ] ,  but it does not do so in a linear fashion. 
Instead, it follows the general rule we discussed of adding a decreasing increment 
for each additional offense. ' 
However, our results do not support the aggregation side of the United States 
Sentencing Commission guidelines approach. Under the guidelines, theft is 
aggregatable; assault is not. Under the guidelines, therefore, each additional theft 
would get even less additional increment; each would be treated as providing no 
more punishment than if the person took the two drums from the same gas sta­
tion in a single theft. The sharp increase in sentence for the thief for the theft of 
the second drum suggests that subjects do not follow this rule. Future research, in 
which the scenarios might compare the theft of x drums from different stations 
with the theft of x drums all at once, will clarify this still further. 
Turn now to the effect that a time delay between offenses has on the sentencing 
patterns of our respondents. Figure 6. 14 shows us the effect of time delays be­
tween a first and a second offense on liability for the two offenses. (The figure 
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FIGURE 6. 1 3  Total Liability as a Function of Number of Offenses (no time delay) 
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graphs the total liability for the two offenses. )  As can be seen, the time delay does 
seem to make a difference; the longer the time between the two offenses, the more 
severe the sentence for the pair of them, and this is confirmed by the statistical 
test, F(2,78) 9.85, p < .00 1 .  However, it is also important to note that, com­
pared to many of the other differences we have found between scenarios in other 
chapters, the differences we have graphed in Figure 6. 14  are not large or dramatic. 
Respondents assign only mildly more severe sentences the longer the delay be­
tween the incidents for which they are sentencing the individual. It may well be 
that this is because the longer the period of time between the multiple offenses, 
the more the subjects would be likely to treat them as entirely independent of­
fenses deserving entirely independent, nonoverlapping penalties, as we suggested 
earlier. The best description of these results is this: increasing the interval between 
offenses slightly increases the liabilities assigned. 
Why might this be so? A glance at Figure 6. 1 5, in which we have illustrated the 
respondents' ratings of the likelihood of the person having committed previous 
offenses (from column f of Table 6. 1 1 ) or the likelihood of the person committing 
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FIGURE 6.1 4  Total Liability as a Function of the Interval Between Two Offenses 
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future offenses ( from column e of Table 6. 1 1 ) ,  suggests a mechanism that might 
be triggered by the delay between offenses and might be producing the increase in 
sentences. Respondents judge that it is much more likely that an individual who 
commits two assaults or two thefts separated by several weeks is more likely to 
commit similar assaults or thefts in the future (and to have done so in the past27) 
than an individual who commits two assaults or thefts immediately following 
each other. Further, an individual who commits two assaults or thefts over a 
period separated by two years is even more likely to act in a similar way in the fu­
ture (and to have done so in the past) .  
It is clear that the respondents do what a great deal of research on person attri­
bution processes suggests that they would, which is to treat information about a 
person's actions as providing information about his underlying dispositions 
(Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1 967). In this instance, if a person does something 
once, a number of possible explanations are available for that action, including 
situational pressures rather than underlying dispositions. The thief of an oil drum 
could have been under some extraordinary pressure (for instance. needing medi­
cine for his child) that caused him to steal; and the person who assaults another 
could have been assaulting a co-worker who harassed him. However, if the person 
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FIGURE 6. 1 5  Past and Future Likelihood of Committing Similar Offenses 
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commits essentially the same act in different situations, then we are likely to con­
dude that the act is dispositional; that it reflects the true underlying personality of 
the person. So the observer will conclude, specifically, that the person is a thief or 
a habitually violent person. What the data pattern suggests is that the time separa­
tion between the two acts is read as suggesting that the two situations are in fact 
different. 
Study 18: Summary 
Our respondents do function the way that our intuition suggests and as the gen­
eral, nonaggregated aspect of the federal sentencing guidelines articulate. They 
assign a more extended sentence for two crimes than for one but generally do not 
double the sentence that they assign for the first offense. They do not follow the 
strictly additive pattern characteristic of consecutive sentencing or the pattern of 
no increase in sentence that would be dictated by a concurrent-sentencing philos­
ophy. Their sentencing pattern is in accord with the principle that we suggested 
earlier-that the punishment deserved for an offense is based only in part on the 
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harm caused, such as the deprivation of the owner of his property. The person's 
willingness to violate the announced rules of society may be part of the founda­
tion for punishment, and this factor is already taken into account in the sentence 
for the first offense. 
Our respondents do not agree with the aggregational rules provided by the sen­
tencing guidelines. Within those guidelines, theft is an aggregatable offense, and a 
number of thefts of one item draws the same penalty as one theft of the same total 
number of items. Our respondents assign a sharply increased penalty to the sec­
ond theft. In further disagreement with the sentencing guidelines, although slight 
differences emerged between the pattern of sentencing for multiple assault and 
multiple theft cases, the small variations do not suggest any major differences in 
our respondents' sentencing "philosophies" in those two kinds of cases. 
What remains to be explored in future research are the conditions under which 
a pattern of multiple offenses leads respondents to move from a model in which 
each additional offense is punished, although with increasingly reduced penalties, 
to one in which the "habitual offender" concept comes into play. The latter may 
apply when an individual who has served a sentence for an offense repeats the 
crime. The "psychological logic" would then be that the sentence for the first of­
fense did not deter the convict and a longer one is required. An alternative expla­
nation is that, having once been officially sanctioned, greater punishment is 
called for with the second offense because the subsequent violation is a greater 
challenge to the authority of the criminal law. Yet one more explanation: We no­
ticed that our subjects are making the inference that a person who commits the 
same sort of crime after a delay is predicted to be more likely to commit future 
crimes, and one might expect this to find its way into individuals' sentencing pat­
terns. Subjects might be exercising the incapacitation function of punishment, 
locking away a person who is likely to commit future offenses. Future research 
could sort out some of these issues. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In several of the cases we considered in this chapter, we found that our respon­
dents' intuitions about the appropriate grading for different variants of offenses 
differ from those reflected in the legal codes. For instance, in sexual offenses, our 
respondents regard forcible rapes as generally of similar grades regardless of the 
existence of various kinds of prior relationship between the individuals involved, 
while the Code sharply conditions the offense grade as a function of prior rela­
tionship. With regard to felony murder, our respondents preferred a "felony­
manslaughter rule" with a standard "accomplice discount" rather than the law's 
imposition of murder liability for all participants (and, in some jurisdictions, all 
variations of involvement by innocents and felons). When this or another com­
munity-code discrepancy was discovered, we commented on what principles of 
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judgment might be underlying our subjects' responses, and we also discussed the 
implications of the discrepancy for code alteration, where we thought that a case 
could be made for consideration of that. With those discussions as background, 
we now turn to a consideration of the general implications of our subjects' re­
sponses. 
In sum, it is clear that our respondents are in accord with the general tendency 
in the legal codes to distinguish grades of offenses within and between offenses. 
For instance, the subjects clearly distinguish different levels of sexual offenses, al­
though not always exactly in the ways suggested by the legal codes. Interestingly, 
in the case of felony murder, in which, probably for policy reasons, the codes em­
phatically reject the idea of grading within felony murder and treat all cases as 
murder, our respondents do distinguish grades within that offense, assigning 
lower sentences to felons whose causal connection with the resultant death is 
more remote. Similarly, in the causation study, respondents grade different causal 
connections with a death differently, specifically assigning lower sentences to per­
sons who intend to kill but do not succeed in directly doing so, although death 
eventuates by means of a later chain of events. The general notion of grading of­
fenses is recognized as a basic and appropriate code function, both in the eyes of 
our respondents and in legal codes. 
However, it is worth noting that the grading of offenses registered by our sub­
jects is done in a somewhat different manner than codes generally accomplish 
such grading. The codes tend toward dichotomous grading: A botched attack on 
another's life, which through a chain of circumstances leads to that other's death, 
is either causally closely enough connected to the death (in which case it is mur­
der) or not closely enough connected ( in which case it is only attempted murder). 
In contrast, our respondents provide more continuous judgments; for instance, 
they judge that cases in which an attempted murderer's victim dies only through a 
chain of events after the attempt warrant a sentence lower than that for straight­
forward murder but higher than that for attempted murder. We will discuss the 
implications of this continuous grading further in the concluding chapter. 
A different but related point is the tendency of some codes, including the 
Model Penal Code, to recognize too few categories of offenses-as compared to 
the refined intuitions of our respondents. Most jurisdictions have adopted a grad­
ing scheme that uses more than the five grades of the Model Penal Code,28 but 
even eight or nine grades could not give expression to the rather nuanced judg­
ments that we see our respondents make. The effect of this shortage of grades 
means that even in cases in which the codes properly identify a relevant mitigat­
ing or aggravating factor, they frequently must give it more or less effect in grad­
ing than it merits. Our respondents agreed with the Model Penal Code, for exam­
ple, that absence of a prior sexual relationship aggravates liability for rape, but the 
Code's one-grade difference for those two cases-the minimum distinction it can 
make-significantly exceeds the difference in grade that our respondents would 
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give. This argues for codes with more grades into which offenses can be catego­
rized.29 
The special problems of sentencing multiple offenses also suggest a structural 
change in current doctrine. Presently, multiple offenses typically are dealt with ei­
ther by concurrent sentences, which impose no additional sentence for the second 
offense, or by consecutive sentences, which effectively double the penalty. Our re­
spondents assign sentences for a second offense that add to but do not double the 
sentence for the first offense; and they continue this pattern for any further of­
fenses. This approach matches at best one aspect of the United States Sentencing 
Commission guidelines, and the model provided by these guidelines may move 
the legal doctrine in this direction. 
7 
Conflict Between Community Views 
and Criminal Codes 
We now return to the question, which we raised at the beginning of the book, of 
the implications of discrepancies between legal codes and community standards, 
using the specific cases on which we have gathered evidence to illuminate the pos­
sible meanings of those discrepancies. 
Recall our discussion in Chapter 1 regarding the importance of taking account 
of community views in formulating liability rules. Certainly, one cannot claim 
that the community's view is necessarily the morally correct view. As moral phi­
losophers would note, the members of the community may well express views 
about proper punishment that they would find unfair if they themselves were to 
be judged by such views or that are in some other way unfair when examined 
from some rational moral perspective. Nonetheless, the community's disagree­
ment with a liability rule may, at the very least, suggest that philosophers should 
scrutinize the analysis that leads them to a different formulation of the liability 
rule than community intuitions expect. 
Community views have a more direct relevance, we argued, under a utilitarian 
justification for criminal-law rules, where the primary goal is the reduction of 
crime rather than the imposition of deserved punishment. The fear of the shame 
and stigmatization of criminal conviction is a powerful yet inexpensive deterrent, 
but its effectiveness depends on the established condemnatory value of convic­
tion. The more past convictions correlate in the community's collective con­
sciousness with morally condemnable conduct, the more likely that condemna­
tion will attach with the conviction at hand. Thus, discrepancies between the 
criminal code and the community tend to undercut the condemnation of convic­
tion and thereby lessen the effectiveness of condemnation as a deterrent threat. 
Perhaps more important, recent empirical evidence suggests that the law's 
most powerful mechanism for gaining compliance lies not with the negative force 
of the deterrent threat but rather with the positive force of the law as arbiter of 
proper conduct. Most people obey the law not because they fear punishment but 
because they see themselves as persons who want to do the right thing. Again, dis­
crepancies between the criminal code and the community tend to undercut the 
law's moral credibility and this, in turn, weakens the law's ability to dictate proper 
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conduct. As the law's moral credibility decreases, so too does its power to set au­
thoritative standards of conduct to which people are willing to conform. 
Finally, the perceived «justice" of the system also is crucial to gaining the coop­
eration and acquiescence of those persons involved in the process (such as offend­
ers, potential offenders, witnesses, and jurors) . Greatest cooperation will be 
elicited in that situation where the system has greatest moral credibility. A system 
that is perceived as unjust is in danger of being subverted and ignored. On the one 
hand, it risks jury nullification and martyrdom that rallies resistance to its com­
mands. On the other, it risks vigilantism. 
Our conclusion is that the moral credibility of the criminal law is its single 
most important asset. Discrepancies between the code and the community have 
the potential to undercut the law's moral credibility and thereby its effectiveness. 
This can occur in either of two ways: by convicting morally blameless persons and 
by failing to convict morally blameworthy persons. The former may be more det­
rimental than the latter. That is, each time the criminal law convicts a blameless 
person, it calls into question, in some small way, the legitimacy of every other 
criminal conviction. As the number of blameless convictions increases, the credi­
bility of each subsequent conviction decreases. 
Where the criminal law fails to convict a blameworthy person, it may earn a 
reputation as being ineffective, but it does not as directly undercut the credibility 
of the convictions that do result. However, the criminal law's failure to criminalize 
certain conduct, which the community finds morally offensive, does call into 
question the moral judgment of the code drafters, which in turn may undercut 
the law's moral voice. Imagine for a moment that bestiality was decriminalized on 
the basis that no individual was harmed and that the prohibition infringed upon 
the individual's right of privacy ( following the arguments that led to the 
decriminalization of consensual sodomy in many codes) .  A similar dynamic may 
occur where the law criminalizes the repugnant conduct but fails to punish viola­
tors of the prohibition, for reasons other than a lack of blameworthiness. One 
could conceive of many people losing faith in the moral judgment of the criminal 
law generally and reacting to it merely as a collection of rules rather than as a 
statement of moral wrongs. And this, in turn, we speculate, might reduce the 
criminal law's compliance power. 
In the studies we have discussed in this book, we have sought out evidence for 
code-community discrepancies an4 frequently found it. However, we have not 
shown whether those discrepancies have the undercutting consequences we have 
suggested here. Is there any evidence that these discrepancies have the sorts of ef­
fects we suggest? 
A number of studies have confirmed the existence of one of the relationships 
that we suggest, the one between an individual's disbelief in the morality of a par­
ticular law and his or her unwillingness to obey that law. Studies show that the 
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degree to which people report that they have obeyed a law in the past and plan to 
obey it in the future correlates with the degree to which they judge that law to be 
morally valid (Grasmick and Green, 1 980; Jacob, 1 980; Meier and Johnson, 1 977;  
Silberman, 1 976; and Tittle, 1 980) .  
There i s  less evidence for our other claim, which is that disbelief in  the morality 
of one law eventually causes contempt for the legal code in general, or more accu­
rately, those areas of the code that are concerned with the prohibition of activities 
that are not immediately and intuitively regarded as wrong. Tyler's recent ( 1 990) 
Chicago panel study provides some indirect evidence on this point. The degree to 
which Tyler's subjects saw the legal authorities as having legitimate power pre­
dicted their willingness to obey various laws promulgated by those authorities. 
Thus, if people believe in the legitimacy of the authorities making the law, they 
are willing to believe that the laws that those authorities promulgate should be 
obeyed. Other studies find that a person's views about the legitimacy of the legal 
system and obligations to obey its laws correlate with that person's reports of en­
gaging in lawbreaking activity (Sarat, 1 977; Tittle, 1 980) .  We would argue from 
this that when authorities promulgate what individuals consider an unjust law, 
individuals lose respect for the authorities and regard with suspicion the whole 
system of laws. When people report that they do not trust the "governmental sys­
tem" or grant relatively little legitimacy to authorities, the evidence suggests that 
they are more willing to engage in violent social protest, rioting, aggressive politi­
cal behavior, and use of violence for political ends. See Tyler's 1 990 review of this 
evidence, pp. 33-35. 
WHEN CODE AND COMMUNITY AGREE 
With this introduction, one may ask whether we found cases in which any sort of 
code-community discrepancy exists. We did. But we also found many cases in 
which the code and the community seemed in harmony, and we begin by mark­
ing those cases. 
The results of the studies confirm many aspects of current doctrine, including 
several important foundational principles upon which the doctrine is based. The 
legal system consistently asserts that the degree to which liability should follow a 
violation depends to a considerable extent on the culpability level of the person in 
violating the law. With this principle, stated at this broad level, our subjects were 
in agreement. The degree of a person's culpability for a violation, ranging from 
negligent through purposeful commission, made a difference in the penalties that 
our subjects assigned. This emerges most clearly from our Study 8, concerning of­
fense culpability requirements, but also emerges indirectly in many other studies 
as well. 
Further, our subjects recognized and granted validity to the various "excusing 
conditions" that are recognized in legal codes. For instance, debilitating abnor-
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malities in an offender's capacities (from mental illness, for example) can indeed 
serve to exculpate a person, even for the most serious offense. Still further, the 
studies found broad support for the recognition of justification defenses. If the 
person's conduct is justified in any of several ways that the law now recognizes, the 
subjects do not punish what normally would be an offense. 
The studies also support many specific aspects of current doctrine, including 
provisions that have been criticized by some commentators. Causing a death dur­
ing a felony is treated by the subjects as more blameworthy than causing the same 
death under otherwise similar circumstances. Negligence as to becoming intoxi­
cated is accepted by the subjects as an adequate basis to impose liability for many 
offenses committed while intoxicated, as it is in many legal codes. When faced 
with a possibly insane person, people evaluate the degree to which that person 
shows both control and cognitive dysfuncion, which are the two dimensions that 
the legal codes mark as important. Further in accordance with the standards of 
judgment that the codes use, respondents make their liability judgments based on 
their perceptions of these dysfunctions. 
WHEN CODE AND COMMUNITY DISAGREE 
We turn next to the second set of cases, those in which the subjects' views conflict 
with current law. How can we characterize these differences in general? What is­
sues do these differences raise for code formulation? 
Our empirical research suggests factors currently used by the doctrine that are 
not relevant to the community's assessment of blameworthiness. The sexual of­
fenses study, for example, reveals instances in which the Model Penal Code, which 
was drafted in the 1950s (and promulgated in 1962) ,  no longer reflects commu­
nity social mores. The subjects do not treat consensual intercourse with an under­
age partner as the very serious offense that the Code treats it as; they give no miti­
gation because of prior promiscuity of an underage partner, though the Code 
does; they do not give the significant mitigation to forcible rape that the Code 
gives where the victim is a voluntary social companion. Recall that if subjects see 
the violated individual as the nonconsenting victim of a sexual assault, they re-
. gard the act as incurring approximately equal liability whether or not a previous 
sexual relationship existed and the woman was on this occasion a voluntary social 
companion. This strikes us as an area in which the opinions of society have genu­
inely changed. In fact, current state codes now reflect this change in public opin­
ion; most have recently dropped the spousal exclusion, voluntary social compan­
ion mitigation, and so on. 
Research also can suggest factors that should be added to a code's assessment of 
liability. The culpability requirements study, for example, revealed that subjects 
impose significant increases in liability for a person's increased culpability over 
the minimum required for the offense by most legal codes. As the person moves 
Conflict Between Community Views and Criminal Codes 205 
from negligent to purposeful commission of the same offense conduct, our sub­
jects assign greater punishment in response to this heightened culpability. Yet, 
with the exception of homicide and a few other offenses, most codes typically de­
fine each kind of criminal conduct as an offense with a single grade, defined only 
by certain minimum culpability requirements, usually recklessness. If the code is 
to mirror community views, the culpability study suggests that offenses be de­
fined to include multiple grades according to the person's culpability level. The 
specific suggestion here is that code drafters consider increasing the grade of the 
crime as a function of the culpability of the perpetrator-rather than using reck­
lessness as the trigger for a single grade of offense. 
Empirical studies have the potential to not only identify when an additional of­
fense element is needed but also to guide drafters in formulating the element, as 
in selecting the level of culpability to require as to which element. The culpability 
study illustrates that the subjects have specific views on what the minimum level 
of culpability ought to be and how much liability ought to increase for increases 
in a person's culpability. Recall that this judgment was a relatively complex one, 
with culpability as to different elements-for example, «core" elements versus 
«collateral" elements-having different effects. 
In addition to identifying needed elements or setting culpability levels, empiri­
cal research can help choose between alternative formulations of an offense or 
even suggest new formulations or criteria. The attempt study, for example, chal­
lenges the Model Penal Code's formulation of the objective requirement for at­
tempt. Though modern doctrine imposes attempt liability as soon as a person 
takes a substantial step toward commission of an offense, 77 percent of the sub­
jects would impose no punishment in such a case. Instead, the subjects generally 
support the older common-law tests for attempt: All respondents would impose 
liability and punishment when a person has come close to committing the of­
fense. The code-community discrepancy here is an interesting one, and one that 
raises pertinent issues in the debate. It may be that, given the current climate of 
worry about increased criminal activity, the code is moving in the direction of 
criminalizing relatively small steps toward the commission of crimes. Here, those 
interested in retaining the system's integrity should carry out this debate with 
maximal involvement of the public, so that the public can be put on notice that 
the code criminalizes conduct at an earlier point than the community intuitively 
would. This is important to protect the code's moral credibility; code drafters 
ought to make clear their reasons when their formulation conflicts with the com­
munity's views. 
Earlier in this chapter, we remarked that, in Study 1 6, our respondents agreed 
with the code's tendency to treat a killing that occurs in the course of a felony as 
deserving more blame than the killing would in nonfelonious circumstances. Al­
though this generally is true, our felony-murder study reveals that the common 
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formulations of the rule do not reflect popular intuition. (Subjects tended to pun­
ish most accidental killings during a robbery as less serious than manslaughter, 
though many codes woud punish those killings as murder.) This makes all the 
more puzzling the rule's continuing political vitality despite its extensive criticism 
by scholars. Some aspects of the rule are clearly less popular with the subjects 
than others, suggesting a means by which the rule could be reformed. For in­
stance, subjects do not follow the logic of assigning murder to the surviving rob­
ber when, during the course of the robbery, the wife of the store owner shoots and 
kills one of the robbers. A reconstruction of the rules to reflect this would be pos­
sible. Felony-murder could be retained for killings that directly result from the ac­
tion of the perpetrator and perhaps his accomplices, given the utility of holding 
participants in the crime responsible for the actions of their fellow culprits. Alter­
natively, some might use the results to support abolition of the special rule in fa­
vor of reliance upon the usual homicide doctrines with the addition of certain ev­
identiary presumptions, as the Model Penal Code does but which most states 
have rejected. That is, if a death occurs during the course of a felony, the perpetra­
tors would be presumed to have caused that death in a way that warrants a mur­
der penalty, and it would be the task of the defense to rebut this presumption with 
evidence showing that the defendants' conduct, while reckless, did not manifest 
extreme indifference to the value of human life. 
Another use of empirical research is to set or adjust the grades of offenses. For 
example, if the felony-murder doctrine is not to be abolished or reformulated, the 
research suggests that, at the very least, its liability grades should be reduced. A 
"felony-manslaughter rule" might be more appropriate. 
A more fundamental grading issue is illuminated by the attempt study. Some 
codes, like the Model Penal Code, impose the same level of liability for an attempt 
as for the offense that is attempted;1 but a majority of codes provides a standard 
discount for attempt liability. The subjects support the majority rule here.2 This 
sheds some light on a dispute in the literature over people's intuitive notions as to 
whether actual resulting harm should increase liability.3 The attempt study also 
suggests that resulting harm does increase a person's deserved punishment-in 
the subjects' view-but that even liability for a completed offense sometimes is 
reduced if the person is able to undo the harm that has been done. This evidence 
has implications for the formulation and grading of all offenses, as well as doc­
trines of liability such as complicity; it suggests that codes ought to distinguish 
and punish more severely instances where the prohibited harm actually occurs or 
the prohibited conduct is actually consummated, as compared to instances where 
the harm or evil is only intended (but not carried to completion) . 
The studies also suggest different grading than current law for most of the doc­
trines that concern errors in justification. If a mistake as to a justification does not 
give a defense, it ought to at least mitigate liability, according to our subjects. 
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The general area of justification for actions otherwise prohibited is an interest­
ing one from the perspective of code-community clashes. Review for a moment 
our findings on the degree of force that the community finds appropriate to use 
in defense of self or property or to bring about a citizen's arrest. The shared theme 
here is the degree to which the average citizen can take the law into his or her own 
hands. Recall that our subjects were willing to approve the use of a good deal 
more force than the legal codes would permit, and the use of force in a good many 
more cases that the codes would allow. 
We see several possible explanations for this. First, many of our subjects may 
see the criminal justice system as failing to keep its side of the social contract­
failing either to apprehend criminals or to get them convicted when they are ar­
rested or to keep them in j ail when they are convicted. If this is the case, have they, 
therefore, reverted to a vigilante notion of justice, in which any individual is enti­
tled to take almost any step to protect his or her property or person? To the degree 
that this is the case, it represents a complex problem for code drafters. To what de­
gree can or should the code be formulated to represent people's views about a per­
ceived or actual breakdown of the criminal justice system? This seems a particu­
larly acute question for the case of force allowable in carrying out a citizen's 
arrest. Our subjects seem to be trying to convey the message that a person who 
uses a high degree of force in these circumstances, even unnecessary or dispropor­
tionate force, should receive only relatively minor punishment for doing so (in 
contrast to the codes' dichotomous, aU-or-nothing assignment of liability) . 
Again, what may be going on here is that subjects may perceive the existence of 
crisis within the criminal justice system. People may believe that our overtaxed 
police departments have a very low likelihood of apprehending a thief or that our 
court system has a very low likelihood of appropriately punishing the thief if ap­
prehended. If respondents are thinking along these lines, they may believe that 
the violent acts of the theft victims are the only punishment a perpetrator is ever 
likely to receive and, therefore, that victims are appropriately empowered to de­
liver this punishment. 
A second explanation of the results is this: People may rely on a different set of 
principles than those that we articulated from the legal code for judging appropri­
ate defensive force. For instance, the legal code formulation seems to require some 
apparently complex calculations-on the part of the attacked person-about ex­
actly what an attacker intends and about the minimum force sufficient to thwart 
those intentions. People may regard it as inappropriate to require such judgments 
of an attacked individual in what they perceive as a rapidly occurring and emo­
tionally terrifying situation (such as an assault or a robbery) . 
The above cases raise the possibility that subjects would approve of alterations 
in the legal codes that decriminalize certain acts or reduce the liability assigned to 
those acts. However, we would remind the reader that, in other cases, our subjects 
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seem to be calling for the criminalization or more serious treatment of actions 
that the codes do not criminalize or to which the codes assign relatively minor 
penalties. These studies suggest that new offenses be created or that liability be 
expanded from its current scope. The omission study, for example, reveals that 
about 80 percent of the subjects would impose liability for a person's failure to 
rescue a stranger when such can be done with no danger to the resc\ler. Current 
doctrine, recall, imposes no duty to rescue in such a case and, therefore, imposes 
no liability for failing to do so, no matter how minor the inconvenience to the po­
tential rescuer. 
LIABILITY REQUIREMENTS VERSUS LIABILITY FACTORS 
AND DICHOTOMOUS FUNCTIONS VERSUS 
CONTINUOUS FUNCTIONS 
Perhaps more dramatic than the comparison with any particular aspect of current 
doctrine are the rather clear findings that the process by which our subjects assess 
liability is different from the way in which the drafters of current doctrine con­
ceptualize the issue. Where the doctrine treats a factor as setting a fixed minimum 
requirement for full liability, the subjects frequently see the same factor as aggra­
vating or mitigating the degree of a person's liability and punishment. For exam­
ple, while the doctrine treats complicity as a means of establishing full liability for 
the substantive offense, the subjects generally consider an accomplice to be less 
blameworthy than the principal and reduce the accomplice's liability according­
ly.4 A similar general "discount" in liability is seen in cases of omission. Though 
the doctrine holds a person fully liable for the substantive offense if he or she 
satisfies the requirements of omission liability, the subjects significantly reduce a 
person's liability if he or she commits an offense by omission from what it would 
be if he or she committed the same offense by commission.5 Reacting intuitively, 
the community's views seem to us to be more rational than the code treatment 
here. In a failure to rescue case, the codes' assignment of no penalty to the 
stranger who fails to rescue and of a penalty equivalent to murder or manslaugh­
ter if certain complex conditions about the assumption of duty are met seem, re­
spectively, too lenient and then too harsh. 
The grading of attempt conduct further demonstrates this difference between 
the codes' and the respondents' treatment of liability. The codes define a particu­
lar point, during the preparation and conduct toward an offense, as the moment 
when liability attaches. The subjects, in contrast, see increasing liability as the 
person gets closer to committing the offense. 
From the subjects' perspective, the codes' tendency to dichotomize signals a se­
rious and pervasive flaw in current law. The doctrine more often than not sees a 
fact as either establishing liability or not or as giving a mitigation (or an aggrava­
tion) or not; a relevant fact in the case typically triggers application of a particular 
rule or sub rule. The subjects, in contrast, frequently see a continuum of blame-
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worthiness and liability. A fact more frequently contributes to an increment or 
decrement in liability judgment than produces a complete assignment of liability 
or total escape from liability. 
The notion of a liability continuum for some factors is acknowledged by cur­
rent doctrine in some contexts. Codes typically are structured to impose greater 
liability for greater harm done, all other things being equal. Codes sometimes­
too rarely from the subjects' perspective-vary the degree of a person's liability 
with his or her level of culpability. The codes' culpability spectrum is not a strictly 
continuous one, at least as it is defined in modern codes, with four discrete levels 
of culpability. It is, however, a practical and useful approximation of a continuum. 
In most other instances, however, current doctrine fails to acknowledge contin­
uums that the subjects dearly support. In complicity, for example, not only do the 
subjects give a liability discount to the accomplice, which the codes do not, but 
the respondents vary the extent of the discount with the extent of the accomplice's 
contribution to the offense. Similarly, in attempts, the extent of the attempter's 
discount will depend in part on how far he or she has gone toward completion of 
the offense. In omissions, the extent of liability depends on the degree of danger 
or inconvenience to the person who is to undertake the rescue. 
In causation, liability varies with the strength of the causal connection between 
the person's conduct and the result. The law, in contrast, sets a maximum degree 
of tolerable remoteness between the person's conduct and the result-for in­
stance, in time, place, or strength of causal chain. If this maximum amount is not 
exceeded, the person is fully accountable for the result. The subjects, in contrast, 
see degrees of liability according to the degree of remoteness. 
Obviously, a criminal code cannot take account of the infinite continuum over 
which many factors may range.6 It is not unrealistic, however, to expect a code to 
recognize that these factors are relevant to determining liability-that is, to recog­
nize some kind of discount-and to attempt a rough approximation of their 
varying effect. This can be done in the same way that modern codes approximate 
the harm and culpability continuums-by defining a few large categories for each 
of the most relevant factors. Such a rough approximation of a continuum gener­
ally is sufficient for the criminal code's role of indicating a range for the extent of 
punishment. More refined distinctions can be made in the se.ntencing process. 
Is it not the case that all such distinctions could be reserved for the sentencing 
process? We suggest that it would be a mistake to push over to the sentencing pro­
cess the responsibility to make such rough approximations of highly relevant fac­
tors, especially when such determinations can effectively be made by a code. First; 
as a matter of principle, the purposes supporting the legality principle, as well as 
modern notions of due process, prefer that the most significant determinants of 
liability be considered at the liability stage, where the jury can make the determi­
nation under the normal rules of trial procedure. To leave such determinations to 
the more discretionary sentencing stage is to devalue legality, the jury system, and 
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due process unnecessarily? Second, at the level of practice, jurors are more likely 
to abide by their legal instructions to the extent that those instructions reach re­
sults that they regard as fair outcomes. To fail to have verdicts that match the gen­
eral range of punishment deserved is to invite jury dissatisfaction and resistance. 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 
In many of our studies, the subjects impose criminal liability on a person but then 
impose little or no punishment. 8 Such is the subjects' view: ( 1 )  where the person 
is intent on crime but his conduct falls short of dangerous proximity of commis­
sion; (2) where the person satisfies the objective elements of an offense but is 
faultless as to one or another element; (3) where the person fails to rescue the 
stranger because of danger (or inconvenience); and (4) where the person mistak­
enly or improperly uses deadly force in self-defense, unnecessary force in protec­
tion of property, or excessive force or force against the wrong person in attempt­
ing to detain an offender. 
This practice by subjects may seem somewhat odd. If the person's conduct is 
serious enough to merit the condemnation of criminal conviction, why should 
the person escape punishment? One explanation is that the subjects want to ex­
press their disapproval of the person's conduct but feel that the person is not suf­
ficiently blameworthy to be punished for the conduct. If one takes a once-popular 
view among academics that the only role of the criminal law is one of deterring 
criminal behavior, this response by the subjects makes very little sense. Liability is 
taken as a judgment that application of deterrent punishment is appropriate, yet 
no such application is made.9 However, if one sees the criminal law as having dual 
roles (of both announcing rules of proper conduct and adjudicating violations of 
those rules) and, further, sees desert as the primary guide for assessing punish­
ment, then this sort of judgment of "improper conduct, no punishment" makes 
more sense. It is the mechanism by which the subjects seek to achieve the some­
times conflicting functions oflaw: judging the propriety of the conduct as a signal 
to others in the future and judging the blameworthiness of the defendant at hand 
for his past violation. 
Notice that, in each instance that "liability but no punishment" is given as a re­
sponse, the person's conduct is arguably inappropriate although the actor is not 
held to be terribly blameworthy. In the omission cases, for example, in which an 
individual fails to rescue a drowning man although he could do so without great 
danger, our subjects often assign a verdict of "liability but no punishment." Here 
the subjects seem to be saying that this is conduct that they want to disapprove of, 
but the individual does not deserve a term in jail. The subjects use the condemna­
tory function of the legal system in a way that makes perfect sense if one sees that 
ordinary people take the legal code as having moral force to exert on the citizen. 
The respondents also seem to be saying that these sorts of behaviors are morally 
inapproprfate, without feeling that the person is to be punished for the conduct. 
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In doing so, they are acknowledging what has become one of the major messages 
of our discussion: that the legal code is seen as having moral force by the citizens 
of the state, and the legal code's moral force operates independently of its coercive 
force. For this reason, we suggest that code-community discrepancies have far 
more importance than the previous rather scant attention to the topic has given 
them. 
Still, imposing criminal liability in such a verdict, in one sense, perverts the 
function of criminal conviction. · If the person is not sufficiently blameworthy, 
why should he or she suffer the condemnation of a criminal conviction? The an­
swer may be found in the limited options available in the criminal law. The law 
provides no opportunity, other than through criminal conviction, for a person's 
criminal conduct to be disapproved. The subjects are caught in a difficult situa­
tion. On the one hand, to decline to impose liability is to seemingly approve of 
conduct of which they in fact disapprove. On the other hand, to impose liability is 
to blame a person whom they see as not warranting the blame they hand out. The 
liability-but-no-punishment option may seem an attractive compromise in such 
a situation. 
In the end, however, the liability-but-no-punishment option is just that-a 
compromise-rather than an accurate expression of the subjects' or jurors' feel­
ings. The fact is that such a practice imposes criminal liability, albeit without 
punishment, on persons who do not deserve it. This is not only unfair to the per­
son and unsatisfying to the subjects and jurors but also undercuts the effective 
operation of the criminal law. If the law's role is to exact justice, it fails in that 
function when an insufficiently blameworthy person is convicted. That no pun­
ishment is imposed only minimizes the extent of the injustice. Also, of course, 
when juries convict, they cannot control whether the judge will exercise the no­
punishment option. 
The difficult situation and the undesirable compromise arise because the crim­
inal law has two important but distinct functions, each of which has its own spe­
cial demands. These two functions-announcing public rules of conduct and as­
sessing individual blame in adjudication of a violation-have very different 
doctrinal foundations. The rules-of-conduct function gives the general popula­
tion ex-ante direction as to what they can, must, and must not do. The principles­
of-adjudication function gives decision-makers (i.e., prosecutors, juries, and 
judges) guidance in assessing ex post the blameworthiness of an individual's vio­
lation of the rules. When the doctrine tries to serve both of these functions with 
the same provisions, one or the other of the functions suffers. In this instance, an 
offender is convicted to assure that the proper signals are sent to disapprove of the 
conduct-the rules-of-conduct function is satisfied-yet a blameless or insuffi­
ciently blameworthy offender suffers the condemnation of conviction-the adju­
dication-of-blame function is perverted. In other instances, the reverse perver­
sion occurs. 10 
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The solution to the subjects' dilemma and to the "perversion" of the law is to 
allow subjects and jurors to disapprove of the person's conduct without con­
demning the person. This requires the use of trial verdicts that allow a distinction 
between an acquittal based on approval of the person's conduct and an acquittal 
based on a person's blamelessness for admittedly improper conduct. The available 
trial verdicts might be: "no violation;' "blameless violation;' and "guilty" or 
"blameworthy violation" (see Robinson, 1990, pp. 766-767). In future research, 
one could allow for such verdicts from subjects and test the conditions under 
which they would use each. 
THE JURY AS A RESOLVER OF 
CODE-COMMUNITY CONFLICTS 
Is it possible that our elaborate focus on code-community comparisons misses 
the point? One could argue that we misunderstand the functioning of the legal 
system and ignore the presence of a mechanism within it that modifies the results 
produced by a mechanical application of the legal code where community stan­
dards would be seriously violated by formulaic application of the code. The 
mechanism, of course, is the jury. Juries have been known to produce verdicts that 
seem far from the ones that would be required by an exact application of the legal 
code, choosing instead, for instance, to find an individual not guilty of the offense 
or guilty of a lesser offense that provides the reduced punishment that the jurors 
judge to be appropriate. Here we recall the case of"the subway shooter:' Bernhard 
Goetz, who shot several persons whom he believed were beginning to mug him 
during his ride on the subway in New York. He was found not guilty of any seri­
ous charges even though his actions seemed to clearly violate what the code for­
mulations allow in self-defense. Similarly, the rather inelastic code formulation of 
self-defense has been stretched to find persons innocent who would otherwise be 
found guilty under the code-for example, battered women who finally kill their 
abusive husbands. 
Certainly, within the Anglo-Saxon legal system, the jury emerged with what is 
called "jury nullification" as one of their legitimate functions. Historically, this 
was not always the case; the jury was not always given leeway to make these sorts 
of adjustments. Early in the history of the emergence of the jury, there were cases 
in which the civil authorities, outraged at a particular verdict of a jury, threw the 
members of the jury in jail. But quite early in the development of the jury, jurors 
became immune from this kind of retrospective punitive evaluation of their ver­
dicts (Green, 1 985). This gave the jury the autonomy to refuse to find individuals 
guilty ( even when the code would have found them guilty) , or to find guilty un­
popular individuals who were charged with offenses they might not have com­
mitted. Interestingly, Green's analysis of jury deliberations occurring in the 
twelfth century showed that jurors actually did use their nullification powers to 
find innocent various of their neighbors who had harmed or killed others in what 
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the jurors regarded as acts of self-defense, even though the acts did not meet the 
stringent requirements that the legal code set up for legal self-defense. 
The code requirements at that time were not dissimilar to what they are now, 
requiring that the attacker be threatening injury at the moment and that retreat 
from the attack be impossible. Facts damaging to the claim of self-defense, there­
fore, were that the attacker was wounded in the side or the back (since it would 
follow then that the attack could not have been in progress) or that the incident 
took place in an open field or some other location from which it should have been 
possible to flee the attack. Coroner's reports often attested to the awkward pres­
ence of these facts in specific cases. But during the jury deliberations (as inferred 
from the facts as they were described in the jury reports) ,  wounds that the coro­
ner had described as located in the back or side of the attacker were mysteriously 
relocated to the front--creeping wounds-and what were described as open 
fields were found to contain ditches, dikes, hedges, or other obstacles that made 
retreat from the attack more plausibly impossible. l '  Juries have nullified the me­
chanical operation of the criminal code in the twelfth century, in the twentieth 
century, and no doubt every century in between. By doing so, they bring commu­
nity standards to bear in a context that finally gives them no apparent role. 
However, relying on the jury to nullify the normal operation of the legal code 
in cases of code-community discrepancies does not seem to us to be an entirely 
satisfactory mechanism for adjudicating differences. First, it is unlikely to consis­
tently work in a way that provides fairness across cases. One jury, somehow aware 
of its power to nullify, does so. Another jury, unaware of its power to nullify, or 
more cowed by the authority of the court, does not. One of the accused goes to 
jail, the other goes free.12 What frequently happens is that this discrepancy, now 
personalized in the form of two individuals, is publicized, drawing attention to 
the unfairness of the legal system in a vivid and personal way. Second, as we have 
discussed earlier, for the legal code to criminalize certain actions that people re­
gard as morally acceptable (even though juries at least sometimes do not convict) 
is to give a signal that damages peoples' respect for the legal code and, thus, likely 
impairs what we have called its moral credibility. Third, as pointed out by Green, 
if juries systematically provide this kind of "safety valve" function for the legal 
code, they reduce pressure for a change in the code that would move it in the di­
rection of better rendering community standards (and thereby enhance its moral 
credibility) . In the extreme case, they stultify code change. 
Further, the jury's nullification ability is effective only as far as their power ex­
tends-in the assignment of liability. The jury's power only works in one direc­
tion; they can with their verdict minimize the extent of punishment that a person 
can receive, but they cannot ensure that a judge will sentence a person to the full 
punishment that their verdict calls for. Finally, and relatedly, many of the code po­
sitions that we have shown to conflict with community views are instantiated in 
sentencing-guideline systems. Most of what we have said about "missing dis-
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counts, and dichotomous rather than continuous treatment in codes applies 
equally to existing sentencing guidelines. Although judges who pronounce sen­
tence might share the jury's desire to deviate from the formal demands of the 
code and might regularly have done so through the exercise of sentencing discre­
tion, that possibility is reduced when sentencing guidelines have been articulated 
that deviate from community views. 13 For all of these reasons, then, it seems pref­
erable to us to have community standards reflected in legal codes when it· is ap­
propriate to do so. 
Our argument has been a long one, and it seems useful to draw some elements 
of it together as a conclusion. In doing so, we will emphasize what we think the 
implications are for those who are involved in legal code drafting. 
Drawing on both empirical social science research and various theories of the 
justification of punishment, we suggested that code-community conflicts, if they 
are to exist, would have various corrosive consequences on the general respect 
that ordinary citizens have for the criminal justice system and, therefore, their 
willingness to obey the law. Next, via a set of scenario experiments, we demon­
strated that, frequently, such discrepancies do exist. The moral intuitions of ordi­
nary persons and the rules formulated in legal codes frequently dash in ways that 
seem very important to us. 
We suggest that the implications of this for code-drafting groups are as follows. 
First, we would urge that various alternative formulations of code provisions un­
der consideration by code drafters or legislators be subjected to the sort of empiri­
cal scrutiny represented by our experimental procedures. We suggest, specifically, 
that social science research of the sort we have illustrated in this work be an ex­
plicit part of a code-drafting process and that social scientists be included among 
the parties involved. 
The research process need not be complex or time-consuming. Representative 
samples of subjects could be drawn in advance from the state or other jurisdiction 
that was to be governed by the proposed legal code. Once the specific alternate 
code provisions were clear, the social scientists could quickly design scenarios that 
would test the community intuitions about the alternative possibilities instanti­
ated in the proposed versions. 
Second, how would these empirical results play into the drafters' deliberations? 
A number of possibilities exist. Frequently, if one examines the minutes of the de­
liberations of code-drafting groups, one finds that they intend to base the code 
provisions under discussion on the intuitive standards ofjustice of the commu­
nity. If this is so, then disagreeing factions among the code-drafting group are of­
ten disagreeing about the moral intuitions of the community. Certainly, in that 
case, the empirical findings, particularly if they result from experimental designs 
that the disagreeing factions have agreed on in advance, should be of considerable 
utility in resolving the controversy. Nevertheless, one or more factions may be 
pressing for the consideration of other reasons for preferring a specific code for-
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mulation than one reflecting the moral intuitions of the community. I f  so, sup­
pose our sort of empirical research reveals that the proposed formulation is in 
some way at significant odds with the community's view. Then, such conflict 
ought to be taken into account in debating the provision and, if the counter­
intuitive provision is finally adopted, community education about the provision 
would be required. 
In fact, two kinds of education are necessary. First, the community should be 
informed that the counterintuitive provision is the one that the lawmakers chose 
to adopt and therefore people should govern their behavior accordingly. Other­
wise, since individuals generally tend to assume that code provisions match their 
moral intuitions, they will be uninformed about the possibilities of transgressing 
the law. 14 Second, the public needs to be informed about the reasons why the code 
deviates from moral intuitions in order to avoid the lessening of respect for the 
criminal law that would otherwise result when some violation of it is publicized, 
causing the community to become aware of it in what could be explosive circum­
stances. In other words, when a counterintuitive provision of the legal code is put 
into effect, the community needs to be informed about the provision and per­
suaded of its validity. 
Certainly, social science has a role to play here as well. Research could deter­
mine not only what sorts of explanations of the new code provision would make 
people most aware of the code, but also what sorts of explanations would make 
them most convinced of the necessity of the provision. 
Our attempt, then, has been to persuade the reader of the value of a certain 
kind of research in the formulation of legal codes and to demonstrate what the 
beginnings of such research projects would entail. 
Appendix A: 
Research Methodology 
In this appendix, we discuss several related technical matters that we believe will 
be useful to the reader attempting to evaluate the weight to be given to the find­
ings that we report. We begin by placing our research design in a more general so­
cial science context and then discuss the strengths and weaknesses associated with 
that design. Finally, we turn to what proves to be a quite complex question: When 
can it be said that there is a consensus among our individual respondents in their 
treatment of cases? This brings us again to a discussion of the role of community 
views in drafting legal codes. 
OUR RESEARCH DESIGN IN CONTEXT 
In a good many ways, our present research method resembles what Rossi and 
Nock ( 1 982) refer to as a "factorial survey:' As they report, the method of factorial 
survey was designed to gain an empirically based understanding of people's judg­
ments in various domains. Basically, it asks people to judge a number of cases and 
then analyzes the pattern of judgments across cases in order to determine the 
judgmental principles that the people are using. 
The factorial survey method combines elements from experimental psychology 
with those of survey sociology. From experimental psychology one takes the no­
tion of the balanced multivariate experimental design and from sociology the 
method of sample survey procedures. Subjects are presented with a number of 
cases to judge, and these cases differ on the various factors that the researchers 
think might make a difference to the respondents. The cases are arranged so that 
the different factors are varied orthogonally, enabling an assessment of the inde­
pendent contribution of the different factors to the final judgment. Because a rea­
sonable sample of respondents is surveyed, it is possible to determine to what de­
gree the judgment structure is a shared one and to what extent it differs between 
individuals in the sample. 
An example may make this clear. Automobiles differ on a number of dimen­
sions, but surely safety on the road, gas mileage, and price are three of them. Sup­
pose, for a beginning, we set three levels of each of the three factors. Combining 
each level of each factor together generates 27 (33) cases. 1 By having a number of 
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respondents rate each case, we would be able to determine the weight they put on 
each dimension in determining their preference. We would expect some consen­
sus on the ratings; we would be surprised if anyone did not put a reasonable 
weight on safety. However, we would also expect some individual differences in 
the ratings as well; one respondent might value gas mileage a great deal; another 
might care more about price. 
In the present studies, our goals have caused us to deviate from standard facto­
rial survey methods in several ways. First, our research was theory-driven in a 
particular way. Because we are interested in only a subset of dimensions that 
might determine judgments, we designed cases that varied only on those dimen­
sions rather than on all of the possible dimensions that might contribute to hu­
man judgments. Specifically, we examined the dimensions of a crime that were 
signified by legal codes as important, such as culpability or the presence or ab­
sence of excusing conditions. We also examined the plausible alternate dimen­
sions that had some claim to be included within the legal codes and along which 
we suspected our respondents might assess the cases. Certain dimensions that do 
not have a claim to be included within the legal code were omitted from the stud­
ies. For instance, a considerable body of research suggests that the physical attrac­
tiveness of the defendant can make a considerable difference in the sentence 
handed down for a crime. Despite this fact, there is no argument that recom­
mends including such a dimension in legal codes, and we did not include a physi­
cal attractiveness dimension in our studies. 
Second, although it will be relevant in future studies, we were not initially con­
cerned with a highly precise assessment of group or individual differences in 
judgments, so we did not include the larger numbers of respondents that would 
have been required to assess such differences in a more precise fashion. Also, we 
did not do the careful sampling of a defined population that would be required to 
precisely generalize our results-with a known degree of error-to this popula­
tion. Our reasons for this, discussed in Chapter 1, involved a decision as to what 
we thought was valuable to achieve in these initial studies (investigating the moral 
intuitions of the community and discrepancies between those intuitions and the 
legal codes) .  
The procedures we used for examining the community's views on appropriate 
punishments for various crimes can be quickly overviewed. We contacted people 
to participate in our studies and asked for their views on the appropriate level of 
liability to assign to perpetrators of various crimes that we described to them. 
Each individual read about a particular crime case, "a scenario'' in our vocabu­
lary, and was asked to decide whether a criminal sentence was appropriate for the 
perpetrator. Individuals, "subjects" or "respondents" as we call them, then read 
another crime scenario and assigned a punishment to it. The sets of scenarios that 
our respondents were given usually were identical in a set of core elements and 
differed only on the dimensions that we thought would make a difference in their 
liability judgments or were thought by criminal codes to make such a difference. 
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By this method of examining the differing sentences assigned to closely related 
cases, we sought to determine whether shared community notions of justice exist 
and, if so, on which issues, as well as the ways in which such notions compare to 
current law. 
For example, criminal codes often treat the crime of forcible sexual intercourse 
differently if it is committed between individuals who have had a previous sexual 
relationship. Is this in accord with the way people currently think about rape? To 
determine this, we first developed a description of a rape that could function as 
the core of a scenario. To form the "stranger" scenario, we then added to that core 
a few sentences making it clear that the two parties were strangers to one another. 
To form another of the scenarios, we added to the core a few sentences making it 
clear that there had been a previous sexual relationship between the two parties. 
In this way, we formed the various scenarios that were needed for investigating 
the various issues in sexual offenses. Using the same general procedure of core 
and additions to the core designed to create the variations of interest to codes and 
community standards, we developed the sets of scenarios that we used for all of 
our studies. 
Reported in this book are 18 studies that were designed and executed in semi­
nars at Rutgers University School of Law in Autumn of 1990 and Spring 1991, 
with the help of faculty and graduate students from the Princeton University De­
partment of Psychology. Some of the studies informed us as to conduct that the 
community believes should be criminalized or as to the conditions that exculpate 
a ·normally blameworthy violation of a legal rule. Other studies were directed at 
community standards for appropriate behavior in defense of selfor property. In 
still others, on the vexing questions of actions committed while the offender is in­
toxicated or insane, we returned to some of the oldest questions at the intersec­
tion of law and social science. In the book, we discuss the results of our studies 
and attempt to draw out the implications of our findings for the criminal code. To 
help the reader evaluate the evidence, we now will take a closer look at our re­
search methodology and particularly at its potential pitfalls. 
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
OF OUR RESEARCH METHODS 
Each study presented subjects with a series of scenarios depicting variations of a 
criminal episode. Each scenario embodied a particular variable or combination 
of variables that ·were to be tested. The subjects typically were asked to indicate 
the liability that they would impose given the facts described, and their responses 
to the different scenarios were compared to determine the effect of the variable or 
variables. 
For non-social-science readers, the dangers and limitations of such "scenario" 
research should be noted. Briefly, three difficulties exist. First, the scenarios may 
not be perceived by the respondents as we hoped they would be. Second, because 
our version of the experimental design asks the same respondent to respond to 
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many versions of the same core scenario, the differences between those scenarios 
are highlighted and called to the respondent's attention in a way that they might 
not be in other situations. Third, the people we tested, "the samples we drew" in 
technical parlance, were not selected to represent the population of the United 
States or even of a particular state or jurisdiction. They were individuals whom we 
contacted who were willing to participate. In the end, more than seven hundred 
individuals had participated in our studies. 
Next we will say a bit more about each of the difficulties that we have just de­
scribed, what we did to combat them, and what limits they still impose on our 
findings. 
The first, that "the scenarios might not be perceived by the respondents as we 
hoped they would be:' really references a whole family of related concerns. When 
we were writing scenarios about the amount of force that it is legitimate to use in 
self-defense, for instance, suppose we attempted to create a case in which the de­
fender used just sufficient force to stop the attack on him. But did the subjects 
read the case in that way? That is an open question. The standard procedure to 
answer the question involves asking the respondent to report not only on the lia­
bility he or she would assign to the person but on �he various ways that he or she 
perceived the details of the case. So in this instance, we would ask the respondents 
to tell us "if the force used was just sufficient to deter the attack" or greater or less 
than that. These questions that test the respondent's general perceptions of the 
story (and whether these perceptions agree with the ones that the researchers in­
tended to create) are called "manipulation checks." Sometimes we "passed" the 
checks and sometimes we did not. That is, sometimes the respondents read the 
stories as we intended, and sometimes, even though we wrote and rewrote nu­
merous versions of the stories, they did not. 
Further, it is not enough to confirm that the subjects perceive the scenario as 
presenting the factor that the researcher wishes to have represented. One needs to 
be careful that a change in one element of the story, intended to create one per­
ception, does not create others as well. For instance, in some jurisdictions, an in­
sanity defense is provided if an individual suffers from what is called a "control 
dysfunction." In other jurisdictions, only an individual who suffers from a "cog­
nitive dysfunction" qualifies for the defense. To test which formulation agrees 
with the views of the respondents, we needed to create a scenario version in which 
a person assaults or kills another and does so because he has a control dysfunction 
rather than a cognitive dysfunction. (And, in another version, vice versa.) To see 
that the scenarios were correctly interpreted, we asked readers questions about 
what degree ofboth dysfunctions they inferred from the story. Not surprisingly, it 
was often the case that the reader inferred both a control and a cognitive dysfunc­
tion from information that we had hoped would create the inference of one dys­
function but not the other. People process information in rich, multiple, and 
complex ways, when occasionally we wished that they wouldn't. 
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Even confirmation that the tested variables are properly perceived does not 
guarantee usable results, however. In addition, a researcher must attempt to dem­
onstrate that the scenarios are not perceived as presenting other unintended but 
potentially influential factors. If such extraneous factors exist and are perceived as 
being present in varying degrees in different scenarios, differences in liability re­
sults may reflect the subjects' reaction to the unintended factor rather than to the 
variables sought to be tested. One method of reducing such unintended varia­
tions is to have all scenarios use the same basic facts-with differences only to re­
flect the intended variables. While this procedure might seem relatively effective 
at reducing unwanted variations, it has its limitations. A subject may give differ­
ent meaning to identical language in different scenarios. Context matters, as we 
occasionally discovered in our studies. 
Given these difficulties, it came as no surprise to us that some studies required 
five or ten drafts and pretests of the test instrument before they could be adminis­
tered to the full subject pool. Even where the manipulation seems successful, 
however, there is always the theoretical possibility that an unidentified factor in­
fluenced the liability results. As we learn more about the determinants of liability 
from the community's perspective, we will be in a better position to identify and 
control the effect of unintended influences. Only the last study on the last unre­
solved liability factor can be a perfect study. 
Now to the second difficulty. All of our studies employed what is called a 
within-subjects design. A within-subjects design has each subject respond to all of 
the scenarios in a study (a between-subjects design, the primary alternative, has 
each subject respond to only one or some of the scenarios). Within-subjects de­
signs, when they can be used, have an enormous advantage over between-subjects 
designs: they get rid of a certain kind of error. An illustration will make this dear. 
Our research question concerns whether people see forcible sexual intercourse 
between people who have had a previous sexual relationship as less serious than 
between strangers. If we were to attack this with a between-subjects design, we 
would give individual A a description of a rape between strangers and individual 
B a description of a rape between acquaintances. But suppose, by the bad luck of 
the draw, A was a person who does not think rape of any sort is much of a crime 
and, thus, assigns the stranger rape case a low penalty. However, person B consid­
ers rape of any kind a major offense and assigns the acquaintance rape case a high 
penalty. 
Seeing only those results, we might be led to the odd conclusion that stranger 
rape is considered a less-serious offense than acquaintance rape! More likely we 
might conclude that people saw no difference between them. 2 Note that these re­
sults are not inconsistent with the possibility that both persons A and B see 
stranger rape as more worthy of punishment than acquaintance rape. A within­
subjects design would reveal this. Person A, who rated the stranger rape low, 
would rate the acquaintance rape even lower. Person B, who rated the acquain-
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tance rape as requiring a stiff prison sentence, would rate the stranger rape as re­
quiring an even higher sentence. 
So a within-subjects design is preferable from this point of view-if using it 
does not cause other problems. Given what we want to study, does its use cause 
other problems? Yes, but we judged them to be manageable, and so we opted to 
use within-subject designs. Now to an account of those problems. 
One disadvantage of a within-subjects design is that, to keep the task manage­
able for subjects, the number of scenarios in a study must be limited. On balance, 
we thought that we could live with the limitation on the number of scenarios. 
There also is the danger that, where multiple scenarios are given to a single sub­
ject, the order in which a subject sees the scenarios may affect his or her re­
sponses. We attempted to minimize the potential order effects by "randomizing" 
the scenario order. Thus, different groups of subjects considered the scenarios in 
a different order. This makes possible a statistical test for what are called "order 
effects," and they proved not to be of particular concern. 
The main problem in a within-subjects design is the possibility that subjects 
will focus more directly on the variable being tested than they might in other cir­
cumstances. Because subjects see all of the test scenarios and because the sce­
narios differ only in relation to the variables being tested, the differences that are 
being tested inevitably are obvious to the subjects. If subjects seek to give results 
that are expected of them (as much social science research suggests) ,  they may 
tend to give greater weight to the differences between scenarios than they might if 
they confronted these differences in another context. 
Actually, there are two related differences here. First, subjects may give defer­
ence to distinctions that they do not believe are relevant. Second, subjects may ex­
aggerate the significance that they give to a factor that they do find relevant. We 
sought to minimize these possibilities by insisting to subjects that there were no 
right answers and that it was acceptable to find that differences between scenarios 
were not significant. Each study contained instructions to this effect. In fact, sub­
jects frequently gave "no difference" responses to a series of clearly different sce­
narios, even though the instrument's design was classically thought to suggest to 
them that the researchers wanted to see different responses. So we were not overly 
concerned with subjects being driven to find nonexistent differences between sce­
narios. We ended up thinking that having subjects who were aware that they were 
comparing cases was useful, because the subjects generated a more informed and 
thoughtful response-something we thought valuable for our specific purposes. 
Another difficulty with our studies is not inherent in the research design but 
lies instead in the particular procedures we used for selecting our respondents. 
Putting it inelegantly, we grabbed whomever we could get our hands on. Typi­
cally, the subjects were neighbors, family, or friends of the students. Law students, 
lawyers, and persons involved in the criminal justice process, such as police offi­
cers, were barred as subjects because we thought that their responses might be 
driven by their knowledge of the details of the legal codes. 
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Having said all of that, our subjects did show a reasonable demographic varia­
tion. The number of subjects that took part varies among the studies. Forty sub­
jects per study is typical. Demographic information was collected on the subjects, 
and the 307 subjects in the first semester's sample had the following demographic 
characteristics: 
Political 
Age % Income (U.S. dollars) % Education % Affiliation % 
Less than 20 0.7 Less than 1 0,000 3.0 High school 26.4 Democrat 32.3 
20-29 37.2 10,000-24,000 1 4.2 College 47.2 Independent 3 1 . 1  
30-39 1 7.8 25,000-39,000 28.3 Graduate degree 26.4 Republican 36.6 
40-49 24.2 40,000-54,000 2 LO 
50-59 1 0.4 55,000-69,000 1 5.5 Sex % 
60-69 5.7 70,000-95,000 1 1 .6 Female 56.4 
70-79 3.7 More than 100,000 6.4 Male 43.6 
BO or more 0.3 
These results suggest considerable diversity in the subject population. We thought 
these accidental samples were a reasonable place to begin our research. As the re­
search continues and (as we hope) others are drawn into it, it may be useful to 
turn to more self-consciously drawn samples that are constructed to be demon­
strably representative of various populations that are defined by the code-drafting 
conditions as central. For instance, if a state legislature was contemplating a 
change in the legal code of the state, then one would want to carefully draw a rep­
resentative sample of the population of that state. 
It would also be useful to use a research design that including some elements of 
a between-subjects design. We have argued that the awareness of the differences 
between conditions that is created by the within-subjects design is not likely to af­
fect the outcomes of the study, but it would be well to verify this when the results 
were going to affect code drafting. 
THE PENALTY SCALE AND WHAT CAN BE LEARNED 
FROM THE SUBJECTS' PENALTY RESPONSES 
An identical liability-punishment scale was used in each study to enable us to 
make some comparisons across studies as well as within studies. 
Crimina! liability and sentence for __ _ 
N 0 
no liab. liab. 
no 
punish. 
2 3 4 5 
I day 2 wks 2 mo 6 mo I yr 
6 7 
3 yr 7 yr 
8 9 1 0  I I  
15 yr 30 yr life death 
imprison-
ment 
The penalties on the scale were selected after an examination of the offense classi­
fication schemes used in current American criminal codes. The relative relation 
between each point on the scale represents the typical relation between grades of 
offenses in the states that use the �ore refined grading schemes (e.g., New York, 
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Illinois, Virginia, and Florida). The Model Penal Code is atypical in this respect, 
with fewer classifications (5) than most state codes (9). Because of this character­
istic of the scale, the results could be understood in liability terms (the grade of an 
offense) as well as punishment terms (the length of a term of imprisonment) .  
What can we learn from the subjects' responses to such a scale? Examining the 
experimental design gives us some answers to this question. Suppose that our re­
spondents, on the average, assign a liability scale score of 7.8 ( this translates into 
13.4 years) .  This can be useful in giving us a very approximate sense of the 
amount ofliability and punishment that the community thinks is appropriate for 
this offense. But it strikes us that it would be inappropriate to try to infer from 
their rating the grading of the offense, as it is doubtful that members of the com­
munity have strong feelings that a particular grade or length of sentence is essen­
tial. More likely, people may have only a general sense of the approximate degree 
of punishment that is appropriate. 
This observation is important to the analysis and use of liability results. The 
amount of punishment imposed by subjects in a given scenario should be under­
stood as providing no more than a general idea of where punishment should fall 
on the absolute scale. So the results should not be taken to mean that 13.4 years 
(7.8 on the penalty scale) and 2.4 years (5.7 on the scale) are, in the subjects' view, 
the specific punishments appropriate for stranger rape and spousal rape, respec­
tively. Every rape case will be different; the liability responses in any rape scenario 
represent only the subjects' view as to that particular case's description. Further, 
there also is some question as to what the subjects have in mind when they select a 
value ·on the penalty scale. Do they fully understand how much punishment is 
suffered through a sentence of 13.4 years imprisonment? Would their views 
change if they knew more? Although the instructions tell them to assume that the 
sentence will be served in full, are they sufficiently skeptical about current early 
release practices to the extent that they impose a higher sentence to account for 
this possibility? Is their notion of the "going rate" for this offense distorted by 
news of the high sentences that are commonly imposed (but not served) under 
the practice of early release? These and other uncertainties make the use of the lia­
bility results as absolute measures inappropriate. 
But exactly because we use a within-subjects design, the differences in sen­
tences assigned across variations in the same core scenario give us what we regard 
as reasonably precise information of a comparative sort. By assigning different li­
ability scores in these comparisons, the respondents can with some precision 
identify those situations that they see as more and less condemnable than others 
and those factors that increase and decrease the assignments of punishments. 
What this means is that the results are most useful as a means of comparing the 
subjects' views of different scenarios. A liability mean of7.8, where a person rapes 
a stranger, compared to 5 .  7, where the person rapes a spouse, would suggest that 
the community sees stranger rape as more serious than spousal rape. 
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This does not mean that the test results cannot be tied back to current sentenc­
ing practices. In many of the studies reported in this book, we had subjects rate 
"control, scenarios that describe relatively common forms of the study's offense, 
for which the current sentencing practice in any given jurisdiction may be pre­
dictable. By comparing the liability results to these benchmarks, one can get a 
rough idea of what the liability results would mean in current practice terms. For 
example, the felony-murder study included three control cases of rather straight­
forward purposeful, reckless, and negligent killings not committed in the course 
of another offense. By comparing the felony-murder results to each other, one can 
learn which variations are seen as more (or less) blameworthy. By comparing the 
results of each felony-murder variation to those of the control scenarios, one can 
determine which of the traditional homicide grades-murder, manslaughter, and 
negligent homicide-the subjects see each of the felony-murder scenario varia­
tions most akin to in overall blameworthiness. 
Having said all of this, we still think that sometimes the absolute value of a sen­
tence assigned can illuminate a community standard. It may give some general 
sense of the level of seriousness that is perceived. The data mentioned in the dif­
ferent rape cases, for example, suggests that while spousal rape is viewed as less 
serious than stranger rape, it nonetheless is seen as a serious offense-a view con­
trary to the common law and Model Penal Code rules, which provided a complete 
defense to spouses against charges of forcible intercourse. 
Still, one corollary to these observations about the limitations of scenario re­
search results is that singling out the exact liability assigned to any scenario within 
a study is rarely of value. The nature of the research puts the primary focus of the 
results on comparisons between scenarios within a study. And if the conclusions 
drawn from the results are to be reliable, the difficulties concerning subject per­
ception and scenario manipulation already described must be overcome. As the 
readers examine the study reports, we would remind you of the need to keep these 
points in mind. This illustrates the care with which these results must be used; we 
report them to begin a discussion rather than end one. 
THE QUESTION OF "CONSENSUS": 
AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT AMONG RESPONDENTS 
Many of the analyses of the data including in the 1 8  studies in this book compare 
current law to the statistical means of the subjects' liability responses, with the 
latter taken by us as representing the community's views. Of course, the subjects' 
liability mean is a reliable indicator of the community view only if the underlying 
methodology is sound. 3 Moreover, even if the methodology is sound, liability 
means alone do not always tell us all we need to know about the community's 
view. While a liability mean can always be calculated, it can mask considerable 
disagreement among the subjects. The liability mean does not disclose the level of 
agreement. To measure degree of agreement among respondents, it is customary 
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to use some measure of the «spread" or "dispersion" of their responses. The stan­
dard measure of dispersion is a statistic called the «standard deviation:' It has a 
number of useful properties, specifically that 68 percent of the sample's responses 
lie within one standard deviation of the mean of the distribution.4 
In the pilot projects described in this volume, the level of agreement varies con­
siderably from scenario to scenario. Some of this varia ton is artificial, that is, the 
product of the test instrument rather than a reflection of disagreement on the 
substantive issue. Apparent disagreement among subjects increases as the sce­
narios are open to greater differences of interpretation. Diversity in the subjects' 
perceptions of the situation naturally translates into diversity of their responses to 
the situation. Even with general agreement on how a scenario is perceived, how­
ever, there will be diversity of opinion on some issues. This is especially true in the 
studies in this book because controversy was one of the criteria used to select is­
sues for study. 
Empirically, it turned out that a considerable degree of agreement among re­
spondents exists on many matters. For some scenarios, there exists near unanim­
ity that punishment is inappropriate.5 For other scenarios, there exists near una­
nimity that some kind of punishment is appropriate.6 In these scenarios, the 
mean standard deviation of the liability responses is 1 .39. For a normal distribu­
tion, this means that 68 percent of all responses fall within 1 .39 points of the 
mean on the penalty scale? 
We are struck by this degree of agreement. It is significant that agreement exists 
even on issues that have probably never been the subject of public discussion, for 
it suggests that the shared notions are the result of some process other than intel­
lectual or political analysis, or direct knowledge of a societal consensus. We have 
frequently referred to an individual's judgment of appropriate liability as "intu­
itive," but in fact it is likely to be grounded in shared cultural understandings of 
the differential seriousness of different crimes, what counts as intentional, and so 
on. 
However, other scenarios generate a significant range of responses. In 20 per­
cent of the scenarios, the standard deviation of the liability responses exceeds 
3.50.8 This raises an interesting question. What level of agreement ought to be re­
quired before the expressed view of the "mean" subject is taken as giving us a 
"community standard"? Recall that we have already conceded that there are valid 
reasons why a legal code does not conform to a community standard. Let us as­
sume, however, that we are facing a particular case in which we grant the rele­
vance of a community standard to code formulation. When is a community stan­
dard "standard enough" to be used as a basis for formulating doctrine? On the 
one hand, at least a majority is required even to call a "position" a community's 
"view." On the other hand, it no doubt is rare that every member of a community 
agrees with a proposed rule or principle for adjudicating blame. Should more 
than a majority be required? If so, how much less than absolute agreement may be 
tolerated? 
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Precedent might be found in the two-thirds or other supermajority proportion 
typically required for a legislature to override the veto of an executive. The pro­
portion required to modify a state's constitution, sometimes three-fourths,9 is an­
other possible analogy. No particular proportion stands out, however, as an obvi­
ous logical preference. Beyond requiring that the proportion represent a 
substantial majority, the particular choice seems somewhat arbitrary. One might 
require a sufficiently high percentage so that the position will not be likely to 
change over short periods of time. A potential problem with requiring only a bare 
majority is this potential for slight shifts in community views to mandate changes 
in the liability rules. Indeed, such concern for the disruption that comes with too­
frequent changes may be at the root of the high proportions required to override 
an executive-branch decision or to change a constitution. 
Another reason to require more than a bare majority stems from the reasons 
for considering the community's views, discussed in the introductory chapter. If 
the utilitarian goal is to create dear moral credibility in the criminal law, it fol­
lows that the proportion of agreement must be high. The view of a bare majority 
can easily be dismissed as a matter on which reasonable people can disagree. A 
bare majority, after all, means that people are about equally divided on the issue. 
It is hardly persuasive to those in the minority to claim that "a majority'' disagree 
with them, if that majority can be changed with the decision of one person. A 
two-thirds proportion means that for every person in the minority, two people in 
the majority hold a contrary view. A three-quarters majority means that the mi­
nority are outnumbered three to one. One of these latter proportions seems more 
likely to give the sense of a strongly shared view, which would be needed to per­
suade the members of the minority to reconsider their view. 
Another argument derives from the utilitarian interest in maximizing the de­
terrent effect and cooperative appeal of the criminal law. The larger the propor­
tion of people who share in the majority view on an issue of blameworthiness, the 
greater will be the benefit to the criminal law of adopting that view, all other 
things being equal. At the very least, those who share in the view will see greater 
moral credibility in the criminal law and the larger that number, the larger the 
overall effect. 
These observations suggest that a supermajority proportion is appropriate for 
the just-desert goal as well. If philosophers care about the community's views, 
they certainly will be less inclined to reexamine a philosophically derived rule if it 
conflicts only with the views of one person more than the number who support it. 
The same may be said of us nonphilosophers. Only large majorities on an issue 
are likely to be significant in causing us to reassess what we think is and is not 
morally blameworthy. 
One argument against requiring more than a majority comes from the fact that 
the legal code must adopt some position. If this is so, should it not adopt the ma­
jority view over a minority view? The goal here is not to make criminal justice ad­
ministration a democratic function; the community ought not be voting the re-
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suits in the adjudication of individual cases. The argument here is that, if a 
majority of the community share one view on a rule for the distribution of crimi­
nal liability to be applied to all members in the community, that rule generally 
ought to be preferred to a minority-supported rule. 10 
Whatever conclusion one reaches on the degree of agreement that ought to be 
required to support a code position, no reform ought to be undertaken without 
such information on the degree of agreement. More advanced analysis of the data 
collected in the studies described in this book and more advanced studies than 
these can give a clearer picture of how much agreement exists on a specific issue. 
The studies described here are meant simply to illustrate the kinds of things that 
empirical research can teach about substantive criminal-law issues. 
Appendix B: 
Text of Stimulus 
Instrument Scenarios 
STUDY 1 :  
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF ATTEMPT 
Scenario 1 :  Thought Only (TH) 
(W) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept 
in a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray thinks about how easily 
he could sneak into the back room during normal business hours and "crack" the 
safe. Ray decides that he will rob the safe in the coin shop. Before he does any­
thing to prepare for the robbery, Ray tells a friend that he has decided to rob the 
safe. 
Scenario 2: Substantial Step (SS) 
( I )  Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in 
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the 
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin 
shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. Ray tells a friend what he 
has decided to do. 
Scenario 3: Unequivocality (EQ) 
(L) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in 
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the 
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin 
shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. Ray determines that he 
needs a special tool to crack the safe. He buys the parts he needs, and cuts and 
welds them to make the special tool, which has no lawful purpose. Ray tells a 
friend what he has decided to do. 
Scenario 3a: Renounces (EQR) 
(A) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in 
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the 
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safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin 
shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. While casing the coin shop, 
Ray meets the old man who owns the shop. Ray feels sympathy for the old man, 
whose business would be crushed by the robbery. Out of sympathy for the old 
man, Ray decides not to rob the safe. Ray tells a friend what he has done. 
Scenario 4: Probable Desistance (PD) 
(M) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept 
in a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob 
the safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the 
coin shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. Ray tells a friend about 
his plans to rob the safe the next day. His friend tells the police. The next day Ray 
drives to the coin shop to rob the safe, but when he is just one block away he is 
stopped by two undercover policemen who were alerted by Ray's friend. 
Scenario 5: Dangerous Proximity (PX) 
(P)  Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in 
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the 
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin 
shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. Ray tells a friend about his 
plans to rob the safe the next day. His friend tells the police. The next day Ray goes 
to the coin shop and slips into the back room, where he begins to crack the safe. 
Before Ray is able to open the safe, however, two undercover policemen burst into 
the room and arrest him. 
Scenario Sa: Dangerous Proximity-Renounces (PXR) 
(T) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in 
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the 
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin 
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the 
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another 
customer, Ray slips into the back room. As he is about to crack the safe, Ray feels 
sympathy for the owner, whose business would be crushed by the robbery, and 
decides not to crack the safe. Ray tells a friend about what he did and why he de­
cided not to rob the safe. 
Scenario Sb: Dangerous Proximity-Desists Out of Fear (FR) 
(H) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in 
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the 
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin 
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the 
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another 
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customer, Ray slips into the back room. As he is about to crack the safe, Ray hears 
someone say, "Good morning Officer Smith:' Ray looks into the next room and 
sees a police officer, and decides not to crack the safe out of fear of being caught in 
the act. Ray goes home and later tells a friend about what he did and why he de­
cided not to rob the safe. 
Scenario 6: Completed Offense 
(N) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in 
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the 
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin 
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the 
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another 
customer, Ray slips into the back room and cracks the safe. Ray slips away with a 
briefcase full of valuable coins. That night Ray tells a friend about what he did, 
and his friend tells the police. The next day two policemen search Ray's home 
with a search warrant, find the coins, and arrest him. 
Scenario 6a: Completed Offense-Renounces and «Undoes" (CPR) 
( 0) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in 
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the 
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin 
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the 
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another 
customer, Ray slips into the back room and cracks the safe. Ray slips away with a 
briefcase full of valuable coins. On the way home Ray feels sympathy for the 
owner of the coin shop, whose business will be crushed by the robbery, and de­
cides to return the coins before they are discovered missing. Ray returns to the 
coin shop, cracks the safe, replaces the coins and goes home. Later Ray tells a 
friend about what he did and why he decided to return the coins. 
Scenario 6b: Completed Offense-Renounces but Unable to «Undo" 
(R) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in 
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the 
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin 
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the 
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another 
customer, Ray slips into the back room and cracks the safe. Ray slips away with a 
briefcase full of valuable coins. On the way home Ray feels sympathy for the 
owner of the coin shop, whose business will be crushed by the robbery, and de­
cides to return the coins before they are discovered missing. Ray returns to the 
coin shop, but as he enters the store two policemen, called when the owner dis­
covered the robbery, see a coin sticking out of Ray's briefcase and arrest him. 
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STUDY 2: 
CREATING A CRIMINAL RISK 
Scenario 1: Slight Injury 
(R) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects 
poison into one of the raisins from the box, returns it to the box, and shakes the 
box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with 
time, until it is totally harmless after a few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as 
to the amount of poison required to cause death, and if Tom eats the raisin that is 
poisoned at breakfast, he will only suffer mild stomach cramps. 
Scenario 2: Moderate Injury 
(I )  Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects 
poison into one of the raisins from the box, returns it to the box, and shakes the 
box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with 
time, until it is totally harmless after a few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as 
to the amount of poison required to cause death, so that if Tom eats the raisin that 
is poisoned at breakfast, he will suffer material injury to his digestive tract. 
Scenario 3: High Injury 
(S) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects 
poison into one of the raisins from the box, returns it to the box, and shakes the 
box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with 
time, until it is totally harmless after a few hours. If Tom eats the raisin that is poi­
soned at breakfast, he will die. 
Scenario 4: Slight Injury 
(K)  Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
one piece of fruit from the fruit bowl. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast 
Mary injects poison into one of the two pieces of fruit in the bowl. Unbeknownst 
Appendix B 233 
to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally 
harmless after a few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as to the amount of poi­
son required to cause death, so that if Tom eats the piece of fruit that is poisoned 
at breakfast, he will only suffer mild stomach cramps. 
Scenario 5: Moderate Injury 
( 0) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
one piece of fruit from the fruit bowL Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast 
Mary injects poison into one of the two pieces of fruit in the bowl. Unbeknownst 
to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally 
harmless after a few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as to the amount of poi­
son required to cause death, so that if Tom eats the piece of fruit that is poisoned 
at breakfast, he will suffer material injury to his digestive tract. 
Scenario 6: High Injury 
(F)  Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divor�e. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
one piece of fruit from the fruit bowl. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast 
Mary injects poison into one of the two pieces of fruit in the bowl. Unbeknownst 
to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally 
harmless after a few hours. If Tom eats the piece of fruit that is poisoned at break­
fast, he will die. 
Scenario 7: Slight Injury 
(D)  Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects 
poison into almost all of the raisins in the box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison 
that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally harmless after a 
few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as to the amount of poison required to 
cause death, and if Tom eats the raisins that are poisoned at breakfast, he will only 
suffer mild stomach cramps. 
Scenario 8: Moderate Injury 
(E) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
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raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects 
poison into almost all of the raisins in the box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison 
that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally harmless after a 
few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as to the amount of poison required to 
cause death, so that if Tom eats the raisins that are poisoned at breakfast, he will 
suffer material injury to his digestive tract. 
Scenario 9: High Injury 
(A) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects 
poison into almost all of the raisins in the box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison 
that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally harmless after a 
few hours. If Tom eats the raisins that are poisoned at breakfast, he will die. 
Scenario 10: Slight Injury 
(T) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects 
poison into the raisins in the box. Tom eats the poisoned raisins. However, Mary 
made a mistake as to the amount of poison required to cause death, and Tom suf­
fers only mild stomach cramps. 
Scenario 1 1 :  Moderate Injury 
(H) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects 
poison into the raisins in the box. Tom eats the poisoned raisins. However, Mary 
made a mistake as to the amount of poison required to cause death, and Tom suf­
fers only material injury to his digestive tract. 
Scenario 12: High Injury 
(Z) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the 
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. 
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds 
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects 
poison into the raisins in the box. Tom eats the poisoned raisins, and dies. 
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STUDY 3: 
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLICITY 
Scenario 1 :  Only Thinks of Helping 
(H) Because John knows that Catherine is unhappily married, he wonders if she 
longs for her husband's death, which would make her a rich widow. She strikes 
him as a woman quite capable of murder, and he often thinks about approaching 
her and suggesting a plan in which she could kill her husband and get away with 
it. If she did decide to do it, John realizes that he would be willing to help her. Be­
fore he can sound her out on the subject, however, Catherine shoots her husband 
dead. 
Scenario 2: Failed Attempt to Help 
(A) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and 
claiming that it was an accident. 
One night at a party Catherine confides her murder plan to her sister and says 
she is going to try to buy a gun. They are unaware that John has overheard their 
conversation. He is secretly delighted. He does not tell Catherine what he has 
learned. The next day, he takes his own pistol and drives over to Catherine's house 
to give it to her. By the time he gets there, however, Catherine has already bought 
a gun and has used it to shoot her husband dead. 
Scenario 2a: Failed Attempt to Help/Murder Fails 
{N) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and 
claiming that it was an accident. 
One night at a party Catherine confides her murder plan to her sister and says 
she is going to try to buy a gun. They are unaware that John has overheard their 
conversation. He is secretly delighted. He does not tell Catherine what he has 
learned. The next day, he takes his own pistol and drives over to Catherine's house 
to give it to her. When he gets there, however, he sees police in the house and 
learns that Catherine has already shot at her husband, but missed. 
Scenario 3: Encourages/No Help 
{D)  Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and 
claiming that it was an accident. 
She confides her plan to John, sensing correctly that he will be delighted. He 
agrees with her that she should kill her husband. The next day, Catherine shoots 
her husband dead. 
Scenario 4: Minimal Help 
{S )  Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and claim­
ing that it was an accident. 
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She confides her plawto John, sensing correctly that he will be delighted. John 
agrees with her that she should kill her husband. She says she is going downtown 
that afternoon to buy a gun. John gives her the name of a gun store, where she 
goes and buys a gun. That night she uses it to shoot her husband dead. 
Scenario 4a: Minimal Help/Murder Fails 
(0) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and 
claiming that it was an accident. 
She confides her plan to John, sensing correctly that he will be delighted. John 
agrees with her that she should kill her husband. She says she is going downtown 
that afternoon to buy a gun. John gives her the name of a gun store, where she 
goes and buys a gun. That night she uses it to shoot at her husband, but she 
misses, and he is unharmed. 
Scenario 5: Substantial Help 
(M) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and 
claiming that it was an accident. 
Before she buys a gun, she stops at John's office and reveals her plan to him, 
sensing correctly that he will be delighted. John agrees that her plan is a good one. 
When she says she is on her way to buy a gun, John says, "I'll give you mine." He 
reaches into a drawer and hands her his pistol. She uses it that night to shoot her 
husband dead. 
Scenario 6: Necessary Help 
(E) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and claim­
ing that it was an accident. 
She confides her plan to John, realizing that he will be secretly delighted. He 
encourages her, and agrees that her plan is a good one. But one day she comes to 
his office in despair and tells him that she has been unsuccessful in buying a gun 
illegally and has decided to abandon her murder plan. At that point, John reaches 
into his desk drawer and hands her his gun. When she confesses her total igno­
rance of firearms, he instructs her how to use it. She takes the gun and uses it that 
night to shoot her husband dead. 
Scenario 6a: Necessary Help/Murder Fails 
(P) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and claim­
ing that it was an accident. 
She confides her plan to John, realizing that he will be secretly delighted. He 
encourages her, and agrees that her plan is a good one. But one day she comes to 
his office in despair and tells him that she has been unsuccessful in buying a gun 
illegally and has decided to abandon her murder plan. At that point, John reaches 
into his desk drawer and hands her his gun. When she confesses her total igno-
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ranee of firearms, he instructs her how to use it. She takes the gun and uses it that 
night to shoot at her husband, but she misses, and he is unharmed. 
Scenario 7: Unique and Necessary Help 
(I )  Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and claim­
ing that it was an accident. 
She goes to John's office and reveals her plan to him, sensing correctly that he 
will be delighted. He agrees with her that her plan is a good one, but he interrupts 
her to say, "When I left your husband an hour ago, he confided in me that he fears 
you are going to kill him. He is home packing right now to leave the country, and 
he plans on telling the police of his suspicions about you on his way to the air­
port." Catherine leaves John's office immediately at this news and goes home, 
where she finds her husband ready to leave for the airport. She shoots him dead. 
Scenario 8: Masterminds 
(G) John is a compulsive gambler and deeply in debt. He has thought of killing 
his business partner to gain control of the oil company, but is afraid the murder 
would be traced to him because the bad feelings between the two men are well­
known. John knows that Catherine is unhappily married, and he wonders if she, 
too, longs for her husband's death. She strikes him as a woman capable of murder. 
It occurs to him that if he could persuade Catherine to do the murder, they would 
both be very rich. He feels free to remind her of what a rich widow she will be­
come one day. He says to her, "Why wait?" Then he outlines a plan whereby she 
could shoot her husband and make it look like an accident. Catherine is startled, 
but she thinks it over and agrees to his idea. The next day, she shoots her husband 
dead, just as John planned it. 
STUDY 4: 
OMISSION LIABILITY 
Scenario 1 :  Stranger 
( Q) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old. 
Vic is 16  years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud­
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out­
"Help! I'm drowning:' Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that 
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. Walt cannot 
swim. But there is a lifesaving flotation device on the pier. Walt does not want Vic 
to drown and knows that he need only throw the flotation device into the water to 
rescue Vic. But Walt does not throw the flotation device into the water. Vic 
drowns. Later, Walt explains-" I didn't want him to drown. But I just didn't want 
to get too involved." 
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Scenario 2: Parent 
(U) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old. 
Vic is 16 years old. Walt is Vic's father. Suddenly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally 
pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out-"Help! I'm drowning." Pete then imme­
diately runs away, practically certain that Vic will drown. Walt is also practically 
certain that his son Vic will drown. Walt cannot swim. But there is a lifesaving flo­
tation device on the pier. Walt does not want his son Vic to drown and knows that 
he need only throw the flotation device into the water to rescue Vic. But Walt does 
not throw the flotation device into the water. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! 
didn't want him to drown. But I just didn't want to get too involved." 
Scenario 3: Contract 
(E) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old. 
Vic is 16 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Walt is 
working as a security guard whose job is to protect people and property on the 
pier. Suddenly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls 
out-"Help! I'm drowning:' Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain 
that Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. Walt the 
security guard cannot swim. But there is a lifesaving flotation device on the pier. 
Walt does not want Vic to drown and knows that he need only throw the flotation 
device into the water to rescue Vic. But Walt does not throw the flotation device 
into the water. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! didn't want him to drown. 
But I just didn't want to get too involved:' 
Scenario 4: Assumption 
(S) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old. 
Vic is 16 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud­
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out­
"Help! I 'm drowning." Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that 
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. Walt cannot 
swim. But there is a lifesaving flotation device on the pier. Another stranger 
approaches Walt and says-"I'll get the flotation device." Walt replies-"Wait. 
You go and get help. I'll see what I can do to rescue him:' The other person does 
as Walt suggests. Walt does not want Vic to drown and knows that he need only 
throw the flotation device into the water to rescue Vic. But Walt does not throw 
the flotation device into the water. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! didn't 
want him to drown. But I just didn't want to get too involved." 
Scenario 5: Stranger-High Danger 
(T) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old. 
Vic is 16 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud­
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out­
"Help! I'm drowning:' Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that 
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Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. There is no 
lifesaving flotation device on the pier. But Walt is an excellent swimmer. Walt does 
not want Vic to drown and knows that someone will have to dive into the water to 
rescue Vic. There is no one else on the pier. But Walt knows that man-eating 
sharks inhabit the body of water. So Walt does not dive into the water to rescue 
Vic. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! didn't want him to drown. But I was 
concerned about being attacked by sharks." 
Scenario 6: Stranger-Low Danger 
{ I )  Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 3 8  years old. 
Vic is 1 6  years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud­
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out­
"Help! I'm drowning." Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that 
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. There is no 
lifesaving flotation device on the pier. But Walt is an excellent swimmer. Walt does 
not want Vic to drown and knows that someone will have to dive into the water to 
rescue Vic. There is no one else on the pier. But Walt knows that the water may be 
cold and that there may be a current. So Walt does not dive into the water to res­
cue Vic. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! didn't want him to drown. But I was 
concerned that I might get muscle cramps and possibly drown myself." 
Scenario 7: Stranger-High Inconvenience 
( 0) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old. 
Vic is 1 6  years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud­
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out­
"Help! I'm drowning." Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that 
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. There is no 
lifesaving flotation device on the pier. But Walt is an excellent swimmer. Walt does 
not want Vic to drown and knows that someone will have to dive into the water to 
rescue Vic. There is no one else on the pier. Walt knows that it would not be dan­
gerous to dive into the water. But Walt is unemployed and is on his way to an im­
portant job interview. So Walt does not dive into the water to rescue Vic. Vic 
drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! didn't want him to drown. But I was concerned 
about missing my job interview." 
Scenario 8: Stranger-Low Inconvenience 
{N) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 3 8  years old. 
Vic is 1 6  years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud­
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out­
"Help! I'm drowning:' Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that 
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. There is no 
lifesaving flotation device on the pier. But Walt is an excellent swimmer. Walt does 
not want Vic to drown and knows that someone will have to dive into the water to 
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rescue Vic. There is no one else on the pier. Walt knows that it would not be dan­
gerous to dive into the water. But Walt is wearing a new silk suit. So Walt does not 
dive into the water to rescue Vic. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-" I didn't want 
him to drown. But I was concerned about getting wet." 
STUDY 5: 
USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE 
Scenario 1: Killing, No Self-Defense 
(K) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for protection. One night while 
he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man comes up 
to him and asks for some money. Paul is in a bad mood and tells the man to go 
away. The man continues to pester Paul until Paul says "you asked for it:' He then 
shoots and kills the man. 
Scenario 2: Killing, Self-Defense 
(I )  Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One 
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man 
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul with a knife. The man will kill him unless 
Paul acts fast. Paul pulls his gun and kills the attacker. 
Scenario 3: Knows Deadly Force Is Not Necessary Because Unarmed Attacker 
(L) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One 
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his
'
way back home, a man 
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul. Paul realizes that the man is unarmed and 
that he could definitely scare the man away just by pushing him, but he pulls his 
gun and kills the unarmed attacker. 
Scenario 4: Knows Deadly Force Is Not Necessary Because Could Retreat 
(X) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One 
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man 
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul with a knife. Paul notices that the man is 
limping and he realizes that he can easily run the half block to his house and be 
completely safe from his attacker, but instead he pulls his gun and kills the man. 
Scenario 5: Knows Deadly Force Is Not Necessary Because 
Could Retreat from Home 
(S) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One 
night while he is relaxing at home a man kicks in the front door of his house. The 
Appendix B 24 1 
man is armed with a knife and Paul realizes that unless he acts fast the man will 
kill him. Paul is standing by the back door to his house and he can retreat in com­
plete safety, but Paul grabs his gun and kills the armed attacker. 
Scenario 6: Believes Deadly Force Is Necessary but Mistaken 
as to Threat 
(M) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One 
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man 
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul. Paul believes that the man is armed with a 
knife and that the man will kill him unless he acts fast. Paul pulls his gun and kills 
his attacker. Paul later learns that the man was unarmed and could not have seri­
ously injured him. 
Scenario 7: Believes Deadly Force Is Necessary but Mistakenly 
Believes Retreat Not Possible 
{U) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One 
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man 
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul with a knife. Paul believes that the man will 
kill him unless he acts fast. Paul pulls his gun and kills the attacker. Paul did not 
realize at the time, however, that the man had a bad leg and that he could have 
easily run away from the man in complete safety. 
Scenario 8: Believes Deadly Force Is Necessary but 
Actor Provokes Attack 
(C) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One 
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home a man 
comes up to him and asks for some money. Paul annoyed that there are panhan­
dlers in his neighborhood, picks up a pipe and hits the man in the side of the 
head, intending to seriously injure him. The man does not fall but instead pulls 
out a knife and attacks Paul. The man will kill him unless Paul acts fast. Paul pulls 
his gun and kills the attacker. 
Scenario 9: Believes Deadly Force Is Not Necessary 
but Mistakenly Believes Deadly Force Legal 
(Y) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One 
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man 
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul. Paul knows that the man is unarmed and 
cannot seriously injure him. Believing that he is justified in doing so, Paul pulls 
his gun to defend himself and shoots and kills the unarmed attacker. 
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STUDY 6: 
USE OF FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 
Scenario 1 :  Necessary Force 
( J )  When Joe arrives at home from work, he finds a man attempting to steal his 
motorcycle. Joe immediately yells, "Hey! What do you think you are doing? Get 
away from that bike!" The man ignores Joe and continues in his attempt to hot 
wire the motorcycle. Joe approaches the man and grabs him around the arm. The 
man shrugs Joe off and continues hot wiring. Finally, Joe takes a swing at the man 
and hits him in the face. The man appears to be in pain and he runs off. The man 
is later apprehended by the police. 
Scenario 2: Questionably Necessary Force 
(L) When Joe arrives at home from work with his wife, he finds a man attempting 
to steal his motorcycle. Believing that it is absolutely necessary to protect his 
property, Joe approaches the man and punches him in the face. The man appears 
to be in pain and he runs off. Joe's wife begins to yell at Joe that the man was small 
and not very muscular and Joe probably could have scared him off with a yell. Joe 
later realizes that his wife was right. The man is later apprehended by the police. 
Scenario 3: Necessary Force Applied by Device 
( 0) A man sees Joe riding his new motorcycle and he follows Joe home to find out 
where Joe lives. The next day, while Joe is at work, the man returns to steal Joe's 
motorcycle. The motorcycle is parked in a locked garage, but the man has 
brought the proper tools to gain entry. After working on the lock for 20 minutes, 
the man successfully breaks through and opens up the garage door. When the 
door is fully opened an automatic device which Joe had previously set up is trig­
gered and the man is hit in the face with a mini-bean bag. This breaks his nose 
and he stops in his efforts to steal Joe's motorcycle and runs off. The man is later 
apprehended by the police. 
Scenario 4: No Imminent Threat (Perceived as Not Immediately Necessary) 
(C) Joe finds a man outside his house attempting to steal his motorcycle. Joe yells, 
"Hey! What do you think you're doing? Get away from that bike!" The man looks 
up and replies, "O.K. man, but I'll be back for your bike later when you are gone. 
Consider it as good as gone." The man holds his hand out and shows Joe that he 
has made an imprint of the keyhole of Joe's motorcycle. Joe realizes that this man 
is going to have a key made to fit Joe's bike so that he can quickly steal the bike at 
any time in the future. Joe is leaving his house to catch a plane for a business trip 
which he cannot delay. There is nothing else Joe can do to protect his motorcycle. 
Joe approaches the man and attempts to get the mold out of his hand. The man is 
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strong and does not flinch. Joe then takes a swing at the man, hitting him in the 
face. The man appears to be in pain, drops the day mold and runs off. The man is 
later apprehended by the police. 
Scenario 5: More Than Necessary Force by Choice 
(T) When Joe arrives at home from work, he finds a man attempting to steal his 
motorcycle. The man is of small build and is not very muscular. Joe realizes that 
he can simply scare the man away by yelling at him. He nonetheless approaches 
the man and punches him in the face. The man appears to be in pain and he runs 
off. The man is later apprehended by the police. 
Scenario 6: Deadly Force, Knowing Not Lawful 
(Y) Joe arrives home to find a man attempting to steal his motorcycle. Joe re­
quests the man to stop but the man refuses and continues in his effort to hotwire 
the cycle. Joe grabs the man by the arm but the man easily pulls away from him 
and continues with his work. Joe approaches the man again and punches him in 
the face. The man is not deterred. Joe picks up a stone and strikes the man on the 
head. The man is knocked down but is able to stand up again and has just about 
completed his work. While Joe believes that it may not be lawful to use a gun to 
prevent the theft of a motorcycle, he sees no other way to stop the man. He goes to 
his house just a few steps away, retrieves his gun, returns and shoots the man. The 
man survives and is later taken into custody by the police. 
Scenario 7: Deadly Force, Believing It Lawful 
(Z) Joe arrives home to find a man attempting to steal his motorcycle. Joe re­
quests the man to stop but the man refuses and continues in his effort to hotwire 
the cycle. Joe grabs the man by the arm but the man easily pulls away from him 
and continues with his work. Joe approaches the man again and punches him in 
the face. The man is not deterred. Joe picks up a stone and strikes the man on the 
head. The man is knocked down but is able to stand up again and has just about 
completed his work. Joe believes that the law allows him to use his gun to protect 
his property when it is absolutely necessary. He goes to his house just a few steps 
away, retrieves his gun, returns and shoots the man. The man survives and is later 
taken into custody by the police. 
STUDY 7: 
CITIZENS' LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
The eight scenarios below are premised on the following set of facts: 
Suzanne and William Smith are a married couple living in a two-story home. 
Suzanne is 39 years old and William is 40 years old. Suzanne is a secretary and 
works 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. William works the 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. shift at a 
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local car manufacturing company. Suzanne is typically home alone at night. 
When she goes to sleep, she keeps a weapon in the nightstand next to her bed in 
case of an emergency. 
Scenario 1 :  Rape: Deadly Force-Actual Offender 
(R) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up­
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a man who im­
mediately overpowers her. Suzanne is extremely frightened. The man quickly sub­
dues her, rapes her, and starts to leave. 
As the man makes his way out of her bedroom, Suzanne realizes that if she does 
not detain the man there is a great possibility that the man will never be appre­
hended. Suzanne reaches into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a handgun 
and shouts, "stop you bastard or I ' ll shoot!" As the man dashes for the door, 
Suzanne jumps out of bed and races after him. The man runs down the stairs and 
out of the back screen door. As Suzanne reaches the back door she raises the gun 
and shoots through the screen door into the dark. She hears the thump of a body 
hitting the ground and when she opens the door she finds that she has shot and 
killed the man who raped her. The milkman, making his early morning deliveries, 
was standing nearby looking surprised. 
Scenario 2: Rape: Deadly Force-Mistaken Identity 
(C) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up­
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a man who im­
mediately overpowers her. Suzanne is extremely frightened. The man quickly sub­
dues her, rapes her, and starts to leave. 
As the man makes his way out of her bedroom, Suzanne realizes that if she does 
not detain the man there is a great possibility that the man will never be appre­
hended. Suzanne reaches into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a handgun 
and shouts, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" As the man dashes for the door, 
Suzanne jumps out of bed and races after him. The man runs down the stairs and 
out of the back screen door. As Suzanne reaches the back door she raises the gun 
and shoots through the screen door into the dark. She hears the thump of a body 
hitting the ground and when she opens the door she finds that the man she shot 
and killed was not the man who raped her but was the milkman making his early 
morning deliveries. 
Scenario 3: Rape: Nondeadly Force-Actual Offender 
( I )  One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up­
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a man who im­
mediately overpowers her. Suzanne is extremely frightened. The man quickly sub­
dues her, rapes her, and starts to leave. 
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As the man makes his way out of her bedroom, Suzanne realizes that if she does 
not detain the man there is a great possibility that the man will never be appre­
hended. Suzanne reaches into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a stun gun 
(an instrument which will temporarily stun an individual but will not cause seri­
ous bodily injury) and shouts, "stop you bastard or I 'll shoot!" As the man dashes 
for the door, Suzanne jumps out of bed and races after him. The man runs down 
the stairs and out of the back screen door. As Suzanne reaches the back door she 
raises the stun gun and shoots through the screen door into the dark. She hears 
the thump of a body hitting the ground and when she opens the door she finds 
that she has shot and stunned the man who raped her. The milkman, making his 
early morning deliveries, was standing nearby looking surprised. 
Scenario 4: Rape: Nondeadly Force-Mistaken Identity 
(K) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up­
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a man who im­
mediately overpowers her. Suzanne is extremely frightened. The man quickly sub­
dues her, rapes her, and starts to leave. 
As the man makes his way out of her bedroom, Suzanne realizes that if  she does 
not detain the man there is a great possibility that the man will never be appre­
hended. Suzanne reaches into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a stun gun 
(an instrument which will temporarily stun an individual but will not cause seri­
ous bodily injury) and shouts, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" As the man dashes 
for the door, Suzanne jumps out of bed and races after him. The man runs down 
the stairs and out of the back screen door. As Suzanne reaches the back door she 
raises the stun gun and shoots through the screen door into the dark. She hears 
the thump of a body hitting the ground and when she opens the door she finds 
that the man she shot and stunned was not the man who raped her but was the 
milkman making his early morning deliveries. 
Scenario 5: Property Destruction: Deadly Force-Actual Offender 
(J) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up­
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a sound outside 
of her bedroom window. She gets out of bed, looks outside and sees a man setting 
fire to the inside of her car. Suzanne realizes that if she does not detain the man 
there is a great possibility that the man will never be apprehended. She reaches 
into the drawer ofher night stand, pulls out a handgun and shouts out of the win­
dow, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" Suzanne runs down the stairs and out of the 
front door. When she is outside she sees a man running away at the bottom of her 
driveway. Suzanne raises the gun and shoots. She sees the man fall  to the ground. 
The man Suzanne shot and killed was the man who set her car on fire. The milk­
man, making his early morning deliveries, was standing nearby looking sur­
prised. 
246 Appendix B 
Scenario 6: Property Destruction: Deadly Force-Mistaken Identity 
(H)  One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up­
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a sound outside 
of her bedroom window. She gets out ofbed, looks outside and sees a man setting 
fire to the inside of her car. Suzanne realizes that if she does not detain the man 
there is a great possibility that the man will never be apprehended. She reaches 
into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a handgun and shouts out of the win­
dow, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" Suzanne runs down the stairs and out of the 
front door. When she is outside she sees a man running away at the bottom of her 
driveway. Suzanne raises the gun and shoots. She sees the man fall to the ground. 
The man Suzanne shot and killed was not the man who set her car on fire but was 
the milkman who was making his morning deliveries but who saw the fire and 
was running to call for help. 
Scenario 7: Property Destruction: Nondeadly Force-Actual Offender 
( 0) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up­
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a sound outside 
of her bedroom window. She gets out ofbed, looks outside and sees a man setting 
fire to the inside of her car. Suzanne realizes that if she does not detain the man 
there is a great possibility that the man will never be apprehended. She reaches 
into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a stun gun (an instrument which will 
temporarily stun an individual but will not cause serious bodily injury) and 
shouts out of the window, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" Suzanne runs down 
the stairs and out of the front door. When she is outside she sees a man running 
away at the bottom of her driveway. Suzanne raises the stun gun and shoots. She 
sees the man fall to the ground. The man Suzanne shot and stunned was the man 
who set her car on fire. The milkman, making his early morning deliveries, was 
standing nearby looking surprised. 
Scenario 8: Property Destruction: Nondeadly Force-Mistaken Identity 
(N) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up­
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a sound outside 
of her bedroom window. She gets out ofbed, looks outside and sees a man setting 
fire to the inside of her car. Suzanne realizes that if she does not detain the man 
there is a great possibility that the man will never be apprehended. She reaches 
into the drawer ofher night stand, pulls out a stun gun (an instrument which will 
temporarily stun an individual but will not cause serious bodily injury) and 
shouts out of the window, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot! " Suzanne runs down 
the stairs and out of the front door. When she is outside she sees a man running 
away at the bottom of her driveway. Suzanne raises the stun gun and shoots. She 
sees the man fall to the ground. The man Suzanne shot and stunned was not the 
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man who set her car on fire but was the milkman who was making his morning 
deliveries but who saw the fire and was running to call for help. 
STUDY 8:  
OFFENSE CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
AND MISTAKE/ACCIDENT DEFENSES 
Scenario 1: As to Causing Damage to House 
( 0) Chris Bradley lives in a small three bedroom house with a wooden shed in the 
backyard which leans up against a fence which divides his property from that of 
his next door neighbor. In July, Chris decides to store some of the chemical sam­
ples sold by his company in his shed until the warehouse being built at work is 
completed. The next day, Chris and two of his employees unload a small truck 
load of various chemical samples into Chris's shed. Unfortunately, the tempera­
ture steadily rises during the next week and the increased heat causes some of the 
barrels of chemicals to spontaneously combust and Chris's shed catches on fire. 
The fire spreads to his neighbor's house which is destroyed. Fortunately, Chris's 
neighbors are away on vacation and no one is injured. The fire then extinguishes 
itself. Chris Bradley is arrested for arson. 
(a) Knowing 
(IV) Now, assume the following: Chris Bradley was practically certain the 
chemicals would explode, but stored them in the shed anyway because he was an­
gry with his neighbor. 
(b) Reckless 
(III) Now, assume the following: Chris Bradley was aware of a substantial 
chance that the chemicals could explode, but decided to store them in the shed 
anyway because he was unhappy with his neighbor. 
(c) Negligent 
(II) Now, assume the following: It never occurred to Chris Bradley that the 
chemicals would explode, but a reasonable person would have been aware that 
there was a risk of explosion and would have taken precautions to prevent it. 
(d) Faultless 
(I) Assume the following: It never occurred to Chris Bradley that the chemicals 
would explode because the barrels were improperly labeled by the manufacturing 
company which supplied the chemicals and as labeled were not subject to the risk 
of explosion. Thus Chris Bradley could not have been aware of the risk of explo­
sion. 
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Scenario 2: As to Causing Damage to Unimproved Property 
(R) Peter Jones lives in a peaceful rural area in a big old farmhouse with a barn in 
the back. The barn leans up against the fence which divides his property from that 
of his next door neighbor. In July, Peter decides to store some of the chemical 
samples sold by his company in his barn until the warehouse being built at work 
is completed. The next day, Peter and two of his employees unload a small truck 
load of various chem.ical samples into Peter's barn. Unfortunately, the tempera­
ture steadily rises during the next week and the increased heat causes some of the 
barrels of chemicals to spontaneously combust and Peter's barn catches on fire. 
The fire spreads to his neighbor's property and an entire field is destroyed. Fortu­
nately, Peter's neighbors are on vacation and no one is injured. The fire then 
extinguishes itself. Peter Jones is arrested for arson. 
(a) Knowing 
(IV) Now, assume the following: Peter Jones was practically certain the chemi­
cals would explode, but stored them in his barn anyway because he was angry at 
his neighbor. 
(b) Reckless 
(III) Now, assume the following: Peter Jones was aware of a substantial chance 
that the chemicals could explode, but decided to store them in his barn anyway 
because he was unhappy with his neighbor. 
(c) Negligent 
(II) Now, assume the following: It never occurred to Peter Jones that the chemi­
cals would explode, but this possibility would have occurred to a reasonable per­
son. 
(d) Faultless 
(I) Assume the following: It never occurred to Peter Jones that the chemicals 
would explode because the barrels were improperly labeled by the manufacturing 
company which supplied the chemicals and as labeled were not subject to the risk 
of explosion. Thus Peter Jones could not have been aware of the risk of explosion. 
Scenario 3: As to House Belonging to Another 
(C) Bill Smith lives in a relatively quiet neighborhood, except for Brad Wilson, 
who bought the house next door. Wilson has little regard for the peace and quiet 
of the neighborhood. In addition to having noisy late night parties, he has al­
lowed his house and property to become an eyesore. Over the course of the last 
two years the house has become virtually uninhabitable. After repeatedly com­
plaining to Wilson, to no avail, about the parties and the condition of the house, 
Bill Smith decides that the only way to resolve the problem is to buy the house 
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from Wilson. Smith, through his lawyer, makes such an attractive offer to Wilson, 
that Wilson quickly signs the agreement of sale. To celebrate the hefty profit he 
will make from the sale of his house when the deal is finalized at the closing in a 
couple of months, Wilson packs up all his belongings and departs for a two week 
island vacation. After Smith is certain that Wilson is gone, he surveys the property 
and decides that the house is worthless and purposefully burns the house to the 
ground. Upon Wilson's return from vacation, Wilson is very upset to find that his 
house has been destroyed and that there will be no closing. Subsequently, Bill 
Smith is informed that until the closing had actually taken place the house was 
still owned by Brad Wilson. Bill Smith is arrested for arson. 
(a) Knowing 
(IV) Now, assume the following: Bill Smith knew that the house was not his 
yet, but burned the house anyway because he was angry at his neighbor. 
(b) Reckless 
(III) Now, assume the following: Bill Smith was aware of a substantial chance 
that the house might not be his yet, but he went ahead and burned the house any­
way because he was unhappy with his neighbor. 
(c) Negligent 
(II)  Now, assume the following: It never occurred to Bill Smith that the prop­
erty was not his when he burned it, but this possibility would have occurred to a 
reasonable person. 
(d) Faultless 
( I )  Assume the following: It never occurred to Bill Smith that the house was not 
his yet because when the agreement of sale was signed his lawyer said to him, 
"Congratulations Bill, you've just bought yourself some peace of mind." 
Scenario 4: As to Unimproved Property Belonging to Another 
(U) Tom Janson lives in an area of small family owned farms and open fields that 
is relatively quiet, except for Jack Nelson who bought the fields next to Janson's 
farm. Nelson has little regard for the peace and quiet beauty of the area. In addi­
tion to having noisy parties and motorcycle races in the fields, he has allowed the 
fields to become overgrown and unsightly. Over the course of the last two years 
the fields have become an eyesore. After repeatedly complaining to Nelson, to no 
avail, about the parties, the motorcycles and the condition of the fields, Janson 
decides that the only way to resolve the problem is to buy the fields from Nelson. 
Janson, through his lawyer, makes such an attractive offer to Nelson, that Nelson 
quickly signs the agreement of sale. To celebrate the hefty profit he will make from 
the sale of his fields when the deal is finalized at the closing in a couple of months, 
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Nelson heads off for a two week island vacation. After Janson is certain that Nel­
son is gone, he surveys the fields and decides that in their current condition they 
are worthless and purposefully burns the fields to the ground. Upon Nelson's re­
turn from vacation, Nelson is very upset to find that his fields have been destroyed 
and that there will be no closing. Subsequently, Tom Janson is informed that until 
the closing had actually taken place the fields were still owned by Jack Nelson. 
Tom Janson is arrested for arson. 
(a) Knowing 
( IV) Now, assume the following: Tom Janson knew that the fields were not his 
yet, but he burned them down anyway because he was angry with his neighbor. 
(b) Reckless 
( III)  Now, assume the following: Tom Janson was aware of a substantial chance 
that the fields might not be his yet, but went ahead and burned them down any­
way because he was unhappy with his neighbor. 
(c) Negligent 
(II )  Now, assume the following: It never occurred to Tom Janson that the fields 
were not his when he burned them, but this possibility would have occurred to a 
reasonable person. 
(d) Faultless 
(I)  Assume the following: It never occurred to Tom Janson that the fields were 
not his yet because when the agreement of sale was signed his lawyer said to him, 
"Congratulations Tom, you've just bought yourself some peace of mind." 
Scenario 5: As to Victim's Lack of Consent in Rape 
(T) Louis Haggarty lives in Nevada, in a county where prostitution is legal, and 
visits a house of prostitution once a month. His favorite room in the house is 
called the "Rape Room" where the prostitute "pretends" to be asleep and the cli­
ent "pretends" to attack her and have forcible sexual intercourse with her. After 
Louis's most recent visit to the prostitution house he is arrested for rape. 
(a) Knowing 
( IV) Now, assume the following: Louis was practically certain that the "prosti­
tute" really had been kidnapped, but had forcible sexual intercourse with her any­
way. 
(b) Reckless 
( III) Now, assume the following: That night the "prostitute" told Louis that she 
had been kidnapped by the owners of the prostitution house and was being kept 
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there against her wilL Louis knew that there was a substantial chance that her 
story was true because the house had been in trouble before for kidnapping, but 
Louis had forcible sexual intercourse with her anyway. 
(c) Negligent 
(II) Now, assume the following: That night the "prostitute" told Louis that she 
had been kidnapped by the owners of the prostitution house and was being kept 
there against her will. Louis had heard from some friends that the prostitutes were 
telling wild stories to liven things up. The woman, however, told Louis again that 
she was being held against her wilL Louis thinks to himself, "Probably not, but 
her story might be true." Louis, however, has forcible sexual intercourse with her 
anyway. 
(d) Faultless 
(I )  Assume the following: That night the "prostitute" told Louis nothing and 
he proceeded to have forcible sexual intercourse with her. Neither Louis nor any 
reasonable person would have had any reason to know that the woman was being 
held against her will. 
Scenario 6: As to Victim Being Underage in Statutory Rape 
(N) David Johnson met Stacey Collins at his health dub which he visits approxi­
mately three times a week. After talking to Stacey on numerous occasions at the 
health dub, David asks Stacey to go out with him on a Friday night. David and 
Stacey go to dinner and then dancing and finally back to David's apartment 
where they engage in consensual intercourse. The next Monday, David Johnson is 
arrested for .statutory rape. Stacey Collins is fourteen years old, below the legal age 
of consent. 
(a) Knowing 
( IV) Now, assume the following: David Johnson knew that Stacey Collins was 
underage on the night they went out, but engaged in sexual intercourse with her 
anyway. 
(b) Reckless 
( III) Now, assume the following: David Johnson was aware of a substantial 
chance that Stacey Collins was underage on the night they went out, but engaged 
in sexual intercourse with her anyway. 
(c) Negligent 
(II) Now, assume the following: It never occurred to David Johnson that Stacey 
Collins was underage on the night they went out and engaged in sexual inter­
course, but this possibility would have occurred to a reasonable person. 
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(d) Faultless 
( I )  Assume the following: It never occurred to David Johnson and would not 
have occurred to a reasonable person that Stacey Collins was underage on the 
night they went out and engaged in sexual intercourse because she told him she 
was twenty-one and even had fake identification, which she showed to the 
bouncer at the dub where they went dancing. 
STUDY 9: 
CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLICITY 
In each of the following six cases, assume the following: 
Mark and Gregory arrive at the plant where they both work-Because Gregory 
has been drinking alcoholic beverages and is intoxicated, Mark is driving the au­
tomobile, which is borrowed from one of their joint friends. Mark has IJ.Ot been 
drinking. After they park� Gregory asks Mark for the· car keys so that he can drive 
home to change before work. 
Scenario 1: Purposeful as to Assisting Driving, Knowing as to Causing Death 
(C) Gregory says that if he rushes, and uses the West Gate as a short cut, he can 
make it back to the plant before the shift starts. Mark says, "Yeah, go ahead. Bring 
me back a jacket." Mark knows that the West Gate is now crowded with people 
coming to work and he is certain that if he gives the keys to Gregory, Gregory will 
hit someone at the gate and kill them. Nonetheless, he gives Gregory the car keys. 
Gregory speeds off toward the West Gate and, because of dangerous driving due 
to intoxication, he strikes and kills two workers just arriving for work through the 
West Gate. 
Scenario 2: Purposeful as to Assisting Driving, Reckless as to Causing Death 
(U) Mark says, "Yeah, go ahead. Bring me back a jacket." Mark is aware that be­
cause of Gregory's intoxication, there is a chance that if he gives the keys to 
Gregory, Gregory may have an accident and kill someone. Nonetheless, he gives 
the car keys to Gregory and proceeds into the plant. Gregory drives off for his 
house to change and ten minutes later, because of dangerous driving due to intox­
ication, Gregory collides with another car, killing the two passengers in the car. 
Scenario 3: Knowing as to Assisting Driving, Knowing as to Causing Death 
(L) Gregory says that if he rushes, and uses the West Gate as a short cut, he can 
make it back to the plant before the shift starts. Mark knows that the West Gate is 
now crowded with people coming to work and he is certain that if he gives the 
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keys to Gregory, Gregory will hit someone at the gate and kill them. Nonetheless, 
Mark pleads with Gregory not to drive because he (Gregory) is too intoxicated. 
Gregory continues to insist. Mark gives him the keys, and then proceeds into the 
plant. Gregory gets into the car and speeds off toward the West Gate. Because of 
dangerous driving due to intoxication, he strikes and kills two workers just arriv­
ing for work through the West Gate. 
Scenario 4: Knowing as to Assisting Driving, Reckless as to Causing Death 
(P) Mark is aware that, because of Gregory's intoxication, there is a chance that if 
he gives the keys to Gregory, Gregory may have an accident and kill someone. 
Nonetheless, he pleads with Gregory not to drive because he (Gregory) is too in­
toxicated. Gregory continues to insist. Mark gives him the keys and then proceeds 
into the plant. Gregory gets into the car and drives off for his house to change. 
Ten minutes later, because of dangerous driving due to intoxication, Gregory col­
lides with another car, killing the two passengers in the car. 
Scenario 5: Reckless as to Assisting Driving, Knowing as to Causing Death 
(A) Gregory says that if he rushes, and uses the West Gate as a short cut, he can 
make it back to the plant before the shift starts. Mark tells Gregory that he 
(Gregory) is too drunk to drive and proceeds into the plant with Gregory follow­
ing him. In the locker room, Mark puts his valuables, including the car keys, on 
the locker room bench. Before he heads for the bathroom, it occurs to him that 
Gregory might take the keys. Mark knows that the West Gate is now crowded with 
people coming to work. If Gregory takes the keys, Mark is certain that Gregory 
will hit someone at the gate and kill them. Mark nonetheless leaves the keys on the 
bench. When he returns, Gregory has taken the keys and left the plant. Gregory 
speeds off toward the West Gate and, because of dangerous driving due to intoxi­
cation, he strikes and kills two workers just arriving for work through the West 
Gate. 
Scenario 6: Reckless as to Assisting Driving, Reckless as to Causing Death 
(B) Mark tells Gregory that he (Gregory) is too drunk to drive and proceeds into 
the plant with Gregory following him. In the locker room, Mark puts his valu­
ables, including the car keys, on the locker room bench. Before he heads for the 
bathroom, it occurs to him that Gregory might take the keys and, if he does, Mark 
believes that Gregory may have an accident and kill someone. Mark nonetheless 
leaves the keys on the bench. When he returns, Gregory has taken the keys and left 
the plant. Gregory drives toward his house to change and ten minutes later, be­
cause of dangerous driving due to intoxication, Gregory collides with another car, 
killing the two passengers in the car. 
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STUDY 1 0: VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
Scenario 1: Purposeful Killing-Control 
(X) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, wants to kill him. 
VVhen his roommate arrives home, Brian starts beating his roommate. His room­
mate later dies from the beating. 
Scenario 2: Reckless Killing-Control 
( 0) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Brian wants to se­
verely beat his roommate but does not want to kill him. When his roommate ar­
rives home, Brian starts striking his roommate over the head with a lead pipe. His 
roommate later dies from the beating. 
Scenario 3: Pre-Intoxication Purposeful Killing-Purposeful Intoxication 
(B) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, wants to kill his 
roommate. Brian plans to beat his roommate over the head with a heavy object 
until his roommate dies. First, however, Brian drinks two six-packs of beer in the 
course of two hours to steel his nerves. Brian knows his alcohol tolerance is gener­
ally low. By the time he has finished the last beer, Brian is extremely intoxicated. 
At this point, Brian can barely stand up. His thought processes and vision are se­
verely impaired. His roommate then arrives home. Brian starts striking his room­
mate over the head with a lead pipe. His roommate later dies from the beating. 
The next day, Brian does not remember the beating. 
Scenario 4: Pre-Intoxication Purposeful Killing-Reckless Intoxication 
(T)  Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, wants to kill his 
roommate. Brian plans to beat his roommate over the head with a heavy object 
until his roommate dies. First, however, Brian goes out with his friends. Brian has 
recently been taking medication for his chronic back pain. Although he thinks 
that the medication's warning states that the consumption of alcohol might cause 
intoxication, Brian disregards the warning and consumes 3 beers. Brian becomes 
extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can barely stand. His thought pro­
cesses and vision are severely impaired. Brian somehow makes it back to his 
home. When his roommate arrives home, Brian starts striking his roommate over 
the head with a lead pipe. His roommate later dies from the beating. The next day, 
Brian does not remember the beating. 
Scenario 5: Pre-Intoxication Purposeful Killing-Negligent Intoxication 
(P) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, wants to kill his 
roommate. Brian plans to beat his roommate over the head with a heavy object 
until his roommate dies. First, however, Brian goes out with his friends. Although 
he has been taking medication for his chronic back pain, Brian has never read the 
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medication's warning. The warning clearly states that the consumption of alcohol 
while on the medication will result in extreme intoxication. Brian has 3 beers with 
his friends. Brian becomes extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can barely 
stand. His thought processes and vision are severely impaired. Brian somehow 
makes it back to his home. When his roommate arrives home, Brian starts strik­
ing his roommate over the head with a lead pipe. His roommate later dies from 
the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the beating. 
Scenario 6: Pre-Intoxication Reckless Killing-Purposeful Intoxication 
(J) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Brian wants to se­
verely beat his roommate to scare him but does not want to kill his roommate. 
First, however, Brian drinks two six-packs of beer in the course of two hours to 
steel his nerves. Brian knows his alcohol tolerance is generally low. By the time he 
finishes the last beer, Brian is extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can 
barely stand. His thought processes and vision are severely impaired. When his 
roommate arrives home, Brian starts striking his roommate with a lead pipe. His 
roommate later dies from the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the 
beating. 
Scenario 7: Pre-Intoxication Reckless Killing-Reckless Intoxication 
(H) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Brian wants to 
severely beat his roommate to scare him but does not want to kill his roommate. 
First, however, Brian goes out with his friends. Brian has recently been taking 
medication for his chronic back pain. Although he is aware of the medication's 
warning that the consumption of alcohol might cause intoxication, Brian disre­
gards the warning and consumes 3 beers. Brian becomes extremely intoxicated. 
At this point, Brian can barely stand. His thought processes and vision are se­
verely impaired. Brian somehow makes it back home. When his roommate ar­
rives home, Brian starts striking his roommate with a lead pipe. His roommate 
later dies from the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the beating. 
Scenario 8: Pre-Intoxication Reckless Killing-Negligent Intoxication 
(W) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Brian wants to 
severely beat his roommate to scare him but does not want to kill his roommate. 
First, however, Brian goes out with his friends. Although he has been taking med­
ication for his chronic back pain, Brian has never read the medication's warning. 
The warning clearly states that the consumption of alcohol while on the medica­
tion will result in extreme intoxication. Brian has 3 beers with his friends. Brian 
becomes extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can barely stand. His thought 
processes and vision are severely impaired. Brian somehow makes it back home. 
When his roommate arrives home, Brian starts striking him with a lead pipe. His 
roommate later dies from the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the 
beating. 
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Scenario 9: Pre-Intoxication Faultless Killing-Purposeful Intoxication 
(M) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Although he 
knows his alcohol tolerance is generally low, Brian consumes 2 six-packs of beer 
within the course of 2 hours. By the time he finishes the last beer, Brian is ex­
tremely intoxicated. At this point Brian can barely stand. His thought processes 
and vision are severely impaired. Then, Brian's friend Joe, who lives in another 
town, stops by for a visit. Upon Joe's arrival, Brian loses control of himself and 
starts striking Joe with a lead pipe. Joe later dies from the beating. The next day, 
Brian does not remember the beating. 
Scenario 1 0: Pre-Intoxication Faultless Killing-Reckless Intoxication 
(A) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, decides to go out 
with his friends. Brian has recently been taking medication for his chronic back 
pain. Although he thinks that the medication's warning states that the consump­
tion of alcohol might cause intoxication, Brian disregards the warning and con­
sumes 3 beers. Brian becomes extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can 
barely stand. His thought processes and vision are severely impaired. Noticing 
that Brian is intoxicated, Joe, one of Brian's friends, decides to drive Brian home. 
Upon arriving at his home, Brian loses control and starts striking Joe with a lead 
pipe. Joe later dies from the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the 
beating. 
Scenario 1 1 :  Pre-Intoxication Faultless Killing-Negligent Intoxication 
(L) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, decides to go out 
with his friends. Although he has been taking medication for his chronic back 
pain, Brian has never read the medication's warning. The warning dearly states 
that the consumption of alcohol while on the medication will result in extreme 
intoxication. Brian has 3 beers with his friends. Brian becomes extremely intoxi­
cated. At this point, Brian can barely stand. His thought processes and vision are 
severely impaired. Noticing that Brian is intoxicated, Joe, one of Brian's friends 
decides to drive Brian home. Upon arriving at his home, Brian loses control of 
himself and starts striking Joe with a lead pipe. Joe later dies from the beating. 
The next day, Brian does not remember the beating. 
STUDY 1 1 : INDIVIDUALIZATION OF THE 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF NEGLIGENCE 
Scenario A: Commission-Death 
(S) Sam decides that he wants to go hunting by himself in a very remote area out 
West. He drives for half a day on a gravel road through the mountains without 
seeing another car, house, or store. Sam camps out and is amazed at how quiet it 
is; he feels so far away from people. He thinks how great it would be to have a 
cabin there. He guesses there is a lot of wildlife, including bears, in the woods 
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around him. Just recently he read Alaska Bear Tales, a collection of stories about 
bear encounters. 
Early in the morning, after he finished a tasty breakfast of bacon and eggs, Sam 
hears a noise in the brush and quickly grabs his gun and fires it in the direction of 
the noise. Then he hears nothing. He runs through the thicket and evergreens to 
see what he has shot. He discovers that he has killed another hunter. 
Characteristic ( 1 1 ) Cultural Norms 
( 4S) Sam is an American Indian. In his tribe, the men hunt alone. They hunt in 
remote areas away from any people. Unlike most hunters, it is normal for the men 
to shoot at anything. This is because their kill is their food. No one ever killed an­
other hunter using this hunting method. 
Characteristic (SS) Substandard Education 
Sam had never been hunting before. 
Characteristic ( 6S) Old Age 
At age 82, Sam has gray hair and is very wrinkled. 
Characteristic (7S)  Religion (Knowledge) 
Sam's religion is not a traditional one, but. its beliefs include the fact that the 
forest, though beautiful and peaceful, is also filled with animals that are evil be­
cause they can be violent to man, and man is God's image. It is the duty of believ­
ers in the faith to destroy evil wherever they encounter it. Sam knows this from his 
religious lessons and he is very devout. 
Characteristic (8S) Recent Upset 
Sam was mugged only two nights ago. 
Characteristic (9S) Below-Normal Intelligence 
No matter how much Sam studied in school, he just could not understand the 
material. 
Characteristic ( 1 OS) Lack of Knowledge (Culture) 
Sam is originally from the Outback of Australia. They do not have firearms. 
They hunt with spears and know nothing about guns. Even though he can use a 
gun, Sam still doesn't really know the powerful impact of a gun and the distance a 
bullet can traveL 
Characteristic ( l l S) Immaturity 
Sam is a senior in high school and is seventeen years old. 
Characteristic ( 12S) Upbringing (Knowledge) 
When he was a child, Sam used to accompany his father to hunting club meet­
ings, and even occasionally, on a hunting trip with his father and uncle. 
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Characteristic ( 1 3S} Advanced Experience 
Sam has a college degree. He teaches part-time at the community college and is 
working on another college degree. 
Characteristic ( 1 4S)  Upbringing (Knowledge) 
Though no one in Sam's family has ever hunted, Sam's parents are both very 
safety-conscious people. Their young children followed the traffic rules for riding 
their bikes. They had their children take a driver education course before getting 
their licenses. The whole family had an escape plan in case of fire in the home. Ev­
eryone always had to wear their seatbelts. "Safety FirsC was the family motto. 
Characteristic ( ISS) Religion (Norms) 
Sam's religion holds that he absolutely must never worry about anything be­
cause God's will takes care of everything. Worrying would mean a lack of faith. 
Characteristic ( 1 6S)  Genetic Irregularity 
No matter what they did or where they were, both of Sam's parents were acci­
dent-prone. They said they always tried to be careful. But they couldn't help it. 
Sam's grandparents were the same. They were just an accident-prone family. The 
family doctor testified that there is an actual physical cause of their tendency to 
act too quickly which causes their accident-prone behavior, which is, in turn, 
caused by a hereditary enzyme deficiency. 
Characteristic ( 1 7S) Above-Normal Intelligence 
Sam always scored the top score on standardized tests at school, including the 
Iowa Test in grade school and the I.Q. test in high school. 
Scenario B: Omission-Death 
(M) Mart is the parent of Jennine, age 2 .  Jennine had always been a colicky baby. 
When she fussed, there was nothing that could be done for her. Mart usually 
leaves Jennine in front of the television, occasionally checking on her. One day, 
Jennine starts to cry a lot, holding her head and vomiting most of her food. She 
also shakes uncontrollably, which she has never done before. This goes on for two 
days. On the third day, Jennine dies. An autopsy reveals that she died of lead poi­
soning and that timely medical intervention would likely have saved her life. 
Characteristic ( 4M) Religion (Norms) 
The religion that Mart, as an adult, chooses to follow forbids seeking medical 
treatment for illness. 
Characteristic (SM) Upbringing (Knowledge) 
Mart was orphaned when she was a baby. She was raised in a very nice orphan­
age, which sent the children to public schools. Usually there was only one staff 
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member on duty to care for 10  children per shift. The children were kept sepa­
rated by age, so they never saw the younger children being taken care of. 
Characteristic (6M) Cultural Norms 
Mart lives in a very tight-knit community in a remote part of Maine. Everyone 
there is committed to keeping "civilization" away. The nearest doctor is in a town 
75 miles away and everyone thinks that is just dose enough. The community does 
not want the intrusion that a "town doctor" would be. They had a town meeting 
once and everyone said) "Who needs lawyers and doctors-if it weren)t for them) 
there wouldn)t be such a 'rat race: We like the simple life. That's why most of us 
left places like New York to live here." They all like their community just the way it 
is and are proud of being a self-reliant community. 
Characteristic (7M) Immaturity 
Since Mart is too young to drink alcohol) she just has a soda when she goes to 
any party that serves alcohol. Last year her favorite rock group was New Kids on 
the Block; now she loves Vanilla Ice. Mart is sixteen years old. 
Characteristic (8M) Below-Normal Intelligence 
Mart works in a sheltered workshop. She is a slow learner compared to other 
people. 
Characteristic (9M) Recent Upset 
Mart's mother and husband were very recently killed in an accident. 
Characteristic ( 10M) Above-Normal Intelligence 
Mart is a firm believer in learning as much as possible. She received her Bache­
lor's degree. Also, she took a mini-psychology course called "Parent Effectiveness 
Training" when she found out she was pregnant. 
Characteristic ( 1 1M) Religion (Knowledge) 
Mart knows from her religion that vomiting is not illness. Rather, the religion 
teaches that vomiting is a sign that evil spirits are being cast away. It teaches that 
when a child vomits, the child needs to be left alone for God to do his work 
against the evil. 
Characteristic ( 1 2M) Upbringing (Environment) 
Normally Mart's parents hardly ever took their children to the doctor. They al­
ways said that if you just waited 2 weeks, you would go to the doctor a lot less. 
Characteristic ( 1 3M) Above-Normal Intelligence 
Since first grade Mart was always an honor student. Learning just comes natu­
rally to her. 
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Characteristic ( 14M) Genetic Irregularity 
Mart's grandmother and mother seemed to have all kinds of different accidents 
and didn't understand how or why they happened. Even though they were smart 
and caring people and otherwise fine, the family doctor testified that all three 
women had a hereditary hormonal imbalance which causes them to be less obser­
vant of what goes on around them than most people would be in the same situa­
tion. 
Characteristic ( 1 5M) Old Age 
Mart is eighty-one years old and Jennine's grandmother. 
Characteristic ( 16M) Lack of Knowlege (Culture) 
Recently, Mart came to the United States from what is thought of as a "Third 
World Country." Because of a shortage of doctors, there was little medical care in 
her country, except for trauma. So, the medical care they know of consists mostly 
of surgical intervention or taking care of broken bones. They don't know that 
doctors take care of children for illnesses. 
Characteristic ( 1 7M) Substandard Education 
Even though Mart was an average student, she only finished grade school. 
Scenario C: Omission-Property Damage 
(R)  Ry owns an eight unit apartment building in Rochester; he has a duty to 
maintain the building properly. He also lives in one of the apartments. Last week, 
a fire started in the building, causing $500,000 of property damage before the fire 
was brought under controL Fortunately, no lives were lost and no one was seri­
ously injured. 
An investigation later determined how the fire started. The building hadn't 
been painted in some time and so much paint had peeled off that most of the hall­
ways had piles of paint in the corners. In the hallway where the fire started, the 
overhead light was just a naked light bulb. Someone had removed the protective 
light fixture and it had never been replaced. Apparently the fire started when a 
large piece of paint landed on the hot, naked bulb, caught fire, and fell to the floor 
before burning up, where it ignited other paint peelings. 
Ry was unaware that these conditions existed. Because he had a separate en­
trance to his own apartment and rarely went into the common hallways, he didn't 
know there was a risk of fire. He had not seen the flaked paint. He did not know 
that the protective light fixture �as missing. 
Characteristic ( 4R) Old Age 
Whenever anyone asks just how old eighty year old Ry is, he always says that he 
is "older than sand., 
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Characteristic ( SR) Advanced Experience 
Ry's job experience includes building maintenance work. 
Characteristic ( 6R) Genetic Irregularity 
A geneticist testified that there is a gene that can cause sporadic forgetfulness 
and lack of attentiveness. After studying Ry's parents and Ry, he concluded that 
Ry has inherited the trait. 
Characteristic (7R) Upbringing (Knowledge) 
Ry never saw either parent ever do any maintenance work on their house. Be­
cause of his father's job, they moved a lot into new homes that never needed 
painting or any other kind of maintenance work. As a result, he has no knowledge 
of what building maintenance entailed. 
Characteristic (8R) Below-Normal Intelligence 
Ry is willing to try to learn new things, but not too many people have the pa­
tience to teach him. He just doesn't catch on very quickly. 
Characteristic (9R) Religion (Knowledge) 
Ry's religion teaches him that whatever was good could stand the test of time 
and whatever was evil would not last. If a tree grows for 100 years, it is because of 
good. He knows that if a car falls apart or if a roof caves in, it is because of evil 
spirits. He knows there is nothing anyone could do about such occurrences. He 
knows this is a universal truth. 
Characteristic ( 1 OR) Above-Normal Intelligence 
Ry always learns more quickly than most other people. In school, he was a bet­
ter than average student. He even skipped one grade. 
Characteristic ( l lR) Upbringing (Environment) 
Ry grew up in a city that is very overcrowded-so it's hard to find an apart­
ment. His family was glad to have found theirs. As a result, his own family always 
repaired and maintained their own apartment. They never thought of having the 
landlord do any of it. From this upbringing, Ry believed maintenance was some­
thing tenants take care of. 
Characteristic ( 12R) Lack of Knowledge (Culture) 
Ry is a member of an Indian tribe that lives on a reservation in Northern Maine 
where he lived most of his life. They still speak their native tongue. Their homes 
are log cabins. Everything is in its natural state. They have never painted any­
thing. They have no electricity. They know nothing about man-made paint and 
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its characteristics or about the operation of light bulbs. Ry was left the apartment 
building by an uncle who left the reservation. 
Characteristic ( 13R) Substandard Education 
Ry was an average student, but only went as far as the fifth grade. 
Characteristic ( 14R) Cultural Norms 
Ry comes from a country that has a very strict standard of privacy. No one ever 
entered another person's home unless invited. To do so would be an insult. He be­
lieves that entering common hallways violates a tenant's privacy. 
Characteristic ( 1 5R) Recent Upset 
Just after Ry acquired the apartment building, his daughter died from leuke­
mia. 
Characteristic ( 1 6R) Religion (Norms) 
Ry's religion does not allow him to use man-made products such as paint. He is 
trying to find a paint made from natural products. 
Characteristic ( 1 7R) Immaturity 
Ry is only nineteen years old and is still unsure of all his goals in life. The apart­
ment building was left to Ry in his aunt's will. 
STUDY 12:  INSANITY 
Scenario 1: Murder 
( Q) John Hardey is angry with Jack Turner for making disparaging remarks 
about him. He goes to Jack's house, waits until he is alone, then bludgeons him to 
death with an ax handle. 
Scenario 2: Self-Defense 
(R) Dennis Harkins is the owner of a small convenience store. At about 1 0  p.m., a 
man enters the store, pulls out a knife, and demands the money in the cash regis­
ter. Harkins refuses to hand it over and takes a policeman's "night stick" from un­
der the counter. As the man lunges at him, Harkins strikes him on the head to de­
fend himself. The man subsequently dies from the injury. 
Scenario 3: Mistaken Identity 
(Z) Dennis Harkins is the owner of a small convenience store. At about 1 0  p.m., a 
man enters the store, robs Harkins at knifepoint, and flees. Harkins gives chase 
with a policeman's "night stick" that he keeps under the counter but loses the sus-
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pect during the chase. As he is returning to the store, having given up the chase, 
he sees the man standing on a porch talking with others. Harkins approaches the 
man, demands his money back, and tells the others to call the police, which they 
do. The man denies being the robber. Harkins is aware that the man might not be 
the robber but thinks that he probably is. He and Harkins get into a fight, during 
which Harkins beats the man with his "night stick:' The man subsequently dies 
from the injuries. Another man, similar in appearance is later arrested and con­
victed for the robbery. 
Scenario 4: High Control, Low Cognitive 
(I)  Stanley Charlson has been twice committed to a mental hospital, each follow­
ing an attempt to disfigure or mutilate himself. On the first occasion, he stuck his 
hand into a fire in a fireplace and held it there; on the second, he cut his left shin 
repeatedly with a large bread knife. On both occasions, his injuries would have 
been life-threatening had he not been stopped by others who happened onto the 
scene. Other than these two episodes, Stanley is able to function and has many 
friends and a good relationship with his family. On a Sunday afternoon he goes to 
visit his parents and his younger brother, Peter, who lives with them. The back 
room windows of their house overlook a shallow river. Stanley calls Peter fro111 the 
front room to look at a boat traveling down the river. While the boy is looking out 
of the window, Stanley picks up a wooden mallet and strikes the boy twice on the 
head, killing him instantly. When his mother enters the room, he is standing over 
the boy, with the mallet still in his hand and a horrified look on his face. He can 
give no explanation to his mother as to why he did what he did, saying simply that 
"something came over me and made me do it." When the police arrive, they find 
him huddled in the corner of the back room. He is transported to the local county 
hospital for treatment. In interviews with doctors and private talks with his 
mother, he describes that at the time he hit Peter on the head he was well aware of 
what he was doing and that it was wrong but felt subject to an overwhelming 
compulsion that "took control of his body;' and compelled him to do what he 
did, although he has no idea why. Court-appointed psychiatrists testify that at the 
time of his conduct causing Peter's death he was mentally ill, suffering from severe 
impulse control disorder. 
Scenario 5: High Control, Low Cognitive 
(C) Michael Monte was discharged from the Navy at the age of 1 7  after a psychiat­
ric examination showed that he suffered "from a profound personality disorder 
that renders him unfit for Naval service." He now lives alone in a boarding house 
and, because of repeated outbursts of temper, has no dose friends. He has not 
held a job for more than two weeks at a time and is always on the verge of being 
evicted from his room for his unpredictable behavior. His landlady is tolerant of 
his minor misconducts because she feels sorry for him, believing that he is not al-
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ways in control of himself. "He is as sweet as can be for a while, then will turn to a 
very black mood and blow up at whoever happens to be around," she explains. 
"He is always very sorry immediately after and makes a nuisance of himself trying 
to apologize:' On this particular day, Michael is in one of his black moods when 
he leaves the building in the morning. When he returns that afternoon he seems 
to his landlady to be even more distressed. She asks him if he is "ok" as he passes 
her door. He does not respond. Twenty minutes later one of the other tenants 
knocks on Michael's door and demands that Michael turn his music down. He 
continues to pound on the door for several minutes. Michael suddenly opens the 
door swinging a baseball bat, striking the surprised tenant in the head, killing him 
instantly. When the landlady reaches the landing, she finds Michael, standing 
over the body, as if frozen. She checks the body and tells Michael that the man is 
dead. Michael gasps, falls to his knees-"Why did I do that? I knew I shouldn't 
have hit him:' Court-appointed psychiatrists testify that at the time of the killing 
Michael knew what he was doing and knew that it was wrong, but that he suffers 
from severe anger control disorder and, as a result, was not able to control his 
conduct. 
Scenario 6: Medium Control, High Cognitive 
(G) Mrs. Jeanne Cogdon lives with her husband Frank and her daughter Pat, age 
1 5. Mrs. Cogdon suffered a severely traumatic experience when she became lost 
during a camping trip two years earlier. She was found after six days, suffering 
from exposure, disorientation, and severe depression. Since that time, she has 
been seeing a psychiatrist, who is treating her for post traumatic stress disorder. 
On this particular night, she goes to bed at 1 0:30 p.m. as usual and at 1 :30 a.m. 
she awakes in order to check on her daughter, Pat. She sees Pat and becomes terri­
fied because she thinks she is seeing Pat being attacked by moles. She screams 
"the moles are going to get us. They are attacking Pat!" Jeanne attempts to protect 
Pat by picking up a hockey stick and striking Pat's bed several times including one 
blow to Pat's head that kills her. When Jeanne's husband arrives she is striking at 
different parts of Pat's desktop although the desktop is actually empty. She yells to 
her husband, "you've got to help, the moles are hurting Pat:' Her husband tells 
her to put the stick down, and she does. Psychiatrists testify that she was halluci­
nating at the time of the killing, as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Scenario 7: Low Control, High Cognitive 
(V) Jeffrey stays in his room most of the time, with the shades pulled and the 
lights out. Every month he must go to the hospital for counseling with a psychia­
trist. The trips are very stressful for Jeffrey, who becomes more agitated as the day 
for his monthly trip approaches. He is afraid that someone "will get him;' he tells 
his mother and is upset with the hospital for making him go. She tries to assure 
him that everything will be fine, and that he should leave for the bus immediately. 
Jeffrey leaves the house, walking quickly, heading for the bus stop three blocks 
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away. Two women and a young man are already at the stop waiting for the bus. 
Although the young man has done nothing, Jeffrey becomes frightened and feels 
physically threatened by him. He finds a stone and hides it in his pocket in order 
to defend himself. Jeffrey waits to board after the other people but the young 
man, who is ahead of him in line, steps out of line and bends to one knee to tie his 
shoe. The young man stands up just as Jeffrey passes him. Jeffrey imagines that 
the man is about to attack him, reacts by hitting the youth in the face with the 
rock that he had hidden in his pocket. As the young man staggers, Jeffrey hits him 
again on the side of the head, killing him. Jeffrey explains to onlookers that the 
young man was about to attack him. Court-appointed psychiatrists testify that at 
the time of his conduct causing the young man's death, Jeffrey was suffering from 
severe paranoid schizophrenia. 
STUDY 1 3: 
IMMATURITY AND INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
Scenario 1 :  Control-Murder 
(G)  Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both 
are visiting their grandmother. Neither brother is particularly fond of the other 
but this evening, for some unknown reason, they appear more antagonistic than 
ever. When the poker game is over, Mike waits for Joe to fall asleep and pours gas­
oline, which he gets from his grandmother's garage, over Joe and lights a match. 
Joe dies quickly in the ensuing fire. 
Scenario 2: High Control 
(R) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both 
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to 
control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about 
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur 
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev­
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is 
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule. 
During the game the normally calm and mild-natured Mike says particularly 
malicious things to his brother and suggests that Joe "buy" his grandmother's 
love by purchasing expensive gifts for her that Mike could never afford. Joe says to 
Mike, "Other than the television I bought her last year for her birthday, what have 
I given her?" Mike responds, sarcastically, "Only a television, huh?" and runs over 
to the set and proceeds to throw it out the living room window. Joe, upon enter­
ing the living room, screams "What the hell are you doing, Mike?" Noticing the 
kerosene can next to the heater, Mike picks up the can, splashes kerosene on Joe 
and says "I'll show you what I'm doing-I'm going to turn you into a great ball of 
fire;' and throws a match on Joe. Joe dies quickly in the ensuing fire. When his­
grandmother enters the room she finds Mike sitting on the floor, crying, and 
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mumbling "I can't believe what I've done. I knew it was wrong when it happened 
but I couldn't stop myself. If you can hear me Joe, rm sorry." When questioned, a 
court-appointed doctor states that the medication prescribed for Mike interacted 
with a common cold remedy, causing Mike to totally lose his ability to control his 
actions. 
Scenario 3: High Cognitive 
(A) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both 
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to 
control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about 
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur 
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev­
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is 
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule. 
Shortly after the beginning of the game, Mike, who has never had any psycho­
logical impairments, notices that his cards all seem to be Jacks and that the faces 
on the cards appear to be laughing in a haunting manner. As Mike begins to relate 
his visions to Joe, Mike sees Joe slowly transform into a bull, a snake, and finally, a 
ghost. Mike, while taking steps backward into the living room screams at his vi­
sion to "stay away from me." Mike picks up the kerosene can next to his grand­
mother's heater, splashes kerosene over Joe and lights a match. Joe dies quickly 
from the ensuing fire. When his grandmother enters the room she finds Mike 
standing proudly over Joe's enflamed body. Mike turns to her and says: "I was 
playing cards with Joe but he turned into this ghost that was going to kill me!" 
When questioned, a court-appointed doctor says that the medication prescribed 
for Mike interacted with a common cold remedy, causing Mike to experience hal­
lucinations which completely distorted reality for Mike throughout the evening. 
Scenario 4: Low Control 
(T) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both 
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to 
control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about 
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur 
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev­
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is 
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule. 
During the game the normally calm and mild-natured Mike says particularly 
malicious things to his brother and suggests that Joe "buy" his grandmother's 
love by purchasing expensive gifts for her that Mike could never afford. Joe says to 
Mike, "Other than the television I bought her last year for her birthday, what have 
I given her?" Mike thinks to himself "You know, he's right. I should apologize:' 
But several moments later Mike feels angry again. Mike grabs the television and 
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proceeds to throw it out the living room window. Joe, upon entering the living 
room, yells "What the hell are you doing, Mike?" Noticing the kerosene can next 
to his grandmother's heater,·Mike splashes kerosene on Joe and pushes him to the 
floor. While reaching into his pocket for matches, Mike reasons to himself: "This 
is silly. I could really hurt Joe over nothing." Joe, while still on the floor, yells "You 
moron, what are you doing?" Mike's anger wells up again. Mike then lights a 
match and throws it on Joe. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire. When his 
grandmother enters the room she finds Mike sitting on the floor, crying, and 
mumbling "I can't believe what I've done. I knew it was wrong when it happened 
and I thought I could stop myself but in the end, I just couldn't. If you can hear 
me Joe, I'm sorry:' When questioned, a court-appointed doctor states that the 
medication prescribed for Mike interacted with a common cold remedy, resulting 
in a substantial, but not complete loss of emotional self-control. 
Scenario 5: Low Cognitive 
(E) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both 
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to 
control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about 
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur 
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev­
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is 
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule. 
Shortly after the beginning of the game, Mike, who has never had any psycho­
logical impairments, begins to say particularly malicious things to Joe, including 
comments about Joe's weight problem. After a few moments Joe has had enough 
of the verbal attack and makes a vulgar hand gesture to Mike. Mike then thinks 
"Geez, if he's angry enough to do that, he might even attack me. I 'd better protect 
myself." When Joe gets up from the table to go to the bathroom, Mike gets a can of 
kerosene from his grandmother's living room and hides it under the card table. 
When Joe returns he first goes over to the sink to get a glass of water. While Joe is 
looking for a glass, Mike thinks "I bet Joe's looking for a knife to stab me! I've got 
to protect myself!" Mike then splashes kerosene over Joe, pushes him to the 
ground, and throws a lighted match on him. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing 
fire. When questioned, a court-appointed doctor states that the medication pre­
scribed for Mike interacted with a common cold remedy, resulting in a substan­
tial, but not complete loss of ability to appreciate the nature of his conduct or that 
it was wrong. 
Scenario 6: Low Control and Cognitive 
(S) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both 
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to 
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control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about 
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur 
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev­
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is 
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule. 
During the game the normally calm and mild-natured Mike says particularly 
malicious things to his brother and suggests that Joe "buy" his grandmother's 
love by purchasing expensive gifts for her that Mike could never afford. Joe, while 
making a vulgar hand gesture at Mike, says: "Other than the television I bought 
her last year for her birthday, what have I given her?" Mike then thinks: "You 
know, he's right, but he's awfully upset at what I said. I want to apologize but I'm 
afraid to say anything:' Several moments later Mike begins to feel angry again, 
grabs his grandmother's television and throws it out the living room window. Joe 
yells, "What the hell are you doing, Mike?" Mike then thinks: "Oh my gosh, he's 
really angry now-I'd better protect myself:' Mike then picks up the can of kero-:­
sene next to his grandmother's heater, splashes kerosene on Joe, and pushes Joe to 
the ground. Mike thinks: "This is silly. I could really hurt Joe over nothing, but I 
think he might try to hurt me:' Joe, while still on the floor, yells "You moron, 
what are you doing?" Mike's anger wells up again. Mike then lights a match and 
throws it on Joe. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire. When questioned, a court 
appointed doctor states that the medication prescribed for Mike interacted with a 
common cold remedy, resulting in substantial, but not complete, loss of ability of 
self-control and substantial, but not complete, loss in his ability to appreciate the 
nature of his conduct or that it was wrong. 
Scenario 7: 1 0-Year-Old 
( 0) Mike, age I 0, is trading baseball cards with his brother Joe late one evening 
while both are visiting their grandmother. Neither brother is particularly fond of 
the other but this evening, for some unknown reason, they appear more antago­
nistic than ever. When the "trading session" is over, Mike waits for Joe to fall 
asleep and pours gasoline, which he gets from his grandmother's garage, over Joe 
and lights a match. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire. 
Scenario 8: 1 4-Year-Old 
(P) Mike, age 14, is repairing his Puch Moped with his brother Joe late one eve­
ning while both are visiting their grandmother. Neither brother is particularly 
fond of the other but this evening, for some unknown reason, they appear more 
antagonistic than ever. When the repairs are finished, Mike waits for Joe to fall 
asleep and pours gasoline, which he gets from his grandmother's garage, over Joe, 
and lights a match. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire. 
Appendix B 269 
Scenario 9: 18-Year-Old 
(I )  Mike, age 18, is watching "Late Night with David Letterman" with his brother 
Joe late one evening while both are visiting their grandmother. Neither brother is 
particularly fond of the other but this evening, for some unknown reason, they 
appear more antagonistic than ever. When the program is over, Mike waits for Joe 
to fall asleep and pours gasoline, which he gets from his grandmother's garage, 
over Joe, and lights a match. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire. 
STUDY 14: 
DURESS AND ENTRAPMENT DEFENSES 
Scenario I :  Control-No Duress or Inducement 
(E) Chris, a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record, needs money quickly. To 
get it, he agrees to make a delivery of eight ounces of cocaine for Tom, a local drug 
dealer. While making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle violation. 
A subsequent lawful search of the car results in the discovery of the cocaine. The 
police arrest Chris and charge him with possession of cocaine with intent to dis­
tribute. 
Scenario 2: High Coercion 
(P) Chris is a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record. Chris meets Tom at a 
baseball game and their friendship develops over the course of several weeks. 
Chris's friend tells him that Tom is "no good, he is involved in all kinds of drugs." 
Chris thereafter tries to avoid Tom as much as possible. A week later, Chris re­
ceives a telephone call from Tom asking for a favor. Chris quickly cuts off the con­
versation on the pretext that he has relatives over. Three days later Tom calls Chris 
and asks him to deliver eight ounces of cocaine for him. Tom is very insistent, 
stating that Chris is going to do it, but Chris still refuses. The following evening 
Chris receives another call from Tom. This time Tom is very loud, "You're going 
to deliver this stuff for me. Remember, you just moved into a place that has a dark 
entrance, and you leave that entrance with your wife and children ... You and your 
family are going to jump at shadows when you leave that dark entrance. If you call 
the police about this, you will be very sorry. Just deliver the stuff and I won't 
bother you again." After hearing this, Chris agrees to make the delivery. While 
making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle violation. A subsequent 
lawful search of the car results in the discovery of the cocaine. The police arrest 
Chris and charge him with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 
Scenario 3: Low Coercion 
(A) Chris, a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record, is working as a truck 
driver for Tom. Tom tells Chris he wants him to deliver eight ounces of cocaine. 
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Chris initially refuses, but after Tom tells him that his employment will be termi­
nated if he does not transport the cocaine, he agrees. While making the delivery, 
Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle violation. A subsequent lawful search of the 
car results in the discovery of the cocaine. The police arrest Chris and charge him 
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 
Scenario 4: No Prior Record-Agent 
(T) Chris is a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record. He is unemployed and 
depressed about his financial condition. Buck was in the Navy with Chris and, in 
fact, saved Chris's life while in the service. Since leaving the Navy, Buck has be­
come an undercover narcotics agent. He approaches Chris pretending to be a 
drug dealer seeking help on a delivery and insists that Chris should help him in 
return for his saving Chris's life while in the service. Chris refuses, saying that he 
will do anything for Buck except commit a crime. Buck insists, "My life is at stake 
now. If you don't make this delivery my connection will kill me. Are you saying 
you won't save my life?" Chris relents and agrees to make the delivery. Buck makes 
arrangements for Chris to deliver eight ounces of cocaine for him the following 
day. ' While making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle violation by 
Buck and other narcotics officers. A subsequent lawful search of the car results in 
the discovery of the cocaine. The police arrest Chris and charge him with posses­
sion of cocaine with intent to distribute. 
Scenario 5: Prior Record-Agent 
(N) Chris, a Navy veteran, has a string of arrests and convictions for various drug 
offenses. The word on the street is that Chris is looking to get back into the drug 
business. Chris is pursuing several people whom he believes may need help in 
their own drug businesses. Buck was in the Navy with Chris and, in fact, saved 
Chris's life while in the service. Since leaving the Navy, Buck has become an un­
dercover narcotics agent. When he learns about Chris he is saddened, but when 
he is assigned to target Chris he decides he must do his job. He approaches Chris 
pretending to be a drug dealer seeking help on a delivery and insists that Chris 
should help him in return for his saving Chris's life while in the service. Chris 
readily agrees. Buck makes arrangements for Chris to deliver eight ounces of co­
caine the following day. While making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor 
vehicle violation by Buck and other narcotics officers. A subsequent lawful search 
of the car results in the discovery of the cocaine. The police arrest Chris and 
charge him with possession of cocaine, with intent to distribute. 
Scenario 6: No Prior Record-Buddy 
( R) Chris is a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record. He is unemployed and 
depressed about his financial condition. Jake was in the Navy with Chris and, in 
fact, saved Chris's life while in the service. Since leaving the Navy, Jake has turned 
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to dealing drugs to make a living. When he hears that Chris is in town he 
approaches him seeking help on a drug delivery, insisting that Chris owes it to 
him in return for his saving Chris's life while in the service. Chris refuses, saying 
that he will do anything for Jake except commit a crime. Jake insists, "My life is at 
stake now. If you don't make this delivery my connection will kill me. Are you say­
ing you won't save my life?" Chris relents and agrees to make the delivery. Jake 
makes arrangements for Chris to deliver eight ounces of cocaine for him the fol­
lowing day. While making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle viola­
tion. A subsequent lawful search of the car results in the discovery of the cocaine. 
The police arrest Chris and charge him with possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute. 
STUDY 15 :  
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE-SEXUAL OFFENSES 
Scenario 1 :  Forcible Intercourse-Straight 
(C) Pam exercises three afternoons a week at the health club where she belongs. 
Alex is also a member of the health club. He is a 28 year old recently divorced gen­
eral contractor. One evening Pam leaves the club and Alex follows her to the park­
ing lot. It is late and there is no one anywhere near. Suddenly, Alex rushes up be­
hind Pam and pushes her behind a dumpster. He tells her not to scream or resist 
or he will kill her. He forces her to have sexual intercourse. 
Scenario 2: Forcible Intercourse-Date 
(R) Pam exercises three days a week at the health club where she belongs. Alex is 
also a member of the health club. He is a 28 year old recently divorced general 
contractor. He had dated Pam for a few months when they were both in college. 
He remembers that they had slept together only for the last month they were dat­
ing. He has not seen or spoken to her in four years. He says hello to Pam one day 
and they speak for a few minutes. Alex asks if they could work out together the 
following day and she agrees to meet him and then go out for drinks. The next 
evening after going out for drinks, Pam invites Alex to her apartment for coffee. 
They sit on the sofa and talk about old times. Suddenly Alex reaches out and be­
gins kissing her. He tells her that if she screams or resists he will kill her. He then 
forces her to have sex. 
Scenario 3: Forcible Intercourse-Live Together 
(L) Pam and Alex are lovers and have been living together for two years. They first 
met when Pam was a junior in college and Alex was a bartender at a local bar. Pam 
graduates from college and she is accepted into a law school which is two thou­
sand miles away. She tells Alex that she is going to law school and does not want 
him to come with her. She tells him she is leaving for good and does not want to 
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see him anymore. She asks him to sleep on the sofa or at his brother's place. He is 
extremely angry and hurt by her decision to leave. He comes into the bedroom 
and they start fighting. Alex pushes Pam onto the floor. He tells her that if she re­
sists or screams he will kill her. He forces her to have sex with him. 
Scenario 4: Forcible Intercourse-Married 
(A) Pam and Alex have been married for two years. They first met when Pam was 
a junior in college and Alex was a bartender at a local bar. They married that same 
year. Pam graduates from college and she is accepted into a law school which is 
two thousand miles away. She tells Alex that she is going to law school and she 
does not want him to come with her. She tells him she is leaving for good and 
wants a divorce. Pam then asks Alex to sleep on the sofa or at his brother's place. 
He is extremely angry and hurt by her decision to leave. He comes into the bed­
room and they start fighting. Alex pushes Pam onto the floor. He tells her that if 
she screams or resists, he will kill her. He forces her to have sex with him. 
Scenario 5: Forcible Intercourse-Homosexual 
(W) Alex and David are lovers and have been living together for two years. They 
met at a gay bar when David was a junior in college and Alex was a bartender. Da­
vid graduates from college and is accepted into a law school which is two thou­
sand miles away. He tells Alex that he is going to law school and he does not want 
Alex to come with him. He also tells Alex that he is leaving for good and does not 
want to see him anymore. David asks Alex to sleep on the sofa or at his brother's 
place. Alex is extremely angry and hurt by David's rejection. He comes into the 
bedroom and they start fighting. Alex pushes David onto the floor. He tells David 
if he screams or resists, he will kill him. Alex forces David to have sex with him. 
Scenario 6: Consensual Intercourse-Statutory 
(I)  Pam exercises three days a week at a health club where she belongs. She is four­
teen years old. Alex also works out at the health club. He is a nineteen year old 
sophomore in college but he remembers Pam from junior high school. She had 
been an eighth grader when he was a senior. He walks over to her and says hello. 
They speak for a few minutes and arrange to work out together the next day. The 
following evening, after working out, Pam invites Alex to her home and tells him 
her parents are away. When they get to her house, they sit on the sofa and begin 
kissing. Pam wants to have sex with Alex and sexual intercourse ensues. 
Scenario 7: Consensual Intercourse-Statutory-Prior Promiscuity 
(M) Pam exercises three days a week at a health dub where she belongs. She is 
fourteen years old. Alex is also a member of the health club. He is a nineteen year 
old sophomore in college but he remembers Pam from junior high school. She 
had been an eighth grader when he was a senior. He remembers catching her in 
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the boy's locker room with one of his football teammates. They were having sex 
behind the lockers. From what he heard she had slept with quite a few other guys 
on the team when he was in high school. However she had never gotten around to 
Alex. He thinks to himself that it is about time he gets some. He walks over to her 
and says hello. They speak for a few minutes and arrange to work out together the 
next day. The following evening, after working out, Pam invites Alex to her home 
and tells him her parents are away. When they get to her house, they sit on the 
sofa and begin kissing. Pam wants to have sex with him and sexual intercourse en­
sues. 
Scenario 8: Consensual Intercourse-Mentally Handicapped Female 
(S) Pam is a young woman with Down's Syndrome who participates in physical 
therapy three afternoons a week at a local health club. Down's Syndrome is a type 
of mental retardation which originates at birth. There are distinguishing physical 
features which many people affected by Down's Syndrome display: cleft palate, al­
mond shaped eyes, and a childlike personality. Alex is a member of the health 
club. He is a 28 year old recently divorced general contractor. He notices that Pam 
is mentally handicapped. Alex is a good friend of the trainer who teaches the 
class. He asks the trainer if he can "help out" teaching the class. During the class, 
Alex and Pam become good friends. After exercising, Alex walks Pam back to the 
home where she lives with several other mentally handicapped people and a su­
pervisor. They sit on the sofa and begin kissing. Pam wants to have sexual inter­
course with Alex and sexual intercourse ensues. 
Scenario 9: Consensual Intercourse-Mentally Handicapped Male 
(E) Peter is a young man with Down's Syndrome who goes for physical therapy 
three afternoons a week at a local health club. Down's syndrome is a type of men­
tal retardation which originates at birth. There are distinguishing physical fea­
tures which many people affected by Down's Syndrome display: cleft palate, al­
mond shaped eyes, and a childlike personality. Alexandra is a member of the 
health club. She is a 28 year old recently divorced secretary. She notices that Peter 
is mentally handicapped. Alexandra is a good friend of the trainer who teaches 
the class. She asks the trainer if she can " help out" teaching the class. During the 
class Alexandra and Peter become good friends. After exercising, Alexandra walks 
with Peter back to the home where he lives with several other mentally handi­
capped people and a supervisor. They sit on the sofa and begin kissing. Peter 
wants to have sexual intercourse with Alexandra. Sexual intercourse ensues. 
Scenario 10: Consensual Intercourse-Female in ]ail 
(N) Pam is a woman who is confined in a women's medium security prison. She 
dutifully performs all required chores and is a model prisoner. Alex is the guard 
who supervises the cell block where Pam resides. They frequently converse and 
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know each other by name. Alex comes into her cell one day when her cellmate is 
gone. He sits on her bed and strikes up a conversation. Alex leans over and kisses 
Pam and she wants to have sexual intercourse with him. Sexual intercourse en­
sues. 
STUDY 16:  
THE CULPABILITY OF THE PERSON-FELONY MURDER 
Scenario 1 :  Purposeful Killing 
(B) Mark is furious with his best friend Pete for making derogatory remarks. 
Mark tells his wife that he is going to kill Pete. He purchases a gun, and shoots 
Pete in the head while he is looking away, killing him instantly. 
Scenario 2: Reckless Killing 
(R) Mark is furious with his new neighbors; this is the fifth night in a row that 
they've had wild parties. The house is packed with drunken, loud and unruly 
guests. Mark decides to scare the inconsiderate neighbors and teach them a les­
son; he loads his pistol and shoots two bullets from his bedroom window towards 
the neighbor's crowded entertainment room 50 feet away. One of the bullets 
strikes a guest killing him instantly. 
Scenario 3: Negligent Killing 
(U) Mark, assuming that his gun was unloaded, but without first double checking 
the chamber, shows his friend Pete how to clean a handgun. In fact the gun is 
loaded. While Mark demonstrates the "proper" procedures, he inadvertently pulls 
the trigger while the gun is pointed at Pete, killing him instantly. 
Scenario 4: Purposeful Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Owner Victim 
(G) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree to "waste" the cashier if 
he does not hand over the money immediately without a hassle. Mark and Pete 
enter the liquor store with loaded guns and demand the cash. The owner is reluc­
tant to hand over the day's earnings and tries to talk them out of the robbery. 
Mark and Pete get impatient and decide to shoot the cashier. Mark aims the gun 
at the owner's head and pulls the trigger, killing him instantly. Pete comments, 
"good job man, he had it coming!" 
Scenario 5: Negligent Shooter, Negligent Co-Felon, Owner Victim 
(E) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree that no one should get 
hurt but that they should carry unloaded guns, nonetheless, to make the cashier 
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think that they "mean business." Mark and Pete enter the liquor store without 
first checking their weapons to ensure that they were unloaded; in fact, the guns 
happened to be loaded at the time. They demand the cash but the owner is reluc­
tant. Mark is so nervous about the whole endeavor that his hands begin to shake 
uncontrollably, and when he motions at the cashier with his pistol to place the 
money in the sack, he accidentally discharges the gun, killing the cashier instantly. 
Pete is shocked and yells out "you idiot, look what you've done!" Mark shakes his 
head in disbelief and cries, "Oh no, oh no!" 
Scenario 6: Purposeful Shooter, Negligent Co-Felon, Owner Victim 
(H) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree that no one should get 
hurt but that they should carry unloaded guns nonetheless to let the cashier know 
that they "mean business." Mark tells his girlfriend that even though they agreed 
not to hurt anyone, he would carry a loaded gun anyway and "waste" the cashier 
if he did not comply immediately. Mark and Pete enter the liquor store (Mark 
with a loaded gun, Pete with an unloaded gun) and demand the cash. The cashier 
is hesitant to hand over the money. Mark gets impatient and shoots the cashier, 
killing him instantly. Although Pete is aware of Mark's violent tendencies, he is 
nonetheless surprised at Mark's actions and yells "you idiot, look what you've 
done!" Mark simply responds, "hey man, he had it coming." 
Scenario 7: Negligent Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Owner Victim 
( 0) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree not to hurt anyone but 
that they should carry unloaded guns to make the cashier think they "mean busi­
ness." Pete loads his gun anyway and decides to "waste" the cashier if he does not 
comply immediately. Prior to the robbery, Mark inadvertently picks up Pete's 
loaded gun leaving Pete the unloaded gun. They enter the store and demand the 
money; the cashier is reluctant. Resolving to shoot the cashier, Pete raises his gun. 
Before he has a chance to fire, Mark's gun goes off. Mark was so nervous that 
when he motioned to the cashier to put the money in the bag, he inadvertently 
pulled the trigger, killing the cashier instantly. Mark shakes his head in confusion, 
and yells "oh no, what did I do?" But Pete is unflustered and says "good job man, 
he had it coming!" Mark suddenly realizes that he had Pete's gun. Recalling Pete's 
violent tendencies, the infamous phrase begins to echo in Mark's mind: "I should 
have known." 
Scenario 8: Purposeful but Innocent Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Felon Victim 
(L) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree to "waste" the cashier if 
he does not hand over the cash immediately. They enter the store with loaded 
guns and demand the cash. The owner is reluctant and seems to be stalling. Both 
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Mark and Pete get impatient and decide to shoot the owner. As they raise their 
guns, a shot goes off and Mark falls to the floor. Apparently, the owner's wife was 
hiding in the back room with a rifle. Hoping to kill the gunmen and save her hus­
band, she aimed the rifle and shot Mark, killing him instantly. She yells to Pete 
"drop it or you're nextf' Fearing the same fate as his partner, Pete surrenders. 
Scenario 9: Purposeful but Innocent Shooter, Negligent Co-Felon, Felon Victim 
(A) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree that no one should get 
hurt but that they should carry unloaded guns to make the cashier think they 
"mean business." Mark and Pete enter the liquor store with unloaded guns and 
demand the cash. The owner is reluctant and seems to be stalling. To everyone's 
surprise, a shot goes off and Mark falls to the ground. Apparently, the owner's 
wife was hiding in the back room with a rifle. Hoping to kill the gunmen and save 
her husband, she aimed the rifle and shot Mark, killing him instantly. She yells to 
Pete "drop it or you're next!" Fearing the same fate as his partner, Pete surrenders. 
Scenario 10: Negligent but Innocent Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Felon Victim 
(N) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree to "waste" the cashier if 
he does not hand over the money immediately. They enter the store with loaded 
guns and demand the cash. The owner is reluctant and seems to be stalling. Both 
Mark and Pete get impatient and decide to shoot the owner. As they raise their 
guns, a shot goes off and Mark falls to the floor. Apparently, in an effort to scare 
away the gunmen, the owner's wife stepped out of the back room with a rifle 
aiming at the gunmen. However, she was so nervous and inexperienced with the 
rifle that while she pointed it at the gunmen, she inadvertently pulled the trigger 
killing Mark instantly. When Mark falls to the floor, she cries, "oh no, what have I 
done?" Pete flees but is subsequently apprehended by police. 
Scenario 1 1 :  Negligent but Innocent Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Owner Victim 
(D)  Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree to "waste" the cashier if 
he does not hand over the cash immediately. They enter the store with loaded 
guns and demand the money. The owner seems to be stalling. Mark and Pete get 
impatient and decide to shoot the owner. As they start to raise their guns, the 
owner suddenly falls to the floor. Apparently, the owner's wife stepped out of the 
back room with a rifle. Although she knew she was unskilled, she aimed the rifle 
at the gunmen in an attempt to scare them away and save her husband. However, 
she was so nervous that her hands began to shake uncontrollably and she inadver­
tently pulled the trigger while the gun was actually pointed at her husband, killing 
him instantly. She screams, "oh no what have I done!"  Mark and Pete flee but are 
subsequently apprehended. 
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STUDY 1 7: THE STRENGTH OF THE PERSON'S CONNECTION 
WITH THE PROHIBITED RESULT-CAUSATION REQUIREMENTS 
Scenario 1: Murder-Control 
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(B) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de­
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman 
at the front door, Luman enters the house and stabs Smith in the chest, killing 
him instantly. Luman and Alma flee, but both are subsequently apprehended. 
Scenario 2: Attempt-Control 
(X) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma 
both decide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a 
watchman, Luman shoots at Smith through a window but misses him. Luman 
and Alma flee but are subsequently apprehended. 
Scenario 3: Subsequent Killer 
{ I )  Fred and Hunter, who do not know each other, are each angry with Eric, each 
for a different reason. Fred goes to Eric's house and stabs Eric in the chest. The 
wound is such that Eric cannot be saved and will die in four hours. Immediately 
after Fred leaves, Hunter arrives at Eric's house and, unaware of what Fred has 
done, he shoots Eric in the head, killing him instantly. Fred and Hunter are subse­
quently apprehended. 
Scenario 4: Allergy 
{N) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de­
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman 
at the front door, Luman enters the house and stabs Smith in the side. Luman and 
Alma leave thinking that Smith is dead but in fact the wound is not itself suffi­
cient to cause Smith's death. A neighbor calls the police and an ambulance. Smith 
is taken to the hospital and is treated. Because he has a rare allergy, Smith dies 
during treatment from an allergic reaction to a commonly used drug. Luman and 
Alma are subsequently apprehended. 
Scenario 5: Careless Nurse 
(S)  Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de­
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman 
at the front door, Luman enters the house and stabs Smith in the side. Luman and 
Alma leave thinking that Smith is dead but in fact the wound is not itself suffi­
cient to cause Smith's death. A neighbor calls the police and an ambulance. Smith 
is taken to the hospital and is treated. A nurse carelessly injects the wrong medica­
tion and Smith dies. Luman and Alma are subsequently apprehended. 
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Scenario 6: Accident  on Way to Hospital 
(P) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de­
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman 
at the front door, Luman enters the house and stabs Smith in the chest. Luman 
and Alma leave thinking that Smith is dead. A neighbor calls the police and an 
ambulance. Smith is taken to the hospital, undergoes surgery, and recovers. Two 
months later, Smith is killed in a traffic accident on his way to the hospital for 
post-operative treatment for his injury. 
Scenario 7: Construction Accident 
(L) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de­
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman, 
Luman shoots at Smith through a window but misses him. To escape further at­
tacks, Smith flees out the back door. Ten blocks later, Smith is killed instantly 
when a construction crane cable snaps and drops steel beams on the sidewalk be­
low. 
STUDY 1 8: 
PUNISHMENT FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES 
Scenario 1 :  One Victim 
(A) AI is angry with one of his colleagues at the office where he used to work One 
afternoon he returns to the office with a baseball bat intending to hurt Paul. AI 
hits Paul with the bat, breaking several of his bones. AI is later arrested and subse­
quently convicted for assaulting a person with a weapon. 
Scenario 2: Two Victims, Immediate 
(D) Chris is angry with two of his colleagues at the office where he used to work 
One afternoon he returns to the office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them. 
Chris hits Dave with the bat, breaking several of his bones. Then Chris hits Eric 
and breaks several of his bones too. Chris is later arrested and subsequently con­
victed for assaulting two people with a weapon. 
Scenario 3: Four Victims 
(U) Fred is angry with four of his colleagues at the office where he used to work 
One afternoon he returns to the office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them. 
Fred hits John with the bat, breaking several of his bones. Then Fred hits Ray and 
breaks several of his bones too. Fred also hits Tom and Jay, breaking several bones 
of each one of them. Fred is later arrested and subsequently convicted for assault­
ing four people with a weapon. 
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Scenario 4: Seven Victims 
( I )  Gary is angry with seven. of his colleagues at the office where he used to work. 
One afternoon he returns to the office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them. 
Gary hits Stan with the bat, breaking several of his bones. Then Gary hits Ron and 
breaks several of his bones too. Gary hits Tim and Mike, breaking several bones of 
each one of them as well. Additionally, Gary breaks several of Paul's, Sam's and 
Walt's bones as a result of hitting each one of them with the bat. Gary is later ar­
rested and subsequently convicted for assaulting seven people with a weapon. 
Scenario 5: One Item 
(N) Bob knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of 
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal a drum and selects a gas station 
where no one will come around during his theft. After the station is closed and 
everyone has gone home, Bob steals an oil drum without being noticed. Bob is 
later arrested and subsequently convicted for stealing the oil drum. 
Scenario 6: Two Items 
(J) Don knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of 
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal several drums and selects two gas 
stations where no one will come around during his theft. After the stations are 
closed and everyone has gone home, Don goes to one and steals an oil drum with­
out being noticed. He then goes to the other gas station and again steals an oil 
drum without being noticed. Don is later arrested and subsequently convicted for 
stealing two oil drums. 
Scenario 7: Four Items 
(S) Frank knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of 
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal several drums and selects four gas 
stations where no one will come around during his theft. After the stations are 
closed and everyone has gone home, Frank goes to one and steals an oil drum 
without being noticed. He then goes to another and again steals an oil drum with­
out being noticed. Later that same evening, Frank visits two more gas stations 
and, with no one around to see him, takes an oil drum from each one. Frank is 
later arrested and subsequently convicted for stealing four oil drums. 
Scenario 8: Four Items, One Victim (Gas Station) 
(T) Rich knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of 
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal several drums and selects a gas sta­
tion where no one will come around during his theft. After the gas station is 
closed and everyone has gone home, Rich steals four oil drums. Rich is later ar­
rested and subsequently convicted for stealing the four oil drums. 
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Scenario 9: Seven Items 
(C) Harry knows that construction companies pay large sums of money for 
empty oil drums. He plans to steal several drums and selects seven gas stations 
where no one will come around during his theft. After the stations are dosed and 
everyone has gone home, Harry goes to one and steals an oil drum without being 
noticed. He then goes to another gas station and again steals an oil drum without 
being noticed. Later that same evening, Harry visits two more gas stations and, 
with no one around to see him, takes an oil drum from each one. Before the eve­
ning is over, Harry occasions three more gas stations and takes one oil drum from 
each without ever being noticed. Harry is later arrested and subsequently con­
victed for stealing seven oil drums. 
Scenario 1 0: Assault, Two Victims, 1Wo Week Delay 
(E) Ian is angry with two of his colleagues at the office where he used to work. 
One afternoon he returns to his office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them. 
Rick, one of his intended victims, is there, and Ian hits him with the bat, breaking 
several of his bones. Jim, the other colleague, is not present. Two weeks later, Ian is 
thinking about his time at the office and becomes angry again. He returns to the 
office with the bat, and on this occasion Jim is present. Ian hits Jim with the bat, 
breaking several of his bones. Ian is later arrested and subsequently convicted for 
assaulting two people with a weapon. 
Scenario 1 1 :  Theft, Two Items, Two Week Delay 
(F) Jeff knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of 
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal a drum and selects a gas station 
where no one will come around during his theft. After the station is closed and 
everyone has gone home, Jeff steals an oil drum without being noticed. Two weeks 
later Jeff has the same idea and does the same thing again. He goes to another gas 
station and again steals an oil drum without being noticed. Jeff is later arrested 
and subsequently convicted for stealing two oil drums. 
Scenario 12: Assault, 1Wo Victims, Two Year Delay 
( 0) Steven is angry with two of his colleagues at the office where he used to work. 
One afternoon he returns to his office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them. 
Charlie, one of his intended victims, is there, and Steven hits him with the bat, 
breaking several of his bones. Kevin, the other colleague, is not present. Two years 
later, Steven is thinking about his time at the office and becomes angry again. He 
returns to his office with the bat, and on this occasion Kevin is present. Steven hits 
Kevin with the bat, breaking several of his bones. Steven is later arrested and sub� 
sequently convicted for assaulting two people with a weapon. 
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Scenario 13: Theft, Two Items, Two Year Delay 
(R) Mark knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of 
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal a drum and selects a gas station 
where no one will come around during his theft. After the station is closed and 
everyone has gone home, Mark steals an oil drum without being noticed. Two 
years later Mark has the same idea and does the same thing again. He goes to an­
other gas station and again steals an oil drum without being noticed. Mark is later 
arrested and subsequently convicted for stealing two oil drums. 
Appendix C: 
Liability Score/Imprisonment 
Term Translation Table 
At various points in the text, we translate liability scores in terms of imprisonment. In 
this appendix, we show the table that we used to do so. The translation formulae we 
used also are given (following the table) .  Our thanks to Justin Mcintyre for preparing 
these translations. 
y X y X y X 
1 .0 1 .0 day 3.7 4.8 months 6.4 4.6 years 
1 . 1  2 .3  days 3.8 5.2 months 6.5 5.0 years 
1 .2 3.6 days 3 .9 5.6 months 6.6 5.4 years 
1 .3 4.9 days 4.0 6.0 months 6.7 5.8 years 
1 .4 6.2 days 4. 1 6.6 months 6.8 6.2 years 
1 .5 7.5 days 4.2 7.2 months 6.9 6.6 years 
1 .6 8.8 days 4.3 7.8 months 7.0 7 .0 years 
1 .7 10 . 1 days 4.4 8.4 months 7. 1 7.8 years 
1 .8 1 1 .4 days 4.5 9.0 months 7.2 8.6 years 
1 .9 1 2 .7 days 4.6 9.6 months 7.3  9 .4  years 
2.0 1 4.0 days 4.7 1 0.2 months 7.4 1 0.2 years 
2 . 1  2.6 weeks 4.8 1 0.8 months 7.5 1 1 .0 years 
2 .2  3.2 weeks 4.9 1 1 .4 months 7.6 1 1 .8 years 
2.3 3.8 weeks 5.0 1 2 .0 months 7.7 1 2 .6 years 
2 .4 4.4 weeks 5 . 1 1 .2 years 7.8 1 3 .4 years 
2.5 5.0 weeks 5 .2  1 .4 years 7.9 1 4.2 years 
2.6 5.6 weeks 5.3 1 .6 years 8 .0 1 5.0 years 
2 .7 6.2 weeks 5.4 1 .8 years 8. 1 1 6.5 years 
2 .8  6 .8  weeks 5.5 2 .0 years 8.2 1 8 .4 years 
2 .9 7.4 weeks 5.6 2.2 years 8.3 1 9.5 years 
3 .0 8.0 weeks 5.7 2.4 years 8.4 2 1 .0 years 
3 . 1  2.4 months 5.8 2.6 years 8.5 22.5 years 
3.2 2.8 months 5.9 2.8 years 8.6 24.0 years 
3 .3  3.2 months 6.0 3.0 years 8.7 25.5  years 
3.4 3.6 months 6. 1 3.4 years 8.8 27.0 years 
3.5 4.0 months 6.2 3.8 years 8.9 28.5 years 
3.6 4.4 months 6.3 4.2 years 9.0 30.0 years 
y = Liability score; x = Term of imprisonment 
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Equations 
(1� 2) x  = 1 3{y .923)  days 
(2� 3) x = 6(y - 1 .667) weeks 
(3� 4) x = 4(y - 2.5)  months 
(4� 5) x = 6(y 3) months 
(5� 6) x = 2(y - 4.5) months 
(6� 7) x 4(y - 5.25) years 
(7� 8) x =  8(y - 6.125)  years 
(8-+ 9) x = 1 5(y- 7)  years 
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Notes 
CHAPTER 1 
1 .  Where work on popular assessment of blame has been done, as in studies in "attribution of 
blame" (see, e.g., Shaver, 1 985), the work understandably is designed for psychologists, not law­
yers or legal reformers. The issues generally are formulated in ways different from current law, 
and the distinctions tested are distinctions other than those that current law relies upon. 
2.  Though a large portion of criminal cases are disposed of by guilty plea, the terms of plea 
agreements are typically set with each side projecting the likely outcome at a j ury trial. 
3. A number of studies have confirmed this relationship. As Tyler ( 1990) has shown, citizens 
of our society are motivated to obey various laws not simply to avoid "being caught" but because 
they believe in the moral weight of those laws. A society that systematically applies the criminal 
justice system to events and actions that the community regards as not blameworthy risks de­
stroying this motive to adhere to the laws. It risks becoming a society in which the only motive 
not to commit "criminal" actions is to avoid being caught and punished. It risks creating a soci­
ety in which deterrence is the primary consideration that sentencing can address. As various 
writers (cited later in the text) have argued, a society in which adherence to laws depends pri­
marily on considerations of deterrence is a society that will have real difficulties in obtaining 
compliance to its laws. 
4. Thus the discovery of conduct that the community judges wrong but the legal code does 
not criminalize at least raises a question that deserves investigation. As the reader will be aware, 
there are dangers involved in the "criminalization" of certain actions, such as acts of omission. 
Nonetheless, it  would at least be useful to know what the criminal justice system is risking when 
it chooses not to criminalize a particular action. 
5. As the reader will be aware, the legal system has available to it punishment options that do 
not involve prison, such as community service or house arrest. In a separate study, we attempt to 
work out the correspondences that people see between these different sentencing alternatives so 
that, for instance, we might be able to say that the set of subjects saw a month of weekend con­
finements as about equal to a week in jail (see Harlow, Darley, and Robinson, 1994) .  In the stud­
ies reported here, we instructed subjects that if one of these other punishments seemed to them 
the one to assign, they were to work out an equivalent prison sentence for it and assign that. Par­
ticularly for the cases in which our subjects gave higher sentences, prison terms were their pre­
ferred option. 
6. For these reasons, it would have been foolish for us, in the sense of being wasteful of money 
and effort, to begin this investigation of the field by going immediately to the costly and ponder­
ous task of polling stratified national samples of subjects. One would do that next for the sub­
sample of our studies that seemed to have been technically successful and generated interesting 
results. 
CHAPTER 2 
1 .  There are exceptions, of course. Some avid Communists, for example, might argue against 
the desirability of a competitive market economy. 
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2. For a general discussion and defense of this minority position, see Model Penal Code § 
5 .05( 1 ) , p. 2 ( 1985) .  
3 .  An example of a case in which the dangerous proximity test is not satisfied is found in 
Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 190 1) (the act of solicitation-asking an employee 
to ignite prepared combustibles-could not be used to satisfy the objective element of attempt) . 
For a discussion of the dangerous proximity test, see Model Penal Code § 5.0 1, p. 40 (Tent. Draft 
No. 10, 1960) . For a discussion of the difficulties in stating a persuasive rationale for this test, see 
Williams ( 196 1 ) , § 20 1 .  
4 .  See, generally, Model Penal Code § 5.0 1 ,  comment pp. 38-48 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960);  
and Fletcher ( 1 978), pp. 135-144. 
5.  By interpolation within our liability scale, we are able to figure out the length of the sen­
tence, in days, months, and years, that the respondents are assigning to the individuals. When it 
is illuminating to do so, we will report the results of those interpolations to you. The liabililty 
score translation table that we used is reproduced in Appendix C. 
6. See Model Penal Code § 5.01 (4) (except for an attempt to commit a first degree felony, i.e., 
murder, which is graded as a second degree felony). 
7. In this study, we asked subjects whether they thought the different scenarios matched the 
different criteria set up by the code. For instance, we asked subjects to indicate the extent of their 
agreement that "the actor had taken a substantial step toward completion of the crime," or the 
extent of their agreement that "the actor had gone beyond the point of probable desistance." The 
questions used legal language to define the various attempt tests. Our respondents had trouble 
with this task, tending to see all scenarios as fitting many of the legal definitions (an inaccurate 
perception). We suspect that this occurred because the task somewhat overloaded the subjects. 
The results cited in the text make dear that the subjects do see important differences between 
the scenarios. In future research, it will be useful to return to the question of the subjects' under­
standings of the legal definitions of various crime elements as well as mental states of the perpe­
trators. 
8. It would be useful for a future study to examine more closely what people see as the point 
of "dangerous proximity." The common-law concept may have embodied an intuitive notion 
shared by the community, but the common law is sufficiently vague in its statement that predict­
ability in application is difficult. 
9. The risk issue is an exception to our previous comment that there is a rather sparse social 
science literature on punishment issues, but the relevant literature in social psychology deals 
with the issue of risk only tangentially. The relevant literature is known as "defensive attribu­
tion" literature and is reviewed in Shaver ( 1985) .  For an argument that attempts to bring the 
concepts of seriousness and probability of harm risked into the psychological l iterature and that 
provides some evidence that people do work out a calculus of risk considerations, see Karlovac 
and Darley ( 1 988).  
10. That the state of mind as to risk was seen as constant across all conditions is no doubt par­
tially due to the fact that each subject saw every case and would realize that they were given iden­
tical information about state of mind. Here one of the advantages of a within-subjects design 
comes into focus. 
1 1 . As concerns the degree of contribution, the United States Sentencing Commission Guide­
lines Manual ( 1994) sets forth the following framework: 
§ 3Bl . l .  Aggravating Role 
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows: 
(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five 
or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. 
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(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) 
and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, in­
crease by 3 levels. 
(c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal 
activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels. 
§ 3Bl.2. Mitigating Role 
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows: 
(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4 
levels. 
(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2 
levels. 
In cases falling between (a) and (b),  decrease by 3 levels. 
12. This recognition-that encouraging another to commit a crime may be critical in bring­
ing about the actual occurrence of that crime-is made in several areas of the law and seems psy­
chologically sensible. A person may waver in his or her resolve to commit a crime, and the en­
couragement of others may be a critical factor in causing him or her to actually go ahead with 
the act. 
13. On the one hand, we may have a ceiling effect here, in which substantial involvement in 
murder is sufficient to trigger a sentence near the maximum allowed. In further research, one 
might examine this possibility by creating various degrees of complicity with more minor 
crimes. On the other hand, it is also possible that the ceiling is set not by the maximum penalty 
that the legal system imposes-life imprisonment or the death penalty-but by the maximum 
sentence that is actually given to the individual who is the main perpetrator of the crime. In this 
instance, then, the maximum sentence would be the life sentence that is assigned to the wife. If, 
in the minds of our respondents, the highly complicit individual deserves a sentence of about 
one grade down from that of the perpetrator, such a reduction may be the maximum warranted 
in the community's view, though the accomplice's involvement is "substantial" or greater. As we 
say, this needs to be examined in further research. 
14. In each of these instances of a duty to rescue, the person is legally obliged to do only what 
he or she is physically capable of doing and need not expose themselves to danger (e.g., a parent 
need not jump in front of a train to save a child)-Model Penal Code § 2.0 1 ( 1 ) . See Robinson 
( 1984 ) ,  § 87(b) (3)  and (4). 
15. The liability means for the three duty scenarios are all statistically significantly higher 
than that for the control (stranger) scenario (p = .000 to .002) but are not statistically signifi­
cantly different from each other (p = ns) . 
16. Notice an incongruity in one comparison. Why do subjects impose less liability in the 
control, no-inconvenience scenario than in the low- and high-inconvenience scenarios? One 
would expect more liability as the inconvenience is less. First, it may be because the no-inconve­
nience scenario, as a control case, was not included in the randomization and, thus, always given 
first and judged more leniently. Second, once the subjects begin focusing on inconvenience as a 
person's excuse for not saving the victim, they may impose higher liability because they are of­
fended by the triviality of the excuse. In the control scenario, the issue of excuse is never raised. 
17. This generally corresponds to the penalty range provided in the Rhode Island and Wis­
consin duty rescue statutes cited earlier in this study, which make the failure to act a "petty mis­
demeanor" (six months maximum) and a "Class C misdemeanor" ( fine not to exceed $500, or 
imprisonment not to exceed 30 days, or both) ,  respectively. 
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18 .  One might speculate that the degree of danger or inconvenience also would alter the lia­
bility of a person who has a legal duty to act, but this was not tested in our omission study. 
CHAPTER 3 
I .  Liability means for purposeful or knowing killings in other studies range from 9.46 to 
10.42 (see Studies 2, 3, 10,  12 ,  1 3, 16, and 1 7) .  
2 .  For a discussion of these general principles and how they are manifested in  the Code's de­
tailed rules, see Robinson ( 1984),  § 1 3 1 (c) and (d). 
3 .  While the person who mistakenly believes he is authorized to use deadly force in protection 
of property is given slightly higher liability than the person who is aware that such force proba­
bly is not permitted-which is an odd result-the liability means for the two cases are not statis­
tically different. 
4. This percentage was calculated from data not presented in Table 3.5. 
5 .  We do not know what the subjects' reactions would be if the thief were killed. One might 
speculate that the liability would be significantly higher. This would be a useful point for a future 
study to investigate. 
6. For example, liability for assault, which requires negligently causing bodily injury, would 
be imposed if the person recklessly or negligently caused such injury [MPC § 2 1 l . l ( l ) (b)  ] .  Lia­
bility for reckless endangerment, which requires recklessly creating a risk of serious bodily in­
jury, would be imposed if the person recklessly created such a risk [MPC § 2 1 1 .2 ] .  
7. This assumes that the person is also judged nonreckless as to injuring the innocent person 
[MPC §§ 3 .09(3 )  and 2 1 1 . 1  ( 1 )  ] .  The subjects perceive the victimized person as being unaware of 
a risk of injuring an innocent person (Table 3 . 1 0, column d). Future research in such cases ought 
to test more carefully the effect of culpability level on liability. 
8. However, the distribution of their responses among the two categories that impose no pun­
ishment is worthy of remark. A majority of the subjects would impose formal criminal liability 
in these cases ( 70 percent in the rape arrest; 77 percent in the property destruction arrest) . As we 
have noted in previous studies, "liability but no punishment" is a common response of our sub­
jects in those cases in which the person's actual conduct is disapproved of but the person is not 
seen as meriting the punishment of a prison term. 
9. Under the Code, citizens are rarely authorized to use deadly force for law enforcement pur­
poses [MPC § 3.07(2)(b) ] . 
10. The Code determines the amount of force permitted according to the seriousness of the 
underlying offense in only one respect: Deadly force is authorized for arrest when used by a law 
enforcement officer, or at h is or her direction, for a felony involving the use of deadly force but 
not for other offenses [ MPC § 3 .07(2 ) (b) ] .  
1 1 . While most subjects would not impose punishment in  three of  the four scenarios where an 
innocent person is injured or killed, a majority would impose liability. The common use of this 
"liability but no punishment" option suggests other reforms, which are discussed in Chapter 7. 
CHAPTER 4 
1 .  The six base scenarios were given to the respondents in random order. The four variations 
of each scenario were given together, in reverse order of culpability level ( faultlessness, negli­
gence, recklessness, and then knowledge) .  Methodologically, it would have been better, though 
logistically more difficult, to randomize the order of the variations as well. 
2. See the general discussion of the development of the grading scale in Chapter 1. The Model 
Penal Code has fewer grades than most codes. 
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3. There remains a statistically significant difference, however, among each value within the 
group. 
4. One such offense is found in Model Penal Code § 220.2( 1 ) .  Causing a catastrophe pur­
posely or knowingly is graded higher than causing it recklessly. 
5. Before this can effectively be done, however, the problem of conflicting functions--an­
nouncing ex-ante rules of conduct and adjudicating ex post individual violations of the rules­
must be resolved. If it is not resolved, the subjects' desire to impose liability to reaffirm the rules 
of conduct can contaminate the definition of minimum culpability elements. We will return to 
this topic in our final discussion in Chapter 7. 
6. 125 N.H. 57, 480 A. 2d 870 ( 1984) .  
7 .  Recall the core story, which involves an individual giving the other a set of car keys. We at­
tempt to make that act seem either purposeful or knowing. Intuitively, it is difficult to cause 
people to see a person giving another car keys as purposefully causing the other to take them and 
drive. A better case of purposefulness might involve him giving the keys deliberately to the other 
and urging him to use them-but that would have "unstandardized" our core scenario. Occa­
sionally we pay the price, in terms of the subjects' perceptions of the cases, for standardization. 
8. See the previous footnote. The consequence of death seems causally distant and problem­
atic enough from the accomplice's act so that it was difficult for our subjects to perceive that act 
as completely knowing. 
9. However-and interestingly-notice in column d of Table 4.6, that, on average, around 50 
percent of our respondents would assign the now familiar "liability but no punishment" verdict 
in these four cases. Again, they use this particular verdict, which condemns conduct but does not 
incarcerate individuals, for the person who recklessly leaves car keys around for a drunken friend 
to take (case 6). 
10. One of us has suggested in another work that a prosecutor might argue that the "conduct 
constituting the offense" is the conduct of becoming intoxicated, rather than the conduct more 
immediately causing the death. This would allow the law to take into account a person's culpa­
bility as to the offense at this earlier time, but this approach has some limitations. Most notably, 
it gives the prosecutor a greater burden than he or she otherwise would have in establishing an 
adequate causal connection between the conduct constituting the offense (getting intoxicated) 
and the resulting death. See, generally, Robinson ( 1 985). 
1 1 . More generally, in future research it would be beneficial to investigate the differential ef­
fects of degree of risk on assigned liability. 
12. It would have been useful to include scenarios of faultlessness as to becoming intoxicated 
to confirm that liability would not have been imposed by our respondents in such a case. It may 
be difficult, however, to construct believable scenarios of a person who is purposeful or reckless 
as to killing but faultless as to becoming intoxicated. In further research it also would be useful 
to develop other scenarios of negligence with respect to becoming intoxicated in which the indi­
vidual was not in an angry and hostile emotional state-to see to what degree the conjunction of 
those two factors led to the judgments we see here. 
13.  The practical difficulty with this approach may be in the increased burden in establishing 
the causal connection between this conduct in becoming intoxicated and the subsequent death. 
This could be solved with a rebuttable evidentiary presumption but such a presumption might 
constitute a constitutionally impermissible shift of the burden of persuasion under Wilbur v. 
Mullaney, 42 1 U.S. 684 ( 1975). 
14. Our study asked subjects whether a particular characteristic would increase or decrease 
the extent of liability that they would impose on the person. In reality, the individualizing of the 
reasonable-person standard would simply make it more or less likely that the person would be 
held negligent; it would not, under current doctrine, serve to raise or lower liability. It seems rea­
sonable to assume, however, that the subjects' liability responses would take account of the same 
factors that informed their negligence judgments. 
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1 5. Recall that the stories that were used across the three scenarios of negligence differed. So, 
for instance, coming from a cultural background that was likely to create lack of knowledge 
about the risk (characteristic 9) might not make a difference to subjects in the case of commis­
sion, or we might not have created a set of specific circumstances that seemed to our subjects to 
be a valid case of lack of knowledge. 
CHAPTER S 
1 .  The general mistake excuses also are of this category but their excusing conditions operate 
in a different way. See, generally, Robinson ( 1982 ) .  
2 .  The first two are commonly recognized [e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.04( 3)  ] .  The third rarely 
is recognized as a defense-we know only of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-4(c) ( 3)-but has much sup­
port in the legal literature. 
3. That the respondents were not able to accurately reproduce the legal language of the de­
fense is not surprising. However, the study authors claimed more-that the respondents were 
not able to identify the elements of insanity that the legal system deems relevant. 
4. This does not mean, however, that the two kinds of defenses for mental illness-mental ill­
ness negating a culpability element and general insanity-are mutually exclusive. Some forms of 
mental illness, especially severe cognitive dysfunctions, may provide either kind of defense. See, 
generally, Robinson ( 1984) .  
5. McNaughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 7 18, 722 ( 1843). 
6. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 ( 1 887). 
7. 1 8  U.S. Code § 1 7. For a description of which states have adopted which formulation, see 
Robinson ( 1984), § 1 73 (a) nn. 1-5. 
8.  See Robinson ( 1 984) at n. 5. ( Idaho, Montana, and Utah have abolished their insanity de­
fense; Connecticut has reached essentially the same result through other means.) 
9. For the record, here is what we attempted. We focused the details of the case description on 
either the cognitive or the control dysfunction, describing in  the first case what we thought 
would be a high degree of dysfunction and in the second case, a low degree of dysfunction. Since, 
for instance, the cognitive-dysfunction case description left the control dysfunction unspecified 
(and vice versa), we thought that would cause the omitted dysfunction to be perceived as low. 
That would have created cases of high and low cognitive dysfunction, with the control dysfunc­
tion low, and cases of high and low control dysfunction, with the cognitive dysfunction low. 
1 0. Strictly speaking, this is not completely matched to the ways in which the civil system 
deals with mental illness, since it is not likely to specify a term of commitment, but rather a com­
mitment until either something like a cure has been achieved or the individual is no longer dan­
gerous to others. To choose between a civil term of commitment of indeterminant length (until 
some particular end state has been achieved) versus a criminal term of fixed duration is a diffi­
cult task. Those making the choice, among other things, need to have a position on the success of 
the psychiatric system in producing the cure and knowing when it is likely to be produced. 
These issues will need to be dealt with in future research; our concern in this set of studies is 
largely with the criminal j ustice system and the liabilities that it assigns. 
1 1 . Recall that the respondents did not have the option of "incapacitation until cured or 
nondangerous." 
1 2. An example may clarify why this is important. It might well be that the respondents' an­
swer patterns showed a perfect correlation between a legal and common language version of a 
statement. Still, one would not want to treat them as equivalent if, on the average, the respon­
dents disagreed that the test specified in the legal version of the statement was met and the test 
specified in the common language version was not met, and this possibility is not ruled out by 
the perfect correlation. 
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1 3. Much of the current debate about the appropriate age of transition from the juvenile to 
the adult criminal justice system centers around these ages. 
1 4. They were also told that the person with the criminal record was looking to get back into 
the drug business. This certainly strengthened the respondents' perception that the person was 
predisposed to the criminal act, but in retrospect it would have been better to let those percep­
tions be affected by prior convictions alone in order to achieve a dearer determination of the ex­
tent to which prior convictions, without additional information, signify predisposition to re­
spondents. 
1 5. In order to maintain the inducements as constant, in the agent condition, the agent is ac­
tually a prior acquaintance of the entrapped person, who saved the person's life when they were 
in the Navy together. In the buddy condition, the inducer is the same acquaintance-but is not 
an agent of the police. 
CHAPTER 6 
1 .  This does not extend after a time when the couple are no longer living together as husband 
and wife [MPC § 2 1 3.6(2 ) ] .  
2 .  Rape and gross sexual imposition are offenses only where the victim is a female [MPC § 
2 1 3. 1 ( 1 )  and (2) ) .  This is also true of statutory rape [ MPC § 21 3.3( 1 ) ] .  
3 .  However, from another perspective, it is worth noting that the act o f  inviting another per­
son into one's home is perceived by some as moving toward consenting to sexual intercourse. 
Here, one hears an echo of the familiar refrain, "she should have known better than to . .. :' 
4. Despite the fact that the Code uses "deviate" intercourse as an aggravation for forcible rape, 
it does decriminalize "deviate" intercourse between consenting adults [MPC § 2 1 3.2, p. 2 
( 1980) ] .  
5 .  Unlike most o f  the studies, the sexual offenses study was not given through the subject 
pool, which assured relatively diverse subjects. Instead, most of the subjects were of two profes­
sional groups, psychologists/social workers and librarians. Minor differences were found be­
tween the responses of social worker/psychologists and non-social-worker subjects ( 1 6  social 
workers, 23 non-social-workers). Social workers gave statistically significantly lower liability 
than non-social-workers for the two forcible intercourse scenarios in which the heterosexual ag­
gressor and victim were married or living together. 
6. Because the subject matter suggested that males and females might give different re­
sponses, the data also was analyzed for such differences. No statistically significant difference was 
detected between the responses of male and female subjects ( 1 2  men, 27 women). See also foot­
note 5.  
7. See, e.g., MPC §§ 2 1 0.2( l ) (a), 2 1 0.3( l ) (a), and 2 10.4( 1 ) .  
8 .  See, e.g., MPC § 2.06(3)(a) ( ii) and (4) . 
9. Most jurisdictions also have a corresponding misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, which 
treats all killings during a misdemeanor as manslaughter, without regard for the person's culpa­
bility as to causing the death. 
1 0. See, e.g., Calif. Penal Code § 189 (West 1994); 1 8  Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2502(b) (Purdon 1994); 
N.Y. Penal Law § 1 25.25(3) (McKinney 1 994) .  
1 1 . See, e.g., 1 8  Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2502(b); N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(3) .  
1 2. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A. 2d 71 1 ( 1 979).  
13 .  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 1 1 7 A. 2d 204 ( 1 955).  
14. See, e.g., Fletcher ( 1 980) and Pirsig ( 1963). 
1 5. Or is it? In retrospect, it strikes us that the control scenarios in this study are somewhat 
more distant from the experimental scenarios than they were in other studies. Specifically, it 
strikes us that the manslaughter liability score is somewhat higher than we would expect and 
that this may be because it involved a person deliberately shooting into a house in which he 
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knew other people were partying, a case in which the person's action seems likely to cause a 
death. The reader should keep in mind that this may create an artificially high reference point for 
manslaughter. 
16. Indeed, a jury might conclude that, given the obvious potential for starting a gunfight, 
such an armed robber is reckless as to causing death (i.e., he must have been aware of a substan­
tial risk that his conduct could cause a death) .  If that were the case, the felony-murder rule 
would be unnecessary here; normal homicide grading would be adequate to impose liability 
equal to or in excess of that imposed by the subjects. However, the fact that most subjects per­
ceive the armed robber as being only negligent, not reckless, as to causing death in the negli­
gence scenarios (all of which involve armed robbery) suggests that juries would not routinely 
find felons reckless as to causing death from the fact of the armed robbery alone. 
1 7. This may reflect the subjects' tendency to vary liability according to the strength of the 
causal connection. See the causation study (Study 17)  discussed later in this chapter. 
18.  This occurs where the person does not have the relatively high culpable state of mind re­
quired for attempt liability. 
1 9. See American Law Institute Floor Debate on MPC § 2.03(1 )(a), 1 962 ALI Proceedings, 
pp. 77-79 and 1 35-1 39. 
20. Requiring that a cause be "a substantial factor in causing a result" suggests that other fac­
tors may contribute to and be necessary for the result. Thus, the "substantial factor" need not be 
sufficient by itself to cause the result. 
2 1 .  See MPC § 2.03( 1 ) (a). 
22. See discussion of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines in Chapter 2, note 
1 1  (Study 3, "Objective Requirements of Complicity").  
23.  The lower liability assigned by the respondents in the traffic accident scenario (8.03, or 15  
years) suggests this interpretation, but a better design would have been to include for compari­
son a scenario with a traffic accident involving the ambulance on the way to the hospital for the 
victim's original treatment. In the four cases of complex causation, although occasionally a sta­
tistically significant difference in liability assignment appears, the differences are not of great 
magnitude. 
24. Varying the time interval also provides an interesting test of the theory that pure consecu­
tive sentences for multiple offenses are inappropriate, because the first offense already punishes 
the offender's demonstrated willingness to break the law and therefore need not be taken into 
account in determining the punishment for the second offense. As the offenses become further 
separated by time, it becomes more clear that they are not part of a single episode during which 
the person never stopped to fully contemplate his past lawbreaking, increasing the likelihood 
that the individual is seen as having a criminal character, thereby in turn strengthening the argu­
ment for consecutive sentences. 
25. In passing, we note an interesting apparent contradiction. This "multiple-offense dis­
count" tends to be applied only when a person is sentenced for all offenses at the same time; an 
offense for which the person has been previously sentenced does not act to reduce a sentence on 
a subsequent conviction-it increases it. The latter pattern is instantiated in the practice of giv­
ing heavier sentences for "habitual offenders." In most jurisdictions, it is appropriate to give a 
harsher sentence for an offense committed a second time; in some jurisdictions, a person who 
has committed three or more offenses is given a sentence of considerably greater length, as a ha­
bitual offender. The notion here is probably that the first, more lenient sentence did not fulfill its 
purpose of  deterring the offender and thus a harsher sentence is appropriate and, relatedly, that 
a habitual offender has provided sufficient evidence that he or she needs to be locked away to 
protect others. Sentencing considerations also may rest upon a notion that to violate society's 
rules--once specifically warned and previously punished-is to show a disregard for the author­
ity of such rules so as to deserve a greater punishment. Elucidating these matters will require fu­
ture research; we did not address them in this study. 
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26. Notice that, in making the assault cases plausible, we made them connected by taking 
place in the same workplace, with the assaulter seeking out different co-workers and hitting 
them in turn. The thief moves from gas station to gas station, and so the respondents were likely 
to perceive that more time intervened between the incidents of theft than of assault. Future re­
search will be needed to sort out the effects of this difference on liability ratings. 
27. Obviously, a person who committed a theft or assault two weeks or two years ago has 
committed an offense "in the past." If our subjects responded to this reading of the question, 
they would certainly agree that this person had committed past offenses. We were instead inter­
ested in whether our respondents thought that the person had committed similar actions in the 
past that had not been discovered, and we worded the question to make this clear. 
28. The United States Sentencing Commission guidelines recognize forty-three "offense 
levels" [USSC Guidelines Manual, Ch. 5, Pt. A ( 1994) ] .  
29. The Model Penal Code recognizes three degrees of felonies and two other classifications­
misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors. A sixth classification, violations, are judged too trivial 
or too absent of culpability to be crimes ( MPC §§ 1 .04 and 6.0 1 ). 
CHAPTER 7 
l. See Model Penal Code § 5.05 ( 1 ) .  The one exception is that an unsuccessful attempt to com­
mit a first-degree felony, such as murder, is graded as a second-degree felony. 
2. See the objective requirements for attempt case, Study 1 (6. 1 2  for completed theft versus a 
maximum of 5.35 for an unsuccessful attempted theft); see also the causation case, Study 1 7  
(9.89 for murder versus 7.25 for an unsuccessful attempted murder). 
3. Compare Mansfield ( 1 964) with Schulhofer ( 1974). 
4. See, e.g., the case of a killing perpetrated during the course of a robbery ( 1 0. 1 1  for the prin­
cipal versus 9.56 for the accomplice, where both are purposeful or knowing as to the killing; 8. 78 
for the principal versus 7.3 1 for the accomplice, where both are negligent as to the killing); or 
the causality case (9.89 for the principal versus 8.89 for the accomplice, in a case of murder; 7.25 
for the principal versus 6.67 for the accomplice, in a case of attempted murder) .  
5 .  See the omission liability case (Study 4) ,  specifically the contrasts between the liabilities as­
signed the person who created the danger to the victim and the liabilities assigned the person 
who fails to rescue the victim. 
6. However, this is possible in a sophisticated sentencing system. For examples of how a factor 
now treated as a minimum requirement might be drafted to alter liability and punishment by 
degrees, see Robinson ( 1987) .  
7 .  If  this solution were introduced, would there be a continuing need for sentencing guide­
lines? Perhaps. Those who establish the guidelines could do so with the purpose of refining the 
liability judgment rather than with the purpose (now served) of essentially making the judg­
ment. Under the current system, the elaborate adjudication process serves primarily to deter­
mine whether there will or will not be liability. Why would it not be preferable for the system to 
do more-to make a binding judgment setting the approximate degree of the person's punish­
ment? 
8. Subjects not only did this implicitly, where they selected a sentence of one day [or two 
weeks ] ,  but commonly did it explicitly by selecting the "liability but no punishment" ( 0) option. 
9. It would be possible to attempt to salvage the rationality of this verdict within deterrence 
theory by suggesting that the individual found "guilty" but not given a jail term will be punished 
by informal societal mechanisms-such as loss of prestige or job. Since the application of these 
informal sanctions will vary wildly as a result of a good many forces having nothing to do with 
the severity of the crime, this rescue seems implausible to us. 
10. See, generally, Robinson ( 1990) .  
1 1 . Green's report o f  this phenomenon i s  contained i n  chapter 8 o f  his book. 
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1 2 .  It is, of course, difficult to estimate how often this happens. From a recent (September 29, 
199 1 )  20-20 broadcast on women in prison for killing abusive and battering spouses, one 
emerges with the strong impression that some of these women have been convicted and sent to 
prison for an offense that is essentially identical to that committed by other women who were 
not convicted. 
1 3. For a general discussion of how sentencing systems might be constructed to better capture 
the subtleties of community views, see Robinson ( 1987). 
1 4. See, generally, Robinson, "Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?" ( 1994). 
APPENDIX A 
1 .  As the calculating reader will have noticed, adding further factors or deciding to sample 
more levels of a factor quickly leads to the generation of a remarkably large number of cases­
more cases than one can expect a respondent to rate without error-inducing boredom or more 
obvious signs of mutiny. When the logic of the situation requires a large number of cases, the 
factorial survey experts simply sample among the cases and give a subset of cases to each respon­
dent. They have developed procedures that still enable them to estimate the overall population 
response and the differences between the responding individuals. 
2. In the between-subjects design, this problem is solved by randomly assigning subjects to 
conditions, with the thought that some subjects who give low sentences will end up in both con­
ditions, as will subjects who give high sentences, and these differences will cancel each other out 
as the data are aggregated. 
3. Throughout Chapters 2 through 6 we have discussed some of the difficulties within indi­
vidual studies. As we have said before, we intend our studies to demonstrate the need for larger 
social science research projects than the pilot projects undertaken in this work. 
4. Those versed in statistics will know that this is true only if the variable in question is nor­
mally distributed. By and large our distributions are normal, and the exceptions to this rule have 
been duly noted in the discussion. 
5. This was the case for about 23 of the total set of 1 71 scenarios. 
6. This was the case for 56 of the 1 7 1  scenarios. 
7. Many of the liability distributions were not normal, however. For example, where a factor 
in the scenario leads some subjects to give a complete defense but not others, the resulting distri­
bution is likely to be bimodal, with responses grouped at extreme ends of the penalty scale if the 
offense at issue is a serious one. The large resulting standard deviation might suggest a wide 
range of disagreements when, in fact, the subjects disagreed only on a single issue-the propri­
ety of a defense-and otherwise have significant unanimity within each of the two tested groups. 
The effect is due in part to subjects coinciding with the law in its practice of treating most issues 
as discontinuous functions. 
In fact, rarely was the standard deviation so large as to suggest bimodality. The mean stan­
dard deviation of all scenarios in all studies is 2.25. When the scenarios containing "no liability" 
responses are omitted, the mean standard deviation drops to 1 .66 (N = 56). When all scenarios 
containing either "no liability" or "liability but no punishment" are omitted, the mean standard 
deviation drops to 1 .39 (N 33) .  
8. Some of these no doubt are explained by the severe bimodal distribution caused by a per­
son's failure to get a defense to a serious offense, as discussed in note 7. A particularly useful 
study for future research might be an investigation of the sources of agreement and disagree­
ment among the community. On what kinds of issues are there greater shared intuitive notions? 
On which are there less-shared notions? A profitable study could be done even using existing 
data. 
9. Florida Art. XI, § 1 ;  Illinois Art. XIV, § 2; New Jersey Art. IX, § 1 .  [Other requirements in­
dude two-thirds (California Art. XVIII, § 1 )  or a majority (New York Art. XIX, § 1 ) . ]  
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10. The troublesome cases, of course, are those where the rule is by no means neutral in its 
effect but falls more heavily in its application upon one group than upon another, especially if 
that group is the minority that opposes the rule. Some would say that all rules are of this nature; 
thus, the need to avoid the tyranny of the majority that would come with relying upon commu­
nity views. The goal of this book is not to argue that majority views should be followed at the 
expense of minorities who would be injured by the rule. It is, rather, to argue that the majority 
view should be followed if it is at the expense of crime control measures. The ignored minority 
here is likely to be academics and criminal justice professionals who would give priority to crime 
control over individual justice. That choice, or balance, is one that is more appropriately deter­
mined by majority vote. 
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Praise for 
JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME 
"Through a wide-ranging study that is solidly grounded in an 
impressive knowledge of current legal doctrine, Robinson and 
Darley bring the area of "gap" studies, which examines the dis­
crepancy between law in theory and law in action, to a new 
and more sophisticated level. . . .  The rich source of data and its 
direct relevance to a wide variety of legal questions suggest 
that this volume will become a central reference in future dis­
cussions of public views about the law." 
-Tom Tyler 
University of California at Berkeley 
"Robinson and Darley creatively investigate whether criminal 
law's various doctrines of liability and blame are congruent 
with the attitudes of ordinary people and suggest the proper 
legal response to inconsistency. Justice, Liability, and Blame is 
must reading for those concerned with the integrity and effi­
cacy of the criminal law." 
-Stephen J. Morse 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
"This book is clearly written and is an important event in the 
development of effective collaboration between lawyers and 
psychologists ."  
-Geoffrey Stephenson 
author of The Psychology of Criminal Justice 
University of Kent at Canterbury 
